The Crusades: The Authoritative History of the War for the Holy Land
Page 70
Over the past sixty years, a wide range of Islamic groups and individuals, from politicians to terrorists, have sought to draw comparisons between the modern world and the medieval crusades. On points of detail and emphasis there are important differences in the messages and ideas they propagate, but there is also a relatively consistent substructure underpinning all of their various arguments, dominated by two ideas. The first is that the West, as an invading colonial power, is now committing crimes against the Muslim world, just as it did 900 years ago; recreating the medieval crusades in the modern era. However, Israel’s creation, with Western support, added a new strand to the story. In the twentieth-century incarnation of this struggle, it is not just imperialist crusaders but also Jews who are seeking to occupy the Holy Land. Together they are supposed to be joined in a ‘Crusader-Zionist’ alliance against Islam. Propagandists seek to lend an aura of credibility to this strange juxtaposition by pointing out that Israel occupies roughly the same territory as the Frankish kingdom of Jerusalem. In recent decades, however, the geographical focus of this ideology has rapidly been expanded. New western, and notably American-led, interventions in the Near and Middle East and Central Asia have been positioned alongside the Arab–Israeli conflict and the plight of the Palestinians, adding to the crimes of the so-called ‘Crusader-Zionist’ alliance. These include the two Gulf Wars, the struggle against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and the stationing in the sacred Muslim territory of Saudi Arabia of US troops, described by Osama bin Laden as ‘Crusader hosts [who] have spread in it like locusts’.15
The second pillar of ‘crusade parallelism’ relates to the supposed capacity for Islam to learn valuable lessons from the medieval era. In 1963, the Muslim author Sa‘id Ashur published a two-volume History of the Crusades in Arabic, in which he claimed that the situation facing modern Muslims was very similar to that of the Middle Ages, and therefore it was ‘incumbent upon us to study the movement of the crusades minutely and scientifically’. Numerous Islamic ideologues have sought to find inspiration in the medieval war for the Holy Land. Some have argued for the unification of Islam, by force if necessary, and the unflinching and relentless pursuit of jihad, in supposed imitation of the Muslims of the Middle Ages. Many propagandists suggest that Islam must be willing to patiently face a long battle–after all, it took eighty-eight years to reclaim Jerusalem from the Franks and almost two centuries to destroy Outremer. Crucially, Muslim ‘heroes’ of the crusader era have also been raised as exemplars–most notably Saladin. Indeed, in the course of the twentieth century, the Ayyubid sultan has been widely mythologised as the central Islamic champion of the medieval war for the Holy Land. It is now Saladin, not Sultan Baybars, who has gained cult status across the Arabic-speaking world. His defeat of the western Christians in the Battle of Hattin is revered as one of the greatest victories in Muslim history, and his subsequent recapture of Jerusalem is the subject of intense pan-Islamic pride and celebration.16
Arab Nationalism and Islamism
Diverse ideals have been constructed upon these two foundation stones–the idea of a renewed crusader offensive and the need to draw instruction from the Middle Ages. In fact, the true power of this manipulative approach to the past has proved to be its remarkable flexibility, for Muslim adherents of two diametrically opposed ideologies–Arab Nationalism and Islamism–have sought with equal enthusiasm to appropriate crusading history.
The precepts of Arab Nationalism are essentially secular in character: positing the separation of spiritual and temporal authority in Islam; and advocating the governance of Arab Muslim states by political, rather than religious, leaders. As such, Arab Nationalist leaders have shown little interest in the crusades as wars of religion, focusing instead upon the notion of threatening foreign imperialism and the propaganda value of forging comparisons between their own lives and the achievements of Saladin. Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s prime minister (and later president) from 1954 to 1970, was one of the first proponents of Arab Nationalist ideology. He claimed that Israel’s creation was ‘a substitute for the crusades’, instituted when ‘imperialism signed a pact with Zionism’. Nasser also made repeated attempts to liken himself to Saladin. It was no coincidence that Youseff Chahine’s famous ‘historical’ epic Saladin (1963)–in its day the highest-budget Arabic film in history–was produced in Egypt, with a star actor who bore a striking resemblance to Nasser.
Commenting on the Arab–Israeli conflict in 1981, Syria’s President Hafez Asad encouraged Muslims to ‘go back to the Crusaders’ invasion. Although they fought us for 200 years, we did not surrender or capitulate.’ Asad also styled himself as ‘the Saladin of the twentieth century’ and in 1992 erected a larger-than-life statue of his hero in the heart of Damascus. The Iraqi Arab Nationalist leader Saddam Hussein was even more obsessed with Saladin. Conveniently forgetting Saladin’s Kurdish heritage and instead emphasising their shared birthplace of Tikrit, Saddam went to extraordinary lengths to connect their two careers. Iraqi stamps and banknotes depicted Saladin standing alongside Saddam and the exteriors of his palaces were decorated with golden statues of the president dressed as Saladin. Saddam even ordered the production of a children’s picture book, The Hero Saladin, in which he himself was named as ‘the second Saladin’.17
Islamism is the polar opposite of Arab Nationalism in terms of ideology–espousing the notion that Islam must be governed as a theocracy. Nonetheless, Islamists have, if anything, been even more strident in their attempts to establish spurious links between the medieval crusades and the modern world. Given its spiritual perspective, Islamist propaganda presents the crusades as aggressive religious wars waged against the Dar al-Islam (Islamic territory), the only response to which can be violent physical jihad. One of the most influential Islamist ideologues, Sayyid Qutb (who was executed in Egypt for treason in 1966), described western imperialism as a ‘mask for the crusading spirit’, stating that ‘the crusader spirit runs in the blood of all westerners’. He also declared that there was a conspiracy of ‘international Crusaderism’ behind the West’s Levantine interventions, citing Allenby’s supposed reference to the medieval crusades as proof.
Qutb’s ideas have influenced many radical Islamist organisations, from Hamas to Hezbollah. But in the twenty-first century the most dangerous proponents of his particular brand of extremism have been Osama bin Laden and his ally Ayman al-Zawahiri–the leading voices of the terrorist network known as al-Qaeda. Their rhetoric was littered with references to the crusades in the lead-up to 2001. When, just after 9/11, George W. Bush ill-advisedly chose to characterise his proposed ‘war on terrorism’ as a ‘crusade’ (a term carefully avoided since), he simply played into al-Qaeda’s hands. Indeed, in late 2002, bin Laden released a statement declaring that ‘one of the most important positive results of the raids on New York and Washington was the revelation of the truth regarding the conflict between the Crusaders and the Muslims [and] the strength of the hatred which the Crusaders feel towards us’. Then, in March 2003, after the US-led invasion of Iraq, bin Laden added: ‘The Zionist-Crusader campaign on [Islam] today is the most dangerous and rabid ever…[to learn] how to resist these enemy forces from outside, we must look at the previous Crusader wars against out countries.’ This inflammatory and misleading propaganda, grounded in the manipulation of history, has shown little sign of abating.18
THE CRUSADES IN HISTORY
‘Crusade parallelism’ has played a distinct role in shaping the modern world–one that, in recent times, has been widely misunderstood. The manipulation of the history and memory of the war for the Holy Land began with nineteenth-century romanticism and western colonial triumphalism. It has been perpetuated by political propaganda and ideological invective in the Muslim world. The purpose of identifying and examining this process is not to condone or condemn the ideologies of imperialism, Arab Nationalism or Islamism–but rather to expose the crude simplicity and glaring inaccuracy of the ‘historical’ parallels evoked in their name. Th
e political, cultural and spiritual resonances of the distant crusades have been manufactured by an imaginary view of the past; one that trades in caricature, distortion and fabrication, not the medieval realities of reciprocal violence, diplomacy and trade, enmity and alliance that lay at the heart of crusading.
Of course, humankind has always shown a proclivity for the deliberate misrepresentation of history. But the dangers attendant upon ‘crusade parallelism’ have proven to be particularly intense. Over the last two centuries, a fallacious narrative has taken hold. It suggests that the crusades were pivotal to the relationship between Islam and the West because they engendered a deep-rooted and irrevocable sense of mutual antipathy, leaving these two cultures locked in a destructive and perpetual war. This notion–of a direct and unbroken trail of conflict linking the medieval and modern eras–has helped to cultivate a pervasive, and almost fatalistic, acceptance that a titanic clash of civilisations is inevitable. Yet dark, brutal, even savage as they sometimes were, the crusades left no permanent marks upon western Christian or Muslim society. In truth, the war for the Holy Land had been all but forgotten by the end of the Middle Ages and was only resurrected centuries later.
Perhaps the crusades do have things to tell us about our world. Most, if not all, of their lessons are common to other eras of human history. These wars lay bare the power of faith and ideology to inspire fervent mass movements and to elicit violent discord; they affirm the capacity of commercial interests to transcend the barriers of conflict; and they illustrate how readily suspicion and hatred of the ‘other’ can be harnessed. But the notion that the struggle for dominion of the Holy Land–waged by Latin Christians and Levantine Muslims so many centuries ago–does, or somehow should, have a direct bearing upon the modern world is misguided. The reality of these medieval wars must be explored and understood if the forces of propaganda are to be assuaged, and incitements to hostility countered. But the crusades must also be placed where they belong: in the past.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I owe many debts of gratitude to those who helped me through six years spent researching and writing this book. My colleagues in the Department of History at Queen Mary University of London have been wonderfully supportive throughout, and I particularly would like to thank Virginia Davis, Julian Jackson, Peter Hennessy, Miri Rubin, Peter Denley, Yossi Rapoport, Dan Todman and Alice Austin. My students, not least those on my Special Subject ‘The First Crusade’ and the London MA in Crusader Studies, also have been a great source of inspiration.
Peter Edbury kindly read the first draft of this work (when it was considerably longer than it is now!), and I also benefited enormously from the friendship and the assistance offered by Sue Edgington and William Purkis. Andrew Gordon and John Saddler shaped my early vision of the book, while the patience and encouragement of Mike Jones at Simon & Schuster, Dan Halpern and Matt Weiland at Ecco enabled me to complete the project. Sue Phillpott’s astute eye helped to refine the text, and I am especially grateful to Katherine Stanton for her judicious editorial guidance and the great care she has taken in preparing this book for publication. My agents Peter Robinson and George Lucas have always been stalwart sources of support and advice. The numerous discussions of the crusading world I enjoyed with Tony To, Don MacPherson and Kario Salem also helped to spark my idea of switching perspectives between Christendom and Islam in this work.
I would like to offer heartfelt thanks to all those who have stood by me through these years. To James Ellison, the finest of friends and colleagues; to John Hardy, a true friend through all seasons; to Steve Jones and Stuart Webber, who always knew not to ask how the book was going; and to Robert and Maria Oram, Simon Bradley, Anthony Scott, Daniel Richards, Julie Jones and Lizzie Webber for their unfailing support. I am most grateful to my family for their encouragement, and wish to thank Per Asbridge, Camilla Smith, Jane Campbell, Margaret Williams and Craig Campbell. My parents have shown enormous kindness, as always, and without their help it would have been all but impossible to write this book. At the centre of my life, throughout, have been Christine and Ella, my wife and daughter. It is their patience and love that has sustained me, above and beyond all else, and they who deserve my deepest thanks.
Thomas Asbridge
September 2009
West Sussex
CHRONOLOGY
27 November 1095: Pope Urban II’s sermon on the First Crusade at Clermont
18 June 1097: Nicaea surrenders to the First Crusade
1 July 1097: Battle of Dorylaeum
3 June 1098: First Crusade sacks Antioch
28 June 1098: Battle of Antioch against Kerbogha of Mosul
15 July 1099: First Crusade captures Jerusalem
May 1104: Battle of Harran
28 June 1119: Roger of Antioch slain at the Field of Blood
June 1128: Zangi assumes control of Aleppo
December 1144: Zangi conquers Edessa
1 December 1145: Pope Eugenius III proclaims the Second Crusade
September 1146: Zangi assassinated; Nur al-Din assumes control of Aleppo
July 1148: Failure of the Second Crusade’s siege of Damascus
29 June 1149: Battle of Inab
19 August 1153: Latins conquer Ascalon
April 1154: Nur al-Din occupies Damascus
11 August 1164: Nur al-Din defeats the Franks near Harim
March 1169: Saladin assumes the title of vizier of Egypt
September 1171: Abolition of the Fatimid caliphate in Egypt
15 May 1174: Death of Nur al-Din; that October Saladin assumes control of Damascus
25 November 1177: Battle of Mont Gisard
12 June 1183: Saladin occupies Aleppo
May 1185: Death of King Baldwin IV of Jerusalem
4 July 1187: Battle of Hattin
2 October 1187: Saladin retakes Jerusalem
29 October 1187: Pope Gregory VIII issues call for the Third Crusade
November 1187: Richard the Lionheart takes the cross
28 August 1189: Guy of Lusignan lays siege to Acre
10 June 1190: Death of Frederick Barbarossa in Asia Minor
8 June 1191: Richard the Lionheart arrives at Acre
12 July 1191: Third Crusaders occupy Acre
20 August 1191: Richard I executes Muslim prisoners outside Acre
7 September 1191: Battle of Arsuf
13 January 1192: Richard I orders first retreat from Beit Nuba
4 July 1192: Third Crusade makes its second retreat from Beit Nuba
2 September 1192: Treaty of Jaffa finalised
4 March 1193: Death of Saladin
15 August 1198: Pope Innocent III issues call for the Fourth Crusade
12 April 1204: Fourth Crusade sacks Constantinople
November 1215: Pope Innocent III presides over the Fourth Lateran Council
5 November 1219: Fifth Crusade captures Damietta
17 March 1229: Frederick II Hohenstaufen enters Jerusalem
11 July 1244: Khwarizmians sack Jerusalem
18 October 1244: Battle of La Forbie
5 June 1249: King Louis IX of France lands in Egypt
8 February 1250: Battle of Mansourah
April 1250: Louis IX taken captive by Turanshah
February 1258: Mongols sack Baghdad
3 September 1260: Battle of Ayn Jalut
June 1261: Baybars invested as Mamluk sultan
19 May 1268: Baybars sacks Antioch
8 April 1271: Hospitallers surrender Krak des Chevaliers to Baybars
27 April 1289: Qalawun captures Tripoli
18 May 1291: Mamluk conquest of Acre