* The establishment of 7th Light Cavalry provided for a 3 inch mortar troop.
7
U-Go: Relief and Pursuit
Major-General Sato’s 31st Division advanced from the Chindwin in four columns, and behind it was driven an enormous herd of cattle, sufficient to feed the men for the period they thought they would need to capture Kohima and hold it until Mutaguchi had wiped out the Imphal garrison and could come up the road with fresh supplies. Apart from the cattle, and what the men possessed by way of marching rations, 31st Division brought little save guns and ammunition.
During the early hours of 5th April 1944, Sato’s leading regiment, the 58th, succeeded in isolating the little hill town of Kohima, held by a tiny garrison of which the 4th Battalion The Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment formed the major part.
The West Kents came from 161 Indian Infantry Brigade, which had recently arrived in the area direct from the Arakan. The two other battalions, 1/1st Punjabis and 4/7th Rajputs, occupied a defensive box, along with a few mountain guns, at Jotsoma, two miles along the Dimapur road, and this box was, in its turn, isolated by the Japanese on 7th April.
What followed has become known as one of the most savage and vindictive infantry battles in the combined histories of the British, Indian and Japanese armies. For thirteen days, the Kohima garrison beat off incessant fanatical attacks by an enemy many times their number. Within the contracting perimeter, the bodies of friend and foe remained unburied, and in many trenches the only occupants were the dead. Men fought hand to hand on the surface, whilst below ground others grunted and struggled in stifling darkness as Japanese attempts to tunnel their way in were met by counter mines. The battlefield reminded one officer of a particularly nasty corner of the Somme, which says a great deal. On 14th April, Brigadier Warren’s box at Jotsoma was relieved by 5th Brigade from 2nd British Division, and on the 18th the same brigade broke through to Kohima, not a moment too soon, as the garrison was almost spent and could not have resisted many more determined assaults.
Sato, confronted with the steady build-up of Lt-General Montagu Stopford’s 33 Corps to his front, now went over to the defensive. In this he might have succeeded indefinitely, as he held most commanding positions in the hills, and if he lost one he could simply retire to the next.
However, at this stage, things began to go wrong for him. His supplies, both of food and ammunition, began to run down, and his superior, Mutaguchi, turned a deaf ear to his repeated requests for replenishment. His men fought on, throwing back repeated British attacks, but their health began to deteriorate. Relations between the two generals began to sour. Mutaguchi ordered Sato to send about one third of his force to Imphal, but Sato disobeyed as his own losses had been disastrous. Sato made one final request for food and ammunition to be flown up to him, which was ignored, so on 30th May he signalled Mutaguchi to the effect that he was going to withdraw. The latter responded with a promise to court martial him if he did so, to which Sato insolently replied that he would bring him down as well. He then went right over Mutaguchi’s head, and informed Burma Area Army HQ that in his opinion the ability of Mutaguchi’s staff fell short of that of cadets. In the aftermath of the U-Go débâcle, Sato escaped a court martial simply because the washing of so much dirty linen in public was considered to be against the national interest, but both he and Mutaguchi were sacked, and thereafter held only administrative appointments. Many Japanese blame Sato for the failure of U-Go, but he had in fact accomplished rather more than his fellow divisional commanders, and had Mutaguchi given him the support he gave to Tanaka he could have done a great deal more.*
Sato’s opening moves had, in fact, caught the British commanders on the wrong foot, and 33 Corps was slow in putting its counter measures into effect. The Corps consisted of 2nd British Division, a formation containing a high proportion of regular battalions, 7th Indian Division, recently arrived from the Arakan, and one brigade from 5th Indian Division, which has already been mentioned. The Corps’ armour, in the opening stages of the battle, consisted only of five Lees of C Squadron 150 Regiment RAC, commanded by Lt R. H. K. Wait, manned by scratch crews, which included artillerymen and infantry, as the regular crews were already manning the Carabiniers’ reserve tanks at Imphal under the title of YL Squadron. The position improved radically with the arrival of 149 Regiment RAC, commanded by an RTR officer, Lt-Colonel F. W. B. Good, which had been raised from a battalion of the King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, and upon this regiment’s Lees fell most of the tank work at Kohima. A newly raised Indian regiment, 45th Cavalry, equipped with Stuarts, was employed mainly in patrolling the Corps’ line of communication, a task considered to be of prime importance since the Japanese were expected to make a flank move through the hills on Dimapur, and also carried supplies up to the forward troops and provided local protection for the Zubza box. Later, a third regiment, 11th Prince Albert Victor’s Own Cavalry,* arrived with its Daimler armoured cars, and took over some of these duties.
At Kohima, there was less scope for the use of tanks than there was at Imphal, as the country was close and mountainous, and most of the fighting took place along the axis of the road. Nonetheless, the Japanese were well aware of the power of the tank, and decided that they would eliminate Wait and his scratch force before they could do any damage. Twice during the early hours of 14th April they tried to break into his harbour, carrying magnetic mines, and twice they were driven off with severe loss. Later the same day, they had cause to rue their failure, for the five tanks smashed in their bunkers on the feature known as Cameron Picquet, which was then stormed by 1st Cameron Highlanders, opening the way for the relief of Jotsoma. For this, Wait and his men received the personal thanks of Major-General J. M. L. Grover, 2nd Division’s commander, who told them that they had been largely instrumental in getting his troops through to Kohima in time.
By 17th April 149 Regiment was beginning to arrive in the area, and half A Squadron, under Major Matthews, assisted the Royal Berkshire Regiment in their relief of the West Kents at Kohima town. They found that with the exception of Garrison Hill, most of the town was held by the Japanese, including the Naga village, a large native village which stood on higher ground, and most of the surrounding high ground as well. For the remainder of April and for the first three weeks of May, 33 Corps strove to force a way through this mountain wall, and the tanks were in action daily. ‘It was,’ as Colonel Good remarked, ‘A troop leader’s battle from the word go.’ It was also a battle of attrition in the most literal sense, in which the tanks eroded the enemy’s will to fight just as they eroded his dwindling manpower resources. When the Japanese finally broke, one optimist scrawled a message on a wall for the victors to read:
‘British—too many guns, tanks and troops. Japanese going. Back in six months.’
As at Imphal, the main roles for the tanks were destroying bunkers and strong positions, dominating high features and denying high ground to the enemy, evacuating wounded and taking stores, wire, food and water to isolated positions. For their part, the Japanese were quick to appreciate that the tanks were largely confined to the road and to a few tracks, and built formidable road blocks from burned out vehicles, which together with the approaches, were mined. These obstacles were covered by automatic and mortar fire and by anti-tank and 75-mm guns.
Tank operations reached a climax during Operation Thunderbolt, which, between 11th and 14th May, succeeded in smashing a hole through the Japanese centre. Extracts from 149’s War Diary describe the fighting.*
11th May 44. The two tanks from FSD in attempting to help infantry onto DIS were disabled—one by an anti-tank mine and the other by sliding over the side owing to the greasy surface and the narrowness of the track. Lt P. M. Wood killed by the explosion of an anti-tank mine whilst attempting to guide the tank onto the track again. All the rest of crews evacuated safely.
Leading tanks on the way round held up by partial road blocks consisting of a number of disabled armoured vehicles, which wer
e difficult to negotiate. On attempting to pass through, the leading tank blew a track, caused by an anti-tank mine; another tank tried to get round and also blew its track, preventing the passage of further tanks. The column was withdrawn as work could not be carried on owing to heavy mg fire.
12th May 44. Captain P. S. Field in command of two troops of A Squadron (Lts A. B. K. Mitchell and A. Testemale) succeeded in reaching the Pimple and DIS after overcoming three road blocks with the aid of the sappers. Targets were shot up on FSD, DIS and Jail Hill. Estimated number of bunkers knocked out—12. Tanks harboured for the night in own perimeter—2 on FSD, 2 on DIS and one troop at the Pimple.
The arrival of Field’s tanks from round the back of Garrison Hill was greeted with cheers by the British infantry fighting for possession of DIS and FSD, some of whom were pinned down within fifteen yards of the Japanese bunkers. As the tanks opened a brisk and accurate fire, they were forced to lie flat as the shells cracked overhead into the fire slits. Not a single Japanese surrendered, so that by the end both features were littered with the bodies of those who had not been buried in their own bunkers.
8 Kohima : actions fought by 149 Regiment RAC
The same day a B Squadron tank commanded by Sergeant J. Waterhouse had reached the top of Summerhouse Hill by means of a road bulldozed by sappers, and stayed in position throughout the night ready to carry out shoots the following day in the area of the District Commissioner’s Bungalow and the Tennis Court, both of which had long been a thorn in the side of the infantry. The following is Sergeant Waterhouse’s report.
On the afternoon of 12th May I was ordered to proceed to HQ 6th Infantry Brigade … The plan was to attack and capture the Tennis Court and the surrounding (area) on the high ground south west of the DCs bungalow. Infantry reports suggested that the tennis court was fairly well defended and covered so well by enfilade and defilade fire that all previous attempts to take this position had failed with extensive casualties.
My orders were to get down to the tennis court from the top of Garrison Hill and if I could not do so owing to the ground, I was to approach as near as possible to the objective and dominate it by fire while the infantry went in.
The attack was set for 0900 hrs on the 13th, and as the forward platoon commander could give me no idea of the ground in front of his positions, I suggested we recce same just before last light on the 12th. This we did and were successful in finding a route to a position from which we could at least dominate.
The attack went in next day as planned except that zero hour was delayed an hour. A signal for the infantry to go in was my first round of 75-mm fire. I would like to mention here that the infantry gave me every assistance possible, and even put an officer in my tank who knew one or two enemy positions.
We started out well along the route previously arranged, and the next thing I remember was my driver shouting ‘’old on!’ and bump, we’re smack in the centre of the tennis court itself. We pulled to the right and found ourselves in front of a steel water tower very heavily sandbagged and small arms fire met us. My 75-mm gunner dealt with this position so effectively that the Nips started to leave in a hell of a hurry without even arms or equipment; they were met by infantry fire from both flanks and very few got away. We next paid our attention to a series of crawl trenches and MG posts all round the court, and had a hell of a party for the next twenty minutes or so. Finally, the infantry commander got me on i/c and told me all the positions had been captured in this area and quite a few Nips liquidated.
We next went on to the edge of the court which overlooks the DCs bungalow, and gave it quite a pasting (the bungalow). After that everything in sight was well and truly plastered. The infantry again went in and took over without a casualty. I learned afterwards that as we came over the top onto the tennis court we crashed right on top of one of their main positions and buried at least a few of the enemy without ever having the privilege of killing them first.
The whole action lasted about forty minutes, and the infantry suffered one casualty only, and even he walked out. We stayed forward and gave covering fire until all the positions and the bungalow itself were consolidated, then we came out.
The infantry officer estimated that we ourselves had knocked out possibly forty of the enemy. I am not prepared to say that this was the full figure, but when we went down afterwards at the invitation of the infantry CO to view the shambles, as he called it, well, he was just about right.
Altogether, quite a useful shoot.
The effect of such a shoot on the respective morale of the British and Japanese can well be imagined, especially as during the same day Captain Field had smashed up further bunkers on Kuki Picquet. Desperate, Sato issued an order of the day, telling his men to fight to the death with their bodies, and to continue the fight afterwards with their spirits. Incredibly, starving and diseased though they were, they responded, and for another fortnight resisted fiercely on the hills flanking the road to Imphal. Then, finally, they broke, and began drifting away through the mountains, back towards the Chindwin, pursued by 7th Indian Division, whilst 2nd British Division, spearheaded by 149 Regiment, pressed on down the road to Imphal.
Whilst the road itself was good, there were long stretches where it was bounded on one side by a steep hill, and on the other by a precipitous drop, and had they been in a physical condition to do so, the Japanese could have delayed the advance indefinitely. As it was, they had to be winkled out of positions at Vizwema, Kuzama and Marama, but the checks imposed had only been short-lived, and by the evening of 21st June, 2nd Division’s leading troops had reached Milestone 103 on the road from Kohima; only eight miles separated them from 4 Corps’ perimeter.
At about 1030 the following morning, L/Corporal Canning of 123 Brigade’s Intelligence Section, climbed a tree and began to examine the ground to the north of 4 Corps’ most advanced outpost. He had not been looking for long when his binoculars picked up the shapes of a troop of Lees moving southwards down the road from Kohima with infantry riding on them, firing their guns at several parties of the enemy retreating into the hills to the east. It was A Squadron 149 Regiment.
General Scoones had expected a junction to be effected that day, and had ordered a column to break out during the morning, and contact the leading troops of 33 Corps. Leading the column was the Carabiniers’ C Squadron under Major T. E. Dimsdale, with C Squadron 7th Light Cavalry not far behind.
The leading troop, Lt Rowe-Wilson’s, came across a road block in the form of a large tree felled across the road. This was not covered by the Japanese, and the tanks towed it off the road, and the advance continued until a further block was encountered at Milestone 107, this time built of loose stones. Rowe-Wilson told his leading tank to batter its way through. The vehicle gathered momentum for the impact, but suddenly ground to a halt only five yards from the obstruction. The tank commander, Sergeant Reed, had spotted something wedged between the stones, and his caution was entirely justified as the Japanese were found to have included in the wall some forty 37-mm shells with their noses pointing towards the tanks.
The Carabiniers withdrew a little way while the sappers dealt with this obstacle, and were on the point of moving on when the 7th Cavalry’s Stuarts, and some Bren carriers, came roaring past at speed, and disappeared into the distance.
The 7th, led by Lt John Moody’s troop, were now in ‘bandit’ country, but pressed on, nicely spaced, and rounded the last bend on to the long straight leading to the double bridge at Milestone 109. Here could be seen the Lees of 149 Regiment, which had already had some contact with 1/17th Dogras, and both units halted to exchange greetings, to shake hands, and to laugh and talk as though they were old friends.
The junction of the two Corps was symbolic of the total failure of Japanese arms, but was in itself almost a family affair. When the leading cars of PAVO arrived, Moody found that the troop leader was a friend to whom he had lent his poker dice months previously at Poona. To his surprise, the other officer bent down i
nto his turret for a moment, and then handed them back. That night, 7th Cavalry and 3rd Carabiniers celebrated the relief as best they could within their modest means, and somehow plum pudding, rum and cigars were produced for the occasion. During the celebrations, the first lorried convoy from the north drove in, headlights blazing, ‘carrying beer,’ as one Carabinier hopeful announced.
However, the fighting was by no means over. It was true that the Japanese had been beaten, but they were continuing to attack in one or two places, and General Slim wanted them utterly routing. Although the monsoon had broken, they were to be pursued as they retreated back to the Chindwin, and were to be allowed no rest.
Along the Tiddim road, the crack Japanese 33rd Division, which had suffered nearly as much as the two others, but which had had the benefit of a better supply line, conducted a skilful withdrawal, harried by 5th Indian Division, which had as its spearhead half of the Carabiniers’ C Squadron.
‘The Tiddim road,’ wrote Major Dimsdale, ‘was an earth one, cut out of the wooded hillsides by bulldozers. It was rare for tanks to be able to get off the road. Map reading was a troop leader’s paradise: there were not only milestones but furlong posts as well. Each day we sent a troop with the leading company. Generally they would be held up by fire from some wooded spur. The tanks would reply and the infantry would try to work round. If it proved to be a big position, Hurri-bombers would be sent for and other companies hook deeper. Each time Brigadier Salamons would ask for a maximum strike, which was twenty-four planes. Each time, to his never-failing wrath, only twelve came. At the last moment the Japanese rear-guard would fade away. On we would go and repeat the business a few miles farther on.’
Tank Tracks to Rangoon Page 17
