An Inoffensive Rearmament

by Frank Kowalski

  The political struggle in 1950 between the Socialists and the conservative parties generated such violent distrust that meaningful dialogue between “One Man” Yoshida and the Socialists was impossible. Yoshida publicly lumped the Socialist opposition with the Communists while the Socialists regarded Yoshida as an enemy of the people. Unlike the Republicans and the Democrats in the United States, who on many domestic issues fight to the bitter end but who resolve differences on national defense and foreign policy, Japanese political leaders seemed devoid of any disposition to reach a compromise. The issue of rearmament, so vital to the nation, deserved the most thoughtful consideration of all the politicians. Watching the political action in 1950, however, I gathered that the conservative leaders wanted the Socialists to have nothing to do with building the defense forces and the Socialists, locked in their ideological dilemma, refused to consider the critical international situation that faced the country.

  The basic moral responsibility, nevertheless, seemed to rest with the United States. Legally, and in accordance with international agreements, General MacArthur, as the supreme commander of the Allied powers, was placed in Japan to carry out the will of these powers. After the occupation forces decided that Japan was to be permitted to establish a military defense force, the United States, as the principal occupying power, had a joint obligation with Japan to ensure that the Japanese government executed our directive in compliance with the constitution. No sophistry can now be invented to justify the United States’ joining the conservatives in disregarding the Japanese constitution. As an occupying power, we had an obligation to uphold and support that constitution. To argue, as some did at the time, that Great Britain, France, Australia, Nationalist China, and other Allied powers would not agree to rearmament of Japan was to raise the following conundrum: If the United States could induce most of its former allies to fight in Korea, it is inconceivable that we could not convince these same nations that it was necessary to organize a Japanese force to protect United Nations bases in Japan.

  Though it would have been difficult, the supreme commander had the authority and the prestige to call in Prime Minister Yoshida and appropriate Socialist leaders to acquaint them with the military situation facing Japan and to urge them, for the good of the nation, to build a limited military force. Since Article 9 and certain other provisions in the constitution operated against a viable military establishment, the supreme commander should have insisted on a limited revision of the constitution. Unfortunately, the supreme commander allowed Yoshida to convince him that the prime minister did not need the support of the minority parties in the Diet for implementing legislation. Moreover, the Americans and the government wanted to avoid telling the opposition anything about the rearmament program. This unprincipled approach to a problem that was most vital to both the United States and Japan was unworthy of American democracy.

  America, in the interest of Japanese and our own requirements, had a unique opportunity to open channels to the parties on the left in Japan. This, of course, does not mean collaboration with the Japan Communist Party, but it was important for the United States not to isolate itself from the Socialists and other opposition parties, which we Americans should have realized would be around today and may tomorrow be heading the Japanese government. This shortsighted political rigidity on the American side in 1950 created difficult obstacles for our national interests in the Far East. I was repeatedly shocked at the political ignorance displayed by our military commanders in Japan. Time and again, when the Japanese trade union members and Socialists marched in Ōsaka under their red flags, the American division commander and his provost marshal went out of their minds screaming about those “damn communists.”

  Whatever reasons may be ascribed to our conditioning and that of the Japanese government to violate the constitution, the results of that action are disturbing. The NPR in the 1950s, and the Self-Defense Forces today, did not and do not now have the enthusiastic support of the Japanese; the people remain suspicious. In addition, the legal obstacles of the constitution have blocked healthy development of the military establishment, undermining its legal base and weakening its professional structure. Most significant, our close association with the conservative elements has alienated intellectuals, progressives, students, and trade union members who initially turned to us for guidance and understanding.

  No one, neither the Americans nor the successive conservative governments and the Socialists and other opposition parties, can point with any pride to the way they jointly and individually handled the constitutional question regarding the rearmament of Japan.

  Without question an equally important problem, which deserved the searching attention of all the politicians and the Japanese people, was the matter of selection and training of the leadership for the future military forces. Japan had suffered a devastating war precisely because the leadership of the Imperial forces had gone astray. Yet the tremendously important questions regarding qualification, selection criteria, promotion requirements, and training policies for the officers of the new force were never considered by the Diet and never debated in public. All criteria for officer qualification and development was left to the determination of the cabinet, that is, in the control of the party in power. Whereas the U.S. Senate confirms original appointments and all promotion of officers, giving both the Democrats and the Republicans an opportunity to consider the qualifications of each new candidate for military commission and the records of the officers being promoted, the Diet has no such authority. The decision to induct former Imperial officers, the timing of their recruitment, and their rank and qualification criteria were all matters determined by the prime minister with the help of his advisers. Unquestionably, the former military officers brought valuable skills and knowledge to the NPR. Nevertheless, their selection, future training, and schooling deserved the closest supervision by an appropriate committee of the Diet.

  Unfortunately, the ideological nature of Japanese political disharmony made it impossible for the politicians to reason together even on this vital issue, pointing up again the basic failure of national politics in Japan. The majority and opposition parties were unable to find a mutually satisfactory arrangement for studying and determining the best way to organize the new military establishment, because the opposition was ideologically against such a force. Nevertheless, failure to revise the constitution and the one-sided decision regarding leadership in the NPR determined the kind of military establishment the nation has today and what it will be in the future. Although the Socialists and opposition parties refused to consider the revision of the constitution or to participate in solving the leadership problems, their resistance was too weak to prevent the establishment of the NPR or the development of the present military forces. It should have become apparent that political decisions affecting national institutions cannot be endlessly put off by any political party nor can they be arbitrarily made by any one element in the country. The politicians in any country must find a way to hammer out the difficult issues, recognizing that in a democracy, “politics is the art of the possible.”

  A critique enables one to isolate and analyze mistakes and open avenues for corrective action. An examination of achievements, on the other hand, affords opportunities for building on past successes for more effective performances in the future. There were obviously many mistakes made on the American side and by the Japanese in establishing, training, and deploying the NPR. We have examined two, which I considered major deficiencies in our decision making. I think we can also learn much from a consideration of what was accomplished by the NPR and the way the buildup of Japanese forces was achieved.

  For the Japanese government, the NPR was the difference between helplessness and a means for maintaining authority. As the new force moved into vacated American camps and grew and developed, confidence, dignity, and independence returned to Japanese officials. Though it never became necessary for the Japanese government during those uncertain days to call upon the NPR
, the force was there, available to maintain law and order and to defend the nation, if that had become necessary. To those Japanese critics who today point an accusing finger at the inadequacies of the civilian leadership of the NPR, I can only say that the fledgling organization did its job well enough to maintain national tranquility without the fuss of the prewar military.

  Though a military force organized by former Imperial officers would have served equally well the purpose of the Japanese government and the needs of the United States, there was born in the NPR something new and different, something former Imperial officers on their own initiative could likely not have given the new Japanese army. The unique difference was that the individual member became the most important concern of the NPR. Unlike the heitai of the Imperial Japanese Army, the yobitai became an individual, dignified and respected as a person. Officers and noncommissioned officers treated the yobitai as intelligent and capable of learning and doing anything their superiors could accomplish. I was most favorably impressed in those days on visiting the NPR units to find young soldiers taking notes during instructions and referring to notes previously taken in discussing weapons, tactics, and equipment. No longer did a sergeant or officer dare to strike or kick a soldier in ranks. Nor did the yobitai or the officers behave superior to the civilian citizenry of Japan. What was especially gratifying to me was the deep concern the public demonstrated when on occasion some officers resorted to abuse practiced in the Imperial Army. This respect for the dignity of the individual fighter is undoubtedly the most important contribution the NPR made to the future of the nation.

  Yet the heitai of the Imperial Japanese Army was a great soldier, a courageous fighter, ready to die for the emperor and the country. Many believe that the new soldier of Japan is better educated and more reliant than was the simple heitai, but there was something very tough in the fiber of the fighting soldiers of the Pacific War. They acquired this quality through centuries of human refinement. No country can afford to squander these assets by soft, fuzzy thinking. Discipline is as important in an army of a democracy as it is in the army of a dictator or an autocrat. Spirit is as vital a force in the new Self-Defense Forces as it was in the Imperial Japanese Army. Courage and valor are as indispensable today as they were in yesterday’s heroes.

  The time may now have come to take another look at the Imperial Rescript. In my opinion, there is nothing in the rescript that would negate the dignity of the individual soldier. To me, there is nothing inconsistent with respecting a soldier and at the same time demanding obedience from that soldier. Superiors can command subordinates without abusing them, and soldiers can be disciplined without the need to have them grovel.

  The Imperial Rescript was promulgated thirteen years after the Imperial Army was formed. Eighteen years have now elapsed since the formation of the NPR. Perhaps the time has come for a new rescript to be delivered to the new military forces of the nation, one that will incorporate the inspirations of the past with the democratic concepts of the new era.

  Civilian control of the military establishment is an equally important new concept the NPR contributed to democratic Japan. In the broadest sense, civilian control means civilian supremacy in politics. Democratic theory proposes that control of the military of a nation by appointed or elected civilian officials makes it impossible for military leaders to seize the reins of government. Steadfast commitment to the principles of civilian control will, in time, lead to intelligent institutional arrangements and procedures that will permit the maximum utilization of the professional skills and knowledge of the military without jeopardizing the independence of the government from the will of the military. In this arrangement, the military must always be placed in a subordinate position to the elected representatives of the people. They will accept this subordinate position, as they have in the United States, only through indoctrination at all levels in the military and in the nation’s total society. Our American generals today and throughout our history have accepted civilian control because they were conditioned to this concept as cadets in the United States Military Academy and throughout their services in the Army. If the Japanese cadets in the National Defense Academy (Bōei Daigakkō) are encouraged to doubt the desirability of civilian control, and if the officers of the Self-Defense Forces dispute the validity of this principle, the generals and admirals will soon find a way to again seize the government of Japan. In a democracy there of course can be no objection to a retired military officer or one who has left active duty running for elective office. In the final analysis, if representative government continues in Japan, then the principle of civilian control will rest with the people.

  In practice, civilian control tends to place civilian officials and the military in adversary positions. The system should not degenerate into control by bureaucracy nor should all planning and administration be the sole province of the civilians. Civilian control could mean leaving the battles to be fought by the generals and reserving to the elected representatives of the people the discretion and the direction of wars. The most effective way to control the military is to control the funds they can expend and the appointment and promotion of all military officers.

  Another important achievement of the NPR was the great leap forward Japanese rearmament made by accepting new military concepts of training, tactics, logistical procedures, and budgetary controls. All these concepts have played a role in developing the new defense forces. Had the views of Colonels Tsuji and Hattori and some of the other former Imperial officers prevailed, Japanese rearmament would have followed the road of building a massive army of twenty or more Imperial-type divisions organized and trained in accordance with traditional Japanese concepts. Under those concepts, Japanese rearmament would have started where the surrender armies were disbanded. By initially accepting American equipment, training methods, tactics, and logistical systems, the NPR provided a proving ground where the best from both American and Japanese military thought could be viewed, studied, analyzed, and integrated to suit the new requirements. During the past eighteen years, this sifting process has proceeded cautiously and intelligently and has served the best interests of the United States and Japan.

  The slow, gradual, carefully timed rearmament initially conceived by Prime Minister Yoshida and faithfully carried out by successive Japanese governments has allowed Japan to advance its economic and strategic interests without arousing suspicion among its former enemies and without ever provoking the Far East communists. Though the pace of rearmament has not been rapid enough to please some Americans, the program has not neglected vital defensive measures of mutual concern to Japan and the United States. The Japanese Imperial generals and admirals, likewise, have not been satisfied with the speed or magnitude of the rearmament. The mass of the people, however, seem to be quite happy with what has been done. Jobs, family security, education, welfare, and national prosperity are more on the minds of the people than heavy appropriations for armaments. Many are convinced that their phenomenal industrial expansion was owing in a great measure to their small national investment in weapons and troops.

  The limited nature of rearmament, moreover, has served to keep Japan out of overseas involvements. Throughout 1951, pressures mounted from the American side to accelerate the armament pace. While Prime Minister Yoshida grudgingly agreed to expand the NPR to 110,000, American planners were urging a force of 300,000. Had Japan in those days expanded her forces to 300,000, instructions surely would have come from the United Nations to send an expeditionary force to Korea. How long and how deep such an involvement might have become is, of course, impossible to determine. Similarly today, Japan with its limited forces cannot be expected to support the United States in Vietnam.

  It is important to recognize that the rearmament of Japan is closely integrated with the mutual security treaty the nation has with the United States. The pact signed in 1960, currently in effect, provides American military protection for the home islands of Japan and permits the United States to maintai
n military bases on Japanese soil for the purpose of mutual security. The pact requires the United States to consult with the Japanese government before committing any of our forces stationed in Japan to hostile action against an enemy. This requirement, together with the provisions of Japanese law that prohibit the presence of nuclear weapons in Japan, create political difficulties time to time when American carriers and submarines visit Japanese ports. In general, however, the mutual security treaty, by providing a military umbrella over Japan, has permitted Japan to proceed with its rearmament program at a leisurely pace.

  In summary, the NPR adequately and effectively provided the urgent defense needs of the United States and Japan in 1950. It was conceived and established in the exigencies of war rather than as a deliberate first step in the rearmament of Japan. In the formation of the NPR, the United States and the Japanese government trampled upon the Japanese constitution, deliberately confusing the truth and sadly violating moral commitments. The Socialists and opposition political parties of Japan refused to recognize the dangers facing the nation, assumed a rigid political stance, confused the electorate, and in the end achieved little of positive value. Nevertheless, the new Self-Defense Forces of Japan have imbibed deeply of democracy and are committed to an abiding concern for the individual soldier and a firm resolve to make civilian control effective. Within the limitations imposed by the structural deficiencies of the constitution, Japan is developing a small, modern, highly effective military establishment and a significant armament industry. This quiet and reasonable approach to the rearmament program has been achieved without ruffling the national feathers of Japan’s former enemies, the neutral bloc of nations, or even the communist Far East. Thus, while remaining under the protection of the American military umbrella, Japan’s inoffensive rearmament permits it maximum latitude to seek again a place, if it so decides, in a new East Asian coprosperity sphere.