Nelson: Britannia's God of War

by Andrew Lambert

  While his tactical and fleet-command skills were outstanding, it was at the highest level of strategic and political direction that Hood proved his greatness. His analytical approach to war, weighing up the options open to the enemy, provided a solid base for a truly remarkable confidence in his own judgement. Offered the keys to Toulon in 1793, he immediately seized an opportunity that would have terrified his contemporaries: he read the situation clearly, weighed up the options and took a wise decision. Despite the ultimate failure of the operation, it was the right move: it broke the strength of the French fleet more severely than the actions of Howe and Bridport combined, because it ruined the arsenal and workforce60 as well as the ships, destroying the essential bond of trust between the Toulonese and the government in Paris.61 Throughout the 1793–4 Mediterranean campaign, he worked tirelessly to fulfil his instructions to impress upon the local states ‘the strength and power of Great Britain’,62 promote the national interest, cripple the French fleet, and exploit opportunities. His capture of Corsica was a wonderful demonstration of talent at all levels of war.

  Hood’s leadership style was direct. His concern for drill, exercise and discussion with his subordinates was noteworthy, providing a model for his most famous protégé.63 His plans were carefully explained, and he used frigates to convey his orders to the battle-line. Even in defeat, at Toulon, Hood never lost his optimism, or his ability to think through the problems. And he was equally effective in using intelligence and other assets to further his aims. Above all, he never wasted time, constantly trying to exploit the fleeting chance of victory, and to press on the campaign while the enemy was off balance. Nelson took this to heart, valuing time and timing among the greatest of all assets.

  Nor were Hood’s supreme talents unknown to the wider public. As an Irish peer, he was elected MP for Westminster alongside (though in opposition to) Charles James Fox; he held high office as First Naval Lord at the Admiralty and was widely consulted on naval questions after his dismissal from the Mediterranean. When Hood joined Pitt’s party in 1783 Nelson, too, became a Pitt partisan.64

  When Nelson returned to sea in 1793, having been out of favour with Hood, and everyone else in high office, for half a decade, he was desperate to prove himself. Though Hood consistently ignored Nelson’s deeds in his correspondence and dispatches, implying that he was not particularly impressed, his open, free and encouraging conversation brought the two men ever closer as the campaign in Corsica kept them ashore, fighting thick-skulled redcoats as well as the enemy. Nelson valued the praise of Lord Hood above all other currency, just as his followers would esteem his own generosity half a decade later. The confidence he derived from Hood’s praise allowed him to relax and reflect on his profession, rather than desperately seeking some sterile glory in battle.

  Nelson did not possess the supreme egotism of which he is often accused: rather, he consciously built his methods and style on the best models and consistently sought the approval of his seniors. His anxiety to have his deeds recorded was part of this process, reflecting his fundamental and recurring insecurity. This trait drove him to excel, to take risks, and publicise his successes. In the same vein every setback was, to his mind, a disaster – the end of his career. He needed to know that his actions were approved, and only then could he relax. He freely acknowledged his need for praise, public applause and the outward show of glory: he lived his life for public service, and public acclaim. To this end he risked his life, because the spirit of the age required him to be personally brave.

  Notes – CHAPTER V

  1 Nelson to Wife 1.9.1794; Naish pp. 121–2

  2 Nelson to Wife 12.9.1794; Naish pp. 122–3

  3 Nelson to Suckling 20.9.1794; Nicolas I p. 485

  4 Nelson to Hood 23.9.1794; Nicolas I p. 486. Nelson to Wife 27.9.1794; Naish pp. 124–5. See Nelson to Suckling 20.9.1794; Nicolas I p. 486 for a more favourable view. A week was all it took to disabuse him of his optimism.

  5 Nelson to Hood 2.10.1794 and Hood to Nelson 1.12.1794; Nicolas I pp. 487–8

  6 Lambert, A. D. ‘Admiral Lord Hotham, Command and Reputation in the Age of Nelson’, in Lefevre, P. and Harding, R. eds. Contemporaries of Nelson. 2004

  7 Nelson to Wife 10.10.1794 and continuation on 12.10; Naish pp. 125–6

  8 Nelson to Wife 24.10.1794; Naish pp. 185–6

  9 Nelson to Locker 10.10.1794; Nicolas I p. 490.

  10 Nelson to Elliot 10.11.1794 and end.; Nicolas I pp. 497–8

  11 Nelson to Clarence 19.1.1795; Nicolas II pp. 1–2

  12 Nelson to Clarence 11.1794; Nelson to Suckling 28.11.1794; Nicolas pp. 50I–3

  13 Nelson to Wife 12 and 28.11.1794; Naish pp. 187–9

  14 Nelson to Wife 12.11.1794; Naish p. 187

  15 Nelson to Wife 23.1.1795; Naish p. 193

  16 Nelson to Wife 31.1.1795; Naish pp. 194–5. Pocock, T. Horatio Nelson, pp. 124–5. Vincent pp. 139–41.

  17 Nelson to Wife 17.1.1795; Naish p. 192

  18 Nelson to Wife 23.1.1795; Naish p. 193

  19 Nelson to Wife 23–24.1.795; Naish p. 193

  20 Nelson to Wife 31.1.1795; Naish pp. 194–5

  21 Nelson to Wife 7.6.1795; Naish pp. 210–1

  22 Nelson to Wife 25.2.1795; Naish p. 197

  23 Nelson to Wife 2, 6 and 10.3.1795; Naish pp. 197–9

  24 Nelson to Clarence 24.4.1795; Nicolas II p. 31

  25 Nelson to Clarence 15.3.1795, Nelson to Locker 21.3.1795; Nicolas II pp. 19–22

  26 Nelson to Suckling 22.3.1795; Nicolas II pp. 22–3. Nelson to Wife 23.3. and 28.3.1795; Naish pp. 201–3.

  27 Nelson to Wife 1.4.1795; Naish pp. 203–5

  28 Nelson to Locker 4.5.1795; Nicolas II pp. 34–6

  29 Nelson to Elliot 12.4.1795; Naish pp. 405–6. Nelson to Elliot 16.4.1795 and Nelson to Clarence 16.4.1795; Nicolas II pp. 30–1

  30 Nelson to Wife 7.5.1795; Naish p. 208

  31 Nelson to Suckling 24.4.1795; Nicolas II p. 33. Nelson to Wife 28.4.1795; Naish pp. 207–8.

  32 Nelson to Wife 22 and 29.5.1795; Naish pp. 209–10

  33 Nelson to Wife 7.6.1795; Naish pp. 210–11. Nelson to Suckling 7.5.1795; Nelson to William Nelson 8.6.1795; Nicolas II pp. 40–2

  34 Nelson to Wife 15.6.1795; Naish pp. 211–12

  35 Nelson to Locker 18.6.1795; Nicolas II pp. 43–4

  36 Nelson to Wife 1.7.1795; Naish p. 214

  37 Syrett, D. and DiNardo, R. eds. The Commissioned Sea Officers of the Royal Navy; 1660–1815. London Navy Records Society, 1994, p. 6.

  38 Nelson to Locker 8.7.1795, Nelson to Clarence 15.7.1795; Nicolas II pp. 49–52. Nelson to Wife 9–14.7.1795; Naish pp. 215–16

  39 Nelson to Drake 18.7.1795; and Nelson to Hotham 22.7.1795; Nicolas II PP. 53–4, 57–9. Nelson to Wife 18.7.1795; Naish pp. 216–17

  40 Nelson to Spencer 19.7.1795, Spencer to Hood 27.3.1795; Nicolas II pp. 56–7

  41 Nelson to Wife 2.8.1795; Naish pp. 218–19

  42 Nelson to Wife 24.7.1795; Naish pp. 217–18

  43 Nelson to William Nelson 29.7.1795; Nicolas II pp. 63–4

  44 Nelson to Drake 6.8. to Cockburn 8.8. and Elliot 13.8.1795; Nicolas II pp. 66–9

  45 Nelson to Locker 19.8.1795; Nicolas II pp. 69–71

  46 Nelson to Hotham 27 and 31.8.1795; Nicolas II pp. 73–7

  47 Nelson to Wife 1, 15.9.1795, Hotham to Nelson 4.9.1795, Nelson to Hotham 20.9.1795; Naish p. 221–2, 236, 246–7. Nelson to De Vins 9 and 17.9.1795, to Drake 9 and 18.9.1795, to Hotham 17.9.1795; Nicolas II 79–86

  48 Nelson to Wife 21.9.1795; Naish pp. 222–3. Nelson to Elliot 24.9.1795; Nicolas II pp. 87–9.

  49 Nelson to Neapolitan Commander 1.10.1795; Nicolas II pp. 90–1

  50 Nelson to Suckling 27.10.1795; Nicolas II pp. 92–3

  51 Nelson to Wife 2.11.1795; Naish pp. 225–6

  52 Nelson to Wife 13.11.1795; Naish pp. 227–8. Nelson to De Vins 7.11. to Drake 12.11. and to Admiralty 13.11.1795; Nicolas II pp. 95–7

  53 Nelson 6.11.179 5; Nicolas I
I p. 94

  54 Nelson to Drake 27.11.1795. Nelson to Elliot 4.12.1795; Nicolas II pp. 108–9, 112–4. Nelson to Hyde Parker 2.12.1795; Naish pp. 251–2

  55 Nelson to Wife 2.12.1795; Naish pp. 228–30

  56 Nelson to Jervis 21.12.179 5; Nicolas II pp. 12.0–1. Vado Bay Journal; Naish pp. 241–5

  57 Nelson to Wife 18 &25.12.1795; Naish pp. 230–3

  58 See Nelson’s speech to the House of Lords on 30.10.1801, Nicolas IV p. 5 20.

  59 Hood, The Admirals Hood is the only full length treatment, although Hood shares the book with his younger brother Alexander, Lord Bridport, and his cousins Alexander, and Samuel, one of the Nile captains. Hannay, ed. Letters Written by Sir Samuel Hood (Viscount Hood) in 1781–2–3. London Navy Records Society 1895 offers a valuable record of the Admiral when Nelson joined his school. Duffy, M., ‘Samuel Hood, First Viscount Hood 1724–1816’, in LeFevre, P. and Harding, R., Precursors of Nelson; British Admirals of the Eighteenth Century, London, 2000, pp. 249–78, is the latest treatment.

  60 Crook, M. Toulon in War and Revolution, pp. 144–60

  61 Rose, Lord Hood and the Defence of Toulon.

  62 Duffy, p. 268

  63 Duffy, p. 259

  64 Nelson to William. Nelson 31.1.1783; Nicolas I p. 98

  A champion of order: Admiral Sir John Jervis

  CHAPTER VI

  Nelson and Jervis, Partners in War 1796

  Admiral Sir John Jervis took command of the Mediterranean fleet in early 1796. He was a hard-bitten veteran, with an awesome reputation for upholding discipline. He was also a shrewd judge of men and methods with a passion for sound organisation. With his political patron Lord Shelburne unlikely to return to the front rank of political life, he would have to rely on merit to make his career.1 A man of unbending principle, Jervis would defend his convictions against his King, the Prime Minister and the Admiralty with equal determination. Little wonder he was the last choice for the Mediterranean. Having secured a fortune in prize money during his recent West Indian command, and survived an attack on his handling of local prize courts, further brushes with avarice, never far from an eighteenth-century naval career, could be studiously avoided. His ruthless campaign against peculation and fraud created the Victorian naval morality that considered profit vulgar. However, this was not the morality of his own age.

  Jervis was not enamoured of the chaos he inherited from Hotham: the majority of his senior officers, legacies from Hood’s regime, struck him as irresolute and inadequate. His views hardened when Rear Admiral Robert Man made a serious error of judgement, which in a rare moment of generosity Jervis attributed to a nervous breakdown. He considered few admirals on the list fit for their rank, preferring to use his chosen captains, citing Nelson as the example.2 The tendency for officers to go home alleging ‘health’ or private business, a tendency that the absentee Lord Hood could hardly condemn, struck him as amateurish weakness. His insistence on a proper medical report and attempts to close ‘unofficial’ channels of communication with the Admiralty forced every commissioned officer to chose between hard service and half-pay.3 Nor were the seamen exempt from his iron will. In return for improved food and conditions Jervis demanded absolute obedience. He replaced officers who allowed their men to be ‘incessantly drunk’ and who generally relaxed discipline.4 After he had replaced the captain of the Marlborough, no officer would dare contend that he could not discipline his crew, or hesitate to hang the mutinous. Nelson shared his abhorrence of drunkenness, both in the service and in his family, where young Suckling Nelson was hurrying his way to the grave by the bottleful.5

  Within weeks Nelson, ever attuned to the mood of the day, realised that this was not a man he could ask for leave. Instead he expressed a desire to stay in the theatre after the next promotion, when he would become a junior admiral. Claiming he would not regret the loss of a lucrative marine colonelcy impressed the new admiral as much as his obvious talent and dedication. Nelson’s views of other officers began to follow Jervis’s dicta, notably on the feeble conduct of Hotham, whom Jervis termed a ‘crapule’. These opinions were, in turn, largely based on discussions with Nelson.

  Seeking resolute professional commanders for his detached ships and squadrons, Jervis condemned the great bulk of those on the list. He urged Lord Spencer to hasten the promotion of Nelson, whom he had elevated to Commodore pro tem, and lamented the lowly situation of Captain Troubridge. Later he demanded the removal of Rear Admiral Waldegrave.6 Throughout this period Nelson continued to garner praise, and established his claim to command the detached squadron in 1798. Before then, he would also have occasion to demonstrate his unique tactical acumen under the stern gaze of ‘Old Jarvie’, who affected to be the hardest man in the service.

  Beneath his grim public persona, however, Jervis hid a sensitive soul. Off duty, he liked nothing better than playing practical jokes on junior officers and gossiping with other men’s wives, although that was as far as he thought such things should go. That others were less resolute was a matter to be regretted and countered. In 1796 he had to send several lieutenants home, their venereal complaints too far advanced for shipboard treatment, ruined by the dissolute habits of Leghorn. Whether this was the reason he asked Emma Hamilton to keep Nelson away from the local belles of Naples is not clear, but the value of keeping the fleet permanently at sea, away from such temptation, was clear.

  Four years as Commander in Chief Mediterranean was a terrible burden to place on any man, particularly one as dedicated and courageous as Jervis. Under his leadership the easy-going fleet that Hood had created, and which only he could lead, was reformed. New ships and men, drilled into professional fighting machines by constant exercise, transformed his small fleet into the most effective fighting force on the planet. Jervis’s fleet would set the world an example of ‘skill, discipline, and subordination’ – it had never lacked the first quality, but the two latter were entirely absent when he arrived.7 Even before he had the chance to prove his point, he knew the Spanish would be ‘cut to pieces’ by his fleet making ‘its way through them in every direction’.8 When the chance for glory came he was heavily outnumbered. But he not only won the battle, but also, having destroyed the enemy’s will to fight, imposed a crippling close blockade, a very public humiliation for the proud Spanish admirals to endure.

  These were the methods of a new age, the age of total war. With the mass armies of revolutionary France rampaging across Europe, only a revitalised fleet could resist the threat of a pan-European fleet – French, Dutch, Spanish and more. This ‘Mediterranean Fleet’ discipline was the terror of the service, and its salvation. Nelson was at one with him, and was accordingly sent to restore order on that ‘abomination’, the newly arrived Theseus.9 Nelson admired Jervis’s concern to impose sound, thoughtful administration, to preserve the health and welfare of his men, select and reward the dedicated professional officers, and keep his ships efficient and prepared for long cruises at any moment. The system Jervis developed – basing his fleet at isolated anchorages, far from the temptations of port and the endless excuses for delay to be found in dockyards – would be vital between 1803 and 1805. The fact that they saw eye to eye on this point removed any lingering doubts Jervis may have harboured about Nelson’s fitness for a fleet command.10 The point would be proved during the brief Baltic command of 1801, when Nelson would employ the same administrative and organisational style as Jervis: even his standing orders were largely based on those Jervis had issued, copies of which he kept as a handy reference.11

  The two men possessed a complementarity that is perhaps unique in naval history. Jervis moulded fleets, reorganised strategy, overhauled administration and imposed his will on the enemy at the highest level. His root-and-branch reform of the Navy broke the back of an eighteenth-century attitude that tolerated abuses, corruption and incompetence as an inevitable consequence of the political and economic system.12 Yet for all his solid professional merit, strategic grasp and understanding, Jervis lacked the int
uitive, creative spark that could transcend the routine, the insight and judgement to unhinge the enemy, the coup d’oeil to spot the flaw in their dispositions and the absolute self-confidence to disobey a direct order. He found the qualities that he lacked in Nelson, qualities brought to fruition by Hood’s tutelage, and he had the courage to stand by this troubled genius when things went wrong either in battle or on shore. Moreover, he understood the type of role that Nelson was well-equipped to take, and also that he would have been ill-suited to the drudgery of the Grand Fleet’s close blockade of Brest: the very success of the blockade, meaning that the enemy would never come out while he was there, would have gnawed at his soul. Instead Jervis sent Nelson’s friend and saviour William Cornwallis to take up that thankless task: here was a man who would not be defeated by storm, or any number of Frenchmen.13 It was on Cornwallis that Jervis anchored the strategy of the war.

  *

  The Mediterranean campaign of 1796 began with some cause for optimism: the Fleet now possessed a secure insular base on Corsica, a new Commander in Chief, and the usual protestations of commitment from Austria and various Italian allies. Unfortunately the British government was too busy with other, more pressing demands to accord the theatre the priority it demanded. British resources were over-stretched, while those of the various allies were failing. Corsica, which could have been a source of real strength, was largely neglected. As Home Secretary the Duke of Portland was responsible for the island, but he was only concerned to reduce expense. The strategic advantages obvious to Nelson, Jervis and Elliot were the key to an effective Mediterranean policy. Yet Elliot was always short of money and troops. Rather than exploiting his island as the base for offensive strokes, he had to concede the initiative to the enemy.14 The scale of the war was too great for his tiny force to act alone on the mainland, and the Austrians were no longer on the coast.