Such consideration was not extended to one prominent rebel. Commodore Francesco Caracciolo had commanded the Parthenopean gunboats in battle. The King and Queen were well aware of his treason by mid-May, naming him among a handful deserving death, a ‘viper’ who knew so much of the coast that he would constitute a standing danger to the King and the state if he escaped.87 Nelson can have been in no doubt of royal opinion. Caracciolo tried to escape, but was captured on 25 June. Nelson knew of his arrest the following day, but Ruffo only handed him over to the admiral on the 29th. The timing coincided with Ruffo’s loss of power, allowing blame once more to be shifted onto the foreigners.
As the designated Neapolitan Commander in Chief, Nelson properly convened a court martial for the Neapolitan Commodore. The court assembled on board the Foudroyant because there were no large Neapolitan warships present. The court in the great cabin remained open to all interested parties, including several British officers who knew enough Italian to follow the proceedings. A majority of the Neapolitan officers found the Commodore guilty of desertion and of firing on the Sicilian frigate Minerva, an action in which royal sailors were killed. These were charges he could not rebut, and both carried a sentence of death by hanging. Acting in the King’s name, and in accord with his legal obligations, Nelson ordered the sentence to be carried out that evening. Caracciolo asked for another trial, and when this was properly denied, that he be shot rather than hung. Such a mark of his rank was inappropriate to his crime, and he was hung at the yardarm of the Minerva at 5 o’clock that evening. As Commander in Chief of the Neapolitan Navy Nelson had carried out the King’s stated policy and applied the law to the case before him. He had no personal role in the trial, and as the Court made no recommendation for clemency he had no grounds for altering the sentence.
With the rebels safely under his control Nelson moved to restore order, placing Hood in command of Castel Nuovo, and preparing the way for the resumption of royal authority. To secure the city he sent the ever-reliable Troubridge ashore in command of seamen and marines, with Ball as his second.88 Acton wrote to thank him in the King’s name and by his order for saving his honour by proper measures from a capitulation with the rebels. He was equally obliged to Nelson for seizing the rebels in the ships, and making Ruffo see where his duty lay. As for Caracciolo he ‘had deservedly been a proper example for that capital’ as the King returned to restore his authority.89 The correspondence of the King’s chief minister demonstrates categorically that Nelson was acting on the instructions of the Bourbon regime, as their appointed agent. He was not acting on his own authority.
If the scenes of horror that had greeted the downfall of the republic had been positively diabolical, it should be recalled that they pre-dated Nelson’s arrival. Ruffo sought an armistice to protect the city from his own army, but order was only restored when the British took control ashore. As for the hapless, incompetent and misguided Jacobins, some 8,000 prominent and less prominent figures were arrested, largely those who acted for the republic in civil or military roles. Their fate was to be the central figures in a long-delayed public demonstration of royal power and restored authority. It was not a calm judicial process seeking the fine points of each case, more an opportunity to use the deaths of the obviously guilty to teach a lesson. Less than a thousand were punished; only 105 were condemned to death, and six of them were reprieved. Some 222 were imprisoned for life and 322 for shorter terms; 288 were deported and 67 were exiled. Few of the living would pay the full tariff of their offences.90 While the execution of so many leading figures in literature and society was made into a parable of Bourbon vice, the final death toll was trifling when set alongside the human cost of setting up and supporting the Republic. The penalty for a failed rebellion, in time of war, as agents of the enemy was well understood. The posthumous lionisation of the rebels and their treacherous cause by writers with a variety of agendas has obscured the real issues of the Republic. It was the unwanted child of a French invasion, and perished once the bayonets that set it up were withdrawn. It perished of its own irrelevance, with a little help from Ruffo’s Calabrese and the Neapolitan lazzaroni. Nelson made sure that the process ended with the proper submission of the rebels to the mercy of their lawful sovereign. Only in this way could the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies become a useful base for the British fleet, and a shared interest with the Court of Austria.
Ferdinand arrived on 10 July, tactfully taking passage on a Neapolitan warship. He arrived to find Caracciolo’s corpse afloat, but the incident passed off when a wit advised the superstitious monarch that the traitor had come to beg forgiveness for his crimes. Ferdinand so far relented as to permit the rebel commodore a Christian burial in the fishermen’s church. Unwilling to trust his person ashore Ferdinand held court on board the Foudroyant, while Troubridge forced the French in St Elmo to accept terms. The castle capitulated on 13 July, and Nelson immediately despatched Troubridge and Hallowell with a thousand marines and seamen to secure the key fortresses of Capua thirty miles inland, and at Gaeta a hundred miles to the north. This was an unusual employment for the high-quality personnel of the fleet, but there was no other source of disciplined and determined manpower with artillery skills.91 Nelson saw no other way of clearing the kingdom of the French, to release his forces for the wider theatre. The arrival of orders from Keith, dated 27 June, to detach ships to protect Minorca was a problem, but Nelson had long believed that Naples was the bigger prize.92 In explaining his actions to Keith he paraphrased the Articles of War: ‘under God’s providence His Sicilian Majesty … depends upon this fleet.’93 The arrival of fresh orders from Keith, dated 9 July, to take all or most of his fleet to Minorca did not shake his conviction that he had been right. Although well aware that he was in breach of naval discipline, he promised Spencer that once the French had been expelled he would detach eight or ten ships to Minorca. The presence of up to 120 seamen and marines from each ship inland was the reason given, but strategic judgement was the occasion. He also prepared a formal defence of his actions for the Admiralty.94
As the French fleet was already heading out of the Mediterranean, with Keith in pursuit, the only threat to Minorca came from the Spanish, who were unlikely to take the risk. Whatever their object the French ships were leaving the theatre, and Nelson was confident Keith would pursue them all the way back to Brest.95 His faith was misplaced: Keith bungled every stage of the pursuit, lacking the single-minded determination to close with the fleeing French.96 Nelson was left to direct the theatre. To cover Minorca he despatched Duckworth with three ships and left the details to his ‘well-known abilities and judgement’. Duckworth had begged that the Portuguese ships not be sent with him, lacking Nelson’s sure touch with such ineffectual allies.97 By the end of the month Capua and Gaeta had capitulated, and Naples had been secured largely by the efforts of the ships and men of the fleet. The flagship was back at Palermo in time for a grand festival to celebrate the anniversary of the Nile, and there she would have to stay as the coast of Italy was the main theatre, and no allied ships had put in an appearance.98 A squadron was detached to the Gulf of Genoa to support the main allied army on 2 August, and three days later the newly appointed Commodore Troubridge was sent to operate against Rome and Leghorn. But Malta was Nelson’s next object: to support Ball he despatched the flagship, complete with her marines, and authority to land them for ten days.99
Amid the tension of the restoration of the Bourbons, the new British Consul, Charles Lock, began a process that would confuse Nelson’s biographers and blacken his reputation for two centuries. Lock, a cousin by marriage of Irish rebel Lord Edward Fitzgerald, Whig leader Charles James Fox, and Lady Holland, the society hostess, had been given the minor post as a sop to his wife’s family, after failing to make anything of his previous opportunities. Hot-headed and self-important, he took offence at every slight, real or imagined, and rated his abilities far above those of his Minister, while blaming Emma for all his problems. He showed where his political sym
pathies lay by appearing at court functions dressed in a fashion associated by Ferdinand and most of his subjects with the Jacobins. When the Hamiltons embarked with Nelson for the recovery of Naples he was left behind; disappointed in his hopes of acquiring a house and some furniture, he began a sustained attack on the three people who had done most to save the Kingdom. These letters, circulated by his family, contain the first significant attack on Nelson’s conduct in 1799. By13 July Lock was complaining about the dishonour cast on the British by breaking the articles agreed with the Jacobins, revealing both ignorance and partiality. His imputation that Lady Hamilton was a hardhearted monster directing affairs at the behest of the Queen dovetailed perfectly with the gossip of that faded grande dame Lady Holland, who already loathed Emma.
To compound his folly, Lock approached Nelson on the quarterdeck of the Foudroyant on 23 July, seeking a contract to supply the fleet with fresh beef and other provisions. It was common for the Consul to hold such contracts, but with his fleet so widely scattered, Nelson was content to leave matters as they were, with the ship’s pursers conducting the business. Lock claimed to have seen evidence that one or more of the pursers was cheating. Not predisposed to favour Lock, who had already made a thorough nuisance of himself, Nelson demanded names and proof. When Lock tried to retract, Nelson summoned Hardy as a witness, and demanded that he repeat his complaint. Having been backed into a corner entirely of his own making, Lock became agitated. He seemed to be drunk, and it required the best efforts of the powerfully built flag captain to get him off the quarterdeck. The following morning Nelson set up an enquiry, and when the assembled captains and pursers found nothing amiss, the pursers demanded an apology from Lock, who had the bad grace to refuse, claiming that his conversation had been private.
Had Lock apologised Nelson may have let the matter drop, but instead he determined to pursue the question all the way to the Victualling Board in London. Realising what he had done, Lock called on his family to protect him from the consequences of his own arrogance. His defence, having no basis in fact, or law, relied on slanderous accusations aimed at Emma, Nelson and Sir William.100 His exculpatory letters were the basis for the ‘Black Legend’ of Naples. Lock stayed behind after Hamilton was replaced by Lord Arthur Paget – another young man in a hurry who was overly fond of his own opinions. Paget listened while Lock poured vitriol into his ear. With such advice, Paget quickly alienated the court by his blunt and dictatorial manner, while blaming Sir William and Emma for his failings.101
Nelson may have overreacted to the stupidity of the Consul, but he was, as he had shown back in the 1780s, acutely conscious of his own dignity as an officer of the Crown, and of the need to ensure proper control of naval contracts. What would have sparked his ire even more than the arrogance of a young fool was the imputation that he, his captains, or the pursers, most of them veterans of the Battle of the Nile, were corrupt. A few days after Lock had impugned the honesty of his squadron, Nelson received a tribute of gratitude from Ferdinand, who well knew who had put him back on his throne. The King awarded him the Dukedom of Bronte, which included a Sicilian estate valued at £3,000 a year. The contrast between this token of royal esteem and the niggardly reward offered by his own country, especially the failure to do anything for Maurice, was not lost on him. For the rest of his life he would sign himself with some combination of the names Nelson and Bronte, and although the estate never produced much money, it was a real token of his achievements in the Sicilian cause. It was accompanied by a diamond-hiked sword, given by Louis XIV to his grandson Philip V of Spain, and passed on to Ferdinand with his Kingdom. Nelson received it as the Kingdom’s saviour.102
The rest of August was dedicated to securing the stores required to refit the squadron and once more shifting his forces around theatre. He sent newly recovered Neapolitan galliots to support the squadron off Genoa, and demanded that Oushakov return the Leander, recovered at the fall of Corfu.103 Nelson believed it high time the Russians and Turks used their fleets in the western basin. With the Russian hero Suvarov rampaging across Northern Italy, surely his countrymen were his best supporters? Troubridge could hand over at Naples and Leghorn when these unlikely allies arrived to concentrate off Mahon. Both Duckworth at Minorca and the force in the Straits were reinforced: the latter would blockade Cadiz and secure the oceanic trade beyond the Straits, a subject on which he was ‘exceedingly anxious’ to oblige the merchant community. Nelson had no fear for Minorca while the British fleet was in the Mediterranean.104 Because Niza’s Portuguese squadron would be adequate off Malta, Nelson persuaded Ferdinand to grant Ball the chief position ashore as Maltese leader. In this rank Ball could cooperate with Niza as an equal, rather than stay afloat as his ranking subordinate. This typical piece of forethought and finesse avoided inefficiency or offence.105
As if to confirm the talent of the temporary Commander in Chief, his new dispositions were adopted just as Admiralty sent almost identical orders.106 After an apprenticeship of six years Nelson was ready to assume Hood’s role as strategic director of the theatre, while drawing on St Vincent’s approach to fleet support and discipline. The departure of the old Earl had broken the last link with his previous career, and no one else had the professional standing to direct his movements: it was not rank but ability that he followed.
However, the Admiralty had criticised Nelson’s landing of marines and seamen for the operations at Naples and Capua, and issued a rebuke for his deliberate refusal of Keith’s order to protect Minorca. His dilemma was simple: ‘My conduct is measured by the Admiralty by the narrow rule of law, when I think it should be measured that of common sense.’ Keith’s orders would, if obeyed, have lost Naples.107 Although Acton kept telling him he was the key to the salvation of Italy, he was disgusted by the failure of the Neapolitans to act up to their words: ‘I will retire from this inactive service’.108 He remained convinced the Austrian Chancellor Thugut was undermining the Neapolitans, and ‘our English King of Naples’.109 This may have been the Queen’s opinion, but it was not wrong. The Austrian Chancellor saw the 1799 campaign as an opportunity to advance the Viennese empire in Italy, at the expense of the French, the Pope and the Bourbons, with the Russians doing most of the fighting. This policy had influenced his timing of the declaration of war and the direction of the allied advance. Ultimately it ruptured the coalition, leading to the withdrawal of the Russians. Such petty pilfering of principalities would be the downfall of the Emperor and his chancellor. The reward of their duplicity came with utter defeat at Hohenlinden in 1801.
Nelson knew such attitudes had ruined too many Mediterranean campaigns. The British cleared the seas only for their allies to fritter away the fruits of victory on internal disputes. He could see that naval warfare had to be made more effective – that Britain might wage war alone, secure the seas and sustain her trade. Only the largest measures, executed in complete harmony, stood a chance against the French. However, his clear-sighted approach was shared neither by Britain’s shaky and procrastinating allies, nor by Nelson’s petty-minded and conventional masters in London.
Notes – CHAPTER IX
1 Barry Unsworth’s Losing Nelson confronts this issue with imagination. The scale of the debate should not disguise the poverty of hard evidence. The case against Nelson would not stand in a court of law, being wholly based on hearsay and innuendo.
2 Touchette, L-A. ‘Sir William Hamilton’s “Pantomime Mistress”: Emma Hamilton and Her Attitudes.’ In Hornsby, C. ed. The Impact of Italy; The Grand Tour and Beyond, London, 2000, pp. 123–46: an excellent illustrated account of her art.
3 Winifred Guerin’s account in Horatia Nelson, Oxford, 1981, is the most hostile on this score.
4 Hamilton to Nelson 8.9.1798; Nicolas III pp. 71–2
5 Hamilton to Nelson 1.8.1798; Morrison, A. The Hamilton and Nelson Papers. Volume II. London 1894 privately printed pp. 15–17
6 Acton to Nelson 9.9.1798; Nicolas III p. 118. Nelson to Spencer 16.9.1799; Nicolas III pp.
126–7
7 Paret and Moran eds. Carl von Clausewitz: Historical and Political Writings, p. 246 as quoted in Gooch, J. The Politics of Strategy’, War in History 4 (2003), p. 424
8 Rodger, The War of the Second Coalition, 1798 to 1801: A Strategic Commentary is the leading source for this analysis. It has been widely, and uncritically adopted.
9 Nelson to Father 25.9.1798; Nicolas III p. 131
10 Nelson to St Vincent 27.9.1798; Nicolas III p. 132
11 St Vincent to Nelson 27.9.1798; Nicolas III pp. 84–5
12 Admiralty to St Vincent 3.10.1798; Nicolas III pp. 143–4
13 Nelson to Captain Hood 13.9.1798; Nicolas III pp. 121–2
14 Nelson to St Vincent 30.9.1799; Nicolas III p. 138
15 Nelson to St Vincent 4.10.1798; Nicolas VII p. clxiv
16 Nelson to Pitt 4.10.1798; PRO 30/8/367 ff. 42–3
17 Nelson to St Vincent 4.10.1798; Nicolas VII clxiv
18 Nelson to Spencer 9.10.1798; Nicolas III pp. 146–7
19 Hamilton to Nelson 16.10.1798. Morrison II. pp. 23–4. Nelson to St Vincent 22.10.1798; Nicolas III pp. 150–1
20 Testa, C. The French in Malta 1798–1800. Valletta 1997
21 Nelson to St Vincent 7.11.1798; Nicolas III p. 166
22 Mackesy, Statesmen at War: The Strategy of Overthrow 1798–1799. London pp. 54–6
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