Nelson: Britannia's God of War

by Andrew Lambert

  5 The official correspondence for this period is very full, and reveals a clear and effective direction. ADM 1/4206; 2/149–150; 2/1363 (Secret) 2/923; 3/154 and War Office WO 1/282; 1/711

  6 Nelson to Davison 7.5.1805; Nicolas VI p. 427

  7 Nelson to Emma 16.5.1805; Nicolas VI pp. 441–2. Pettigrew prints other letters but badly edited. The originals are at Monmouth.

  8 Waters, The Art of Navigation in England in Elizabethan and Early Stuart Times, pp. 262–3. Hakluyt’s Principal Navigations was a compendium of Tudor and early Stuart sea knowledge. It must be presumed that Nelson owned a copy, and consulted it.

  9 Nelson to Davison 12.6.1805; Nicolas VI pp. 453–4

  10 Matra (Consul at Tetuan) to Nelson 17.7.1805; CRK/9. Matra had been to the Pacific with Cook.

  11 Nelson to Davison 24.7.1805; Nicolas VI p. 494

  12 Villeneuve to Decrès 13.8.1805; Corbett p. 257

  13 Cornwallis to Nelson 1.8.1805; CRK/2 A few weeks later Cornwallis would bitterly regret that he had not called Nelson over, so that they could meet one last time.

  14 Fremantle to Nelson 15.8.1805; CRK/6

  15 Nelson to Rear Admiral Louis 15.8.1805; Nelson to Fremantle 16.8.1805; Nicolas VII pp. 4–5

  16 Nelson to Admiralty 18.8.1805; Nicolas VII pp. 8–9. Rose to Nelson 20.8.1805; Add. 34,930 f. 167.

  17 Clarence to Keats 22.8.1805; Keats MSS NMM KEA/3; Hood to Nelson 22.8.1805; Keats to Nelson 23.8.1805; Add. 34,930 ff.187–90

  18 Nelson to Keats 24.8.1805; Nicolas VII pp. 15–16

  19 Hood to Nelson 26.8.1805; Add. 34,930 f. 250

  20 Rose to Nelson 26.8.1805; Add. 34,930 f. 251. Nelson to Sir Richard Neave, Chair of the West India Committee 27.8.1805; Nicolas VII pp. 17–18

  21 Exeter to Nelson 25.8.1805; Add. 34,930 f. 235.

  22 Minto II p. 368

  23 Ehrman III pp. 789–90.

  24 Barham to Pitt and enclosure 4.9.1805; Instructions for Lord Nelson 5.9.1805; Laughton ed. The Barham Papers III. London, Navy Records Society 1910 pp. 312–15.

  25 Minto II p. 369

  26 Admiralty to Collingwood 4.9.1805; ADM 1/1363. Hardy to Nelson 3.9.1805; Add,. 34,931 f3o.

  27 Marsden and McArthur 6.9.1805. Bligh and Saumarez 10.9.1806; Lord Mulgrave 12.9.1805. Add. 34,931 ff. 111–80. Dalrymple 31.8.1805 Add.34,93o f319.

  28 Nelson to Davison 6.9.1805; to Collingwood 7.9.1805; Nicolas VII pp.30–2

  29 Lady Bessborough to Lord Granville Leveson Gower 12 & 13.9.1805: Countess Granville ed. Lord Granville Leveson Gower, First Lord Granville: Private Correspondence 1781–1821. London 1916 Vol. II pp.112–4. Lady Bessborough was Gower’s mistress, and had his child.

  30 Nelson to Emma 1.10.1805; Morrison II p. 267. He invited the young man to dine with him.

  31 Sidmouth to Nelson 10.9.1805; Add. 34,931 f. 125

  32 Ziegler, Addington, pp. 244–5.

  33 Stanhope, Life of Pitt, IV p. 330.

  34 John Wilson Croker Diary entry of 1.10.1834, minuting a conversation with Wellington on that day. Croker was a lifelong confidant of the Duke, and a key figure in the creation of the Nelson legend.

  35 Col. McMahon to Nelson 11.9.1805; Morrison II p. 265

  The ‘Nelson Touch’: Nelson explains his plan of attack

  CHAPTER XV

  Trafalgar 21 October 1805

  On 15 September the wind came round and the Victory left Spithead, accompanied by Blackwood’s frigate Euryalus, then coasted for Plymouth to pick up two more battleships. Nelson was soon working on his official correspondence: there were presents and a royal letter for the Emperor of Morocco, offered in the hope of securing supplies for the fleet and the garrison at Gibraltar, along with intelligence of enemy movements. With Portugal under severe Franco-Spanish pressure, Morocco was the last source of water and fresh food near the Straits.1 The Vice Consul at Tangier, James Matra, had just persuaded the Moroccans to relax their ban on food exports.2

  Nor did Nelson forget those he left behind:

  I intreat, my dear Emma, that you will cheer up; and we will look forward to many happy years, and be surrounded by our children’s children. My heart and soul is with you and Horatia.3

  However, his head always overruled his heart: he had actively sought this return to sea, anxious that no one else should reap the rewards he saw as his right. Once he was out to sea, his letters to Emma returned to their usual subject-matter of fleets, winds and professional concerns.4

  With the Combined Fleet in Cadiz, Nelson faced the age-old problem of persuading a reluctant enemy to come out to sea, where they could be brought to battle. French and Spanish fleets had rarely chosen to face the risk in the preceding twelve years. Nelson’s hopes of getting them to do so rested on a combination of possibilities and pressures. He would disguise his own arrival, and the strength of his fleet, hoping they might feel strong enough to face battle. He could also develop the strategy that Collingwood had applied, of an increasingly rigorous blockade: hunger and the lack of naval stores might leave the enemy with little option but to sail, or see the fleet reduced to a ruinous condition. Collingwood had extended the blockade to the small ports close by Cadiz.5 While Castlereagh agreed to a closer blockade, he stressed that it was only applicable if the ports were actually stopped up, and he reminded Nelson that the political cost of awkward relations with neutrals had to be borne in mind.6

  Nelson would also review the offensive options. A direct attack on Cadiz harbour was out of the question: though Drake had managed it in 1587, and Lord Howard in 1596, the defences had been greatly enhanced since then. Nelson had lain off Cadiz long enough in 1797 to know that the best option was long-range bombardment using mortar vessels. There were also two brand new options: the developed Congreve rockets, and the floating carcasses, or mines, of the American inventor Robert Fulton, then using the cover name ‘Mr Francis’. On the day Nelson resumed command, Castlereagh had sent him a note from Francis, who wanted to discuss his carcasses, which ‘might do much execution in many cases of blockade’.7 Nelson was not overly enthusiastic about these new weapons, and despite some experiments at Boulogne, they would not be used in battle until after his death.

  Off Lisbon on 25 September, Nelson urged Sutton to keep quiet about his movements, while Blackwood went ahead with a request that Collingwood should not salute him, or any other newly arrived ships. Two days later, Nelson rounded Cape St Vincent and entered his station. He fixed the fleet rendezvous off Cadiz, with a secondary location at Tangier. Late the following day he was off Cadiz, where he spent his forty-seventh birthday. He would not have been anywhere else for a king’s ransom, even ‘paradise Merton’. Having refused the offer of a seventy-four, Blackwood, the senior frigate captain, took command of the inshore watch.

  Many officers came to pay their respects, and the more senioramong them dined that night. Fremantle of the Neptune was greatly pleased to be given the place he had held at Copenhagen, as Nelson’s second astern. Back on board the following day, to dine with the remaining captains, Fremantle ‘never spent a pleasanter day’.8 Duff, of the Mars, agreed: ‘A very merry dinner. He certainly is the pleasantest Admiral I ever served under.’9 Both men were contrasting the social opportunities Nelson provided with the complete absence of such occasions under Collingwood, who as Edward Codrington of the Orion observed, ‘never communicates with anybody but upon service’. Codrington had longed for Nelson to resume command, ‘that I may once in my life see a Commander in Chief endeavouring to make a hard and disagreeable service as palatable to those serving under him as circumstances will admit of, and by keeping up by his example that animation so necessary for such occasions’.10 Even Calder was preferable to Collingwood: his last dinner brought together twenty captains who showed ‘a strong desire to support each other cordially and manfully in the event of a battle’.11

  Despite the presence of old friends, Nelson had taken command of a largely unknown fleet – most of the ships and captains had been detached from the Channel fleet, and
consequently many had little experience of battle. He could rely on Collingwood, Louis, Fremantle, Hallowell and Berry, but there were many men whose conduct and capabilities were unknown. Nelson used these dinners with his captains to expound the tactical ideas he had already discussed with Keats and Sidmouth. The vital briefing was verbal:

  When I came to explain to them the ‘Nelson touch’, it was like an electric shock. Some shed tears, all approved – ‘it was new – it was singular – it was simple!’ and, from Admirals downwards, it was repeated – ‘It must succeed. If ever they will allow us to get at them! You are, my Lord, surrounded by friends whom you inspire with confidence.’12

  Before the prospect of an offensive action in Italy could be considered, Nelson had to address the danger from the Combined Fleet. The latest intelligence from Portugal reported that Bonaparte had issued sailing orders, but a Council of War had decided that this was not possible. Local sources reported growing Franco-Spanish friction, and that Admiral Decrès was coming to take command.13 Much of the news was inaccurate, a garbled version of reality. Nelson was still short of ships. The enemy had thirty-five or thirty-six, while he had twenty-three, allowing for the six he needed to send for food and water.14 Admiral William Young, now Commander in Chief at Plymouth, reported rumours that the enemy would be forced to sea by hunger: his only fear was that the Brest fleet might head south, so Cornwallis had better be ready.15

  After his discussions about weapons with Castlereagh, Nelson examined the prospects for an attack. It was possible the rockets might work: the Combined Fleet was crowded into the harbour area and might be hurried out by a bombardment, although he still put his faith in hunger. He adopted Collingwood’s practice of detaining the Danish ships, then trying to get into the smaller local ports with French supplies from Bordeaux. The only purpose of the blockade was to force the enemy out.16

  Rumours of an impending small ship attack were soon circulating, and ambitious young officers pressed forward to volunteer.17 Royal Marine Artillerymen were coming for the two bomb vessels, fireships would follow and Blackwood was already working out how to use them: ‘I am very glad to learn your Lordship intends to make the place too hot for them.’ While sifting the best intelligence he could obtain on the winds and currents off Cadiz, both to anticipate the enemy putting to sea and to consider a fireship, carcass and rocket attack, Nelson warned Blackwood to be ready, but to keep the news to himself: ‘there is no occasion for putting the enemy on their guard’. With two bomb vessels he would have a useful offensive force.18

  As soon as he took command Nelson was immersed in a veritable blizzard of paperwork: ‘with the business of such a fleet I am not very idle’.19 On his birthday he spent seven hours writing, most of it routine fleet administration, and the load rarely lightened. Admiral Knight at Gibraltar summed up the effect when he confessed that Nelson’s return had relieved him of a burden of responsibility that had made him ill.20 Food and water were pressing problems, with so many ships so far from a major port or naval base. The only way to keep the force efficient was to send the ships away in rotation to revictual. Six battleships left the fleet on 3 October; three days later the next six ships had been nominated. Meanwhile, store ships and newly arrived units were distributing supplies round the fleet. 10 October was a particularly hard day in the office, with a mass of standing orders and paperwork passing Nelson’s desk. Perhaps the most significant was a new form for reporting the casualties of battle in the manner required by Lloyd’s Patriotic Fund; this would ensure early payment for sufferers, and the bereaved.21

  The human dimension of fleet command was equally important to Nelson. His concern for his juniors, together with his anxiety to reward good service and promote the best men, made him the favourite admiral of every brave officer. He, like every admiral, had his favourites, but they were almost all men of the highest talent. When one of them, Sam Sutton, was invalided home from the Amphion, Nelson replaced him with Norfolk protégé William Hoste, who turned over his current command to Nelson’s nephew Sir William Bolton.22 When Berry turned up in the Agamemnon on 13 October Blackwood observed, ‘Berry is such [a] bird of good fortune, that now he is arrived I feel that the enemy will make a bolt – which God send.’23

  The impact of one supremely charismatic man on old friends and new devotees created a unique professional harmony in the fleet in a matter of days – no one else could have generated the same enthusiasm. To mirror this transformation of morale, the captains chose to paint their ships à la Nelson. His black and yellow colour scheme, with the gun-decks picked out by a thick black line, gave ships a chequerboard appearance when the gunports were lowered. In future years it would be the norm for all fleets. Codrington had been so impressed by the state of the ships of the old Mediterranean squadron that he had already done so, once he thought the Orion fit for the honour.24

  *

  Bonaparte’s orders for the fleet to sail reached Cadiz on 26 September. Gravina reported fourteen Spanish ships ready, but reports that three more ships had joined Collingwood changed Villeneuve’s mind. He did not yet know that the three-decked ship carried his nemesis, only that the enemy seemed to have thirty-one sail, far too many for his motley armada of thirty-three to deal with. On 2 October intelligence from Lisbon revealed that Nelson had arrived, with plans to attack, bombard or burn the Combined Fleet. There was little security for any supposedly secret measures. In response Villeneuve prepared a harbour defence flotilla. Although he could not see Nelson, or his fleet, he knew what lay just over the horizon. On 7 October the allied flag officers met in council: Gravina and the Spanish officers considered the enemy outside was not an ‘inferior force’; and therefore they were not obliged to seek battle. Some French officers agreed, but others condemned such opinions, impugning Spanish honour and courage. The inevitable argument only ended when Gravina called a vote. They decided to stay put.

  Admiral Lord Collingwood

  At the same time Nelson, now aware that the Continental war was about to begin, had to prepare for a longer watch off Cadiz. This meant he had to detach a fifth of his fleet to resupply, or risk having to retreat and allow the enemy out. He would accept battle with an inferior force. Although Blackwood reported soldiers being embarked and every preparation for sea, he detached Rear Admiral Louis with six battleships to replenish their food and water, look at Cartagena and cover a convoy bound for Malta. His sympathetic and inspirational handling of Louis, who was desperate to stay, showed his charm and wit at their very best. Louis left on 3 October, taking with him Hallowell in the Tigre, halving the number of Nile veterans among the senior officers. Nor were the needs of his fleet his only concern. The entire Mediterranean theatre demanded Nelson’s attention: if the situation off Cadiz was not resolved soon Malta, Naples and Sardinia would begin to draw off his forces. Little wonder he was anxious for battle.

  The fleet now lay thirty to forty miles west of Cadiz, with a line of frigates connecting it to Blackwood, supported by an inshore squadron of fast seventy-fours commanded by George Duff in the Mars. Nelson had carefully selected his location: it would let the enemy out, but prevent the fleet being driven through the Straits by adverse weather, while remaining well placed to intercept the Brest fleet before it could contact Cadiz. Even so Nelson was desperate for more ships, to ensure he could turn any fleeting opportunity into a battle of annihilation. Once he learnt, as he did on 8 October, that Craig had orders to act in Italy or elsewhere in the event of a Continental war, he was certain the enemy was destined for the Mediterranean.25 By 10 October he was confident he had penetrated the enemy’s thinking, and could anticipate their moves, warning Collingwood where he thought they would be heading if they left harbour. He also issued his famous Tactical Memorandum to complete the process begun verbally in the Great Cabin of the Victory, explaining the ‘Nelson Touch’ to his captains.

  The Trafalgar Memorandum of 9 October has been much debated: Corbett devoted a great deal of attention to the question of whether it
was carried into effect, while the Admiralty subsequently undertook a minute investigation, published less than a year before the First World War broke out.26 Both missed the key point. The memorandum should not be seen as a free-standing document, but in the context of the verbal discussions of 29 and 30 September, in which Nelson had set out the spirit of his idea. The concept was, as ever, to reduce the complex, demanding problem of arranging a fleet for battle, forcing the enemy to fight, and securing a complete victory into a set of basic ideas that could be easily understood. The written version contained the intellectual fruits of a career dedicated to the pursuit and destruction of the enemy. It distilled the history, techniques and possibilities of sailing-fleet tactics, through the prism of personal experience, and applied them to the situation he anticipated. It was not prescriptive, and anyone who had understood Nelson’s career would not expect him to preclude the effects of chance, initiative, individual impulse, human error, weather or enemy action. What Nelson did give his captains was a priceless insight into his intellectual processes, a guide to the way he thought and the objects at which he aimed, together with the core concept of breaking the enemy formation in two places, to destroy two thirds of their fleet. Yet he did not elaborate on the other core concept: that the enemy’s command and control should be destroyed in the process. This would be his task. Finally, he reminded them that ‘something must be left to chance’ and added ‘in case Signals can neither be seen nor perfectly understood, no Captain can do very wrong if he places his Ship alongside that of an Enemy.’27

  This last was the fallback position for the ‘blockheads’ without the wit to think for themselves. It was the least he expected, not a mantra for success in battle. Experience had taught him that not all captains were equal, and he did not know enough of his new team to rely on them all. This was why he was so careful to choose the ships that would be close to him in battle; all were commanded by men he knew and trusted – Fremantle, Keats (if he arrived in time), Louis, Hallo well and Berry. This was no mere form, or personal preference. It was vital that the flagship be supported by the best and brightest officers. Similarly, Nelson gave Blackwood permission to use his name to issue orders to any ships in the rear of his line on the day of the battle. He had an absolute trust in Blackwood’s judgement.28