The Return of George Washington

by Edward Larson

  Any realistic worries that antifederalists might deny Washington the presidency should have disappeared by the time that he wrote to Morris. Reports reaching Mount Vernon pointed to a surge in federalist support and a willingness by all but hard-core antifederalists to give the Constitution a fair try. Although public opinion surveys did not then exist to gauge such sentiments, they were apparent from the results of various state elections conducted during 1788. With federalist support, for example, John Hancock crushed Elbridge Gerry for governor of Massachusetts and antifederalists lost ground in the state legislature. “In our last house of representatives the antifederalists could carry any vote they pleased,” Lincoln wrote excitedly from Boston in early June. “In the present house [the Constitution] has . . . a great majority in its favor.”44

  Even better news came later in the same month from Connecticut, where federalist Jonathan Trumbull reported on his own election as Speaker of the state assembly and the defeat of nearly all “opposition” candidates.45 Similar reports reached Washington from elsewhere. “Indeed,” Madison wrote near the end of 1788, “Virginia is the only instance among the ratifying States in which the Politics of the Legislature are at variance with the” Constitution.46 Even New York had a federalist senate and Clinton faced the toughest reelection fight of his career in 1789. “So far as I am able to learn, federal principles are gaining considerable ground,” Washington concluded. “I hope the political Machine may be put into motion, without much effort or hazard of miscarrying.”47 Only Virginia backed New York’s call for a second convention.

  The federalist surge intensified the clamor for Washington to become President. The Constitution’s least tested and potentially most significant innovation, the American presidency stood at the heart of federalists’ hopes for the new union. “No other man can sufficiently unite public opinion or can give the requisite weight to the office in the commencement of the Government,” Hamilton wrote to Washington in November.48 “No other Man can fill that Office,” Gouverneur Morris echoed a month later. “You alone can awe the Insolence of opposing Factions, & the greater Insolence of assuming Adherents.”49 Refusing to serve, Hamilton added, “would have the worst effect imaginable.”50

  By this point, Washington probably agreed.51 In a January 1789 letter to Lafayette that again expressed his reluctance to become President, Washington conceded that he would serve if doing so “will insure permanent felicity to the Commonwealth” and declared, “I see a path, as clear and as direct as a ray of light, which leads to the attainment of that object.”52 After months of speaking about his future in terms of clouds and darkness, these words had a revelatory ring.

  Over the course of 1788, Washington had articulated three main objectives for America under the Constitution: respect abroad, prosperity at home, and development westward.53 Toward these ends, he envisioned a vigorous federal government encouraging trade, manufacturing, and agriculture through effective tariffs, sound money, secure property rights, and a nonaligned foreign policy. “America under an efficient government, will be the most favorable Country of any in the world for persons of industry and frugality,” he asserted in mid-1788, and “not be less advantageous to the happiness of the lowest class of people because of . . . the great plenty of unoccupied land.”54

  By the beginning of 1789, Washington was writing to Lafayette and others about the clear path forward. Indeed, on the same January day that he wrote to Lafayette, Washington addressed Rochambeau: “We are on the point of seeing the completion of the Government, which, by giving motives to labour and security to property, cannot fail to augment beyond all former example . . . the aggregate amount of property in the Country.”55 And as he surveyed the alliance-induced wars engulfing the Old World and King George’s insanity disrupting Britain, Washington closed his letter to Lafayette with the observation, “While you are quarrelling among yourselves in Europe—while one King is running mad—and others are acting as if they were already so, . . . we shall continue in tranquility here” and trade with all.56

  Notwithstanding his continuing protests, by this time Washington had resigned himself to accept the presidency. Providence guided his destiny, he believed, and that of the country.57 “You will become the Father to more than three Millions of Children,” Gouverneur Morris assured the childless Washington in December.58 For his part, Washington now wrote, “The prospect that a good general government will in all human probability be soon established in America, affords me more substantial satisfaction than I have ever before derived from any political event.”59 Under that government, he had predicted the dawn of “a new era, and perhaps . . . a more happy one than hath before appeared on this checquered scene of existence.”60 The thespian in him was prepared to play his part in what he already called “a greater Drama . . . than has heretofore been brought on the American Stage.”61 With new legislatures and governors in place in many states, it only remained for the states to choose their electors in January, those electors to cast their ballots in February, and Congress to count the votes. Elections to the first federal House of Representatives and appointments to the Senate would occur at roughly the same time on a schedule set by the individual states.

  A COMPLEX, JURY-RIGGED COMPROMISE, the electoral vote system worked seamlessly for installing Washington as the first President. As originally contrived, however, it only worked well when he was a candidate. Two ensuing near-catastrophic elections led to its overhaul by the Twelfth Amendment in 1804. In 1789, however, it operated much as its framers at the Constitutional Convention hoped and produced a result that reflected the popular will.

  Those framers devised the electoral vote system to meet objections raised to three more obvious means of picking the President. Mimicking the method then used by most states to select their governors, the original Virginia Plan called for Congress to appoint the President. Even Madison, the plan’s chief architect, soon realized that this method could undermine executive independence in a system that relied on checks and balances to curb abuse. With Washington’s concurrence, Virginia turned against it at the Convention. From the start, James Wilson and the Pennsylvania delegation wanted “the people” to elect the President directly, but merely counting individual votes from across the country would slash the influence of southern states, where disenfranchised black slaves made up about one-third of the population.62 Again with Washington’s apparent support, Virginia consistently voted against direct elections. Finally, some delegates urged that the states pick the President—one vote per state as under the Articles of Confederation—but Virginia and the other big states objected. For three months, the delegates failed to find a solution. “There are objections agst. every mode that has been, or perhaps can be proposed,” Madison noted midway through the Convention.63

  During the Convention’s first week, Wilson offered the idea of indirect elections using electors as an alternative to direct elections. Wilson’s proposal would have divided the states into electoral districts. Voters in each district would choose one elector. These electors would then meet at a central site to elect the President much as the College of Cardinals selects the pope. Variations offered by other delegates over the summer would have given states one, two, or three electors depending on population and had electors chosen by state legislatures rather than voters. None of these options gained sufficient support to win final approval, but they remained in the mix until the Convention’s final days, when desperate delegates referred all such unresolved issues to a select committee that included such Washington intimates as Madison and Gouverneur Morris.

  Combining elements from earlier proposals into a viable compromise, this so-called Committee on Postponed Parts devised the electoral vote system. Balancing state and individual interests, the system gave each state the same number of electors as senators and representatives, which meant more for big states, at least three for small ones, and a three-fifths factor for slaves. Each state would decide how to choose its own electors, which allowed the Conven
tion to dodge the thorny issues of popular versus legislative selection and district versus statewide election.

  However picked, electors would convene on the same day in their respective states and every elector would vote for two different candidates, not more than one of whom could reside in the elector’s home state. By forcing electors to vote for at least one out-of-state candidate and barring them from meeting as a single multistate body, the framers hoped to encourage the emergence of national candidates and to discourage cabals. The candidate receiving the most votes from at least a majority of the electors would become President. The second-place finisher would become Vice President. If no one received votes from a majority of the electors or in case of a tie, Congress would select from among the top candidates.

  Although not explicitly designed to lift Washington to the presidency, the electoral vote system served that purpose. Under it, Washington need not seek a party’s nomination or campaign for votes. He was not even required to put himself forward for the office or comment in advance on whether he would take it. He could simply await his country’s call at Mount Vernon, which by this point was the only way he would accept the presidency. From start to finish, the process became a long but predictable pageant suitable for America’s Cincinnatus: more of a prelude to a coronation than a campaign before an election.

  Virtually everyone predicted that Washington would sweep the election by receiving one vote from each elector. With Rhode Island and North Carolina not yet in the new union, federalists effectively controlled the government in every participating state except Virginia and New York, and Washington surely would win in those states, too. Even if he wanted to, Patrick Henry could not deny Washington in his home state and even if he could, George Clinton would not want to deny his old friend in New York.64 Antifederalists focused instead on how to elect one of their own as Vice President while federalists struggled to coalesce around a shared second choice.

  WITH FEWER THAN FOUR MONTHS between when Congress called the election in September and when electors were chosen in January, and with no experience to guide them, states labored to devise and implement their electoral vote systems on time. Four methods for choosing electors emerged: legislative or gubernatorial selection and district or statewide election.

  In each state, political traditions, partisan politics, and practical considerations influenced the decision of how to take part in this first grand experiment in a truly national election. Concerned that voters in some regions might choose antifederalists, the federalist-dominated legislatures in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Massachusetts, Delaware, and New Hampshire opted to have electors run statewide or, in the case of Massachusetts, to have the legislature choose between the two candidates receiving the most votes in each district.65 In South Carolina, Connecticut, and Georgia, where local elites held sway, the legislature picked the electors. The politically divided state of New Jersey, whose government was recently captured by West Jersey commercial interests supportive of the Constitution, entrusted this power to the federalist-friendly governor and his handpicked privy council.66 Antifederalist Virginia used a district election method that its proponents hailed as the most democratic way to pick electors under an inherently undemocratic Constitution and its opponents disparaged as designed to advance Patrick Henry’s political interests. In New York, where federalists held the Senate but antifederalists dominated the lower house or “Assembly,” lawmakers became embroiled in a bitter partisan struggle over choosing electors that had national implications.

  The battle over electors in New York turned on vice presidential politics. Everyone conceded the presidency to Washington. Antifederalists in New York and elsewhere, however, remained committed to amending the Constitution both to reform the federal structure and to protect individual rights. As the central government’s second officer, a supportive Vice President could aid this cause, especially since Washington talked about serving as President only long enough to get the government going—perhaps not even a full four-year term.67 If he retired (or died) before the end of his term, the Vice President would succeed him. By parallel reasoning, to back up Washington, federalists wanted a vigorous supporter of both national authority and a strong executive, and not someone who favored early amendments to the Constitution. Further, although federalists foresaw no executive role for the Vice President, no one knew just how meaningless the task of presiding over the Senate would become. At least in the first federal election, political leaders took the office seriously.

  For antifederalists, Clinton offered the obvious choice for Vice President. He had a strong base in New York and should do well in Virginia. Along with scattered votes from other states, this might give him enough support to place second if federalist electors spread their second votes among home-state favorites.68 He did not need a majority—just more votes than anyone but Washington. In contrast, Henry could not get votes in Virginia because casting one vote for Washington would preclude its electors from voting for another Virginian. But Clinton needed both solid support from New York’s electors and deep division in the federalist ranks for this strategy to work.69 Seeing the risk, Hamilton and other federalists took steps to disrupt it.

  Hamilton learned about Clinton’s candidacy from Madison, who heard in November 1788 that Henry was pushing it in Virginia.70 “The attempt merits attention and ought not to be neglected as chimerical,” Hamilton warned at the time.71 By this point, New York antifederalists had already formed a committee to promote Clinton’s election and opened communications with like-minded politicians in Virginia and elsewhere.

  To further his candidacy, Clinton held off calling the legislature into session to vote on how to conduct New York’s federal elections until December. By this time it was too late to have the people choose electors. If New York was to have any, legislators would have to select them. By past practice, the legislature voted on such matters by joint ballot, with each member casting one vote. Due to their broad majority in the Assembly, this approach would allow antifederalists to name all eight New York electors despite the federalists’ slim margin in the state senate. In contrast, federalist candidates surely would have won some district elections and, by proclaiming their support for Washington, might have swept a statewide contest. Putting party first, New York would become the one state where antifederalists wanted lawmakers to pick electors while federalists wanted to let the people choose.72 Having the two houses vote separately rather than by joint ballot, however, would give federalists in the state senate a veto over the outcome.

  A pugnacious politician with a penchant for brinksmanship, Hamilton decided to fight Clinton over electors in New York. Eschewing precedent, he urged federalist state senators to reject any arrangement that did not allow them to pick half of New York’s eight electors. Privately, he did not care whether New York voted. If Clinton and his partisans in the Assembly caved, then Clinton would get only four votes from New York. If both sides held fast and New York did not vote, then Clinton would get none. Either way, he would lose the vice presidency. Washington would win the presidency with or without New York. “If matters are well managed we may procure a majority for some pretty equal compromise,” Hamilton confided to Madison at the outset.73 Soon Hamilton was writing newspaper essays blasting Clinton and was on the scene at the state capital orchestrating the opposition.

  In the end, after a brutal state convention and weeks of legislative gridlock, two battle-scarred parties held their ground and New York sat out the election. “For the last circumstance I am not sorry as the most we could hope would be to balance accounts and do no harm,” Hamilton gloated after the deadline for choosing electors passed. “The Antifederalists incline to an appointment notwithstanding, but I discourage it with the Federalists.”74 Clinton would have to wait sixteen years to become Vice President, when he succeeded his onetime protégé, Aaron Burr, after Burr killed Hamilton in a duel.

  EVEN AS FEDERALISTS BATTLED antifederalists to a standstill over electors in New York, they
reluctantly rallied behind John Adams for Vice President. Hamilton was among the first to realize that they needed to agree on a candidate for the office or risk losing it to the opposition.75 Coupled with Washington, Adams represented something of a ticket balancer. Federalists generally agreed that, with Washington from the South, the Vice President should come from the Northeast. Some liked a candidate who, while supportive of federalist policies and opposed to early constitutional amendments, might appear more moderate and less elitist than the stereotypical federalist. Finally, to complement Washington’s military background, they welcomed someone known for his work in government.76

  Following his crucial role at the Massachusetts ratifying convention, many commentators predicted that Hancock would get the nod, but his continued support for constitutional amendments and his reputed ambitions for the presidency put off many leading federalists.77 Knox and Jay—both mentioned by some—were destined for more substantial posts than Vice President: Knox as secretary of war and Jay as chief justice. These subtractions left Adams at the top of many federalists’ short list for Vice President.78