The Last Great Cavalryman

by Richard Mead

  The tedium of the ‘Phoney War’ was broken only by a number of visits from dignitaries, including the secretary of state for war, Leslie Hore-Belisha, and the King, who arrived to inspect the division on 5 December. Perhaps more usefully, arrangements were made for one brigade group at a time to be transferred to Lorraine, where the French Third Army was in contact with the Germans on the border with the Saar, allowing units to gain experience of patrolling and coming under artillery fire. Dick’s main concern on a personal level was to resume the flow of cakes which had made his life more bearable in the Great War and to obtain some books for his men, who were very prone to boredom. Lettice duly obliged.

  In mid-October the 12th Lancers arrived in France, moving to Arras where they were to provide local defence for the BEF GHQ. Selby was with them. Dick had not seen him since early 1937, when he and Jo had come over to Europe on a visit shortly after Dick arrived back from Egypt. Immediately after the declaration of war Selby decided to rejoin the Army and, on his arrival in England, was taken on by Lumsden as second-in-command of a squadron, reverting to his old rank of captain.

  Although Dick was delighted to have Selby nearby, he was dubious from the start about his decision. His brother seemed to be on good form when he arrived to join the main body of the regiment from a temporary job organizing reinforcements, but at the end of November Dick’s fears were proved well founded when Selby was admitted to a military hospital in Dieppe, suffering from what was probably jaundice and feeling very sorry for himself. Dick went down to see him, to be told by his brother that he was sure he was not strong enough to stand the winter and that he hated the armoured cars. Dick met Lumsden, who agreed Selby was not really fit for active service and should probably be put in front of a medical board with a view to being invalided out. Dick wrote to Lettice: ‘I always knew that it was a mistake Selby hurrying over here, but I didn’t realise that, having had every luxury for the last 8 years, and living in a good climate, he would crack up so soon!’7 Jo had by then arrived in Paris, but in early January 1940 Selby was shipped back to England, where a medical board duly found him unfit. Jo returned almost immediately to California, but Selby remained in London, off and on, until the spring of 1942.8 Dick did feel slightly ashamed of his brother’s behaviour, although also very sorry for him.

  In mid-December Dick was told by Alexander that he was probably going to move on to a bigger job, but was asked by him to keep it quiet from everyone until it was confirmed. On 11 January 1940 he heard officially that he was to take over 2 Light Armoured Brigade. His successor as GSO1, William ‘Monkey’ Morgan, arrived two days later and Dick was back in England by the following evening.

  Alexander wrote to Dick shortly afterwards: ‘It was very sad to see you go – and although I am delighted for your sake, it makes your loss here none the less. I have enjoyed our partnership enormously and am most grateful to you for all your able and excellent work which has now been fittingly rewarded.’9 The seventeen months spent as Alexander’s right-hand man had done Dick an enormous amount of good in terms of experience as a senior staff officer and understanding of infantry operations. Most importantly of all, it had confirmed him, in Alexander’s own words written long afterwards, as a ‘trusted friend and companion whose wise advice and companionship meant much to me.’10 A happy combination of circumstances was to bring them together again, just at the time when Dick needed it most.

  THE SOMME AND THE SEINE

  Chapter 11

  The Somme and the Seine

  After a brief meeting with Lettice in London, Dick travelled straight to Saffron Walden, where his brigade was situated. However, on telephoning the HQ of his superior formation to announce his arrival he was told to take a week’s leave, much of which he spent at Runwick in bed with a temperature. It was not until the afternoon of 22 January that he arrived back at Saffron Walden and was able to take stock of his new command.

  2 Light Armoured Brigade was a major component of 1 Armoured Division which, until a month before Dick’s appointment, had been the sole such formation in the United Kingdom. It was still the only one which was even close to being fully equipped, as 2 Armoured Division at the time comprised barely more than a divisional HQ. This compared with the six complete and highly trained panzer divisions which Germany had deployed against Poland in September 1939 and the four more which would be available by the time it launched its assault on France and the Low Countries in May 1940.

  That this situation had been allowed to develop was an indictment of the parsimony of the British Government and the reactionary attitude of the Army establishment towards armoured fighting vehicles, both of which had persisted throughout the inter-war years, squandering the leadership in armoured warfare which Great Britain had established by 1918. The voices of the small band of tank enthusiasts had gone almost unheard until 1931, when 1 Brigade Royal Tank Corps was created, although even this small formation was experimental in nature and did not achieve permanent status until 1934. It was only at the end of 1937 that the Mobile Division, with which Dick had cooperated so enthusiastically in the first half of the following year, was formed and later renamed 1 Armoured Division.

  The division comprised three subordinate formations, the other two being 1 Heavy Armoured Brigade and 1 Support Group. All the light tanks were in Dick’s brigade, which was formed of three cavalry regiments mechanized in the 1930s, the Queen’s Bays (2nd Dragoon Guards), the 9th Lancers and the 10th Hussars. Dick knew all their commanding officers, respectively George Fanshawe, Christopher Peto, who had been a fellow student at Sandhurst in 1915, and Charles Gairdner, who had been brigade major of the Cavalry Brigade in Cairo during Dick’s time there in 1936. Dick’s own brigade major from early May onwards, John Anderson, described the brigade as a ‘family party’, such were the close friendships that existed amongst the cavalry officers. The cruiser tanks were to be found in the other armoured brigade, whose units were all battalions of the Royal Tank Regiment and whose background and traditions were thus quite different. Whilst it would be highly misleading to describe the RTR officers as professionals compared with amateurs in the cavalry, Roundheads and Cavaliers might not be too far from the truth. The Heavy Brigade was likewise something of a family party, its commanders in the first half of 1940 both being former members of the RTR, first Vyvyan Pope, whom Dick had admired in the Mobile Force in Egypt, and then John Crocker.

  The armoured fighting vehicles in these two brigades themselves reflected the historic lack of interest in armour by the military hierarchy. The light tanks in Dick’s brigade had been developed in the early 1930s by Vickers Armstrong. By 1940 these were mostly the Mark VI variants, A and B, but although they were robust little vehicles with a fast maximum speed of 35 mph, they were under-armoured and under-gunned, their armament consisting of one .50 and one .303 machine gun. The other tank, initially confined to the ‘heavy’ brigade, was the cruiser A13, in both its Mark III and more heavily armoured Mark IV variants. This had as its main weapon the quickfiring Ordnance 2-pounder, with the right shells a moderately satisfactory anti-tank gun, but not suitable for use with high-explosive ammunition. The A13s were, in theory at least, a match for the PzKpfw IIs and IIIs equipping the German panzer divisions, but were far from reliable. They were also in short supply and there were still a number of the older and more cumbersome A10s in use.

  The third of the three components of the division was 1 Support Group, which theoretically contained all the artillery, infantry and engineers. By the time that Dick arrived, however, the two regiments of Royal Horse Artillery had been sent to join the BEF and had not been replaced. There were two regular rifle battalions, but these were also shortly to be removed. Other than the engineers, which at one point became divisional troops before reverting to the Support Group in the field, the only other unit was a territorial infantry battalion, which was in the course of being converted into a combined anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery regiment. Motor transport for 1 Support Group was thin o
n the ground and even incorporated the vehicles of a travelling circus, complete with barred lion cages! It was this and other deficiencies which led to its commander, Freddie Morgan, describing the division subsequently as ‘more of a basis for argument than an instrument of war.’1

  Dick’s first priority was to relocate his brigade from Essex to the area in South Dorset and Hampshire where the rest of the division was concentrated and where he was much closer to the HQ of his divisional commander, Roger Evans, at Breamore House near Fordingbridge. He and Lettice decided that they would rent a house near his own HQ at Wimborne for two months and she moved down from Runwick shortly afterwards. However, they found the new accommodation uncomfortable and Lettice returned to Runwick after the letting period, while Dick stayed at the King’s Head in Wimborne.

  The following weeks were spent in a variety of exercises and training schemes for the various units and TEWTs (tactical exercises without troops) and conferences for the officers. During March, however, the War Office decreed that the organization of armoured divisions would change with immediate effect. Instead of the two armoured brigades differing in both nomenclature and equipment, they would now become identical: 1 Heavy Armoured Brigade was renamed 3 Armoured Brigade and 2 Light Armoured Brigade became simply 2 Armoured Brigade. All the cavalry regiments and RTR battalions would have three squadrons, each of four troops of 3 tanks, plus 4 tanks for the squadron HQ. With 4 more tanks in the regimental or battalion HQ , this resulted in a war establishment of 52 tanks. Adding the 10 tanks at Brigade HQ , which were mostly A10s, the full complement for each brigade worked out at 166 tanks, all of which were intended to be cruisers. In practice there were nothing like enough cruiser tanks available to equip the division to these levels, so light tanks continued to provide nearly half the establishment. By the time the division departed on campaign, Dick reckoned that each regiment in his brigade had 20 light tanks and about 22 cruisers, woefully short of what was intended.

  Dick experienced much more difficulty in converting his brigade than Pope and Crocker. First of all his men had to be retrained on cruiser tanks, with which they were completely unfamiliar. There was not enough time to do more than give the crews basic instruction on driving, maintenance and the use of the 2-pounder gun. Dick tried to fit in as much training as possible for the three regiments at the range at Linney Head in Pembrokeshire, during which he drove a cruiser across country himself and found it an exhilarating experience. Secondly, the units of the two brigades had different strengths in personnel, those of the RTR numbering 30 officers and 573 other ranks, whilst the cavalry regiments ran to 24 officers and 492 other ranks. The new standard establishment of 31 officers and 546 other ranks meant that, whilst Pope and Crocker could get rid of their worst performing men, Dick was compelled to bring his brigade up to strength by taking draftees from the training regiments, many of whom subsequently proved to be of poor quality. There was a particular shortage of specialists, notably drivers and mechanics, the latter having little familiarity with the cruisers.

  All this put Dick under considerable pressure, although this was relieved by two competent brigade majors in succession, Archie Little and, shortly before leaving for France, John Anderson. Anderson was later to say of Dick that ‘he inspired utter devotion among old friends and new ones alike and, at times, considerable alarm as well! At heart the gentlest & most sensitive of men, he could nevertheless “explode” in a frightening way “out of a blue sky” and with a surprising violence of language! Those who knew him well took note of a somewhat wintry smile which was the danger signal & the storm blew up very quickly indeed. I was reduced to tears by him, but within ten minutes he was seeking me out to say how sorry he was.’2

  On 3 May the division received the warning order for a mid-month move to join the BEF in France. Exactly one week later the Germans struck in the west, making immediate gains in the Netherlands and Belgium, whilst the BEF, faithful to Gamelin’s Plan D, moved forward from its prepared defences to the Dyle Line. Having been inspected by the King on 14 May, the division began its move to the Continent without any artillery except the composite 101st Anti-Tank/Anti-Aircraft Regiment, which had a dozen 2-pounder anti-tank guns but nothing heavier than Lewis guns for its anti-aircraft batteries. Worse still, the two rifle battalions had been moved at short notice to 30 Brigade, hurriedly assembled under Dick’s great friend, Claude Nicholson, and destined for a heroic, but in the end fruitless stand at Calais, which would see most of the survivors incarcerated for the duration.3 There was thus no infantry in the division. Morgan lost most of his HQ to Nicholson, the newly arrived replacements lacking any practice in working together, but with only one unit and the division’s engineers under command, 1 Support Group was doomed to irrelevance.

  Somewhat bizarrely, therefore, it was the Support Group which left first for France, although there may have been some logic in it providing air cover, however paltry, with its Lewis guns. It was followed by 2 Armoured Brigade, which, in spite of nearly three weeks’ warning, was still lacking some vital equipment and adequate ammunition. For example, although all the tanks had dischargers for smoke bombs, there were no such bombs available and these were sorely missed when the time came to attack the enemy. Notwithstanding the deficiencies the Brigade HQ and the Bays sailed on schedule, arriving at Cherbourg on 20 May, with the 9th Lancers and 10th Hussars disembarking the next day. What followed was four weeks of extreme confusion, heroic but futile endeavour and ultimately total failure.

  By the time that 2 Armoured Brigade had concentrated at Pacy-sur-Eure, east of Evreux, on 22 May, the situation for the Western Allies was dire, as Evans explained to his brigadiers at a conference that afternoon. On the previous day the first and only successful tank attack against the Germans had taken place near Arras, but it had proved only a temporary respite for the BEF, the French First Army and the Belgian Army, which had been cut off from the rest of the French forces. The German panzer divisions had reached the English Channel near Abbeville on the night of 20 May and had crossed the Somme at various points, although the panzers had swung north towards Boulogne and Calais, leaving their infantry to establish a defensive flank along the river. There was no immediate hope of 1 Armoured Division achieving its original objective, which was to join up with the BEF. Evans was under orders instead to cooperate with the French, with a view to stopping any further incursions south of the Somme, eliminating the existing bridgeheads and crossing the river as quickly as possible. With this end in mind, the Bays were ordered forward to the Forêt de Lyon and thence to the Somme, across which they would establish a bridgehead through which the other two regiments would pass.

  From the outset these orders seemed to Dick to be impossible to execute, in the absence of any infantry or artillery other than whatever the French could supply. He nevertheless instructed the Bays to move forward on 23 May, although they were unable to reach the Somme that day largely because of heavy congestion on the roads. Dick met Fanshawe in Aumale that evening and gave orders to reconnoitre a number of bridges over the river between Amiens and Abbeville. When patrols were sent forward, including one from brigade HQ, they found all of them to be either destroyed or in the possession of locally strong German forces. More encouragingly Dick now acquired some infantry in the shape of the 4th Battalion, the Border Regiment (4 Border), which had been separated from its parent brigade whilst on line of communication duties. An attack was planned on the crossings at Dreuil, Ailly and Picquigny by the Bays and one company of 4 Border.

  At 0630 hrs on 24 May a liaison officer arrived from the division to inform Dick that the French were planning a large attack themselves. In the event this developed into a fruitless artillery duel, but Dick decided to postpone his own attack to take advantage of the distraction. The Bays then advanced along the river and two platoons of 4 Border managed to cross it at one point, but with a 40 ft gap in the bridge it proved impossible to support them and they were withdrawn. Enemy resistance increased and it soon became a
pparent that without any artillery support and bridging equipment a crossing was impracticable. German shells landed around the 9th Lancers, from whose position Dick was watching the action. One of the officers, Derek Allhusen, recalled that he was completely unperturbed, talking to Peto as if nothing had happened.

  On the next day patrols were again sent to the crossings, but the situation was found to be unchanged. That evening orders were received to move 18 miles west to Oisemont, where 2 Armoured Brigade came under command of the French 2e Division Légère Mécanique (2 DLM), the intention being to combine with it to mount an attack on the large German bridgehead at Abbeville. Attending a conference at the HQ of General Berniquet, the French commander, Dick found to his horror that 2 DLM consisted of a few armoured cars and motorcyclists and about 400 men carried in trucks, so any cooperation in the attack would be very limited. Shortly before the attack was due to begin, directed on the village of Huppy, Berniquet arrived with the news that the French artillery were otherwise occupied and proposing a delay. By that time the 10th Hussars had begun their advance and Dick was out of radio contact with them.

  The attack duly went in with very limited artillery and no infantry support, which inevitably led to disaster. It was not helped by heavy rain which had made the ground very sticky for tanks. Both the Bays and the 10th Hussars fought bravely but took heavy losses from well sited and concealed German anti-tank guns, losing respectively about 15 and 22 tanks, a significant proportion of their armour. The light tanks were already proving to be highly vulnerable. On the next day General de Gaulle’s 4e Division Cuirassée de Réserve (4 DCR), equipped with 120 tanks, of which 40 were well armed and armoured Char Bs, and supported by 3,000 infantry, tried again. Only on 28 May was this division able to break through the defence and force the Germans back across the river, although an attempt to cross was foiled on 30 May. Dick was nevertheless highly impressed by de Gaulle, the only French general in this campaign for whom he subsequently had any time. As he later wrote: ‘It was most interesting to watch his method of control from his H.Q. Many French tank officers had by then lost their tanks and these were employed in motor cycle combinations as Liaison Officers to keep touch with tank units. A constant stream of these officers flowed in and out from his Command Post and he appeared to keep excellent control in this way… Gen. de Gaulle’s verbal orders for his attack on the 28th May were decisive and clear and inspired everyone with confidence.’4