Tank Tracks to Rangoon

by Bryan Perrett

  ‘Suddenly, about an hour later, one of the infantry patrols reported to the company commander that there were several hundred Japanese lining the canal a few hundred yards north of us and were too many for the patrol to engage. The patrol were obviously shaken and excited. Within a few seconds there were several rifle shots and it seemed that we were being sniped at on the bridge.

  ‘I had a quick consultation with the company commander, and in view of the information we had, both from the KOYLI sergeant and the infantry patrol, we assumed that the Japanese were crossing the canal at least north of us. I therefore gave orders for the bridge to be blown. The RE officer fired the charges, while the bren gun was fired at the drums of petrol and the incendiary grenades were thrown. The party then retired at speed in a staff car to where the squadron was harboured.’

  Due to a misunderstanding, the infantry withdrew from the position leaving the company commander behind, but returned a few hours later. The tanks, which had stood to at the first shots, felt their absence keenly, since they were at their most vulnerable during the hours of darkness, but for some reason the Japanese did not press their advantage.

  The following day, A Squadron, under Major H. H. Bourne, carried out patrols north of Payagyi with another Cameronian company, and had the satisfaction of killing fourteen Burmese dacoits armed with Japanese weapons. For the Cameronians this little success was marred by the discovery of the mutilated bodies of one of their missing patrols.

  Meanwhile a new Army Commander, General H. R. L. G. Alexander, had arrived in Burma, and was doing his best to comply with the directive of the Commander-in-Chief, General Wavell, that Rangoon must be held at all costs. One direct result of this was that C Squadron 2 RTR were withdrawn from Waw on 28th February.

  The next morning the squadron sent a troop to patrol the village, which was found to be occupied by the enemy. In the exchange of fire the operator of the leading tank was killed, and the troop withdrew. An attack was mounted on the village on 2nd March by B Squadron, with infantry and artillery support, but the Japanese resisted fiercely with 75-mm gun and mortar fire, causing some casualties, and the attack was not pressed home.

  A and C Squadrons had spent the day patrolling, and C Squadron had fought a skilful little battle north of Payagyi. Japanese 75-mm guns had suddenly opened up on the leading troop, damaging two tanks, and causing two of the infantry’s carriers to ditch a few hundred yards from the enemy. A plan to recover the carriers was worked out with the accompanying section of E Troop 414 Battery Royal Artillery (The Essex Yeomanry—7th Armoured Brigade’s integral artillery unit) who fired a concentration for twenty minutes whilst one tank rushed in with the carrier crews, and dragged the carriers clear. The operation was carried out successfully and without loss.

  During the night 3rd/4th March the Japanese resumed their offensive. Major Rudkin was woken at 0400 hours and told to take half of C Squadron down the Waw road to a village three miles away which was being threatened by the enemy. The remaining half squadron would protect the road junction at Payagyi where the Waw road left the main Rangoon–Mandalay road.

  After proceeding only one and a half miles Rudkin encountered some Ghurka stragglers who told him that the Japanese had just occupied a village 800 yards further on. Being without infantry he decided not to proceed further until first light, as visibility would be limited to a hundred yards by heavy mist. As the light began to grow, firing broke out three hundred yards in his rear, firing which gradually increased in volume until it became obvious that a major Japanese attack was in progress.

  While Rudkin had been waiting for better light, his second-in-command, Captain N. T. Plough, had been told to bring up the remainder of the squadron from Payagyi. Suddenly the tanks were surrounded and overrun with yelling Japanese who advanced right up to the tanks, some carrying explosive and incendiary devices attached to long poles, which they attempted to drop into the turrets; clearly the enemy had been expecting tanks, and prepared accordingly.

  For all their efforts, the Japanese had little success, and the Stuarts’ machine guns did considerable execution. In one troop the tank commanders were using their tommy guns from their turrets at very close range, and the result was deadly. Nor were the Japanese particularly lucky in their timing, for 7th Hussars, who were due to relieve 2 RTR on this sector, anyway, were already approaching the battle from the west, and by 0800 had informed Rudkin that they were ready to take over.

  Rudkin therefore ordered Plough and his half squadron to withdraw through the Hussars, which was accomplished without difficulty. However, his own position was now most precarious, since he was now effectively cut off, and the mist had now thickened to the extent that visibility was down to fifty yards in places, making control impossible.

  I therefore gave orders for each tank to find its own way back to RHQ across country. The going was extremely bad and obstacles were tackled for which the tanks could never have been designed. It was a nightmare journey as one could not pick one’s route owing to the mist, and the odd sniper who infiltrated across the road behind us kept the heads of the tank commanders down. By a miracle every tank arrived back safely although the crews were bruised and shaken.

  7th Hussars’ leading squadron, B, commanded by Major G. C. Davies-Gilbert arrived in Payagyi to find the enemy there before them. One of Davies-Gilberts troop leaders, Lt G. S. B. Palmer, describes the course of the action throughout the day.

  By the time we were approaching Payagyi the dawn light was just breaking and there was a thick mist with visibility down to ten yards. I was stopped by 2 RTR patrol and told that the area was full of Japanese snipers. I reported back to the Squadron Leader and was told to take up a position a hundred yards up the Waw road until the visibility cleared. The opportunity was taken to replenish the tanks, but no sooner had the petrol lorry arrived at my troop and while we were in the act of refuelling, than a storm of small arms fire broke out all round the area.* The situation was most unpleasant, as the visibility was now almost nil. As the leading troop, our position was very sticky and there appeared no way of getting off the road. I saw a little figure creeping up the ditch towards my tank and took a pot at him with my sub-machine gun; he didn’t cause me any further trouble.

  Wireless communications were appalling. The No 11 set was very temperamental in the tropical static, and I had little idea what was happening.

  The following troop passed up a message that Squadron HQ, behind us at the cross roads, was under attack from enemy ambush which had apparently allowed our troops to pass through before opening fire. This was the first of many ambushes we were to be involved in during the next few months.

  However, this attack was quite harmless as they appeared to have no anti-tank weapons. One troop leader (Lt Patteson) and his driver were minor casualties. Slowly the mist lifted and the firing died away, and we could see no sign of the enemy apart from a few bodies.

  Basil Young’s troop was ordered through me and told to patrol towards Waw. He had not gone far before he reported numerous Japanese in the area.

  The Squadron was told to deploy off the road and feel out eastwards. No sooner had we done this than a small Japanese spotter plane flew over and circled at about 500 feet. Very soon we came under heavy mortar and artillery fire which was very accurate. As a result of this we withdrew a few hundred yards into more broken country where we could get hull-down and remain in observation.

  My troop was on the left, nearest to the Payagyi cross-roads. There was a slight diversion when one of our troop leaders reported on the air that he could see either tanks or elephants, but was not sure which. After about half an hour the rest of the Squadron drew back about half a mile, leaving our troops where they were, but about 1100 I was told to take up a position on the Payagyi cross-roads and keep the village under observation. It was now appallingly hot and since we were still in contact with the enemy and in a very open position, the crews could not dismount and we felt like fried eggs in a pan.

 
I was called back for an ‘O’ group and we were told that an attack was to be put in on Payagyi supported by a troop of Essex Yeomanry and RAF light bombers. This was supposed to start at 1600, but the whole thing went off at half cock as the alleged RAF squadron consisted of one bomber who dropped his load off target. Later that evening a large formation of enemy bombers flew over us and hammered the Pegu bridges. One could visualize another Sittang shambles.

  Toward late evening I reported that no movement had been seen for some time in Payagyi. I was told to go through the village supported by a platoon of Cameronians who would clear the buildings. I moved through fast and took up a position north of the village. The infantry searched Payagyi and forced the Japanese to withdraw, inflicting heavy casualties, including five men killed while sitting at their evening meal.

  Meanwhile I observed a mule train moving some 2,000 yards to the north, and gave them a good pasting with mg which appeared to have satisfying results. As dusk fell we withdrew back to the Squadron, setting the village alight as we left. We had our first meal since 3 am that morning and then went back into leaguer with a company of Cameronians. We were satisfied with our first brush with the enemy and felt that we had had the better of them.

  The following morning B Squadron returned to a position of observation near Payagyi, and were met with sporadic mortar fire, which ceased when they machine gunned the area of the village. At about 1000 several enemy tanks were spotted moving from the direction of Waw towards Payagyi. They were engaged at once, but were small and presented difficult targets, although one was destroyed and the rest withdrew. Apart from this, the enemy did not trouble B Squadron during the day.

  On their right, however, A Squadron under Major C. T. Llewellen Palmer had been having problems with Japanese infantry who had infiltrated into a wood, and these were cleared out during the day with help from the infantry. Two Japanese tanks, evidently Type 95s, wandered into the area, probably from the direction of B Squadron, and were engaged by Captain Marcus Fox.

  ‘They appeared to be very lonely and untrained, and obviously did not know what to do, remaining stationary in the middle of an open field. They were knocked out immediately before they knew we were there. Their tanks were very much the same as the Honey (Stuart) and obviously copied from an American design; indeed they carried cans of American oil.’

  In spite of the severe lesson taught them by General Zhukov at Khalkin-Gol during the 1939 Manchurian Incident, Japanese tank crews never gave the slightest hint that they were capable of fighting a tank battle, and in fact some of their ideas were downright peculiar. For instance, in several cases, when Japanese tanks had been immobilized or prevented from getting forward by obstacles, the crews had been known to dismount and continue the attack on foot with the infantry—an admirable expression of the offensive spirit, but a prodigal waste of expensively trained specialists. However, the mere presence of tanks in the Payagyi area showed that the Japanese were not taking kindly to the check imposed by 7th Armoured Brigade, and the following day they redoubled their efforts.

  Both squadrons spent a quiet night and moved out to their day positions before first light. Once again there was thick mist, and there was light shelling.

  Because of the mist, Colonel Fosdick had decided to move his RHQ a mile to the south, and was actually moving when his own tank was hit by anti-tank gun fire which blew off a track. Very shortly afterwards a B Squadron tank was also hit and disabled. Major Davies-Gilbert at once despatched Lt Palmer and his troop to assist RHQ. Arriving in the area, all three of Palmer’s tanks were hit repeatedly, fortunately without major damage.

  Suddenly the mist lifted to reveal four anti-tank guns. These had been man-handled into their position during the night, and had been located so as to fire into rear of the squadrons.

  They had opened up a little too early, or their score of kills would have been greater.

  Almost at once Captain Shorten of the Essex Yeomanry got his guns onto the enemy, and a counter attack was mounted by a troop of A Squadron tanks, commanded by Lt M. M. Stanley-Evans, and a company of the West Yorkshires, who had relieved the Cameronians. The attack went in with a swing, capturing all four guns and routing their infantry escort. Heavy casualties were inflicted and one prisoner taken. Stanley-Evans chased another fugitive on foot into some trees, and was laying about him when other Japanese survivors joined in, and he was forced to escape in his turn.

  A little later, A Squadron reported three tanks approaching their position. Careful inspection revealed them as being Type 95s, and they engaged the troops of Lts Barton and Stanley-Evans, the former choosing a good hull down position on the flank, so that the Japanese were caught in a perfect V fire trap. After a short exchange of fire two of the enemy tanks were knocked out, and the third abandoned by its crew. It was examined by A Squadron with interest, and the general opinion was that it was not much use as a fighting vehicle. Unfortunately, the success was marred by the death of Lt Glendinning, killed by a Japanese ‘over’ from the battle whilst he was investigating a report of enemy transport on the Waw–Payagyi Road.

  If the enemy had co-ordinated his tank attack with his antitank gun ambush, he might have done 7th Hussars some damage, but co-ordination was never a Japanese forte, however cunning they might be. As it was, the Hussars were consistently getting the better of every encounter.

  Elsewhere, however, things were going very badly indeed, and General Alexander had already reached the conclusion that Rangoon could not be held; in fact, Burma could not be held with the forces available. Nonetheless, Alexander was not going to make a present of the country to the Japanese, who were going to be made to fight for it. In the meantime, the army would escape from the Rangoon trap by the western Mandalay road, through Prome, whilst demolitions in the city and dock area sent columns of smoke thousands of feet into the sky.

  During the afternoon of 6th March, therefore, 7th Hussars were ordered to leave Payagyi, and retire through Pegu to rejoin the rest of the brigade at Hlegu.

  ‘We arrived in the town as darkness was falling,’ wrote Lt Palmer. ‘The town had been severely bombed and the whole place was blazing from end to end. However, we were lucky as the only bridge was still standing. Meanwhile the enemy had erected a road block three miles south-west of the town and we halted while A Squadron moved down to the block to ascertain its strength. Apparently it was quite impossible to get through and probes were made in various directions to get round the flanks but all were considered impossible.’

  Colonel Fosdick decided to move the Regiment closer to the road block and leaguer for the night. Whilst we were going into harbour Bill Kevill-Davies was killed by small arms fire. He was buried in the leaguer which was an extremely sticky area in the heart of the enemy positions. As a night attack was expected we had to stay in the tanks and spent one of the most harassing nights I can remember in the war. Dawn was most welcome. In fact the only trouble we had was from a most searching mortar fire which continued spasmodically throughout the night. The ‘B’ vehicles, however, did suffer considerably. An ‘O’ group first thing in the morning decided that the block should be cleared by a company of infantry supported by one troop. I was the lucky individual selected to support this attack.

  We set off after 7 am and as we reached the road we were submerged by a panic-stricken mob of fugitives in complete disarray. They looked like wrecking the whole operation and it was impossible to move without running them down. Eventually I had to threaten to open fire, but the Japs did the job for me.

  We had Noel Shorten of the Essex Yeomanry with us as OP and moved towards the road block with Sgt Davis leading the way. On coming round a bend we suddenly came up against the road block which consisted of two lorries drawn across the road and another obstruction some farther 300 yards down the road. The country on either side was heavily wooded and there was no way round. We succeeded in partly moving the lorries with the tanks and immediately came under a hail of small arms fire.

  We to
ok up a fire position and gave the whole area a ten minute pasting with the Brownings. While this was going on the infantry most gallantly cleared the block and the Essex Yeomanry put down a concentration on the area.

  In the middle of all this I suddenly saw a bottle hit the side of Davis’s tank and burst into flames—some kind of molotov cocktail. No damage was done and we shuffled forward, constantly changing, and eventually having Cpl Barr’s tank knocked out, again by a molotov cocktail, although he and his crew got clear. My radio aerial was shot away and I lost contact with the regiment. I signalled to Noel that I would push on to the next block. We moved fast under heavy fire and were relieved to find it clear. As we passed through my tank was hit by an HE shell which exploded in my valise on the outside of the tank. I was mortified to see my bedding and spare kit disintegrate in all directions.

  The infantry had given us most gallant support and cleared the jungle on either side. The company commander had been severely wounded during the engagement. Having got through the road block I had not a clue what was going on and decided to push on with my troop until I could rig an emergency aerial. We stopped a few miles up the road where we linked up with a patrol of 2 RTR and also with John Parry’s troop which had escorted a brigadier through the block the previous night. I still could not contact Squadron HQ and was getting very worried when suddenly the first of the column started to come through. The Squadron had got out of a sticky position very lightly with only one man killed and a few wounded.