by Richard Mead
By this time 1 Armoured Division was in a sorry state, Crocker having lost nearly as many tanks as Dick in an attack by 3 Armoured Brigade on another part of the Abbeville bridgehead. The only uncommitted unit thus far in 2 Armoured Brigade was the 9th Lancers, so Peto was put in command of a composite regiment comprising his HQ and two of his own squadrons, with a third made up from the Bays and the 10th Hussars, whilst the remainder of those two regiments was withdrawn to near Rouen to refit, the broken-down tanks being transported further back to the divisional workshops at Louviers. The dismounted men were formed into Motor Transport squadrons. The composite regiment was left under the command of 51 (Highland) Division, which had arrived in the area after a long journey from Lorraine, where it had been serving on the Maginot Line, and which now took over a 12-mile front near Abbeville.
The dispersal of his units made command very difficult for Dick. As his failure to contact 10th Hussars before the attack on Huppy demonstrated, radio communication was unreliable, so the only alternative was to visit the regiments and even squadrons personally. Anderson remembered that he ‘kept going literally night & day contriving to be where it mattered all the time … when not in some fairly primitive armoured vehicle on reconnaissance or in personal command he was driving his own staff car, night & day, at high speed, since no driver could go fast enough for his liking! I ventured once to say to him “I don’t know how you go on driving all the time like this”, to which he replied quite simply “you’d get tired – I don’t!”’5 Dick must have had tremendous reserves of energy, as he wrote to Lettice on 26 May that he had only had an hour’s sleep on two of the preceding four nights and again on 29 May that he had spent the previous night with only two hours dozing in a chair. He was well looked after by his batman, Bryant, who had worked for Dick privately before the War.
On 4 June the last British and French troops were evacuated from Dunkirk, freeing up the German divisions for a concerted attack south of the Somme. The composite regiment engaged the enemy very effectively in support of 51 Division east of the River Bresle, Peto and his HQ capturing 2 officers and 40 men whilst covering the division’s withdrawal, but Peto himself was seriously wounded in the hand on the following day and handed over to his second-in-command. Up until this time the only engagement had been with German infantry divisions on which even the cruiser tanks took a toll, in spite of them needing increasing maintenance as their tracks were wearing very thin. On 7 June, however, the Germans threw two panzer divisions into the battle and by that evening they had reached the area of Forges-les-Eaux. Crocker was ordered to hold the River Andelle north of Nolleval, but his units were so depleted that one squadron of the Bays was placed under his orders, together with some still functioning ‘runners’ from both Dick’s and the Divisional HQs.
On 8 June orders were received for Dick’s MT squadrons and all remaining personnel not in tanks to fall back across the Seine, whilst the composite regiment was withdrawn from command of 51 Division and began to make its way south to rejoin the brigade, just in time to avoid being cut off with the Highlanders.6 It saw some more action against German medium tanks near Buchy: one troop leader fired no fewer than 50 rounds at the Germans without any apparent effect, as he only had ‘plugged-shell’ available, normally used for training and able to penetrate no more than 20mm of armour. The regiment crossed the Seine that evening, but not without difficulty due to the officiousness of the French at the crossing points, which required Dick’s personal intervention. With the remnants of 3 Armoured Brigade doing likewise, the whole of 1 Armoured Division was now behind the river with the exception of the Support Group, whose engineers and anti-tank gunners had been overrun, leaving only scattered parties to escape. Morgan himself was in a party which had joined up with the composite regiment.
Whilst Dick admired the officers and men of the French armoured divisions, the same could not be said for their infantry. His opinion had not improved over the previous few days, during which he had seen them retreat in confusion from the advancing Germans, attributing their performance to the debilitating effect of French politics over many years and their recent exposure to German bombing. He was later to write: ‘There was no indication of any defensive preparations having been made on the left bank of the SEINE; the bridges were ready to blow but there were no entrenchments anywhere. The folly of rushing up French Divs piece-meal into the open country between the SEINE and the SOMME was now apparent. The French Inf simply marched on into the woods to the South-West. ’7 At least all his own troops were now behind the next water barrier, poorly defended though it might be, as were those of 3 Armoured Brigade. The bridges at Elbeuf and Pont de l’Arche were blown on the night of 8/9 June.
On the morning of 9 June Dick was summoned to an urgent conference at Divisional HQ south of Elbeuf. Following much ‘clicking of heels and shaking hands’, he found himself placed under the command of General Petiet of the French 3 DLM, which was ordered to hold the line of the Seine. The 10th Hussars and 150 men operating as MT squadrons covered the river from Louviers to just short of Pont de l’Arche and the Bays and a similarly sized party did the same from Pont de l’Arche to Elbeuf. The 9th Lancers remained in reserve.
On the morning of 10 June the Germans crossed the river at St Pierre-du-Vauvray, east of Louviers and the situation appeared critical. Dick brought up the 9th Lancers, who plugged the gap but reported that the Germans were moving south towards Gaillon in large numbers. By the end of the day it was apparent that the enemy had also established a strong bridgehead at Vernon and Dick made it clear to Petiet that he could no longer employ skilled tank drivers as infantry when it was quite obvious that the line of the Seine could not be held. He agreed to leave 9 light and 6 cruiser tanks to act as Petiet’s reserve, whilst withdrawing the MT squadrons to the Le Mans area, where such broken-down tanks as were fit to be repaired had been sent. In the event the Germans turned towards Paris and over the next two days the remainder of 2 Armoured Brigade withdrew without interruption to Le Mans to complete its refitting.
Arriving at the new brigade area on the evening of 14 June and believing that he would be staying there for some days, Dick was just unpacking his kit properly for the first time since arriving in France when he was summoned to divisional HQ about 20 miles away. There Evans told him that there had been a major development. Alan Brooke had arrived in France two days earlier to take command of the remaining British forces there8 and had rapidly concluded that further participation in the campaign would be futile and that only a rapid evacuation would serve the national interest. Supported by John Dill, now the CIGS, he had obtained permission from a reluctant Churchill to commence the operation. Dick was ordered to load his remaining 14 cruisers and 24 light tanks on to a train at Le Mans bound for Cherbourg and to send his B Echelon transport and all personnel to Brest by road. The tanks failed to arrive, never getting further than Caen, but the rest of the division, less its transport, which was left behind at the port, embarked satisfactorily and Dick himself sailed for England on 16 June.
Chapter 12
Q and Bumper
Dick disembarked at Plymouth early on the morning of 17 June and proceeded immediately to 2 Armoured Brigade’s new camp at Longbridge Deverill in Wiltshire where, in Anderson’s words, he ‘at once set about siting the Brigade H.Q. defensive layout in complete detail, weapon by weapon, with fields of fire, etc.’1 The camp was far from satisfactory and Dick began a series of improvements, setting an example by spending hours digging trenches himself. It was some time before he felt able to take the leave to which every man in 1 Armoured Division was entitled.
He could now reflect on the last month. In almost every respect it had been a complete debacle. One relief was that the losses of men in the brigade had been relatively slight: 7 officers and 25 other ranks had been killed, 6 officers and 63 other ranks wounded, and 5 officers and 28 other ranks were missing. Of greater concern was the loss of equipment, with all the tanks and ‘soft’ transport either
destroyed or left behind in France, together with most of the warlike stores. The men had come out with their personal weapons and kit, but not much else.
Perhaps more important than the material losses was the knowledge that the British forces were in most ways no match for the Germans. Their tactics were poor and their equipment was inferior. However, a number of valuable lessons had been learnt. Foremost amongst these was the confirmation that committing armour to an attack without either infantry or artillery support was a recipe for disaster. This had in reality been understood long before the division left for France, making its commitment to the campaign, incomplete in such a fundamental respect, an act of near criminal folly. Unfortunately, and precisely because of the lack of these key ingredients, the experience had done nothing to improve the British Army’s appreciation of how to use its armour and it would be some long time before either its organization or its tactics were to meet the demands of modern warfare.
Other lessons were also learnt. One was that the light tanks were so vulnerable as to be obsolete, their armour penetrated even by relatively light anti-tank weapons. The cruisers had not been markedly inferior to their German counterparts in this respect, but the 2-pounder gun was inadequate with the type of solid shot ammunition in use at the time. On the other hand, whilst the light tanks went on week after week with hardly any mechanical problems, the cruisers were subject to constant breakdowns, many of these associated with their tracks wearing out very quickly. Their problems were exacerbated in Dick’s brigade by its recent conversion to A13s and the consequential inexperience of its mechanics.
The priorities for Dick were now to re-equip and to retrain. The first of these was delayed by the continuing demands of 2 Armoured Division, which was still incomplete: with the possibility of invasion looming, it was vital to have at least one fully operational armoured division. Slowly the replacement tanks began to arrive, still A13 Mark IVs to begin with, followed by the Mark V ‘Covenanter’, which proved to be unsatisfactory as its engine had a tendency to overheat. The improved Mark VI ‘Crusader’ also began arriving later in the year: it was destined to be the main tank employed by the British Army until early in 1942, although it too was never wholly reliable. Like all the others, it used the 2-pounder gun which was increasingly inadequate as an anti-tank weapon against better armoured German tanks and was incapable of use with high-explosive ammunition.
In the meantime training had to progress without armoured vehicles, the MT squadrons formed in France remaining in place. There was a great deal of frustration during the summer as the Battle of Britain took place and fears grew about invasion, improvisation being the order of the day. Much of Dick’s own time was spent on TEWTs, mostly on Salisbury Plain and the surrounding hills. He had acquired a dog of uncertain origin called Beetle, who would accompany him on these exercises. According to Anderson, Beetle’s ‘nervous energy was in inverse proportion to his master’s, although his will-power was just about as great. On long, striding walks and tactical reconnaissances on the Wiltshire Downs it was Beetle who called the tune & dictated the overall pace, defying his owner’s exhortations to greater speed &, what is more, getting away with it every time!’2 Dick as usual was indefatigable, covering great distances to keep in touch with his troops, often riding alone on his motorcycle, as he was concerned about the amount of fuel needed for the staff car.
The campaign in France and Belgium had exposed the failings of a number of commanders and highlighted the qualities of others, so many changes now took place at the senior levels of the British Army. A number of officers who were judged to have done well were advanced, Alexander and Montgomery being amongst those promoted to corps command, but the most significant appointment was that of Brooke to Commander-in-Chief Home Forces. Brooke was on his way to becoming the most influential British general of the War and was already identifying the men who would lead the armies of the future, although at this stage and for some time longer he was inclined to despair of the lack of talent. He visited the brigade twice during the summer, on the first occasion telling Dick how splendidly the 12th Lancers had performed in France. Many in the regiment thought that it was not only Lumsden, but also Dick in the years before, who had instilled in the regiment the qualities which made it the outstanding reconnaissance unit of the campaign. Lumsden had been awarded the DSO and promoted to the command of a brigade. In his reply to Dick’s letter of congratulation, he wrote: ‘I feel that I was extremely lucky to have been in command when the fighting started as that was what I wished for most in the world. But without all the hard work that had gone before and over a period of many years it would not have been possible to take the same risks and escape with so few casualties.’3
In September it was announced that Dick, too, had won the DSO for his leadership in the field. As he wrote to Lettice, it showed that at least Roger Evans had been satisfied with his performance. Evans himself, however, was one of those who had not found favour and was replaced by Dick’s great friend, Willoughby Norrie. Much to Dick’s pleasure, his recommendation of Anderson for a DSO also went through at the same time as his own.
With some uncertainty about Dick’s movements, Lettice remained at Runwick. She was expecting their fourth child later in the year and, partly for this reason, Dick was becoming increasingly concerned about the location of their house, which was in an area crowded with army establishments and thus likely to be a prime target of the Luftwaffe. Although Stowell was very much closer to Dick’s HQ, Lettice was seldom there; her relationship with Minnie was going through a difficult patch, with Dick playing the peacemaker whilst sympathizing entirely with his wife. With Stowell not an option, he encouraged her to stay with her Aunt Dora at Wilcot, which was not too far from Longbridge Deverill. He was even more delighted when she elected to take a house at Polzeath for the duration of the school summer holidays, down in Cornwall and likely to be far away from any German bombing. Dick was able to join the family for an enjoyable six days’ leave in the middle of August.
The HQ of 1 Armoured Division was located near Dorking, about 90 miles away from Longbridge Deverill, but the visits there at least enabled Dick to drop into Runwick on the way. His concerns about its safety grew when bombs dropped in the area at the end of September, just after the family had returned from Cornwall, and they had to take refuge for the night in the cellar. The brigade moved in due course from Wiltshire to Surrey to join the rest of the division, with its HQ at Hindhead. Dick was able to spend some more time at Runwick, but insisted that Lettice should move to Wadley Manor, the home of her friends Josephine and Rupert Craven, for the birth. She eventually drove up there with Lucia on 17 October, arriving at the house one hour before their daughter Sarah was born. Dick was delighted to have a daughter and enchanted with her once he was able to visit.
By this time the brigade was being gradually re-equipped with tanks and during the autumn Dick was required to spend many days in South Wales visiting each of his regiments during their training at Linney Head, but contriving to drop in at Wadley on the way there or back. On one of these journeys he was diverted instead to attend a cloth-model demonstration at Longford Castle, near Salisbury, which preceded a full-scale exercise during the following week by Montgomery’s V Corps. The exercise was to involve 1 Armoured Division, under V Corps just for its duration, and 4 Division plus an army tank brigade. In the event it turned out to be something of a disappointment, 4 Division finding itself in difficulty whilst crossing Salisbury Plain at night and grumbling that it had been delayed by two of Dick’s regiments. However, the preliminary demonstration was notable for the first sign of Dick’s feelings towards Montgomery, evidenced in his diary with the words ‘What an unpleasant man Monty is!’ Dick also found Monty’s two-hour long talk at the subsequent conference rather tedious.
On 12 December Dick returned to his office from addressing new recruits at the 10th Hussars to find a telegram informing him that he had been appointed to command 8 Armoured Division with the rank of a
cting major general and ordering him to take up his appointment without delay. Two days later he was on a train bound for Yorkshire, where his new command was forming. At the age of 42, this was a considerable accolade and it is easy to see the hand of Brooke in the appointment. It was also, albeit in an indirect way, due to Churchill. The Prime Minister had been greatly impressed by the German use of panzer divisions in the invasion of France and demanded from the War Office that Britain move closer towards parity with its enemy. ‘I asked the other day,’ he wrote to his Chief Staff Officer, Hastings Ismay, on 5 August 1940, ‘for a forecast of the development of the armoured divisions which will be required in 1941 – namely five by the end of March and one additional every month until a total of ten is reached at the end of August 1941.’4 At the time, there were just two armoured divisions in the United Kingdom, one of which was due to leave for the Middle East as soon as circumstances permitted, while 7 Armoured Division was confronting the Italians in Egypt. Plans were put in place to create a number of others, the timetable largely dictated by how fast the factories could produce the tanks. In September 1940 6 Armoured Division had already been formed under John Crocker, followed by 8 (November 1940), 9 (December 1940), 11 (March 1941) and Guards (June 1941) Armoured Divisions. This was short of Churchill’s target and in fact the British would never get anywhere near the German total – it was the entry of the Soviet Union and the United States into the War that would ultimately achieve the required balance on the Allied side.
