Nelson: Britannia's God of War

by Andrew Lambert

  Cautious, sophisticated enemies like the French did not fight for pride, and rarely in anger. They knew that the British would accept any opportunity to impose their will in battle, to ruin their strategic combinations, and they rarely took the risk. In twenty-two years of war there were only six occasions when a major French fleet was engaged by a British force of similar strength. Only two proved decisive, and on both occasions Nelson was in command. That was not luck: his whole being had been dedicated to setting up those battles, always recalling the battles of Hotham, Bridport, Howe and, in a previous war, Lord Rodney. He would out-think the enemy, and then outfight him. As he told Cornwallis, who faced the same problem off Brest, the French would wait in harbour until ‘they have an object worth fighting for … I do not mean to say that they will merely think us an object worth coming out to fight, I never saw a Frenchman yet fight for fighting’s sake, and I do not believe they will now begin.’ He hoped with all his heart that Cornwallis would meet the French, an opportunity his old friend was denied.54

  While Cornwallis and Keith kept the French locked up in port, Nelson left them an opportunity to get to sea. Ultimately this would draw Bonaparte into a major error: he would attempt to win the war with an inferior fleet, from widely dispersed bases, by grand strategic combinations. His only hope was to link up his forces, and avoid or overwhelm part of the British fleet before launching his invasion. Such complex strategic combinations were the core of his military thinking, and worked well in Western Europe, but they did not work in underdeveloped Eastern Europe and Iberia, nor at sea. Bonaparte never really grasped the tremendous gap in quality between his navy and the British, or the complex and unreliable nature of oceanic navigation in the age of sail. He seemed to think that wind and weather, tide and current should bend to his Imperial will. The threat the French could pose to British trade and overseas territories was real, but there was little chance they would divert such masters of strategy as Cornwallis and Nelson, St Vincent and Lord Barham, from Bonaparte’s real objects.

  *

  In early 1804 the Admiralty, alarmed by the latest intelligence from Spain, sent two more ships: the first-rate Royal Sovereign and the seventy-four Leviathan. When they arrived Bickerton shifted his flag from the shattered seventy-four Kent into the three-decker.55 Now the French, under Latouche Tréville, chose to make an appearance just outside the harbour. This was all the encouragement Nelson needed. Well aware they would not seek battle, but might be forced into a harbour or roadstead, he issued his captains with the latest charts of the most obvious locations, which they were to study closely, and typically minute guidance for an attack on anchored ships. Each ship was to have four heavy anchors already attached to cables, and would send off the launch with the stream anchor and a hawser, ready to assist stranded vessels. The attacking ships should anchor to ensure ‘mutual support for the destruction of the enemy’. Suitable sailing directions for Leghorn roads may have been written at the same time.56

  As the anniversary of Nelson’s return to the Mediterranean arrived, the French seemed as reluctant as ever to move. Instead Nelson had to deal with a trade war stretching across the theatre. As ever he exploited an unrivalled understanding of local wind, weather, currents and geography to frame his orders.57 The fleet was spread across the region, with eight battleships, four frigates and two smaller craft off Toulon, two frigates outside the Straits of Gibraltar, two sloops inside, a frigate and four smaller craft cruising between the Greek archipelago and Ancona to protect trade, a frigate off Barcelona, and three battleships in movement, one at Naples and another to visit Algiers to discipline the Dey. Further ships were escorting convoys, undergoing repairs or carrying dispatches to link Malta, Naples, Gibraltar and other points.58 While Nelson’s mastery of the entire run of business in the Mediterranean was astonishing, he never overrode the judgement of those whom he had ordered to execute well-defined tasks. He always worked through the proper chain of command to avoid giving offence, or undermine the confidence of promising officers. If things went wrong he was the first to leap to the defence of a bold and decisive subordinate.59

  With Admiralty rarely sending any mail much of his news came from the Paris newspapers that were sent from Spain, usually ten to fourteen days old. The translation of Bonaparte from Consul to Emperor in May 1804 prompted further reflections on the state of Europe: he hoped for peace, but with Pitt returning to power on 12 May the die was cast for a climactic campaign. While he would regret the departure of Addington from office, he declared that ‘If Pitt is attentive to me he shall have my vote.’60 For Nelson the main impact was the end of St Vincent’s universally loathed Admiralty Board, although he regretted the departure of his friend Nepean. Nelson knew the faults of the Board, but blamed those surrounding the old Earl, especially Admiral Markham and Troubridge.61 While he knew the new First Lord, Henry Dundas, only slightly, Nelson was confident he would improve the supply of ships and men.

  Sardinia remained his main concern. To block the movement of troops to embarkation ports on the Italian coast and on Elba, he placed frigates close inshore, altering the nature of the blockade to meet particular circumstances. He hoped the pressure would bring on battle; instead it resulted in some smart boat actions and a few wounded men. While delighted that the French had come out of Toulon in mid-June, Nelson rightly feared they did so only to ‘cut a gasconade’ before scuttling back into safety. He waited with an inferior force for them to try their strength. He would not fight them too close to Toulon, where their damaged ships could retreat to safety, unless the wind was favourable. A month later he was wound up to highest pitch by another apparent sortie, but he continued to think very clearly, and work out the options. Whatever the pressure, Nelson never abandoned the analytical approach to his problems or resorted to blind panic.

  The tension of his long wait finally broke when the French press published a boastful, dishonest dispatch by Tréville, claiming the British had run away. In an unguarded moment Nelson declared he would make the Frenchman eat it, if he had the fortune to capture him. Tréville died on 18 August, worn out, it was said, by constantly climbing to his observation post to look at the British fleet. After Tréville’s death the French were noticeably less alert, despite sweeping the streets of Marseilles to man the fleet.62

  As 1804 wore on the prospect of another winter running before the gales of the Gulf of Lyons began to pall, and the combination of exhaustion and boredom began to take a toll on Nelson’s resolve. In mid-August he promised Emma he would be home for Christmas, if only for a rest. Anxious that another senior officer might take his command he wanted Bickerton to stand in, and suggested that King Ferdinand make an official application for his early return.63 It was as if he doubted his own importance to the nation, as commander and talisman. Cut off from home, with little correspondence of any kind, he was losing faith in himself. He needed to recharge his emotional reserves with another infusion of public acclaim. Ferdinand took the bait, but also wrote through Elliot to urge Nelson to come ashore for the winter. This was not what Nelson wanted: ‘Being on shore, either in Sicily or Naples, would not relieve my mind of the charge entrusted to me; for my thoughts would always be off Toulon, and I should not feel answerable for measures which I do not direct.’64

  The Eastern Mediterranean and Adriatic required constant attention, with the Russians steadily building up their forces, and their influence. Nelson had long feared they meant to seize all of European Turkey.65 Their presence at least made it unlikely the French would strike in that direction:

  Therefore; I rather expect they will, as the year advances, try to get out of the Straits; and should they accomplish it with 7,000 troops on board, I am sure we should lose half our West India Islands, for I think they would go there, and not to Ireland. Whatever may be their destination, I shall certainly follow, be it even to the East Indies. Such a pursuit would do more, perhaps, to restoring me to health than all the Doctors; but I fear this is reserved for some happier man.66 />
  This was, he admitted a guess, but it was based on careful calculation.67

  Other problems were looming, especially the possibility of war with Spain – not that he was behind in his preparations, having exploited a Spanish request to convey a cardinal from Majorca to Rome to obtain a full report on the defences and resources of the island. Pitt, satisfied that Spanish payments to France were a breach of neutrality, decided to force the issue. Orders to seize Spanish treasure ships were issued in mid-September, and on 5 October a brief action between four frigates from each nation in the approaches to Cadiz ended when one Spanish ship blew up and the others surrendered. Nelson did not think the situation had been adequately thought through, and would have preferred to be ready with an adequate force to seize Minorca.68

  This new war arrived just as he heard that his official request for leave had been granted. He decided to stay, and kept his leave a secret. Painfully conscious of his impaired vision, he was thinking about taking a seat at the Admiralty as overall director of the naval forces of the state. Nor was this a delusion, as many have argued following St Vincent’s acid asides. In truth, no one would have been better equipped to lead the officer corps by example and encouragement, rewarding merit and courage, rather than imposing harsh measures and blatant favouritism. Nor could any other officer have equalled his strategic insight and record of accurate analysis of complex situations.

  The Spanish war had other consequences. With Nelson expected to return home on leave, the Admiralty despatched Sir John Orde to command a new station in the Atlantic approaches to Cadiz. He was Nelson’s superior in rank, but had a smaller command, fewer ships and less responsibility. As Nelson chose not to go home, it appeared that Orde had merely been sent to reap his ‘golden harvest’.69 Having made a public complaint about Nelson being given the Mediterranean detachment in 1798 it would have been hard to pick an officer less likely to work well with him. He was not overly concerned about the money – ‘God knows, in my own person, I spend as little money as any man; but you know I love to give away.’70 But it was the apparent lack of faith in his ability to handle the station that rankled, especially as he had taken immediate steps to meet the need: his reinforcement of Captain Strachan off Cadiz had led to the capture of two frigates before Orde arrived.

  Orde soon tired of a position that everyone knew was false, and which he could not fill with dignity or ability equal to his rank. Complaining that Nelson was interfering, he asked to be relieved in March 1805, and was taken at his word by return of mail. Orde was the same petty-minded blockhead who had tried to fight a duel with St Vincent five years before. It seems he had been sent only to annoy the old Earl, who was refusing to go back to sea until Pitt apologised for his remarks in the House of Commons on Admiralty administration during the Addington Ministry.71

  Spain was no longer the sea power she had been in 1796. Her fleet had declined through capture and disaster and had not been adequately replaced. The national coffers had been emptied to buy off Bonaparte, while a terrible outbreak of yellow fever swept across southern Spain, hitting Cadiz and Cartagena particularly hard.72 The situation was so bad that Orde was directed not to board any Spanish ships he might capture, but to take them into quarantine at Gibraltar.73 Efforts to mobilise the Spanish fleet were crippled by the loss of craftsmen and seamen, the shortage of food and stores, and above all the lack of hard cash. Gibraltar too was affected by fever: over two thousand people died in a few weeks.

  However, the French now demanded Nelson’s full attention. Vice Admiral Pierre Villeneuve, Nile escapee and Napoleon’s ‘lucky’ admiral, now commanded at Toulon. On 18 January he put to sea with eleven battleships, cruisers and six thousand troops. British frigates quickly reported back to Nelson, who moved to cover Naples and Sicily on the likely track of the enemy. Taking into account the strong winds then blowing, they could only be headed east, so he ran down to the Italian coast, through the Straits of Messina, and by 7 February was off Alexandria. There was no sign of the enemy. By 18 February he knew that the French, crippled by the wind on their first night at sea, had straggled back into Toulon – masts shattered, rigging strained and basic seamanship skills in doubt. Villeneuve was dismayed by the experience; Bonaparte was dismayed by his lack of resolution. Nelson, meanwhile, was concerned that the poor state of the Royal Sovereign’s copper made her too slow for such pursuits.74

  The fleet had suffered no damage in the storms or the pursuit, however, and was ready for another cruise only days after reaching Sardinia on 8 March. Realising Orde had not been sent out to supersede him, Nelson decided to stay until the movements of the French fleet were clear. He was still expecting a battle.75 A few days later Nile veteran Rear Admiral Sir Thomas Louis joined the fleet with flag Captain Francis Austen, then the best known of the Austen family.

  The underlying purpose of Bonaparte’s movements was unclear. Lying in Cawsand Bay, for a brief respite from the hard pounding off Brest, Collingwood recorded his view:

  The sort of dilatory war that he is now carrying on against us, is a new system, and of deep policy: – It is war against our trade & finances – a war the object of which is to subject us to great expenses, and diminish our means of supporting them – but experience will teach him the fallacy of his system very soon.76

  This was a typically lucid and penetrating analysis by a master of war. Collingwood was Nelson’s best friend in the service because he was one of the few men to view the world from the same level, and with the same clarity. Nelson agreed, regretting that Orde’s command had broken up his system of Mediterranean trade protection, leading to the loss of one convoy, and risking many more.77 By this time Bonaparte had switched from trade attack to deception plans to facilitate an invasion, and he continued to change his mind throughout the 1805 campaign. He might outwit Orde, but not Collingwood or Nelson.

  Nelson stressed that the key to success in this titanic conflict lay in striking blows in Europe, not frittering away the national resources on ‘buccaneering expeditions’ to the Spanish empire.78 According to the fleet surgeon’s report, Nelson needed rest and the assistance of an oculist.79 Nelson himself complained of ‘heart’ spasms, though they were later diagnosed as indigestion, brought on by tension, lack of exercise and poor diet – but he was worried that a return might be misinterpreted:

  The moment I make up my mind the French fleet will not come out this summer, I embark in the Superb. My health does not improve; but because I am not confined to my bed, people will not believe my state of health.80

  By the time he wrote, however, the French were already at sea. The final campaign had opened.

  Notes – CHAPTER XIII

  1 Nelson to Davison; to St Vincent 6.5.1803; Nicolas V p. 63

  2 Admiralty to Bickerton 1.2.1803; ADM 2/1360

  3 Admiralty to Bickerton 7.3.1803; ADM 2/1360

  4 Admiralty to Bickerton 7.5.1803; ADM 2/1360

  5 Ziegler, pp. 197–8

  6 Admiralty to Nelson 18.5.1803 Secret; ADM 2/1360. The next Admiralty letter was sent on 9.11.1803

  7 Nelson to St Vincent 22.5. to Admiralty and Cornwallis 23.5.1805; Nicolas V pp. 71–5. Cornwallis to Nelson 25.5.1803; CRK /2

  8 Nelson to Emma 20.5.1803; Morrison II p. 210–1. 23.5.1803; Nicolas V p. 73

  9 Scott to Emma 3.6.1803; Nelson to Emma 10.6.1803 Morrison II pp. 212–13. See Nelson to Emma 4.6.1805: Pettigrew II p. 473 and compare with Monmouth EL167 to see how far Pettigrew removed the passion that distinguished this correspondence from that with Fanny.

  10 Nelson to Acton 10.6.1803 Public and private letters; he also wrote on the same day to both the King and the Queen; Nicolas V pp. 81–5

  11 Nelson to Acton 19.6.1803; Nicolas V p. 92

  12 Ferdinand to Nelson 20.6.1803; CRK/3

  13 Nelson to Jackson 10.6.1803; to Drummond c.11.6.1803; Nicoals V pp. 85–7

  14 Nelson to Addington 4.6.1803; Nicolas V p. 79

  15 Nelson to Hardy and Admiralty 1.7.1803; Nicolas V pp. 112
–14

  16 Lord Hobart to Nelson 23.8.1803; Nicolas V pp. 220–1

  17 Nelson to Davison 27.7.1803; Nicolas V pp. 143–4

  18 Nelson to St Vincent; to Moira 2.7.1803; Nicoals V pp. 114–15

  19 Nelson to St Vincent 4.7.1803; Nicolas V pp. 116–17

  20 Nelson to Captain Richardson HMS Juno 26.6.1803; Nicolas V p. 103

  21 Nelson to Elliot; to Acton 25.6.1803; there were public and private letters to both men. Nicolas V pp. 95–101

  22 Nelson to Villettes 26.6.1803; Nicolas V pp. 104–5

  23 Nelson to Clarence 6 and 17.4.1803; Nicolas V pp. 57–9

  24 Troubridge to Nelson 27.6.1803; CRK/13

  25 Melville to Nelson various; CRK/8. Nelson to Henry Duncan 4.10.1804; Nicolas VI p. 216. Lord Duncan to Nelson 18.7.1803; CRK/4

  26 St Vincent to Nelson various 1803–04; CRK/11. Admiral Sir Peter Parker to Nelson 20.8.1803; CRK/10

  27 Layman to Nelson 27.6.1803; Add. 34,919 f.173

  28 James Duff at Cadiz, Price at Cartagena and Hunter at Madrid all provided vital evidence while Spain remained neutral; CRK/4 /7 /10