Mao: The Unknown Story

by Jung Chang

  When a news item in March 1950 mentioned joint companies, Liu Shao-chi noted that the news “has aroused tremendous waves among Peking students, who suspect these … might be damaging China’s sovereignty. Many Youth League members demanded an … explanation; some even charged out loud … that the people’s government had sold out the country.” And this was without knowing the half of it.

  34. WHY MAO AND STALIN STARTED THE KOREAN WAR (1949–50 AGE 55–56)

  STALIN RECOGNIZED that Mao had the drive and the resources, especially the human resources, to expand the frontiers of communism in Asia significantly. In order not to erode his own power, Stalin decided not to form an Asian Cominform, which would give the Chinese leader a formal pan-Asia set-up, but instead to dole out individual countries to Mao, in such a way that he, Stalin, remained the ultimate boss. At their second meeting, during Mao’s stay in Moscow, Stalin assigned him to supervise Vietnam.

  Stalin had hitherto shown little interest in Vietnam. In 1945, when the Vietnamese Communist leader Ho Chi Minh led an uprising against French colonial rule and declared a provisional independent government, Moscow had not even bothered to answer his cables. But, even though he did not entirely trust Ho, Stalin changed his attitude radically once Mao took power and Chinese troops reached the border with Vietnam in late 1949. On 30 January 1950, while Mao was in Moscow, Stalin recognized Ho’s regime, some days after Mao did. The lack of a common frontier with Vietnam made it difficult for Stalin to command from afar, whereas China could supply arms, goods and training across its border with Vietnam (and Laos). By giving Mao custody of Vietnam, Stalin gave himself a way of reaching into Vietnam, and gratified Mao, while passing on to China the enormous expense of sustaining the Indochina insurgencies.

  Mao had already been trying to bring the Vietnamese under his tutelage. Ho had lived in China for more than a decade, including a stretch in Yenan, and spoke fluent Chinese. Mao had been training, funding and arming the Vietnamese, but when he developed a plan to send in Chinese troops once he controlled the border with Vietnam, in late 1949, Stalin called him to heel. Stalin wanted to gather all the strings together in his own hands first.

  Ho Chi Minh was brought to Moscow, via Peking, arriving in time to make a dramatic appearance at Stalin’s farewell dinner for Mao in the Kremlin on 16 February 1950. Stalin told Ho that aid to Vietnam was China’s responsibility — and cost. Ho was the only foreign Communist leader with whom Mao was allowed to have proper talks on this trip, and the two returned to China on the same train, in a convoy between one train carrying Soviet airmen going to protect Shanghai and China’s coastal cities, and one loaded with MiG-15s.

  Mao now began to take personal charge of action in Vietnam, vetting both grand strategy and the minutiae of military operations. The first objective was to link up the Vietnamese Communists’ base with China, as the CCP had done with Russia in 1945–46. Inside China, a road-building blitz to the border was completed in August 1950. Within two months this enabled the Vietnamese to win a crucial series of battles known as the Border Campaign, as a result of which the French army lost control of the frontier with China. Thereafter, China poured in aid. On 19 August, Mao told Stalin’s emissary Pavel Yudin that he planned to train 60,000–70,000 Vietnamese soldiers. It was having China as a secure rear and supply depot that made it possible for the Vietnamese to fight for twenty-five years and beat first the French and then the Americans.

  In most of these years, the huge logistics burden of the fighting in Indochina fell almost entirely on China. To Mao, the cost was irrelevant. When the French Party’s first emissary to Ho mentioned ways the French Communists could help the Vietnamese, he was told by Liu Shao-chi: “Don’t waste your time on this. Don’t get into things like medical aid. We can do that. After all there are 600 million Chinese …”

  It was not long before Mao started trying to “Maoise” his client, imposing a much-hated land reform on Vietnam in the 1950s, in which Chinese advisers even presided over kangaroo tribunals that sentenced Vietnamese to death in their own country. Vietnam’s “poet laureate,” To Huu, hymned Mao’s role in surprisingly frank doggerel:

  Kill, kill more …

  For the farm, good rice, quick collection of taxes …

  Worship Chairman Mao, Worship Stalin …

  Even though some Vietnamese leaders raised strenuous objections to the Mao-style land reform, Ho Chi Minh put up only feeble and belated resistance to Mao’s attempt to turn the Vietnamese revolution into a clone of China’s.

  IN SEPTEMBER to October 1950, Mao downgraded operations in Vietnam, in order to focus on a much larger war on another patch of turf that Stalin had decided to assign him. This was Korea.

  At the end of World War II, Korea, which had been annexed by Japan early in the century, was divided across the middle, along the 38th Parallel, with Russia occupying the northern half and the US the South. After formal independence in 1948, the North came under a Communist dictator, Kim Il Sung. In March 1949, as Mao’s armies were rolling towards victory, Kim went to Moscow to try to persuade Stalin to help him seize the South. Stalin said “No,” as this might involve confronting America. Kim then turned to Mao, and one month later sent his deputy defense minister to China. Mao gave Kim a firm commitment, saying he would be glad to help Pyongyang attack the South, but could they wait until he had taken the whole of China: “It would be much better if the North Korean government launched an all-out attack against the South in the first half of 1950 …” Mao said, adding emphatically: “If necessary, we can stealthily put in Chinese soldiers for you.” Koreans and Chinese, he said, had black hair, and the Americans would not be able to tell the difference: “They will not notice.”

  Mao encouraged Pyongyang to invade the South and take on the USA — and volunteered Chinese manpower — as early as May 1949. At this stage he was talking about sending in Chinese troops clandestinely, posing as Koreans, and not about China having an open collision with America. During his visit to Russia, however, Mao changed. He became determined to fight America openly — because only such a war would enable him to gouge out of Stalin what he needed to build his own world-class war machine. What Mao had in mind boiled down to a deal: Chinese soldiers would fight the Americans for Stalin in exchange for Soviet technology and equipment.

  Stalin received reports from both his ambassador in Korea and his liaison with Mao about Mao’s eagerness to have a war in Korea. As a result of this new factor, Stalin began to reconsider his previous refusal to let Kim invade the South.

  Stalin was given a push by Kim. On 19 January 1950, the Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang, Terentii Shtykov, reported that Kim had told him, “excitedly” that “now that China is completing its liberation,” South Korea’s was “next in line.” Kim “thinks that he needs to visit comrade Stalin again, in order to receive instructions and authorization to launch an offensive.” Kim added that “if it was not possible to meet comrade Stalin now, he will try to meet with Mao.” He stressed that Mao had “promised to render him assistance after the conclusion of the war in China.” Playing “the Mao card,” Kim told Shtykov that “he also has other questions for Mao Tse-tung, in particular the question of the possibility of setting up an Eastern bureau of the Cominform” (no mention of talking to Stalin about this). Mao, he said, “would have instructions on all issues.” Kim was telling Stalin that Mao was keen to give him military support, and that if Stalin would still not endorse an invasion, he (Kim) would go to Mao direct and place himself under Mao.

  Eleven days later, on 30 January, Stalin wired Shtykov to tell Kim that he was “prepared to help him on this.” This is the first documented evidence of Stalin agreeing to start a war in Korea, and he shifted his position because of Mao, who possessed the critical asset — an inexhaustible supply of men. When Kim came to Moscow two months later, Stalin said that the international environment had “changed sufficiently to permit a more active stance on the unification of Korea.” He went on to make it explicit that this
was because “the Chinese were now in a position to devote more attention to the Korean issue.” There was “one vital condition — Peking’s support” for the war. Kim “must rely on Mao, who understands Asian affairs beautifully.”

  A war in Korea fought by Chinese and Koreans would give the Soviet Union incalculable advantages: it could field-test both its own new equipment, especially its MiG jets, and America’s technology, as well as acquiring some of this technology, along with valuable intelligence on America. Both China and Korea would be completely dependent on Russian arms, so Stalin could fine-tune the degree of Russia’s involvement. Moreover, he could test how far America would go in a war with the Communist camp.

  But for Stalin, the greatest attraction of a war in Korea was that the Chinese, with their massive numbers, which Mao was eager to use, might be able to eliminate, and in any case tie down, so many American troops that the balance of power might tilt in Stalin’s favor and enable him to turn his schemes into reality. These schemes included seizing various European countries, among them Germany, Spain and Italy. One scenario Stalin discussed during the Korean War was an air attack on the US fleet on the high seas between Japan and Korea (en route to Inchon, in September 1950). In fact, Stalin told Mao on 5 October 1950 that the period provided a unique — and short-lived — window of opportunity because two of the major capitalist states, Germany and Japan, were out of action militarily. Discussing the possibility of what amounted to a Third World War, Stalin said: “Should we fear this? In my opinion, we should not … If a war is inevitable, then let it be waged now, and not in a few years’ time …”†

  Mao repeatedly spelled out this potential to Stalin, as a way of stressing his usefulness. On 1 July 1950, within a week of the North invading the South, and long before Chinese troops had gone in, he had Chou tell the Russian ambassador: “Now we must energetically build up our aviation and fleet,” adding pointedly for Stalin’s ears: “so as to deal a knockout blow … to the armed forces of the USA.” On 19 August Mao himself told Stalin’s emissary, Yudin, that America could send in thirty to forty divisions but that Chinese troops could “grind” these up. He reiterated this message to Yudin a week later. Then, on 1 March 1951, he summed up his overall plan for the Korean War to Stalin in chilling language: “to spend several years consuming several hundred thousand American lives.”

  With Mao’s expendables on offer, Stalin positively desired a war with the West in Korea. When Kim invaded the South on 25 June 1950, the UN Security Council quickly passed a resolution committing troops to support South Korea. Stalin’s ambassador to the UN, Yakov Malik, had been boycotting proceedings since January, ostensibly over Taiwan continuing to occupy China’s seat. Everyone expected Malik, who remained in New York, to return to the chamber and veto the resolution, but he stayed away. Malik had in fact requested permission to return to the Security Council, but Stalin rang him up and told him to stay out. The Soviet failure to exercise its veto has perplexed observers ever since, as it seemed to throw away a golden opportunity to block the West’s involvement in Korea. But if Stalin decided not to use his veto, it can only have been for one reason: that he did not want to keep Western forces out. He wanted them in, where Mao’s sheer weight of numbers could grind them up.

  IT WAS NOW very much in Stalin’s interest to make Mao the sub-chief over Kim, but this was a different case from Vietnam. Because of the enormous ramifications of taking on the USA, Stalin decided to keep an extra degree of control. He had to make absolutely sure that Kim understood that he, Stalin, was the ultimate boss before he put Kim in Mao’s hands. So even though Mao was in Moscow on 30 January, when Stalin gave Kim his consent to go to war, he did not breathe a word to Mao, and ordered Kim not to inform the Chinese. Stalin brought Kim to Moscow only at the end of March, after Mao had left. Stalin went over battle plans in detail with Kim, and at their last talk, in April 1950, he laid it on the line to Kim: “If you should get kicked in the teeth, I shall not lift a finger. You have to ask Mao for all the help.” With this comradely envoi, Kim was waved away to Mao’s care.

  On 13 May a Russian plane flew Kim to Peking. He went straight to Mao to announce that Stalin had given the go-ahead. At 11:30 that night, Chou was dispatched to ask the Soviet ambassador, Roshchin, to get Moscow’s confirmation. Stalin’s stilted message came the next morning: “North Korea can move toward actions; however, this question should be discussed … personally with comrade Mao.” Next day (15 May), Mao gave Kim his full commitment, and on the most vital issue: “if the Americans were to take part … [China] would assist North Korea with its own troops.” He went out of his way to exclude the participation of Russian troops, saying that: “Since the Soviet Union is bound by a demarcation agreement on the 38th Parallel [dividing Korea] with America, it would be ‘inconvenient’ [for it] to take part in military actions [but as] China is not bound by any such obligations, it can therefore fully render assistance to the northerners.” Mao offered to deploy troops at once on the Korean border.

  Mao endorsed the Kim — Stalin plan, and Stalin wired consent on the 16th. On 25 June the North Korean army smashed across the 38th Parallel. Mao, it seems, was not told the exact launch day. Kim wanted Chinese troops kept out until they were absolutely needed. Stalin, too, wanted them in only when America committed large numbers of troops for the Chinese to “consume.”

  TRUMAN REACTED fast to the invasion. Within two days, on the 27th, he announced that he was sending troops into Korea, as well as upping aid to the French in Indochina. Furthermore, he now reversed the policy of “non-intervention” towards Taiwan. It was thanks to this new US commitment that neither Mao nor his successors were ever able to take Taiwan.

  By early August, the North Koreans had occupied 90 percent of the South, but the US poured in well-armed reinforcements, and on 15 September landed troops at Inchon, just below the 38th Parallel, cutting off much of the North Korean army in the South, and positioning itself for a move into the North. On the 29th Kim sent an SOS to Stalin, in which he asked for “volunteer units” from China.

  On 1 October, Stalin signaled to Mao that the moment had come for him to act, dissociating himself shamelessly from any responsibility for defeat: “I am far away from Moscow on vacation and somewhat detached from events in Korea …” After this barefaced lie came his real point: “I think that if … you consider it possible to send troops to assist the Koreans, then you should move at least five — six divisions towards the 38th Parallel … [These] could be called volunteers …”

  Mao leapt into action. At 2:00 AM on 2 October he issued an order to the troops he had already moved up to the Korean border: “Stand by for order to go into [Korea] at any moment …”

  Poverty-stricken, exhausted China was about to be thrown into war with the USA. It seems it was only now, at the beginning of October, that Mao convened the regime’s top body, the Politburo, to discuss this momentous issue. The Politburo was not a team to make important decisions, but to serve as a sounding-board for Mao. On this occasion, he specifically invited differing views, because of the colossal implications of war with America. Nearly all his colleagues were strongly against going into Korea, including his No. 2 Liu Shao-chi and nominal military chief Zhu De. Lin Biao was the most vocal opponent. Chou En-lai took a cautious and equivocal position. Mao said later that going into Korea was “decided by one man and a half”: himself the “one” and Chou the “half.” Among the huge problems voiced were: that the US had complete air supremacy, and artillery superiority of about 40:1; that if China got involved, America might bomb China’s big cities and destroy its industrial base; and that America might drop atomic bombs on China.

  Mao himself had been losing sleep over these questions. He needed a functioning China as the base for his wider ambitions. But Mao gambled that America would not expand the war to China. Chinese cities and industrial bases could be protected from US bombing by the Russian air force. And as for atomic bombs, his gut feeling was that America would be deterred
by international public opinion, particularly as Truman had already dropped two — both on an Asian country. Mao took precautions for himself, though. During the Korean War, he mostly holed up in a top-secret military estate outside Peking in the Jade Spring Hills, well equipped with air-raid shelters.

  Mao was convinced that America could not defeat him, because of his one fundamental asset — millions of expendable Chinese, including quite a few that he was pretty keen to get rid of. In fact, the war provided a perfect chance to consign former Nationalist troops to their deaths. These were men who had surrendered wholesale in the last stages of the civil war, and it was a deliberate decision on Mao’s part to send them into Korea, where they formed the bulk of the Chinese forces. In case UN troops should fail to do the job, there were special execution squads in the rear to take care of anyone hanging back.

  Mao knew that America just would not be able to compete in sacrificing men. He was ready to wager all because having Chinese troops fighting the USA was the only chance he had to claw out of Stalin what he needed to make China a world-class military power.

  Mao hand-drafted a cable to Stalin on 2 October, committing to “sending Chinese army to Korea.” Then it seems he had second thoughts. In his eagerness to go in, he had not informed Stalin of any of his problems. Playing them up could raise his price. So he held back the cable committing Chinese forces, and sent a quite different one, saying that Chinese entry “may entail extremely serious consequences … Many comrades … judge that it is necessary to show caution … Therefore it is better to … refrain from advancing troops …” However, he left open the option of going in: “A final decision has not been taken,” he ended; “we wish to consult with you.”

  AT THE SAME TIME, Mao prepared the ground for going into Korea by pretending to give America “fair warning.” For this purpose, Chou En-lai staged an elaborate charade, waking the Indian ambassador in the small hours of 3 October to tell him “we will intervene” if American troops crossed the 38th Parallel. Choosing this roundabout channel, using an ambassador whose credit in the West was minimal, when it would have been perfectly simple to make an official statement, suggests compellingly that Mao wanted his “warning” to be ignored: thus he could go into Korea claiming he was acting out of self-defense.