Concrete Hell: Urban Warfare From Stalingrad to Iraq

by Concrete Hell- Urban Warfare From Stalingrad to Iraq (epub)

  Map 8.1 The Initial Russian Attack into Grozny, December 1994

  The Red Army of the Cold War, despite its lack of expertise in urban fighting, was still a superbly equipped, well-led, and well-trained modern military force. However, the same could not be said for the army that entered Chechnya just four years after the end of the Cold War. The political collapse of the Soviet Union heralded an internal collapse inside the Red Army. Communism, and the discipline and authority built around the Soviet Communist Party, was one of the bedrocks of the Red Army. When Soviet Communism collapsed so did the Red Army. Externally, the army still appeared a formidable force. Though Soviet military forces had numbered over five million in the late 1980s, the rump of the forces still available to the Russian Republic in 1994 retained a formidable strength of over two million. However, the quality of the force was dubious.

  The collapse of the Soviet Union was occasioned by the collapse of the Soviet economy. The economic collapse had significant effects on the army. Budgets were cut and training was cancelled; and more importantly, routine logistics functions came to a standstill. The army could barely feed itself, and getting access to necessary commodities such as fuel became problematic. As the country disintegrated politically, the population began to refuse to comply with conscription. As regions of the country declared their autonomy from Moscow, large elements of the military stationed in those regions, such as the Ukraine, broke away. The military high command was focused more on political survival and privileges than on its soldiers and units. Soldiers in garrisons began to desert. Other soldiers sold their personal, and even unit equipment, including weapons, in order to buy food and alcohol. Pay for the soldiers, never very much, failed to materialize for months. Regular army units, the motorized rifle regiments and divisions, were the hardest hit by these conditions. Elite units such as paratroopers and Spetsnaz special operations forces, nuclear forces, and the air force and navy were not as dramatically affected. The conditions within the regular army forces were disastrous. By 1994 most units were only shadows of their paper personnel strengths, they were receiving virtually no training, and much of their equipment was inoperable.

  The Russian force assembled outside of Grozny in December 1994 numbered nearly 24,000 men: 19,000 from the Russian army and approximately 5,000 from Russia’s internal security forces. The army forces consisted of five motorized rifle, two tank, and seven airborne battalions plus supporting artillery, engineers, aviation and other elements. The major army equipment included 80 tanks, over 200 infantry fighting vehicles, and over 180 artillery pieces. There were over 90 helicopters in the supporting aviation element. Despite these numbers, the force’s combat power was modest by Cold War standards. Its combat elements resembled the combat power of a reinforced motorized rifle division. The seven airborne battalions were some of Russia’s best elite troops, however the airborne battalions themselves were very small units and the total of the seven battalions was likely smaller than that of the five motorized rifle battalions. The concept of the Russian operation was for the army to lead the advance to Grozny. Then, on order, attack the city to seize important government, economic, and communications centers. The internal security units would advance behind the army and once the city was under army control the security forces would take over control from the army.

  Chechnya, the breakaway province, did not have an army. The military forces of the province were built around a small cadre of former Soviet soldiers. They formed a small provincial guard that probably numbered fewer than a thousand. Another group of approximately 5,000 was made up of irregular volunteers with little formal military training. They were led by those volunteers who had experience in the Soviet army, of which there was no shortage. There was some Russian military equipment left in the province following the withdrawal of the Soviet Army in 1991, which included about 40 main battle tanks, 30 armored personal carriers and scout vehicles, and about 30 122mm medium artillery pieces. The Chechen fighters organized as squads of six to seven men. Each squad had at least one RPK medium machine gun, one RPG rocket-propelled grenade launcher, and one designated sniper. Three squads combined with a medium (82mm) mortar team made up the basic fighting unit. Three of these platoon equivalents were formed to make up a 75-man fighting group, the equivalent of a small company. They communicated with each other using commercial handheld radios. The Chechen forces’ major advantage other well, and had a thorough knowledge of the urban terrain over which they fought.

  Marines wearing protective masks prepare to employ CS gas and assault a building to clear out snipers. The use of CS gas as part of military operations has since been outlawed by international agreement, though it is still used widely for riot-control purposes. (Getty)

  Marine infantry of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, fight their way from house to house in the old city north of the Perfume River. The lead Marine on the left in this photo is armed with the M-60 light machine gun and carries a smoke grenade. The other Marines are armed with M-16 assault rifles and carry extra ammunition for the machine gun. (Topfoto)

  French paras enter Algiers. The French paratroopers were the elite of the French army and, with extensive experience in Vietnam, considered experts in revolutionary warfare. (Getty)

  Yacef (center) was the leader of the FLN’s military arm in Algiers. He established an extensive network of bomb-makers, bombers, and supporters throughout the Casbah. This network was systematically destroyed by the French through the use of very controversial interrogation techniques, including torture. (Getty)

  Soldier of the 3rd Battalion, The Light Infantry, passes ruined terraced housing during a patrol of one of the Peace Lines in Belfast in 1977. Poverty and lack of opportunity were legitimate grievances of the Catholic community and led to the beginning of the war. These grievances could only be answered with political action. (IWM, MH30550)

  Soldiers from 2nd Battalion, Royal Anglian Regiment, fire baton rounds at rioters during “hunger strike riots” in Bogside, Londonderry, 1981. (IWM, HU41939)

  An officer of the 1st Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, and lance corporal of the 2nd Battalion, The Queen’s Regiment, patrol a Belfast street with a Saracen wheeled armored personnel carrier (APC). Both Saracen APCs and Ferret armored cars were used for many years in Northern Ireland because of the protection they provided their occupants. Because they were wheeled vehicles their use was less controversial than a deployment of tracked armored vehicles would have been. (IWM, TR32986)

  A Company, 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment, moves up to the Diamond, Londonderry, to control a riot between Protestant and Catholic women in 1970. (IWM, HU43396)

  British troops guard a barricade in the early months of the conflict. When first deployed to Northern Ireland the British Army was seen as a neutral arbitrator in the conflict, but events quickly forced the army to support the sectarian government of Northern Ireland. (Topfoto)

  The results of a deadly PIRA bombing in Belfast on March 20, 1972: seven were killed and over 150 injured. This was the most violent year of the entire campaign with a total of 479 people losing their lives. Bombing was the tactic of choice of the PIRA. It was a pure terror weapon that most often resulted in random civilian casualties. (Fred Hoare)

  Russian soldier in Grozny. The Soviet troops, although superbly equipped, were mostly poorly trained conscripts – in their initial exposure to urban combat they performed miserably. The buildings in this photo demonstrate that the Russians’ response to tactical challenges was often massive artillery bombardment which ultimately destroyed much of the city. (Topfoto)

  Chechen fighter outside the Presidential Palace. This was the primary objective of the New Year’s Eve Russian assault. The command of the Chechen resistance was in a bunker in the basement of this building and remained active until overrun by Russian troops. (Getty)

  A destroyed Russian BMP2 armored personnel carrier in Grozny. These vehicles, armed with a very effective 30mm cannon and carrying a squad of infantry in t
he rear, had the potential to be very effective in urban combat. However, poor command and control combined with hastily assembled and undertrained units resulted in the Russian debacle on New Year’s Eve, 1994. (Getty)

  Chechen fighters on the streets. Organized into groups of about 25 men, armed with a variety of Russian weapons and cast-off Russian uniforms, led by experienced former Russian army leaders, and fighting in their own city, the Chechen mobile combat groups were formidable foes. (Getty)

  Israeli infantrymen, armed with the M-4 carbine variant of the M-16 assault rifle, move carefully from house to house in Jenin. (IDF)

  Merkava tanks move through Jenin as part of Operation Defensive Shield. The Israeli military employed large numbers of armored vehicles as part of the operation largely because the armored protection reduced friendly casualties. (IDF)

  The Israeli military made use of a variety of types of infantry in the urban operations in the West Bank depending on the difficulty of the mission. The different types included reservists, regular mechanized infantry, paratroopers, and special operations forces. (IDF)

  Israeli infantry enter a building in Jenin using a sledgehammer. The IDF operations in the West Bank were security operations in a hostile country rather than classic counterinsurgency. There was no friendly civilian population and no attempt to win “hearts and minds.” (IDF)

  A Merkava tank observes Jenin. Another role of armor was to isolate the urban areas and control traffic in and out. Stationary outposts built around tanks were designed to prevent the escape of fighters from the urban objectives. (IDF)

  1BCT Commander Colonel Sean MacFarland and his security detail enter Ramadi hospital, the largest and most modern building in the city, in July 2006. It would be several weeks before US Marines established sufficient presence in the area and were able to declare the hospital under US control. (Defence Mil)

  Aerial view showing the Euphrates River as it runs north of Ramadi. The river was an important and imposing terrain feature. Controlling the river using riverine forces was an important aspect of 1BCT’s plan to secure the city.

  Infantrymen of Team B, Task Force 1st Battalion, 35th Armored Regiment, provide security from a street corner during a foot patrol in the Ramadi suburb of Tameen. Both soldiers are armed with M249 5.56mm light machine gun. (US Military)

  US Marines in urban combat in Iraq. This picture illustrates some of the equipment employed routinely in urban combat in Iraq including googles (day and night), protective knee pads, M-240 machine guns, M-16 assault rifles, body armor, and a variety of weapons optics including night scopes and flashlights. (USMC)

  An M-1A1 Abrams tank suppressing insurgents during a firefight. The protection and firepower of the tank was an integral part of the operations of the 1BCT as it secured Ramadi. The pyschological effect of tanks and tank-fire on the enemy was as important as the material benefits the tank contributed to operations. (USMC)

  A USMC infantryman in Ramadi. The infantry, as in all urban operations, was the centerpiece of operations in Ramadi. In Ramadi the infantry, US Army and Marine alike, practiced the “three block war”: intense fighting on one block, assisting police and guarding infrastructure on another block, and providing humanitarian relief and economic assistance on a third block. (USMC)

  The Libyan rebel army occupies the capital city of Tripoli in January 2012. One of the challenges of hybrid urban warfare is distinguishing friendly fighters from enemy fighters as both sides may wear the same uniform, or no uniform, and will likely be using the same or similar equipment. (Getty)

  Syrian rebels fighting government forces in Aleppo, April 2012. The face of future urban warfare will not be that different from urban warfare of the past. The combatants will likely be indistinguishable from combatants seen in Iraq, Ireland, Algeria, or Hue, may be armed with similar small arms and RPGs, and will probably practice similar tactics. (Getty)

  Street Ambush

  By December 30, 1994, the Russian forces completely surrounded the city of Grozny. Though positioned on most of the major routes into the city, the Russians did not orient their force to isolate the city. For most of the battle the Chechen forces were able to bring supplies and reinforcements into the city from the southeast.

  Four assault task forces were formed to attack into the city along four separate axes. From the southwest, General Major Petruk would attack with a regiment from 76th Airborne Division and two mechanized assault groups from the 19th Motorized Rifle Regiment. Their objective was the city railroad station, and to isolate the Presidential Palace from the south. A task force under General Major Pulikovsky was assigned to attack from the northwest with the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, and elements of the 276th and 81st motorized rifle regiments. The 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment under General Rokhlin was given the mission to attack the city from the northeast. Finally, General Staskov was to lead the southeastern task force consisting of elements of the 129th Motorized Rifle Regiment and part of the 98th Airborne Division. Their mission was to occupy the southeastern part of the city and seize a series of bridges over the Sunzha River. On paper this appeared to be a very formidable force and a solid plan, but only because it did not reflect the problems inherent throughout the Russian military in 1994. None of the units had trained in large-scale military operations, much less urban warfare. The motorized rifle units in particular were made up of hastily assembled units from all over Russia and many soldiers had only been together for a few weeks. Collective training as a unit was almost nonexistent and the individual training of many soldiers barely covered the use of their individual small arms. Commanders were not given time to conduct detailed planning for their missions, undertake reconnaissance, or rehearse with their troops.

  The Russians were not expecting to fight a sustained battle for the city of Grozny, nor were they mentally or physically prepared for such a battle. Thus, as the battle developed, initial failings on the Russian side were as much due to lack of understanding of the situation as to professional incompetence, although there was an abundance of the latter. There were three phases of the battle. Phase one was the opening days of the attack. During this phase Russian commanders and soldiers were not fully aware of the combat environment in which they were engaged. In phase two of the battle, the Russian forces reorganized, developed tactics, and systematically wrestled the northern portion of the city from the Chechen defenders. In the final phase of the battle, Russian forces secured the city, eliminated the remaining Chechen forces in the northern part of the city, and pushed the Chechen forces out of southern Grozny.

  The plan for the entry into the city was reasonably well conceived. However, its execution was extremely poor. Of the four major commands that were to enter the city, only one mounted a determined effort. In the west, the predominantly airborne forces of General Major Petruk encountered light resistance in the industrial areas just outside the city. However, the planned air support for the attack did not appear, and the units stopped their advance to await developments. In the east the airborne task force under General Major Staskov met heavier resistance on its assigned route of advance. The Russian forces, rather than fight through the resistance, turned north seeking an alternate route. They then ran into minefields and barricades. This force too, stopped its attack and awaited further orders. The northeastern force, under General Rokhlin, moved into the outskirts of the city and then considered its mission accomplished and switched to the defensive. The only force that made a determined effort to achieve its assigned objectives was the mechanized task force under General Major Pulikovsky approaching from the northeast – and they paid a great price for it.

  General Pulikovsky’s force began its movement at 6am on December 31. Though ostensibly attacking to seize the city, the command’s understanding of the situation was completely unrealistic. Pulikovsky and his subordinates viewed the operation as a show of force to intimidate the Chechens into submitting to Moscow’s governance. They did not expect any serious opposition and therefore the un
its moved forward in a column formation with no reconnaissance or security forces deployed. Some of the motorized infantry slept in the back of their armored carriers. By midday, Pulikovsky’s force had entered the outskirts of the city. The 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment proceeded down Pervomayskaya Street moving directly south toward the Presidential Palace, while the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade moved parallel to them to the west along Staropromyslovskoye Boulevard and then Mayakovskaya Street. Initially all went well and the tanks and armored personnel carriers rumbled slowly down the very quiet streets of the city in carefully organized and aligned columns – as if on parade. The movement was very slow and deliberate, partly because the Russians were in no hurry, and partly because the units were not well trained and commanders wanted to ensure they did not lose control.

  In the early afternoon, the 81st MRR made contact with the Chechen defenders. Numerous Chechen battle groups, probably totaling more than a thousand fighters, ambushed the carefully spaced column of armored vehicles from buildings and alleys on both sides of the street. Squads of fighters engaged with the armored vehicles with machine guns and RPGs from the upper stories of buildings. The top armor of the tanks and armored vehicles was thin: the RPGs easily penetrated the armor and destroyed numerous vehicles. The leaders of the Chechen forces were veterans of the Soviet army and knew how to execute an ambush. The attacks focused first on the lead and trail vehicles in each march unit. Once they were destroyed, the other vehicles were trapped and exposed in the street, which quickly became congested. Then, at a more leisurely pace, the RPG fire systematically engaged the rest of the column. Russian officers tried to rally their men but the buildings made radio communications difficult and the individual Russian units were hastily put together, consisted of many new conscripts, and very poorly trained. They were not equipped to operate on their own and when isolated by the ambush and lack of communications, discipline quickly broke down. Russian troops abandoned their vehicles and fought their way to the rear. Many didn’t make it to the hastily organized rally points. The Russians found that the ZSU-23-4 mobile antiaircraft vehicle, which was armed with four rapid-firing 23mm cannon, was one of the few weapons that could quickly and effectively suppress Chechen ambush positions. The rapid fire of the heavy cannon easily penetrated building walls, and the ability of the turret to traverse rapidly and elevate the guns to rooftops intimidated snipers and RPG gunners. The performance of the ZSUs was a small Russian success in an otherwise dismal battle performance. The crews of tanks and BMP mechanized fighting vehicles jumped from their vehicles, often while they were still operational, and made their way by foot to the rear. Other vehicles did not move, waiting in vain for orders, their engines idling until they were hit and set ablaze by Chechen RPGs. By afternoon the attack of the 81st MRR was completely defeated and the regiment was chased from the streets of Grozny, leaving behind dozens of abandoned and destroyed tanks and personnel carriers.