23 Nelson to St Vincent 30–31.12.1798: Nicolas pp. 213–15
24 Nelson to Spencer 1.1.1799; Nicolas III pp. 217–18
25 Nelson to Pitt 4.10.1799; PRO 30/8/367 ff. 42–3
26 Nelson to Wife 17.1.1799; Naish pp. 480–1
27 Acton, H. The Bourbons of Naples. London 1956 pp. 314–334. While Acton dismisses the pro-Jacobin effusions of the Neapolitan historians, he goes on to mistake the role of Nelson and the Hamiltons on very limited evidence.
28 Nelson to General Sir Charles Stuart 7.1.1799; Nicolas III pp. 227–8
29 Acton, pp. 337–8.
30 Nelson to Howe 8.1.1799; Nicolas III pp. 230–1
31 Walker pp. 88–90
32 Nelson to St Vincent 17.1.1799: Nicolas VII p. clxx. Nelson to Minto 19.1.1799: Nicolas III pp 235–690
33 Nelson to Ball 21.1.1799; Nicolas III pp. 236–8
34 Nelson to St Vincent 1.2.1799; Nicolas III p. 239
35 Nelson to Lady Parker 1.2.1799; Nicolas III pp. 248–9. Nelson to Davison 2.2.1799; Nicolas VII p. clxxii
36 Nelson to St Vincent 1, 2 and 3.2.1799; Nelson to Ball 4.2.1799; Nelson to Acton 2.2.1799; Nelson to Niza 1.2.1799; Nicolas III pp. 249–56
37 Nelson to Commissioner Coffin at Port Mahon 5.2.1799; Nicolas III p. 258
38 Nelson to Spencer 17.2.1799; Nicolas VII p. clxxv. Nelson to Stuart 16.2.1799; Nelson to Troubridge 18.2.1799; Nicolas III pp. 267–9
39 Nelson to Spencer 7.2.1799; Nicolas VII p. clxxii
40 Nelson to Ball 28.2.1799; Nicolas III pp. 272–3
41 Nelson to Ball 8.3.1799; Nicolas III pp. 286–7
42 Nelson to St Vincent 20.3.1799; Nicolas III pp. 297–9
43 Nelson to Oushakov 23.3.1799; Nicolas II p. 304
44 Nelson to St Vincent 20.3.1799; Nicolas III pp. 297–9
45 Lloyd, C. ed. The Keith Papers II. London, Navy Records Society 1950. pp. 36–51
46 King to Ruffo 11.4.1799; Gutteridge, ed. Nelson and the Neapolitan Jacobins, pp. 38–41
47 King to Ruffo. 1.5.1799; Gutteridge p. 45
48 Nelson to Troubridge 30.3.1799; Nicolas III p. 310
49 Nelson to Ball 9.4.1799; Nicolas III p. 319
50 Nelson to Spencer 6.4.1799; Nicolas VII pp. clxxvii–iii
51 Hamilton to Charles Greville 8.4.1799; Morrison II pp. 40–1
52 Mackesy, p. 98 is a typical modern example.
53 Lord Keith to Sister 19.4.1799; Keith II p. 37. Typically this is a piece of second-hand reportage, based on an unknown source, by someone who had not met Nelson for a year.
54 Nelson to St Vincent 8.3.1799: Nicolas III pp. 285–6
55 Nelson to Ball 21.4.1799; Nicolas III pp. 332–3
56 Nelson to Troubridge 25.4. and to Stuart 28.4.1799; Nicolas III pp. 333–7
57 Nelson to St Vincent 9.5.1799; Nicolas VII clxxxi
58 De la Gravière, Sketches of the Last Naval War. London 1848, Vol. I pp. 224–31
59 Rodger, The War of the Second Coalition 1798 to 1801; A Strategic Commentary is widely cited, but repeats several important errors, and adds a few new ones. Rodger underrates the importance of Naples and Sicily, while over-valuing Minorca and Malta.
60 St Vincent to Nelson 6.5.1799; Gutteridge p. xxxvii
61 Nelson to various 12.5.1799; Nicolas III pp. 352–4
62 Nelson to St Vincent 28.5.1799; Nicolas III p. 367
63 Nelson to St Vincent 23.5.1799; Nicolas III pp. 364–5
64 Hallowell to Nelson 23.5.1799; in Beresford, Lord C. and Wilson, H. W. Nelson and his Times 1897 p. 123
65 Lambert, ‘Cornwallis’
66 Nelson to Emma 22 and 24.5.1799; Nicolas VII p. clxxxiii
67 Nelson to Wife 24.5.1799; Naish p. 484
68 Nelson to Emma 19.5.1799; Nicolas III p. 362
69 Nelson to St Vincent 30.5.1799; Nicolas III pp. 368–9
70 Foote to Nelson 28.5.1799; Nicolas III p. 360
71 Nelson to Wife 5.6.1799; Naish p. 485
Nelson to St Vincent 5.6.1799; Nicolas III pp. 374–5
72 Nelson to St Vincent 6.6.1799; Nicolas VII p. clxxxiv.
73 Nelson to St Vincent 10 and 12.6.1799; St Vincent to Nelson 11.6.1799; Nicolas III pp. 377–9
74 Keith to Sister 30.3.1799; Keith II pp. 36–7. On the evidence of this letter Keith was a better judge of service politics than enemy intentions.
75 Collingwood reports that Keith was in sight of the enemy before he abandoned the chase to secure Minorca. Collingwood to Edward Collingwood 17.8.1799; Duffy, M. ed. The Naval Miscellany VI. Aldershot 2003 pp. 168–9
76 Keith to Nelson 6.6.1799; Nicolas III pp. 379–80
77 Nelson to Keith 16.6.1799, and to St Vincent 16.6. and to Wife 17.6.1799; Nicolas III pp. 379–81 and Naish pp. 485–6
78 Nelson to Hamilton 21.6.1799; Gutteridge p. 144
79 Nelson to Keith 27.6.1799; Gutteridge p. 264
80 Acton to Hamilton 19 and 20.6.1799; Nicolas III pp. 391–2. Nelson to Magra 20.6.1799; 6c to Hamilton 20.6.1799; Nicolas III pp. 382–3 and VII p. clxxxv.
81 Nelson to Keith 27.6.1799; Nicolas III pp. 390–2
82 Nelson to Duckworth 21.6.1799; Nicolas III p. 384
83 Nelson to Admiralty 27.6.1799; Nicolas III p. 389
84 Gutteridge p. xci
85 Pakenham, T. The Year of Liberty London 1969 p. 327
86 Nelson to Acton 29.6.1799; Gutteridge p. 279
87 Queen to Ruffo 17.5. and 19.6.1799; Gutteridge pp. 55 and 135. King to Ruffo 20.6.1799; Gutteridge p. 141
88 Nelson to Troubridge 26.6.1799; Nicolas III pp. 388–9
89 Acton to Nelson 30.6 and 2.7.1799; Croker MS, NMM CRK/17.
90 Acton p.409.
91 Nelson to Hood 4.7.1799; Nelson to Keith 13.7.1799; Nicolas III p. 400, 403–4
92 Nelson to Spencer 13.7.1799; Nicolas III pp. 406–7
93 Nelson to Keith 13.7.1799; Nicolas III pp. 407–8
94 Keith to Nelson 9.7.1799; Nelson to Keith and Admiralty 19.7.1799; Nicolas III pp. 414–16. Nelson to Spencer 19.7.1799; Nicolas VII pp. clxxxv–vi
95 Nelson to Sidney Smith 20 and 22.7.1799; Nicolas III pp. 416–18
96 Collingwood to Edward Colllingwood 17.8.1799; Owen in Duffy, Naval Miscellany VI pp. 168–9
97 Nelson to Duckworth 22.7.1799; Nicolas III pp. 418–9. Nelson to Spencer 23.7.1799; Nicolas VII p. clxxxvii.
98 Nelson to Admiralty; to Spencer; to Keith 1.8.1799; Nicolas III pp. 425–9
99 Nelson to Ball 14.8.1799; Nicolas III p. 440
100 Sermonetta, Duchess The Locks of Norbury. London 1940.PP. 151–201. The author/editor of the volume was a member of the Caracciolo family, and does not try to hide her bias. This problem is compounded by errors of fact. See pp. 166–70 for the Caracciolo story, and the family connection. Nelson to Lock 23.7.1799; to memorandum 24.7.1799. Nicolas III pp. 420–1. See also Nicolas IV pp. 101 and 129 for further correspondence on this issue. Russell, J. Nelson and the Hamiltons. 1969 pp. 88–90. Acton, pp. 337–9, 405–6, 413–14.
101 Acton, pp. 428–30.
102 Nelson to King Ferdinand 13.8.1799; to Father 15.8.1799; Nicolas III pp. 438–9, 441
103 Nelson to Duckworth 16.8. to Suvarov 16.8. and to Oushakov 18.8.1799; Nicolas III pp. 446–9
104 Nelson to Duckworth 20.8. to Troubridge/Martin 22.8.1799; Nicolas III PP. 453–9
105 Nelson to Ball 21.8.1799; Nicolas III pp. 456–7
106 Admiralty to Nelson 20.8.1799; Morrison II pp. 64–5
107 Nelson to Davison c.23.8.1799; Nicolas III pp. 460–1. Nelson to Wife 23.8.1799; Naish pp. 488–9
108 Nelson to Wife 23.8.1799; Naish p. 488. Nelson to Admiralty 24.8.1799; to Troubridge 31.8.1799; Nicolas III pp. 462, 469–70
109 Nelson to Minto 20.8.1799; Nicolas III p. 452
A run ashore: ‘The Jolly Tars of Old England’
CHAPTER X
Subordination and Homecoming 1799–1800
With the authority of the Bourbon regime at Naples re-established, and the
war swinging in favour of the coalition, Nelson would have been excused for leaving the stage. He chose to stay, however, despite repeated complaints of headaches, chest pains and near-blindness. He thrived on the responsibility of command, and when Keith departed with the main fleet in Bruix’s wake, Nelson was the senior officer inside the Straits. The theatre was an unusual one, since the enemy did not possess a significant battle fleet. Instead the Royal Navy was conducting a range of important strategic tasks from Gibraltar to Alexandria, within a troubled coalition that necessitated watching ‘friends’ as well as foes. Under these circumstances, Nelson recognised the importance of the Commander in Chief occupying a central position to facilitate intelligence gathering and political contacts, while his flag would be the rallying point for the dispersed units of his squadron if an enemy fleet appeared.
In purely strategic terms, Syracuse would have been the best location for the operational fleet base; but political considerations made remaining in Palermo a more sensible choice, and Nelson was unwilling to sacrifice vital political leverage and strategic assets to save a day or two at sea. Nelson was becoming increasingly infuriated by the inability of the King and his ministers to see where their own best interests lay, or to act to secure them. They constantly procrastinated about food and money for the siege of Malta, a Sicilian freehold, while Ferdinand would not go back to Naples, where his presence would have helped restore order and render his state a more effective partner in the war. Nelson was obliged to talk up the Neapolitan contribution to the ministers in London, while offering to mortgage his estate at Bronte and sell his trophies and decorations to fund the siege at Malta.
The main difficulty facing British naval commanders in the Mediterranean was the lack of a reliable military force under their control. The British army was too small, and too heavily committed to defensive tasks, to spare the men for a Mediterranean expeditionary force. The few British troops in the theatre were tied down at Gibraltar and Minorca. Nelson constantly badgered the generals to understand the big picture, to act on the spirit of their instructions rather than the letter, but only Charles Stuart had the necessary confidence in his own judgement, and political courage. Moreover, the command system did not permit the naval Commander in Chief to issue orders to the army. The result of this weakness was the interminable blockade of Valletta, where the French defenders were more numerous than the besieging marines and Maltese irregulars. A force of five thousand British regulars would have reduced the place in a month or two. Instead the operation tied down extensive naval forces for two years. Without troops, St Vincent, Keith and especially Nelson were left to rely on their allies, who were by turns unwilling, incompetent or absent. Rather than simply reporting his frustrations, Nelson landed seamen and marines, employing Troubridge as his general.
On 20 September Nelson received a package of official dispatches. One criticised his judgement in landing seamen and marines for service at Capua, and disobeying Keith’s orders; while another, more welcome, conferred temporary theatre command on him, in the absence of Keith. (Nelson, who remained a Rear Admiral until 1 January 1801, did not have the rank to be placed in permanent command of the theatre.) A further dispatch set out the Admiralty’s priorities among the strategic tasks of the fleet. The first task was to cooperate with the allies to drive the French out of Italy, specifically supporting the siege of Genoa. Next came the reduction of Malta, followed by the protection of Minorca. Fourthly he was to keep watch on the Spanish fleet at Cadiz, a task combined with securing the passage of Mediterranean convoys through the Straits of Gibraltar. The formation and escort of British and allied convoys was the fifth priority, while the redeployment of the squadron from the coast of Egypt, in the expectation that their task was at an end, rounded off the list. The same Board that had criticised his judgement then expressed their confidence that he would do all that he could with the forces under his command.1
Nelson’s replies to the Admiralty dispatches show him vigorously defending his decisions over Capua and Minorca, stressing his concern for the honour of the King and Country, ‘the dearest objects of my heart’. He also cited the opinions of Acton and Hamilton on the likely effect of a withdrawal while affairs at Naples were incomplete. He warned that the new instructions to restore the Knights at Malta, with the Tsar as Grand Master, would be unpopular, and he requested more ships, to replace those going home for refit and the unseaworthy Russians.2 He expressed himself more strongly still, however, in letters to confidants. The third of the Admiralty’s tasks for him had already been dismissed in a letter to Spencer: ‘Minorca I have never yet considered in the smallest danger, but it has been a misfortune that others have thought differently from me on that point.’3 And his real feelings on the Admiralty’s censure were revealed to Davison:
My conduct is measured by the Admiralty, by the narrow rule of law, when I think it should have been done by that of common sense. I restored a faithful Ally by breach of orders; Lord Keith lost a Fleet by obedience, against his own sense. Yet one is censured, the other must be approved.4
Nelson did not allow his feelings of being slighted to impair his command of the campaign, however. He was concentrating on Malta now: he sailed to Minorca to press for some British troops, and asked Oushakov to help. With Bruix gone, he anticipated the French would try to relieve the garrison from Toulon, where Nile escapee Le Genereux and other vessels were fitting out. Scouts were placed on the patrol lines of Toulon–Ajaccio and Lampedusa–Cape Bon.5 At the beginning of October, he was celebrating the fact that Troubridge and Louis had taken Rome, accepting the surrender of the French garrison.He responded by sending his battleships to Minorca, offering a substantial naval defence to release troops for Malta.6 To outflank the inevitable objections from the general at Minorca, he asked the Neapolitans to request that the British garrison at Messina be sent to Malta. To make sure they understood his purpose, he warned them that if Malta remained in French hands the Barbary corsairs would use the harbour to annihilate Sicilian trade. Brigadier Graham, in command at Messina, was also given the benefit of Nelson’s views on theatre strategy and national policy, but both the King and Graham were resolute. Ferdinand did not feel safe without British troops, and the Brigadier would not move without orders. ‘I am almost mad with the mode of going on here,’ Nelson lamented.7
Reports of thirteen French battleships off Cape Finisterre forced another redeployment. Niza’s Portuguese squadron had been recalled, but on 3 October Nelson begged him to stay off Malta, while he sought out the enemy. By 11 October Nelson was heading for Gibraltar, but the following day he realised that the reported sightings of the enemy had been false – just one of many unreliable fragments of intelligence that exercised the mind of the admiral. Nelson returned to Minorca instead to request the troops for Malta. General Erskine admitted the island was in an excellent state of defence, but he was about to hand over to General Henry Fox, and would not commit to the new commander. No amount of naval protection would persuade him to detach troops from Minorca, or redeploy those from Messina. Nelson sent a sloop to report on Toulon, and hurried east, anxious the French would try to reinforce Malta.8
Nelson was forced to return to Palermo, with nothing to show for his cruise. Frustrated by Erskine’s attitude, and the inability of the Neapolitan government to pay the Maltese soldiers, Nelson kept up the pressure on the general and spent his own money on the Maltese. For a man of Nelson’s temperament these were more than professional setbacks. He feared Malta might be lost; he believed the general was wrong to ignore the changed circumstances, and that the war must be prosecuted to the utmost.9 He was frustrated that all his hard work since returning to Palermo had not generated a single soldier, and that his successes had not been given the credit they deserved, as he revealed in a bitter letter to Fanny:
I trust that one day or other I shall rest from all my labours. I still find it good to serve near home. There a man’s fag and services are easily seen. Next to that is writing a famous account
of your own actions. I could not do justice to those of my friends who rescued the Kingdom of Naples from the French and therefore Parliament does not think of them.10
If Parliament underestimated the British contribution to the restoration in Naples, then the Neapolitans themselves could be accused of no such thing; rather, they remained highly dependent, as Nelson stressed to the Admiralty:
My own situation in this Country, certainly a very extraordinary one; for if I move they think the Country in danger, and that they are abandoned. If my flag is in a transport they seem contented.11
As Berry had resumed his post, Hardy, who carried the dispatch home, could inform the Board of the condition of the fleet, and the admiral. Nelson’s mood was not improved by a letter from the Victualling Board, which appeared to sustain Consul Lock’s claims. Wounded and angry, he exploded onto the page – ‘I defy any insinuations against my honour’ – and demanded a full enquiry. He also demanded Lock provide copies of any public letters concerning fleet supply.12 A fortnight later Nelson demanded an Admiralty enquiry. Aware that Lock had used family influence to secure a private commendation of his actions, Nelson demanded he produce evidence, or withdraw. The following day, a humiliated Lock abandoned his claims, and the demand for an enquiry was withdrawn.13 The determination with which Nelson pursued any criticism of his honour was typical.
Given his mental state it was perhaps fortunate that French attempts to supply the Malta garrison now took centre stage. This gave a suitable focus for Nelson’s efforts, and provided a task that could be carried out by naval forces. Another letter begging Erskine to act reached Minorca after General Fox had taken over command. Fox responded quickly: his order that the Messina garrison go to Malta arrived on 25 October.14 Nelson was also promised three thousand Russian troops, but the Messina garrison were the only men who turned up. Troubridge was instructed to sustain the claims of Britain and the Neapolitans, while avoiding friction. Niza, meanwhile, had been ordered home, but Nelson kept up a barrage of letters begging him to run the risk of disobeying, for a higher purpose.15 His successful persuasion earned the Marquis a fulsome tribute of public and private thanks – perhaps more than the Portuguese ships deserved – when he finally departed in mid-December.16
Nelson: Britannia's God of War Page 24
