‘Been wounded, chum?’ asked one of them sympathetically.
‘No, mate,’ came the reply. ‘Can’t you see – I’m a bloody umpire!’
On 23rd May YL Squadron was flown out of Imphal, and rejoined their parent squadron at Dimapur. This unit had already seen some fighting during the breakthrough to Kohima, so by a strange chance C Squadron 150 Regiment RAC became the only armoured sub-unit to fight in both the siege and the relief operations.
Throughout May, the Carabiniers were in action daily on the Bishenpur sector, climbing desperately steep slopes in support of countless infantry attacks. West of Bishenpur, Lt A. Weir of B Squadron, who had survived Nunshigum as his troop had not been committed to the summit, won the Military Cross whilst working with 1/3rd Gurkha Rifles in an attack on a feature known as Red Hill.
Before the attack could even begin, Weir had to get his tank up a track which by any normal standard would have been considered impossible. He did this by walking ahead of the tank and directing the driver by hand signals, whilst sappers worked frantically to shore up tie outer edge of the track to prevent the vehicle sliding over the edge.
Arriving just in time for the infantry to cross their start line, Weir received orders to engage two features known as the first and second pimples, but found that his guns would not depress sufficiently, and decided to cross the crest of Red Hill and open fire from the reverse slope.
No sooner had he crossed the crest than three Japanese raced straight for the tank, to be cut down by the Gurkhas before they could do any damage. However, holding the tank on the slope was no easy matter, even using the engine, and the driver was forced to haul back on both his levers whilst the operator used both hands and all his weight on the handbrake.
About fifteen Japanese had run away from the first pimple when Weir opened fire, and he then proceeded to smash in all the remaining bunkers and foxholes at 150 yards range.
However, when he switched his guns to engage the second pimple, the tank was hit, the main armament jammed, and the driver was knocked unconscious. Weir crawled down into the driver’s seat, and attempted to reverse the vehicle out, but the gradient was too steep and the engine stalled. The tank began to roll forward, out of control and gathering speed, and Weir told his crew to jump for it. After he had been at the controls for a few very frightening moments, he was able to bring the lurching mass of machinery to a halt against a small ridge.
By the end of May, there were definite signs that the Japanese 33rd Division had had enough of the tanks, and in spite of Tanaka’s death or glory style of leadership, the moral effect of the British armour was beginning to tell, as the following account, written by an officer of A Squadron 7th Light Cavalry, clearly shows in describing the capture of the village of Morbam.
‘An attack was put in consisting of two battalions of infantry, a half squadron of Lees, and a half squadron of Stuarts. The enemy fled after showing little spirit, not many of them getting away. The tanks had lots of fun, as in this village there were one or two hill features that the enemy had dug themselves in on, and when they decided to run round to one side of the hill, be driven back by the tanks on that side, and repeat the process as they came under fire from tanks on the other side.’
It was on the northern sector, on the Kohima road, that the Japanese came closest to Imphal town, but the recapture of Nunshigum and the Litan saddle ensured that the enemy was never able to be present in such strength in this area as to present a serious menace, and here, once again, the steady outward pressure from 4 Corps not only prised them off their hard won gains along the road, but also prepared the way for the arrival of the relief column.
This area was the territory of C Squadron 3rd Carabiniers and C Squadron 7th Light Cavalry, and provided some interesting examples of co-operation between the two types of tank in use.
On 11th April the Carabiniers, supporting companies from 1/3rd, 1/4th and 1/10th Gurkha Rifles, threw the enemy off a strong hill position north-east of Sengmai. In spite of tremendous expenditure of ammunition, the Japanese return fire kept the infantry pinned down until Lt J. A. Cole broke into their position with his own tank, after his two other Lees had bogged down, and beat in their bunkers. As always, the enemy’s snipers took particular interest in the tank commanders, and had Cole not been wearing his steel tank helmet, there is no doubt that he would have died.
A month later, on 16th May, half of C Squadron 7th Light Cavalry advanced on Kanglatongbi, in company with a Punjabi battalion, and received a warm reception.
The ground in this area is mostly covered with thick scrub jungle in which it is very difficult to pick out targets. There are also scattered big trees, which the Japs used as positions for snipers and OPs.
No. 1 Troop (Daya Singh) supported D Company on the right. They advanced about 500 yards, encountering several bunker positions, which the tanks silenced, but before they could reach the road, the enemy mortars and LMGs opened up, causing casualties to the infantry. D Company received orders to withdraw, and the troop covered the withdrawal and returned to harbour. They reckoned to have accounted for 30 Japs.
Dave Bishop’s troop supported B Company on the left. They ran into well dug and wired positions soon after starting, and the company commander was killed. Shortly afterwards, Dave was also killed by a burst of LMG from a sniper. His gunner, Kartar Singh, spotted the snipers’ position in a tree. He fired two rounds of cannister, and had the satisfaction of seeing three bodies fall out of the tree.
Owing to the death of the two officers, co-operation between B Company and the troop broke down. The infantry were halted on the edge of the jungle out of sight of each other, shooting up bunkers.
Dave’s wireless set had gone ‘dis’ and his tank took no further part in the action. Risaldar Waryam Singh took over command of the troop, and went back to contact the infantry. Jemadar Buta Singh, the third tank commander, had meanwhile ditched his tank in a nullah several hundred yards within the area held by the Japs. The position was confused, but the Japs had had enough, and started to withdraw. Risaldar Waryam Singh went forward with a reserve tank which had come up, and with some difficulty found Jemadar Buta Singh, and evacuated his crew.
In the meantime, Major Morrison had arrived, and turned himself temporarily into an infantry company commander. We then returned to harbour.
Three days later, the attack was resumed, and this time C Squadron was at full strength, the other half having rejoined after a spell of duty in the Iril valley. In addition, the Carabiniers had provided a troop for heavy support.
The intention was again to advance about 460 yards up the road, to the line of a nullah. The squadron, less two troops, were in support of the Punjabis on the right of the road, Daya Singh with the right platoon, and Sadhu Singh with the left. Risaldar Inder Singh followed up Sadhu Singh’s troop. Risaldar Waryam Singh was out on the left of the road, giving flank protection in the area in which he had operated three days before. John Moody was in reserve.
No. 4 Troop ran into trouble early on. Sadhu Singh’s tank was hit on the top of the turret by a mortar bomb, which penetrated and killed him. The driver tried to back the tank out, but lost direction, and backed into a nullah. Jemadar Darshan Singh’s tank was hit on the turret ring, and the Jemadar and his gunner, Sowar Gurbachan Singh, were wounded. Dafadar Lall Singh’s tank was hit on the front plate. Risaldar Inder Singh was ordered to take over the troop, but almost immediately his tank was penetrated in the right sponson by a 75-mm which killed him and wounded his gunner, Gurdial Singh. The driver, Sowar Naranajan Singh, showed skill and coolness in getting the tank out of action and was later awarded the MM.
The situation was now obscure as wireless communication had broken down with No 4 Troop, and Cyril Morrison had so far received no information of the presence of the 75-mm gun.
He ordered up John’s troop to deal with the opposition, which at the same time was holding up the infantry. Direcdy the troop came into action, Jemadar Hazara Singh’s tank
was hit above the driver’s hatch, and the hatch was blown off. The crew baled out, leaving the driver, Sowar Hazura Singh, for dead. Later, when the tank was recovered the driver was found to be alive, but died in hospital a few days later.
Cyril now tumbled the fact that it was a 75-mm gun that was causing the damage, and he pulled John’s troop out, and called up a troop of Lees to deal with it. One Lee was put out of action by direct hits before the gun was finally silenced.
The infantry tried to consolidate on the ground they had gained, covered by the Lees and by Daya’s troop. They were in open ground and suffered many casualties from mortar and LMG fire, so finally they pulled back and consolidated 300 yards from the objective.
While the consolidation was going on, Cyril and Joe went forward and got Sadhu Singh’s tank out of the nullah with the help of a Lee. Captain Clement, who had deserted his LAD for the day, started to drive the tank out, but he ran over the only mine in Kanglatongbi. The suspension was damaged, and the tank had to be abandoned. It was recovered two days later.
Jemadar Hazara Singh’s tank was recovered without incident. Nos. 1 and 2 Troops, had had a quiet day, though the former had given very valuable support to its accompanying infantry. The squadron had so far lost 6 tanks, but they were at once replaced by reserves, and all were repaired and back on the road within a few weeks.
On 22nd May the Punjabis attacked again from a different direction and found that the Japanese had pulled out. They had abandoned the major supply depot they had established at Kanglatongbi, and left a great deal of equipment behind. The 7th made themselves very comfortable with the spoils, and Major Alister Campbell took over command of C Squadron, Major Morrison having been appointed regimental second-in-command.
Throughout early June preparations took place for an attack on the vital Zebra Spur, which dominated the Imphal-Kohima road.
Zebra Spur was at Milestone 116, a couple of miles north of Kanglatongbi. The spur terminated abruptly in a fifty foot cliff at the foot of which the Dimapur road runs. There is one track up to the spur which runs back from the road round a sharp bend and back up the side of the spur reaching the top immediately above the road. Thick scrub on the edges of the spur gave excellent cover for bunkers, and reconnaissance had failed to reveal the exact positions and strength of the Japs. Before tanks could get up on the spur, it was necessary for the infantry to gain a foothold on the top, and for the track to be searched for mines.
H Hour was 0930 hours on 7th June, and by 1300 hours these tasks had been completed under the cover of fire from tanks and mortars. John, who had been closely following the sapper mine-clearing party, gained the top of the track, and deployed out to the right on the spur and married up with his infantry. Daya Singh followed and deployed to the left, and Joe in the command tank took up position behind John, and SDM Autar Singh in the other SHQ tank, behind Daya Singh.
Alister was on his feet at Company HQ with a 48 set. Meanwhile, Risaldar Waryam Singh’s troop was providing flank protection in the low ground on the east of the road. He did some effective shooting at positions in the scrub ahead of him, and up the nullah which joins the road immediately north of the spur.
The intention was to sweep up the spur away from the road, but the right platoon with John’s troop were held up by heavy fire from the nullah on their right flank and could make no progress. ‘Chota’ Jemmet assisted with his mortars with several good crumps into the nullah, one of which knocked out a 75-mm gun when it had fired only two rounds.* Joe’s tank was slightly damaged by a mortar bomb which also wounded his operator L/Dafadar Gurbachan Singh. Joe pulled out and changed into a reserve tank, and was back in action again within twenty minutes.
Time was getting on, so it was decided to consolidate the foothold gained on the spur. No 4 Troop came up and relieved John’s troop, which returned to harbour. Odd snipers were still active during the consolidation, and one had the audacity to fire at the CO and Major Herford as they were coming up the track in his jeep. The position on the spur was jittered by the Japs throughout the night, but by morning they had gone, leaving behind 32 bodies and a lot of equipment.
This action paved the way for a breakout designed to link up with the relief column fighting its way down the road from Kohima, and was almost the last tank action to be fought before the siege was finally broken.
The part played by 254 Tank Brigade at Imphal cannot be emphasized too much. Whilst the tank crews quite rightly point out that the major part of the day to day fighting was borne by the infantry and gunners, the presence of their vehicles, climbing impossible heights to provide support for the infantry, was a powerful moral force which affected both sides.
The British and Indian infantry knew that if a tank could be got into position, and most times it was, by hook or by crook, success was almost certain. They knew that the tanks would cover them whilst they consolidated their gains, and that they would take their wounded with them when they returned to harbour. They knew also that the tanks’ wireless net was superior to their own, and was an invaluable link with other troops who could reinforce them if necessary, and that the tanks often possessed the nearest first aid kit with which to treat a desperately wounded man. Most important of all, they knew that the tank crews were prepared to take the same risks as themselves, and that by attracting the enemy’s fire the tanks were saving them casualties, and that the tanks’ own fire was both accurate and effective. To tired, battle weary men, these things mean a lot.
To the Japanese foot soldier, waiting at his bunker fire slit to open up at his opposite number, the sound of Stuart or Lee engines thrashing their painful way up the slopes below him, was an invitation to him to make peace with himself before he joined his beloved ancestors, and often his last sight upon earth as the tanks crossed the crest was the black muzzle of a traversing 75- or 37-mm gun. In such circumstances his fire discipline frequently cracked, and instead of reserving his fire for the advancing infantry, he directed it at the tanks as soon as they appeared, to little effect. If his nerve broke and he ran, he would be lucky if the tanks’ machine guns or the infantry did not scythe him down; nor was he provided with sufficient anti-tank weapons to protect himself adequately. Too much of this sort of thing will affect the morale of any army, and the wonder is that the Japanese stood it so long and died so often at their posts. Where are our own tanks, they must have asked; why do they not fight in the mountains, like the British?
The answer was that the British armour had predicted its role well in advance, and had trained very hard with special emphasis on hill climbing; the Japanese armour had never imagined such a method of employment, and was ill equipped both mentally and physically for such tasks.
During the siege, squadrons spent most of their time operating in two halves. This stretched the internal administrative arrangements of their parent regiments, and placed a heavy responsibility upon the half-squadron commanders. Whilst supplies did get through to the tanks, the siege situation did not always permit that every requirement could be met, and at one stage 7th Cavalry’s Jat squadron came close to starving, as the men would not depart from the strict diet ordered by their religion.
Again, the junior officers commanding half-squadrons were sometimes called upon to argue strenuously against misuse of their tanks in certain situations. It takes a certain amount of courage for a captain to argue the toss with a brigade or even divisional commander, but both Colonel Younger and Colonel Barlow were invariably able to prevent bullying, and it would have been a rash infantry commander who pushed the matter to a conclusion, since a complaint from Brigadier Scoones would have brought down the wrath of the Corps Commander himself, who was well aware of the good the tanks were doing.
On the hills surrounding the plain of Imphal two ideas were done to death for ever. One was that the Imperial Japanese Army was invincible, and the other was that tanks can not be used in mountainous jungle; amongst those remote and desolate summits can still be found the rusting remains of Lees and S
tuarts, which bear silent witness to both.
* Pots-an-Pans to the troops.
* Throughout the Imphal battle, in attacks of this nature the tanks always carried coils of barbed wire and other consolidation stores for immediate use by the infantry once the position had been taken. They also carried away the infantry’s casualties when returning to leaguer.
* Major Cyril Morrison, later to command 11th Prince Albert Victor’s Own Cavalry.
* SEAC Newspaper.
* There is an interesting comparison to be made between Colonel Younger’s first method and the tactics of Brig. G. W. Richards’ 23rd Armoured Brigade, 8th Army’s infantry tank formation, at Second Alamein. Both methods provide maximum benefit to the infantry at minimum costs to the tanks. See the Author’s Through Mud and Blood, Robert Hale.
* Piat. Short for Projector Infantry Anti-Tank. This cumbrous device threw a hollow-charge bomb by means of a heavy coiled spring mounted in a trough. It required considerable strength to compress the spring which could only be done by the gunner standing up and pressing with all his weight. The weapon was not accurate beyond thirty yards, but the bomb, like any hollow-charge ammunition, had tremendous penetrative power when it did connect. The American rocket-propelled bazooka was greatly superior and soon replaced the Piat.
* The FOO.
* Enemy – (Urdu).
* There is a story well known through the Army, which has its roots in the fighting around the Silchar track. Two wounded men making their way slowly down the track had paused to rest when a third, wearing a bandage round his left arm, caught them up.
Tank Tracks to Rangoon Page 16
