War Hospital
Page 46
PAGE 240 Inside, boxes fly. The account of the helicopter flight was based on the recollections of four witnesses who were either on the helicopter (Dževad), on the ground awaiting it (nurses Elvira and Samira Duraković), or at a Bosnian army base in radio contact with the pilots (Hadžo Gadžo).
CHAPTER 23: EGRESS
Interviews
Dr. Ejub Alić, Mubina Alić, Dr. Mehdin Hadžiselimović, Dr. Ilijaz Pilav
Documents
Red Cross messages sent by Ejub Alić to Mubina Alić in 1994 dated January 6 (“I’m sending you a photograph… ”), July 12 (“I’m very hopeful…”), and July 17 (“Here love has become very cheap… ”). Letter sent to Mubina Alić via “Mad Max” dated July 26, 1993 (“People are evil… ”). These letters are among a group of several dozen kindly made available by the Alić’s to the author.
Other Materials
Home videotape of Srebrenica taken by Dr. Ejub Alić.
Notes
PAGE 252 The ugliness he saw led him to read his favorite author… Selimović, The Fortress, p. 7.
PAGE 256 On June 8… No other supporting documentation could be found to confirm the exact date of Ejub’s departure, which he estimates was June 8 or 9, 1995.
CHAPTER 24: OVERTURE
Interviews
Dr. Boro Lazić, Sanja Lazić, Damir Ibrahimović, Dr. Ilijaz Pilav
Published Literature
Agence France-Presse, June 12, 1995, describes military activity around Sarajevo and Bosnian government forces’ capture of Mt. Treskavica; Mašić, Srebrenica, p. 178 covers the June 24, 1995, attack on Vidikovac above Srebrenica hospital; NIOD III/5/11 provides details on the military plan, Krivaja 95, including axes of attack (only one, from the southeast, was actually used) and command structure.
Documents
European Commission Monitoring Mission weekly reports provide details about the military activities around Sarajevo described in this chapter, in particular: April 21–27, May 4–11, May 11–18, and June 16–22, 1995.
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998), “UN Srebrenica Report”: Sections 211–212 are about the attempts of Bosnian government forces to break the siege of Sarajevo; Section 225 describes Srebrenica soldiers’ June 26, 1995, attack on Višnjica, arguing that it was a diversionary offensive to draw Serb forces away from the Sarajevo attack, and providing details of Mladić’s response.
Krstić judgment describes the Srebrenica soldiers’ June 26, 1995, attack on Višnjica, arguing that it was a response to the Serbs’ capture of OP-Echo; it also details the Bosnian Serb army plan, Krivaja 95, stressing that the original objective was not, as Boro Lazić assumed, to capture the town, but to split Srebrenica and Žepa and possibly to reduce each enclave to its “urban core,” triggering a humanitarian crisis that would lead to an abandoning of the “safe area” concept.
Notes
PAGES 261–262 It is not a major offensive. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998), “UN Srebrenica Report,” Section 225.
CHAPTER 25: “OUR SINCEREST APOLOGIES”
Note
A great deal is now known about the attack on the Srebrenica enclave and the responses of Dutch U.N. forces. In addition to interviews, this account relies heavily on two secondary sources, both of which are based on original communications of the Dutch forces: the U.N. Srebrenica Report and the 7,600-page NIOD report. The excellent accounts by Chuck Sudetic (Blood and Vengeance) and David Rohde (Endgame) were also extremely valuable, as was the text of the ICTY judgment against General Krstić. I doublechecked these secondary sources against primary source material from MSF (frequent satellite telex reports sent by Christina Schmitz at MSF Srebrenica to MSF Belgrade headquarters) and interviews with those on the ground, including one Dutch soldier, Dr. Gerry Kremer, who, having been relieved of his medical duties by his surgeon replacement a few days before the attack on Srebrenica, spent much of his time with Dutch officers and on the rooftop of the Dutchbat compound viewing the offensive. I’ve done my best to reconcile conflicting accounts and have noted any important outstanding questions in footnotes.
Interviews
Dr. Fatima Klempić-Dautbašić, Dr. Gerry Kremer, Dr. Daniel O’Brien, Dr. Ilijaz Pilav, Naim Salkić, Pierre Salignon, Nijaz Salkić, Christina Schmitz
Published Literature
Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 64–65 (Janvier’s secret hostage negotiations with Mladic and the subsequent change in UN air power approval policy), Rohde, Endgame, p. 11; “NIOD report:” III/5/12 (advance indicators of the attack); III/6/5 (Serb attacks on July 6); IV/4 (explains that the UNMO team had dropped from six to three when, during a rotation on June 24, Serbs had refused entry to the replacements); III/6/5 and III/6/6 (events on sixth, also discusses tacit pledge of Dutchbat to Srebrenicans that they would resist a Serb attack and who knew and didn’t know about this promise); III/6/4 (explanation of the detailed application procedure required for Close Air Support); III/6/24 (Ramiz Bečirović); III/6/8 (denial of Bečirović’s request for arms held by UNPROFOR); III/6/6 (events of the seventh); III/6/7 (events of the eighth including the killing of a Dutchbat soldier, Van Renssen, and failure to transmit air power request); III/6/8 (July 9 including flight of Swedish shelter project residents, Karadžić decision to authorize capture of Srebrenica, Srebrenica War President Osman Suljić’s letter to Bosnian President Izetbegović); III/6/9 (Srebrenicans’ inability to use “Red Arrow” missiles); III/6/13 (July 10 discord between U.S. and Russian Federation in Security Council, debate over calling in a NATO air strike, failure to decide on a resolution, declaration by Security Council chairman calling on the parties to respect the safe area).
Kremer, “Medical neutrality in crisis control areas,” Medisch Contact, #45, November 8, 1996, reviews Dutchbat’s refusals to provide medical care to the local population
Documents
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998), “UN Srebrenica Report”: Section 480 (asserts that the attack on the OPs warranted the use of Close Air Support “even in the most restrictive interpretation of the mandate”); Section 249 (Karremans’ July 7 “appeal on behalf of the population”); 250–251 (attacks on morning of the eighth); 252–254 (afternoon of the eighth and takeover of OP-Foxtrot)
Srebrenica hospital anesthesia records: details of surgery performed on the schoolteacher; records from July 6–11 have some gaps (e.g., no records for July 8 and 9) and appear possibly incomplete; the low number of surgeries represented is inconsistent with recollections of the doctors and nurses involved. They say they were too busy to document all of their work. It is also possible that some of these records were taken or destroyed before I found them in Srebrenica Hospital in 1999.
Unpublished internal MSF reports: situation report from Christina June 26, 1995 (“How come we accept their weapons… ”); Christina’s final situation report covering July 6–22, 1995 (describes being awoken by the shelling on the July 6, agreement to end MSF’s strike on July 9); telex MSF Sreb to Belgrade (hereafter “Bg”) July 6 10:35 (indicators of the attack); telex MSF Sreb to Bg July 7 12:23:27 (Dutchbat refusal to give blood or treat patients, comment “they could at least take some patients”); telex MSF Bg to Sreb July 9 11:49 (“I am sure they will help”); weekly MSF Srebrenica report ending July 7 (“new, more distanced involvement”); telex UN B Company to MSF Sreb July 7 02:11:45 (requests casualty information); telex MSF Sreb to MSF Bg July 8 11:19:59 (casualties opposite Dutchbat compound, July 7’s casualties, Ilijaz close to breakdown); telex July 8 [no time on my copy] MSF Sreb to Bg (Christina hears more than one shell a minute); telex July 9 [no time] MSF Sreb to Bg (“quite tense and shocked”); telex July 9 MSF Sreb to Bg “News from 10:30AM” (Christina requests soldiers and weapons be kept out of hospital complex); telex July 10 MSF Sreb to Bg, 7:00AM (events in hospital overnight July 9–10 confirming Ilijaz worked all night); telex July 10 Dutchbat to MSF
Sreb, 12:16 UTC describes the APCs coming under tank and mortar fire whenever the APCs attempt to move south; telex July 10 UTC Dutchbat logs offers Perspex windows to MSF.
Krstić judgment relates Karadžić’s decision to authorize the capture of Srebrenica.
Notes
PAGE 265 “Say hello to Ibrahim.” This combines information from two sources, which may or may not be describing the same event: The U.N. Srebrenica Report (Section 238) says the “Say Hello to Ibrahim” message was conveyed by an “international humanitarian worker” who saw military preparations, including heavy weapons and tanks, along the Bosnian Serb side of the Drina River on July 4 from near Zvornik down to Bratunac. The NIOD report (III/5/12) describes a similar event, that a U.N. interpreter said on July 5 that a “large column of armoured and mechanized units were moving from the direction of Zvornik to Bratunac… A passing UNHCR convoy only noticed these transports by coincidence.”
PAGE 266 It also reassured her… Karremans was not interviewed. His quote was recalled by Christina Schmitz. His assertion in June that the Bosnian army could hold its positions is also unverified. It is taken from the NIOD Report (section III/5/12) based on the recollections of the commander of the British Joint Commission Observers that Karremans had made this statement to an MSF doctor in June.
PAGE 267 Throughout the morning… The figure comes from a satellite telex message sent from MSF Belgrade to MSF Srebrenica citing information from U.N. military observers based on reports from the observation posts. NIOD III/6/5 says the Bosnian Second Corps in Tuzla reported to UNPROFOR Sector North East that a thousand projectiles hit the city over the day.
PAGE 267 The Serbs fire on positions of Srebrenica soldiers… NIOD III/6/6.
PAGE 267 The Serbs also lob shells into civilian areas… According to capsat 7/7/95, 12:23:27 from MSF Srebrenica to MSF Belgrade.
PAGE 268 Around 1 P.M…. Rohde, Endgame, p. 11, reports the 1 P.M. attack on the defense wall and the “UN Srebrenica Report” describes the 1:20 P.M. hit to the watchtower. Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, reports a hit to the watchtower, p. 267. These might all have been the same event.
PAGE 268 At 1:50 P.M…. NIOD III/6/5 says that only Karremans viewed this as a formal request.
PAGE 269 Janvier, usually based in Zagreb… NIOD III/6/5.
PAGES 269–270 Bečirović communicates with Naser by coded telex. The numbers of troops quoted in this chapter should be taken as inexact, as various sources (“UN Srebrenica Report,” NIOD Report, etc.) quote different and wide-ranging estimates.
PAGE 271 “With our sincerest apologies…” The message is signed, “Greetings, H. G. J. Hegge, surgeon” (the new surgeon who’d arrived in the enclave to replace the departing surgeon, Dr. Gerry Kremer, who was still inside but off active duty). The message is entitled, “Your message concerning patient time 20.17 hrs” and is marked with a UTC time of 20:49.
PAGE 271 Srebrenica awakens Friday… Death toll according to NIOD III/6/6.
PAGE 272 Around 6 P.M…. “UN Srebrenica Report” section 248.
PAGE 274 Around 1 P.M…. For some events occurring over the days of the attack, the local times cited in the NIOD report differ by approximately one hour from the times cited by the U.N. Srebrenica Report. As the sequence of the events is more important than the exact time at which they occurred, I have attempted to at least ensure consistency.
PAGES 274–275 By pulling out… According to U.N. Srebrenica Report (section 254), however the NIOD Report says the unit proceeded through the checkpoint “with permission.”
PAGE 276 Although none of the Dutch commander’s requests… NIOD III/6/8.
PAGE 278 “We want you for our commander!” The quotes are based upon Ilijaz’s recollections several years after the events, and this account was confirmed by Naim Salkić, who was there, and Fatima Dautbašić, with whom he shared the story just after it occurred.
CHAPTER 26: AN UNACCEPTABLE SITUATION
Interviews
Dr. Daniel O’Brien, Damir Ibrahimović, Dr. Fatima Klempić-Dautbašić, Dr. Gerry Kremer, Dr. Ilijaz Pilav, Naim Salkić, Nijaz Salkić, Pierre Salignon, Christina Schmitz
Published Literature
NIOD Report: III/6/9 (events of July 9, UNPROFOR decision to take blocking positions and exact orders given to Dutchbat soldiers, warnings to Bosnian Serb army); III/6/10 (events of July 10, including Srebrenicans’ counterattack, Dutchbat creation of blocking positions, subsequent wounding of the Dutch, Janvier’s assertion that the Bosnian army is capable of defending the enclave; the collapse of the Srebrenica lines); III/6/11 (attack of blocking positions and failure to deploy Close Air Support on the tenth); III/6/13 (Janvier’s fear that UNPROFOR may be manipulated by the Bosnian government); III/6/16 (Srebrenica soldiers’ plans for another counterattack the night of July 10); Medical chapter of the NIOD report details the Dutch refusal to treat the wounded local woman on the night of the tenth.
Rohde, Endgame, pp. 95–97 (describes Srebrenica forces’ July 10 AM counterattack based on interviews with the participants).
Interview with Christina Schmitz published in MSF’s magazine, Ins and Outs, Volume 7 number 9, November/December, 1995 (describes her experience when area near hospital was shelled on the morning of July 10). Kremer, “Medical neutrality in crisis control areas,” Medisch Contact, #45, November 8, 1996 (reviews the Dutchbat refusals to provide medical care to the local population)
Documents
U.N. Srebrenica Report: Sections 273–275 (Bosnian Serb army warned and Dutchbat ordered to take blocking positions); 277–278 (attack on Dutchbat APC attempting to take blocking position), 281 (impact in front of hospital morning of July 10), 284 (Serb infantry movements on evening of July 10 and request for Close Air Support), 288 (panic of population), 295 (Karremans’ promise of air strikes at meeting of Srebrenica soldiers).
Dutch Parliamentary Debriefing Report of January 31, 2003, speculates on the differing interpretations at different U.N. Protection Force command levels of the order for Dutchbat to take blocking positions; the report also asserts that taking blocking positions contributed to fulfilling Janvier’s terms for granting air support.
MSF unpublished communications: July 10 04:17 UTC from Christina to UNPROFOR Srebrenica asking whether Dutch would provide an APC to evacuate MSF. July 10 05:09 UTC from Dutchbat OPs room to Christina answering in the affirmative. July 10 05:47 UTC B-Company to MSF asking for report after seeing smoke in their area. July 10 05:56 UTC MSF to B-Company “we are unharmed…” July 10 telex MSF Sreb to Bg describes events in the overcrowded hospital at 7:00 A.M. including news that Ilijaz’s good friend has just been killed, Christina’s meeting with acting Commander Ramiz Bečirović, and the BBC reporting that Serb forces are denying an offensive (no indication of exactly when she heard this). July 10 telex MSF Sreb to Bg 10:56 UTC describes events in hospital at 9:15 A.M., that hospital is full of armed soldiers, and that Dutchbat liaison has come to Srebrenica and accused the Bosnian soldiers of throwing grenades at the APCs. July 10 telex MSF Sreb to UNPROFOR Dutchbat Captain Schreijen 10:55 UTC reports on shelling in front of the hospital, “We want to continue working…” July 10 telex Opsroom Dutchbat to MSF Sreb 11:34 UTC, “… the enclave is stable.” July 10 telex UTC 16:26 from MSF Sreb to MSF Bg and Pale with details of the injuries suffered in the rocket attack and decision to request Dutchbat medical assistance. July 10 telex UTC 19:27 from Christina to “Major Karremans and everybody who is concerned.” July 10 telex UTC 21:08 from Christina to MSF Bg describing panic of population. July 11 telex UTC 06:51 from Christina to MSF Bg describes conditions overnight.
Anesthesia records found in Srebrenica Hospital: details of the liver surgery performed from 6:10–7:40 A.M. on July 10, the facial and vascular surgery performed from 9–11:30 A.M., several surgeries performed after the rocket attack, the woman Dutchbat refused to treat (as identified by Dr. Ilijaz Pilav) whose surgery began at 2 A.M. on July 11. As mentioned earlier, a number of records appeared to be missing
.
Krstić judgment describes the panic of the population as evening fell on July 10.
Transcript of interview with Dr. Ilijaz Pilav conducted in the autumn of 1995 in which he describes his response to the meeting where Karremans promised air strikes, included in “Eyewitness accounts of the evacuation from Srebrenica and the fate of missing colleagues,” An MSF report, February 1996.
Notes
PAGE 282 Local MSF staff members pick up the wounded… This account is from Damir Ibrahimović, one of the drivers. Christina Schmitz confirmed that MSF’s standing policy was not to transport people in uniform, particularly those with guns, although exceptions could be made for those without, but she couldn’t recall any special requests being made to the drivers on July 10.
PAGE 284 A response arrives in under a half hour… At that point, the Serb army advance toward the town may have seemed for the moment to have been halted, with no attacks on blocking positions, but this quickly changed. Christina described her disbelief in her final situation report to MSF covering the period July 6–22.
CHAPTER 27: KILLING FIELDS
Interviews
Ajka Avdić, Dr. Daniel O’Brien, Muhamed Duraković, Dr. Avdo Hasanović, Damir Ibrahimović, Dr. Fatima Klempić-Dautbašić, Dr. Gerry Kremer, Dr. Boro Lazić, Dr. Ilijaz Pilav, Naim Salkić, Nijaz Salkić, Christina Schmitz, Emira Selimović
Published Literature
NIOD Report: III/6/17 (events of July 11); III/5/11 (describes of the structure of the Serb forces participating in the attack on Srebrenica); III/7/3 (decision to call off air strikes—appears to be a combination of factors. Akashi may have already decided before receiving the message from the Netherlands Ministry of Defense ).