by Richard Mead
Important developments were taking place alongside the raising of the new armoured divisions. In the summer of 1940 Vyvyan Pope had been appointed to the new post of Director Armoured Fighting Vehicles at the War Office, with a key part of his role being the procurement of new tanks in conjunction with the Ministry of Supply. Pope was the ideal man for the job, one whose experience in armour went back to the early 1920s, and he brought a great deal of energy to setting up the infrastructure for the expansion, but he was to be foiled in his main objective, the installation in the new tanks of a 6-pounder gun. The counter-argument to what might have made a great difference to the war in North Africa in 1941 and early 1942 was that there was no design for a tank to accommodate such a gun and that it was better to continue producing those mounting 2-pounders than suspend production for six months while the factories were re-tooled.
One other appointment made in early 1942 would have a more immediate impact on Dick. This was another new role, Commander Royal Armoured Corps, and the man to hold it was Lieutenant General Giffard le Quesne Martel. Known to all as ‘Q’, Martel was an interesting, but on occasion a difficult man. He was neither a cavalryman nor a former member of the RTR, but a Royal Engineer, although his experience with armour went back right to the beginning, when he was a staff officer at the HQ of the Tank Corps in 1916. Subsequently he had designed one of the forerunners of the tracked infantry carriers, had commanded the engineer component of the first experimental mechanized force, had been instrumental in the introduction of the Christie suspension now used in the current generation of British cruiser tanks and had overseen the development of the first infantry tanks, better armoured but much slower than the cruisers. He had recently commanded an infantry division in the BEF and in June 1940 had deployed Matilda II infantry tanks in the only successful British armoured attack against the Germans near Arras.
Martel asked the War Office for a charter for his new role, but this turned out to be too difficult to draw up and it remained somewhat ambiguous. It was certainly agreed that he was responsible for developing a common operational doctrine and the tactical training regime within the armoured divisions. On the other hand, whilst he believed that these divisions were under his operational control, this was never understood by their commanders, let alone by their superiors in Home Forces and its various commands.
For Dick these issues were of secondary importance, as he had to get to grips with forming his division and bringing it up to readiness for active service. The HQ had opened initially on 4 November at Risely Hall, near Ripon, and was temporarily under Brigadier A.G. ‘Kench’ Kenchington, who simultaneously held the command of 24 Armoured Brigade. Dick had met Kenchington during the latter’s previous appointment as BGS AFV Home Forces. He was seven years older than his new GOC and might easily have resented the new arrival, especially as Dick was a cavalryman whilst Kenchington was from the RTR. However, although Dick thought he talked too much he seemed to be amenable.
In October 1940 the structure of the armoured divisions had changed yet again. Each armoured brigade now had its own battalion of motorized infantry, partly balanced by the infantry element of the support group being reduced to a single battalion. The establishment of tanks remained unchanged, but an armoured car regiment had been added. Dick immediately began a tour of inspection, finding that his units were scattered across the whole of Yorkshire. In addition to Kenchington’s brigade, comprising the 41st, 45th and 47th RTR and the 1st Queen’s Westminsters (later renamed the 7th King’s Royal Rifle Corps) and based around Leeds and Harrogate, there was 23 Armoured Brigade under Brigadier W. F. ‘Wallie’ Morrogh, with the 40th, 46th and 50th RTR and the 1st London Rifle Brigade (later the 11th Rifle Brigade) at Whitby, and 8 Support Group under Brigadier H. M. ‘Stan’ Stanford in various other locations. The armoured cars of the 2nd Derbyshire Yeomanry were at Stamford Bridge. Dick thought the units very variable in quality, Kenchington’s tank battalions being markedly superior to Morrogh’s.
To his great pleasure Dick found that his GSO1 was Harry Arkwright of his own regiment and the two of them and Denys Buckle, the assistant adjutant and quartermaster general, got down to work on the first task, the training schedule for the coming months. This was issued only two days later and laid out a schedule of individual, troop and squadron training until early May, followed by a progression of exercises involving whole battalions, then brigades and finally the complete division. The objective was to have the whole formation fit to take to the field by 1 July. Dick’s overall priority was to find the best ways for all arms to work together and he proposed to hold a series of discussions for all the senior officers and staff, covering the employment of the motor battalions, the support of the armour by the field artillery, the use of the divisional engineers and of the anti-tank and anti-aircraft batteries and cooperation with the RAF, all areas which had been deficient in France.
Dick continued to press home the lessons he had learnt. On finding that there was a tendency for the armoured brigades to look at their new tanks admiringly, but not to use them and continue to train on the older models, he wrote to all commanders: ‘This is unsound. By all means train drivers on training vehicles until they have reached the necessary standard, but our mobilisation vehicles are not there to look at – they must be used. One of the outstanding lessons about the employment of the 1st Armoured Division in France was the impossibility of handling equipment and weapons well if the troops are not thoroughly familiar with their use.’5 His main concern was to have sufficient men trained in time for his July deadline. Equipment was also in short supply, with a dearth especially of infantry carriers and 3in mortars for the two motor battalions, both of which Dick thought would be very good, but only if they had the necessary tools of war. Other shortages included only one gun per battery for the 73rd Anti-Tank Regiment and no live ammunition for the 5th Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery, which was in any event training on 4.5in and old French 75mm guns, pending the issue of the new 25-pounders.
Martel came for his first visit on New Year’s Day 1941 and Dick was impressed by him then and at a subsequent conference at Camberley: he was only too keen to help remedy the deficiencies in his division. Brooke was also taking a close interest and paid his first visit to 8 Armoured on 26 February, writing in his diary: ‘Found the division going on well under Dick McCreery.’6
By that time the division was poised to move south to the area around Chippenham, with the divisional HQ at Lackham House near Laycock. With the location of Runwick a continuing concern, Dick had been wondering whether or not to bring the family north and had already insisted on Eldred bringing up Beetle, but he now urged Lettice to look for a house as close as possible to his new HQ. After a number of false starts, she was offered a temporary tenancy of Bewley Court, a medieval manor house on the outskirts of Laycock and about twenty minutes’ walk from Dick’s office. It belonged to Arthur Gemmell of the 12th Lancers and was occupied by his wife Rosemary, who was happy to let it for six months.
Dick was now serving under Alexander again in Southern Command, or so he thought. Martel had a somewhat different idea. On 5 May he wrote: ‘Armd. Divs are lodgers in Commands. Commands cannot order them to move to new localities or give them operational roles without reference to G.H.Q., which means H.Q. R.A.C., but these proposals can be solved by mutual discussion.’7 In practice this system never really worked, as the GOC-in-Cs held a different view, arguing very reasonably that, in the event of invasion, they would become army commanders and would need to have complete authority over all the formations in their areas.
Martel was also at odds with a more formidable opponent in the shape of the prime minister. Churchill wished to have direct involvement in the development of the armoured divisions, writing to the Secretary of State for War and the Minister of Supply on 24 April: ‘I propose to hold periodical meetings to consider tank and anti-tank questions, the first of which will be at Downing Street on Monday, May 5, at 11a.m. These meetings would be attended
by the C.I.G.S, A.C.I.G.S., and General Pope should come, and General Martel and his Armoured Divisional Commanders should also be invited…I am particularly anxious that all officers attending the meeting should be encouraged to send in their suggestions as to the points which should be discussed, and to express their individual views with complete freedom. I contemplate, in fact, a “Tank Parliament”.’8
This was a problem for Martel, for whom Churchill was unsound on armoured matters as he had been listening too closely to the views of one of the armoured division commanders, Percy Hobart. Like Martel, ‘Hobo’ was one of the early tank pioneers, but he was an even more difficult man who had run foul of his superiors while commanding the Mobile Division in Egypt and been forcibly retired. He was reinstated after a petition to the King, with the support of Churchill. Spurning the offer of Martel’s role, he instead accepted the command of 11 Armoured Division. Hobart had long been a proponent of an ‘all tank Army’, which was now anathema to Martel and others who considered that armies should comprise all arms, although there was continuing debate about the appropriate balance.
Martel now feared that Churchill would be influenced by Hobart. His solution was to hold meetings with all his divisional commanders before each meeting of the Tank Parliament, specifically so that they should agree in advance their views on the agenda and speak as one. The majority of the GOCs – Dick, Norrie, Crocker and Brocas Burrows of 9 Armoured Division – were content to play along with this, but Hobart was not. Dick, who was broadly in accord with Martel, described Hobart’s attitude before one meeting as tiresome: Hobart was indeed quite prepared to voice his own opinions, even if they were contrary to those of his colleagues. In the event Churchill realized after four meetings that he was not getting the open expression of views he had asked for, and decided not to proceed with the ‘Parliament’. It was unfortunate that it could not be made to work, as the prime minister’s support was invaluable and some good might have come of the debate. In the longer run it did Martel no good and probably contributed to his being sidelined the following year.
At the end of June, 8 Armoured Division moved to the South-Eastern Command area, with its HQ at Brockham, between Dorking and Reigate. The tempo was now rising, with Dick exceptionally busy, visiting units, running ever more complex exercises and spending time down at the tank range at Linney Head. He was invariably accompanied by his ADC, Tom Powell and occasionally by Harry Arkwright or the GSO2 (Ops), Harry Floyd, a contemporary at Eton with whom he built a close rapport. Rollie Charrington, who had commanded 1 Armoured Brigade in Greece, was invited to lecture the officers on the experience gained in a brief campaign which had been as unsuccessful as that in France and Oliver Leese came to stay for two days to pick up some tips prior to forming Guards Armoured Division. Dick managed to take a week’s leave in early September, based at Bewley Court and largely spent relaxing by riding, playing tennis and going on blackberrying expeditions with the children, with a visit to Stowell thrown in for good measure.
On his return, all his energy was focused on the main event of the year, Exercise ‘Bumper’. Bumper was the largest Home Forces exercise held to that date, involving two ‘armies’, each of two corps, with between them 3 armoured divisions, 9 infantry divisions, 2 army tank brigades and an independent infantry brigade. The background hypothesis to the exercise was that Britain had been invaded by the Germans, whose landings in the north-east and on the south coast had been repulsed, but who had established a firm foothold in East Anglia. The ‘German Sixth Army’ was provided by Eastern Command under Lieutenant General Laurence Carr, the defenders being Southern Command under Alexander. Carr was given two armoured divisions, Alexander only one, 8 Armoured. Brooke supervised the whole exercise from Oxford, whilst Montgomery was the chief umpire.
Dick attended the first conference on Bumper at Alexander’s HQ at Wilton House, near Salisbury, on 19 September and four days later held his own divisional conference. Alexander’s final pre-exercise conference took place on 28 September at his new temporary HQ near Reading and at 0030 hrs the following morning 8 Armoured Division began moving from Surrey to a position in Oxfordshire west of Bicester, concentrating there by 1100 hrs. The ‘intelligence’ indicated that the ‘Sixth Army’ had begun to move rapidly south-west from a line running from March through Ely and Newmarket to Sudbury. Alexander ordered V Corps, with 8 Armoured Division under command, to establish a defensive line roughly along the A5 trunk road from Stony Stratford to St Albans and brought the Canadian Corps into the Chilterns, from where he could move it as the situation demanded. On the left flank was the 8 Armoured Division position, which extended beyond Stony Stratford to Bicester, but there was a vulnerable gap between it and the neighbouring 48 Division.
Contact between the two armies was established that day, when the ‘Germans’ made a successful attack in the St Albans – Luton area, establishing a salient there, but Dick’s troops saw no action. On the following day 2 Canadian Division recovered the salient, whilst units of 9 Armoured Division were encountered by Dick’s reconnaissance regiment, the 2nd Derbyshire Yeomanry, advancing towards Buckingham. The armoured cars fell back, but not before suffering losses. Having failed to find the gap in Alexander’s line, 9 Armoured Division mounted a frontal attack against 8 Armoured Division, but Dick had one priceless advantage. He was in the middle of Bicester Hunt country, where he had a thorough knowledge of the ground from many hunting seasons spent with his sister-in-law at Stratton Audley, which was on his front line. He positioned his troops in well-concealed positions, on which the opposing armour stumbled with disastrous results. In the words of one Canadian observer: ‘The road at CAVERSFIELD was full of Covenanter tanks flying the red and yellow flags denoting “out of action”. Another thrust at Brackley, where 8 and 9 Armd Div tanks had watched each other across the OUSE for some time, had a similar result.’9 Dick’s own casualties were estimated at only 10 per cent.
On the following day, 1 October, as the Canadian Corps pushed the ‘Germans’ back towards Hitchin, 9 Armoured Division again tried to advance, but lacking good intelligence allowed 8 Armoured Division to strike on its flank and rear, destroying Lumsden’s 28 Armoured Brigade and sending the whole division back in confusion, its HQ only just avoiding being overrun. On 2 October, 8 Armoured Division crossed the Ouse and advanced rapidly towards St Neots, finishing off the enemy 27 Armoured Brigade on the way before being withdrawn into reserve. At 0630 hrs on 3 October Brooke brought the exercise to a close.
Dick’s reputation was considerably enhanced by his performance during Bumper. In the subsequent conference Brooke criticized Alexander, unfairly in the latter’s opinion, for dispositions which had lent too heavily on his right flank, rather than on the left where Dick had shown how much damage could be achieved in open country, but he commended Dick and the other armoured commanders for their handling of their divisions. Alex was unstinting in his praise, writing to Dick: ‘Now that Bumper is over and we have had such a great success, just a line to thank you for the grand part you have played in it. Thanks to your brilliant operations near Oxford we were able to gain the initiative and secure success.’10 Martel also sent a letter: ‘I must just write you a note to congratulate you and everyone in the Division on your great success during manoeuvres. The Commander-in-Chief was particularly impressed with your handling of the Division throughout the Exercise, and particularly on the 1st and 2nd Oct.’11
Bumper unquestionably marked Dick out as a senior officer of great potential to Brooke, who within two months would be the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. As far as Alexander was concerned it confirmed Dick not only as an outstanding staff officer, but also as a commander who had the ability to handle a complex formation in the field. For Dick himself, however, change was just around the corner. As he wrote in his dairy on the day after the exercise closed: ‘A v. satisfactory end up to my comd. of the Div.’
Chapter 13
Adviser
The first intimation of a change
had come in August 1941, when Martel put forward a proposal to create a number of Armoured Corps Headquarters. Dick responded, accepting that there was a need to lift the burden of dealing with the multiplying number of armoured divisions and army tank brigades from HQ RAC, but challenging Martel’s argument that each new Armoured Corps HQ should effectively take operational control of two or more armoured divisions. His letter throws some light on his own thinking at the time:
It does not appear necessary to form a group of two or more Armoured Divisions to develop their technique in Armoured fighting. I think that the technique of Armoured fighting, except in exceptional circumstances such as the Western Desert, is an Armoured Division affair or, more often, an Armoured Brigade affair. Again, operational control of say two Armoured Divisions does not appear to be very likely except in a very open theatre of war.
It strikes me that what a Corps Headquarters wants to learn much more than the control of two Armoured Divisions is the combined handling of an Armoured Division and a Motorised Division … Surely one of the outstanding lessons of the fighting in Russia is the failure on many occasions of the Germans to get up sufficient infantry in time to back their Panzer Divisions. The reported reduction of the tank battalions to two, thereby increasing the proportion of infantry, again points to the importance of using infantry in sufficient numbers to back up tanks.
