Concrete Hell: Urban Warfare From Stalingrad to Iraq

by Concrete Hell- Urban Warfare From Stalingrad to Iraq (epub)

  The AQI leadership quickly became aware of the threat that the COPs represented, and responded to it. In the case of COP Falcon, the response came quickly as AQI militants moved in small groups to attack the COP. Though quick to respond, the AQI attacks were inept. Most of the attacks never got past the screen of snipers whose purpose was to identify and break up attacks before they got close to the COP. One SEAL sniper team killed 25 insurgents moving toward COP Falcon in the first 24 hours after the army occupied it. Snipers not only alerted the COP of incoming enemy attacks, but also overwatched patrols operating out of the COP.

  Intelligence was the key to successful operations and when the 1BCT arrived at Ramadi they had little to no reliable intelligence about central Ramadi. One of the purposes of the COP was to increase the intelligence available to the BCT. This was done through patrolling, and primarily through census patrolling. Census patrols were targeted at a specific neighborhood and their task was to identify all the persons living in that neighborhood, much like a typical government census would do. Knowing the people, where they lived, and who they were associated with in terms of family and tribe was absolutely critical information and could only be gleaned through door-to-door operations. These type of operations also made the CF visible to the population, reassured them of their intentions, and provided the opportunity for the population to provide additional information if they were inclined, without their cooperation being exposed to the insurgents. The BCT used this information to build a human terrain database of the urban battle space which guided subsequent operations and decisions.

  Operations to establish the COPs began as soon as the BCT arrived in Ramadi in June, and continued apace throughout the summer at the rate of one new COP about every 10–14 days. It was a slow and systematic pace with the BCT under constant attack from AQI throughout its operations. The COPs were standalone installations, totally capable of defending themselves from attack from any direction, but they needed daily resupply. Much of the BCT’s energy was devoted to protecting logistics convoys moving into Ramadi from IED, grenade, and gunfire attacks. Although these attacks were usually not successful, there were literally dozens a day and they caused all elements of the brigade to operate with patience and caution. The brigade did not have the manpower to operate at a faster pace. This began to change in September 2006.

  By September 2006, 1BCT had made significant progress pacifying Ramadi north of the Euphrates and north of Camp Ramadi itself. It had also established a strong presence in Tameen and in the western and southern portions of central Ramadi. But the clear, hold, build strategy was beginning to falter because there were insufficient resources to both clear and hold simultaneously.

  An Iraqi government presence was needed to hold territory cleared by CF as they systematically pacified Ramadi through the steady construction and occupation of COPs. Iraqi police were the ideal force to replace the COP once the area was pacified because IP had a legitimate presence in the COP neighborhoods even in peacetime, they had the combat capability to deal with inevitable small-scale insurgent activity, and most importantly, they could be organized and recruited locally. Unlike the Iraqi army forces, which were a national asset and subject to service anywhere in Iraq, the policy of the government of Iraq was to employ police in the area from which they were recruited. Thus, local Iraqi leaders, and CF, could recruit for the Iraqi police and be guaranteed that that manpower would, after individual training, report back to Ramadi for duty. The problem with recruitment, however, was that a recent effort to recruit police had been attacked by an AQI suicide bomber who managed to kill dozens of recruits. In addition, a sheik who supported police recruiting was murdered by AQI. So despite CF efforts to recruit police to back up the operations of 1BCT, the size and effectiveness of the Iraqi police in Ramadi did not change significantly through the summer of 2006.

  The Awakening

  The police situation, and really, the entire operational situation in Ramadi, changed dramatically in September 2006. The leadership of the Sunni population, 95 percent of the total population of Al-Anbar Province, were the tribal sheiks. Tribal sheiks were the leaders of their tribes and extended families. They were not elected but rather chosen to lead by the tribal elders based on their competence. They had no formal title or position sanctioned by either the new Iraqi government or the regime of Saddam Hussein. Most had had a close relationship with some branch of the former Ba’athist government, and like the general population in Al-Anbar, many had followers who had been important leaders in Saddam Hussein’s military and intelligence apparatus. Many were also involved in low-level illegal activity such as smuggling. These sheiks, whose responsibility was the health and welfare of their tribe, had no great love for the government of Iraq or for CF, but in 2006 they were becoming increasingly estranged from AQI.

  Relations between the Sunni sheiks and AQI came to a head in August 2006 when Sheik Abu Ali Jassim encouraged members of his tribe to support the 1BCT in northern Ramadi. Tribe members joined the Iraqi police and manned a police station along MSR Mobile just east of where the main highway bridge crossed the Euphrates River. AQI responded with a coordinated complex attack. They attacked the police station with a massive VBIED at the same time as kidnapping Sheik Jassim, whom they then murdered. Possibly worst of all, they did not return the sheik’s body, thus denying his family the timely burial required by Islam. These attacks were the culmination of a brutal policy of murder and intimidation practiced by AQI against the mostly secular sheiks and their tribes for over a year. They, combined with the operations of 1BCT, drove the sheiks to reconsider their alliances.

  One of the reasons that the Sunnis allied with AQI instead of the CF was that in their view, the long-term interests of their tribes lay with AQI. The CF’s consistent message was that they were a temporary presence in Iraq. In contrast, the AQI message was that they were a force in Iraq for good. The sheiks’ interpretation of those messages was that they had to have an accommodation with AQI. The 1BCT brought a different message to their operations in Ramadi. The brigade’s message was that they were in Ramadi to stay until AQI was defeated. Their message to the sheiks was that if they remained loyal to AQI then they would also suffer the consequences. This new message from the CF, combined with the brutality of AQI, convinced one sheik in particular, Abdul Sattar Eftikhan Abu Risha, that the best interests of his tribe lay with the 1BCT. Sheik Sattar came to this conclusion sometime over the summer and began reaching out to the commander of the US forces in his area, Lieutenant Colonel Tony Deane, the commander of TF 1/35 Armor.

  The conversations between Sattar and Deane began with the issue of recruiting local police to protect the neighborhoods north of Camp Ramadi. Sattar, who was a minor sheik of a relatively small tribe, understood that by himself he would not be able to alter the balance of power in the city, so he worked behind the scenes with the other sheiks, convincing them that their long-term interest lay with the coalition and cooperation with US forces. His force of personality, despite his minor status, was sufficient that on September 9, 2006 he met with Colonel MacFarland, commander of the 1BCT and presented him with a written pledge declaring the Al-Anbar Awakening. That document, signed by 11 sheiks, pledged loyalty and cooperation to the CF and opposition to AQI. There was some vagueness regarding the government of Iraq in Baghdad, but Colonel MacFarland ignored that and welcomed his new allies.

  The Al-Anbar Awakening was a turning point in the battle. The sheiks made hundreds of fighters available as recruits for the IP. More importantly, their tribal neighborhoods immediately became coalition-friendly and IEDs and sniping in those areas ceased immediately. The sheiks contributed a wealth of intelligence on AQI that included safe houses, names of leaders and fighters, supply routes, and weapons caches. They also began an active recruiting campaign to bring more sheiks into the alliance against AQI.

  With the support of the sheiks, the 1BCT’s offensive of establishing COPs could continue with new momentum. Though the hundreds of I
raqi police recruits would not be available until they completed weeks of training, the sheiks’ loyal followers instantly became a militia of auxiliary fighters that could control terrain in their own neighborhoods, facilitate the establishment of COPs and take over COPs in the neighborhoods that were now friendly to the coalition. This “flip” by the sheiks took away AQI safe havens, intelligence sources, and manpower. It essentially made AQI militants fugitives in much of Ramadi. In return for the sheiks’ support the 1BCT shared intelligence with them, provided protection and support when necessary, and steered millions of dollars in contracts and business to members of the allied tribes.

  The Al-Anbar Awakening was the second disaster for AQI in Iraq, the first being the aggressive determined COP strategy of the 1BCT. AQI recognized the magnitude of the strategic change represented by the Sunni shift in allegiance and attempted to stop it. They attacked the new allies of the coalition to attempt to coerce them back into supporting their ideal of an Islamic State of Iraq. They also stepped up coercive pressure on sheiks who were neutral, or who may have been contemplating switching sides. The battle of the Shark Fin in November 2006 was an example of AQI’s unsuccessful bid to keep the Sunni sheiks loyal.

  10.2 Deployment of 1BCT in Ramadi, Iraq, 2006–07

  Around 3pm on November 25, Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Ferry, commanding 1st Battalion, 9th (TF 1/9) Infantry at Camp Corregidor (TF 1/9 Infantry replaced 1/506 Infantry in October), received a call from Sheik Jassim Muhammad Saleh al-Suwadawi. The sheik was not a participant in the Awakening, but was one of the group of sheiks who had moved from being an active supporter of AQI to neutral. The sheik was the leader of the Albu Soda tribe, a small group located in an area east of Ramadi and just south of the Euphrates River called the Sufia, known as the Shark Fin by the Americans because of the shape of the bend in the river course. Jassim had been in secret discussions with both the Americans and Sheik Sattar as he contemplated joining the Awakening. He purchased a satellite cell phone so that he could stay in contact with Sheik Sattar. On November 25 he was using that cell phone to report that AQI fighters were attacking his people and he requested the help of the TF 1/9 Infantry to defend the homes of his tribe.

  Colonel Ferry did not know Sheik Jassim, and he was in the midst of preparing for an operation to push in the opposite direction, into central Ramadi from the east, but he understood the concept and intent of the 1BCT plan, and thus he made a quick decision to reorient his task force and dispatch a tank and infantry team to support the sheik. At the Shark Fin, more than 50 AQI fighters arrived in several cars and trucks, armed with RPGs and AK-47 assault rifles. They immediately engaged a small contingent of the Albu Soda tribe who were armed but outnumbered. As this was occurring 1BCT moved unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) over the scene and commanders were able to observe by video the firefight going on at the Shark Fin between the followers of Sheik Jassim and AQI. The 1BCT requested air support and quickly two US Marine F-18 fighters and a Predator drone aircraft were above the fight ready to support. The TF reaction force of Bradley fighting vehicles and Abrams tanks proceeded toward the area.

  Colonel Ferry could see the sheik’s men and AQI engaging on the video and he was able to talk to the sheik on the cell phone (through his translator). The F-18s were in position but the fighters were too closely engaged for the fast-attack aircraft to safely engage, so instead they made high-speed low-level passes and mock attack runs over the fight to let AQI know they were there in position and prepared to participate. The 1BCT was also in contact with the sheik, and they had his men wave towels and scarves so they could be identified on video. The AQI fighters, unnerved by the jets overhead, decided to break off the attack but as a final act of intimidation they tied the body of a tribal fighter to the bumper of their vehicle and dragged it behind their convoy of four vehicles as they loaded up and departed the Shark Fin. This was a mistake.

  The cars dragging the body down the road were clearly visible to both the UAVs and the F-18s. As the cars left the neighborhood and they could be safely engaged they were attacked by the F-18s and the Predator-firing Hellfire missiles. Three of the four vehicles were destroyed. Other AQI fighters leaving the scene were intercepted by TF 1/9 who, using the night-vision devices on their vehicles, ambushed the fleeing AQI vehicles with tank and Bradley fire. By dawn the task force’s quick reaction force was linked up with Sheik Jassim’s fighters at the Shark Fin, the area was secure, and another sheik had joined the Awakening. Jassim’s forces lost seven fighters while over a dozen AQI fighters were killed. The Shark Fin, one of the most important AQI support areas in eastern Ramadi, quickly became another bastion of support for the coalition and the Awakening movement, and a source of police recruits.

  The Shark Fin fight was typical of the synergistic effects of the aggressive 1BCT tactics and the Awakening movement. The BCT inspired the sheiks to resist AQI, and the resistance of the sheiks enabled the aggressive tactics of the 1BCT. By November 2006, the operations of the 1BCT were hitting their stride. The brigade had control of over 70 percent of Ramadi, more sheiks were joining the Awakening movement, and both the coalition high command and the Iraqi government were becoming aware of and supporting the effort to pacify Ramadi. Hard fighting remained however. In December TF 1/37 began pushing east into some of the last AQI strongholds to establish police stations in preparation for the growing operational Iraqi police force. When the operation ended in January 2007 they had killed 14 AQI fighters, captured 72, and most importantly, established three police stations. By the end of January 2007 over half the tribes, 450,000 of the citizens of Ramadi were part of the Awakening movement. Most of the rest of the sheiks had openly declared their neutrality and had ceased resisting 1BCT and its Iraqi army and police allies. Only a handful of tribes were still in the AQI camp and they were mostly located in east Ramadi.

  By the beginning of February the results of the combined 1BCT operations and the Al-Anbar Awakening were clearly evident and decisive. As the “Ready First” brigade began planning the end of its 15-month deployment in Iraq there had been no losses to IED attacks in a month. Operations by 1BCT, supported by the enthusiastic and effective efforts of the Iraqi army, police, and local militias, resulted in a casualty exchange rate of 55 killed AQI fighters for each loss to the 1BCT.

  On February 18, 2007, the 1BCT, of the 1st Armored Division, relinquished control of Area of Operation Topeka, and prepared to redeploy from Iraq to its home bases in Germany. The 1BCT of the 3rd Infantry Division from Fort Stewart, Georgia took over the battle. When the “Ready First” left Ramadi the battle was not over, but the end was in sight. Large portions of the city were completely clear of AQI influence and openly supportive of coalition forces. Soldiers could walk the streets without their combat equipment. The 3rd Infantry Division continued the fi“ht, building on the strong relations and the tactics established by the Ready First.” The coalition forces took additional losses, had more sharp firelights, but by the summer of 2007 the city was not only secured, but was one of the safest large metropolitan areas in Iraq. AQI gave up its plans for Al-Anbar to be the center of an Iraq caliphate and retreated to safer areas outside of the province.

  The Example of Ramadi

  The battle for Ramadi was not a quick or an easy victory. The 1BCT lost 83 soldiers killed and hundreds wounded during the battle. Equipment losses were also heavy: Task Force 1/37 alone lost a total of 25 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and trucks during the battle. Iraqi army and police forces suffered similar casualties, but AQFs losses were many multiples more. The 1BCT estimated that in nine months of operations in the city approximately 1,500 AQI fighters were killed and another 1,500 were captured.

  The Ramadi battle demonstrated the tactical and operational approach necessary to achieve success in the urban counterinsurgency environment in Iraq. The approach required three key elements. First, it required aggressive offensive action to clear insurgents from a selected neighborhood and to establish a permanent military presen
ce in the midst of the urban civilian population. Second, it required that a competent and capable Iraqi army and police force be able to hold that area against insurgent counterattacks after it was initially cleared. Finally, it required a combined coalition and Iraq effort to build a working urban infrastructure in the cleared area to win and maintain the loyalty of the civil population by demonstrating the clear benefits of peace, stability, and the rule of law under the government of Iraq.

  The battle of Ramadi also validated many of the fundamentals of urban combat proven in previous urban warfare experiences. Huge numbers of infantry were not required for the fight. However, well-trained infantry targeted very precisely at specific objectives linked logically to a comprehensive plan were important. Snipers and special operations forces were disproportionally important to the success of the battle. Those specialized forces, however, could not operate independently but had to be tied closely to the operations and objectives of the larger conventional force. Armor and mechanized infantry made important and vital contributions to the battle and gave the coalition forces multiple asymmetric advantages in all the firelights with AQI. Finally, the urban battle requires tactical patience if large-scale military and civilian casualties are to be avoided. The battle of Ramadi took a year to win. However, the city was not destroyed in the process, and given that the population of almost half a million people were present throughout the battle, civilian casualties were relatively light.

  The approach of the 1BCT to operations in Ramadi was the three-step “clear, hold, build” tactical approach. But that three-step approach had two major lines of effort which supported each other. One was the security and combat operations conducted by the 1BCT and its allies. The other, equally important, was the political engagement of the population through the civilian leadership, the sheiks, which the military leadership actively pursued. These two lines of effort, one military and the other political, reinforced each other and led to the success. Without political engagement with the sheiks and the Awakening movement 1BCT’s tactical operations would likely have still been successful, but they would have been much more costly, time-consuming and ultimately would have resulted in a city that was pacified but not cooperative. Likewise, without the support of the coalition forces, the sheiks’ revolt against AQI would have been bloodier, taken longer, and probably would have resulted in an incomplete success.