Tank Tracks to Rangoon

by Bryan Perrett

  Acting in command of two troops which the squadron commander had given me, I ordered the tanks into the village deployed in line, firing their machine guns on the move. On seeing the tanks with their close-escort infantry advancing, the assaulting company took fresh heart and followed. The enemy was so overwhelmed and shocked by our weight of fire and boldness of action that they left their trendies in large numbers and started retreating. When the tanks debauched from the village we saw large numbers of Japanese running in different directions across the open paddy fields. They were killed almost to a man. We had practised such tactics during training for fighting in enclosed areas, and termed them ‘Blitz’ tactics, which came in very handy on occasions.

  Sheodan Singh goes on to describe the fight for Pyawbwe itself.

  The town was well organized for defence, and the enemy meant to hold us here. The Royal Deccan Horse operated frontally and from the eastern flank, mainly against their defences in the waterworks area, which had been well fortified and was well protected by mines and anti-tank guns. B Squadron operated on the left, in support of infantry, with the waterworks as its immediate objective.

  The enemy had covering parties well dug in, forward of the main defences in sandy undulating ground. As the terrain was open, enemy automatic fire was very effective against infantry, who started losing men rapidly. The tanks’ fire appeared to be ineffective, as the trenches were located on the reverse slopes.

  I therefore took a calculated risk and ordered my tanks over the crest and onto the enemy trenches. Other tank troops did likewise, our infantry taking full advantage and finishing off the enemy with their bayonets. Thereafter progress was fairly good, and the enemy was rolled back to the waterworks, which was cleared the next day.

  The fall of Pyawbwe was an unmitigated disaster for the Japanese. The town was to have been the pivot of their stop line, and had been prepared for a defence comparable to that of Myitkina.* It fell for two reasons.

  First, the Japanese had not imagined that 14th Army was capable of the rapid reorganization which had taken place after the Meiktila–Mandalay battles, and were not fully prepared for the attack when it came. Secondly, the speed and dash of the tanks, whether in the direct attack from the north, or more particularly in ‘Claudcol’s’ turning operation to the west and south, again had them off balance before serious fighting for the town began.†

  After Pyawbwe, 4 Corps streamed through the gap and the Japanese had nothing to throw in their path which could stop the avalanche of armour and the infantry divisions which rolled steadily down the railway corridor towards Rangoon. It must have given Field Marshal Slim great pleasure to write, shortly after the end of the war in Burma, ‘If the Tokyo radio had announced “Our forces are pursuing the enemy rapidly in the direction of Rangoon”, it would have been nearer the truth than usual.’

  However, some 300 miles of road separated Pyawbwe from Rangoon, and with the monsoon looming, there was no time to be lost. Even as the final shots were being fired around Pyawbwe, 5th Indian Division was moving through the town, going into the lead with Toungoo as its objective.

  Acting as 5th Division’s armoured spearhead was 116 Regiment RAC, which had had a few days to rest and refit at Meiktila following its numerous actions with 7th Division, plus B Squadron 7th Light Cavalry and A Squadron 16th Light Cavalry, which merged into two composite squadrons to provide the best combination of speed, mobility and firepower that light tanks and armoured cars could produce.

  During the advance, one of these light squadrons was always well out in front, its task being to brush aside minor opposition, move as rapidly as possible, and seize and hold vital bridges before the enemy had time to blow them.

  Some way behind came the advance guard, consisting of two Sherman squadrons, an infantry battalion, riding partly on the tanks and partly in lorries, a battery of self-propelled guns, and a troop of engineers, usually equipped with Valentine bridge-layers.

  Behind the advance guard travelled Brigadier Pert’s brigade HQ, including an air liaison unit, the reserve Sherman squadron, the remainder of the SP gun regiment and sapper squadron, and administrative troops, protected by a Bombay Grenadier company and the second composite light armoured squadron, whose troops were frequently despatched to the flanks to screen villages or positions on either side of the road.

  Some way behind again would come the infantry division’s own advance guard, and then the division itself.

  On 11th April, the reconnaissance squadron and advance guard roared through Yamethin unopposed,* and went into leaguer in the area of Inzin. Yamethin had also been patrolled by ‘Claudcol’ two days earlier, prior to its attack on Pyawbwe, and had been reported clear, so appeared to present no problems.

  However, after the advance guard had passed, the Japanese filtered back into the town, determined to succeed where they had failed at Pyawbwe. They cut the road north of the town, and in a heavy exchange of fire killed C Squadron’s fitters, this squadron being held in reserve for the moment. The advance guard was now isolated, and spent an uneasy night amidst many alarms and some indiscriminate firing.

  The following morning, the Japanese air force put in an unexpected appearance, four fighters shooting up the column and causing casualties. The town was attacked by C Squadron and 7th York and Lancaster Regiment from the north and by half of A Squadron plus two platoons of infantry, sent back from the advance guard, from the south. Neither attack was successful, as they were mounted in bad tank country, and the Japanese suicide squads were able to close with the tanks and place picric acid charges on the engine decks of two vehicles, destroying them. Lt Holt’s hull gunner, Tpr Lomas, won a Military Medal assisting wounded from the blazing wreck.

  At 1700 hours, the attack was called off, and the Gordons were reluctantly forced to destroy with their own gunfire a further tank which had bogged down, before carrying away as many wounded as possible. The next day the battle was resumed, with slightly better progress, but the town remained in enemy hands until the 14th, when a full scale attack by 123 Brigade eliminated the last of the defenders.

  At noon, the armoured column resumed its advance, reaching Takton by mid-afternoon. There were not sufficient infantry present to hold the town during the night, and it is believed that General Honda and 33 Army HQ Staff slipped through, continuing their extraordinary series of adventures which had begun at Pyawbwe, when tank shells were actually bursting in the Army Commander’s quarters, and the defence company and staff were in the thick of the fighting.

  The road south from Takton rounds a high bluff, cut out of the hillside, just north of Shweymo. There was no room for manoeuvre, and as the armoured cars reported that this bottle-neck was held, it was decided to by-pass the position to the west, although the country was close and difficult, and the move would entail crossing the Sinthe Chaung before turning south to cross another, and water-filled chaung, then re-crossing the Sinthe.

  At the first crossing, A Squadron and a Dogra company caught a party of 150 Japanese digging in round a railway bridge, and killed forty, the remainder fleeing into a nearby village, where they received the benefit of an air strike. The sappers then got to work, completing a crossing over the Sinthe and laying a scissors bridge over the water obstacle. Whilst they worked, the Japanese put in a number of attacks on the now stationary column, but all were beaten off. By 1400 hours the following day, the second Sinthe crossing had been finished, and the force was back on the main road, harbouring for the night near Milestone 264.

  ‘On the 17th we crossed the Chaung and cut back onto the road through some of the closest country possible to imagine,’ wrote a 7th Cavalry officer. ‘It was shockingly slow going, as we were supposed to clear 400 yards on either side of the road. Liggi shot up a 47-mm anti-tank gun before it could fire, and found an enemy dump which was also burnt up. Away again the next morning, breaking up road blocks, shooting up mines, and crossing a blown bridge. Liggi’s own tank went up on a mine. We harboured that evening at Milest
one 257, where a few Japs were killed. On the 19th, Ronnie, Peter and Paddy pushed off ahead, by-passing Pyinmana, shot up several Japs and eventually went into Nyobin, which was a Jap Army HQ. They had to come out very quickly, but succeeded in doing a lot of damage first, and actually collected some prisoners.’

  Early the same day, the advance guard had captured an important bridge over the Sinthe Chaung, at Milestone 240.

  ‘Again speed caught the enemy napping. The bridge was intact but heavily mined and ready for demolition, but the Jap detailed to blow it did not wake up until the bridge had been in our hands for over half an hour, when he appeared unarmed and obviously completely out of touch with the local situation. His subsequent appreciation was so rapid that he managed to escape.’*

  After breakfast the column by-passed Pyinmana to the east, as it had insufficient infantry to clear the town, its objective being the Lewe airfields. 7th Cavalry reported the presence of three enemy tanks in the village of Pyinmanahaung, and Colonel Blackater despatched C Squadron to deal with them.

  ‘This village was some 500 yards long running parallel with the main road, and owing to the hard ground it was difficult to pick up the tracks of the enemy vehicles. The village, however, yielded a considerable number of Japanese trucks all camouflaged and all destroyed in the hope that that camouflage concealed the tanks. Petrol dumps were set on fire and other stores destroyed, and a good time was had by all, although it was some considerable time before the enemy tanks were located. They were carefully camouflaged close to the road and in depth some fifty yards apart. The troop leader who located them, complained bitterly that “the bastards had fired four rounds at him, but he had now located their position, and proposed to put an end to this annoyance”. One round of 75 HE blew the enemy tank apart, and then the second, which was only a tankette, was so ill advised as to start a private war. Its destruction was sudden and complete. The third tank (if any) was never traced.’†

  Nearby, A Squadron had been supporting an attack made by 3/9th Jats and their own Bombay Grenadier escort on Kyodan. Resistance had been fierce, and contact had been broken at last light. A prisoner turned out to be a senior clerk from 33 Army HQ, who advised his captors that his general had once again made good his escape. Questioned concerning this incident later. General Sawamato Rikichiro laughed and said that our forward troops had penetrated to within 150 yards of the HQ, and that rather than be captured, all the senior officers had prepared for ritual suicide, but when the attack had been broken off after dark, General Honda and his staff had escaped across the paddy fields, carrying what they could on their own backs. General Kimura himself seemed greatly amused by the whole business, adding that ‘Honda speaks of nothing else!’

  Next day, 20th April, Lewe airfield was taken without trouble by B Squadron. Later, as the column was going into leaguer near Milestone 220, 150 Japanese were located trying to escape down the bed of a small chaung, were engaged with every weapon that would bear, and all but annihilated.

  On the 21st Yedashe was taken, the enemy garrison being shot down when they tried to run for it, and the following morning C Squadron seized all three airfields north of Toungoo without opposition. Toungoo itself offered slight opposition during the morning, but was not strongly held, and fell during the afternoon. There is a story that surprise was so great on the Japanese side that they still had a military policeman on point duty when the first tanks arrived; they ran over him.

  The capture of the town was most timely, for the Japanese were trying to get their 15th Division into the area from the Keren hills, hoping to form another stop-line which would give them time to reorganize. However, the Keren tribesmen, organized, trained and armed by British officers over a long period for just such a contingency, rose. The 15th Division’s columns ran into ambush after ambush, found bridges blown, had isolated detachments massacred, and lost the race by a very wide margin.

  This division, however, constituted a threat to the flank of the advance, and as it also formed a rallying point for troops from broken formations straggling in from the north, it was a threat that could not be ignored. The 19th Indian Division was pushed up the Toungoo–Mawchi road, sealing the flank, and the advance continued.

  Toungoo had been the last place north of Pegu where a stand could be made. Its fall spelled in letters of fire the end of any hopes Kimura might have had of holding Rangoon. Stripping the post of its garrison, he pushed every available man and gun, including hastily raised conscript battalions made up from naval personnel, civilians and fishermen into a last desperate stop-line at Pegu. He might optimistically define the role of these ersatz formations as being ‘to destroy the enemy north of Payagyi and Waw’, but the truth was that their function was to hold open a last corridor of escape into lower Burma. On 24th April he left with his staff for Moulmein, taking with him the traitor Subhas Chandra Bose, whose farewell address to Indian National Army units expressed regret that he was unable to stay with them, but high political considerations demanded his presence elsewhere.

  Whilst Kimura and Subhas were fleeing, 5th Indian Division had pushed south from Toungoo, Probyn’s taking over the role of advance guard from 116 Regiment RAC. Technically, 5th Division were overshooting their mark in advancing beyond Toungoo, where 17th Division were due to take the lead again, but the prospects of being able to bounce a crossing of the Pyu chaung were too good to miss. Due deference was paid to march discipline by calling the advance guard ‘Smeecol’, implying the detachment of a force from the division’s main body.

  The column advanced without meeting opposition until reaching the chaung itself at Milestone 143, only to find that both the road and railway bridges had been blown. A company of 1/17th Dogras came under fire fording the chaung, and A Squadron’s commander, Major B. Loraine-Smith, lost his tank, which caught fire after being penetrated by a hollow charge shell, whilst looking for an alternative crossing to the west.

  Two air strikes were put in, and when the Dogras crossed again during the night, they found the enemy gone. The following account, by an engineer officer, gives an interesting description of the way the sappers dealt with this particular problem, which was typical of the many water obstacles which threatened to hold up 4 Corps’ advance.

  The chaung was 120 feet wide with 3 feet 6 inches depth of water in the centre. Recce was not made easier by a band of snipers on the far bank. However, one mile upstream the remains of a Jap wooden bridge was discovered. The chaung at this point had also a narrow sandbank about thirty feet from the shore. It was decided that this was the most promising place for a rapid crossing. Work could not be started that night owing to the uncleared enemy opposition. At 0800 hours the following morning the far bank was reported clear and work started. Wooden platforms were made on the sandbank and under what remained of the Jap bridge. By a judicious combination of luck and improvization two scissors bridges were laid to fill in the gaps. The resulting monstrosity was ready at 1000 hours and stood up to seventeen hours of continuous traffic while the main Bailey bridge was under construction. It took practically the entire wheeled element of ‘Smeecol’ plus 9th Royal Deccan Horse, HQ 255 Tank Brigade, and armoured cars. Tanks crossed the chaung by two fords west and east of the bridge. A strong working party was kept busy all day and through the night maintaining the bridge and the exit road after the rain.

  The 25th April saw 17th Division in the lead again, with the Royal Deccan Horse as advance guard. No opposition was encountered, and the force harboured for the night at Milestone 132. The mango showers, precursors of the monsoon proper, had by now begun in earnest. On 26th, the advance continued so fast that some of 7th Light Cavalry’s Stuarts ran out of fuel.

  At Milestone 114 we had to halt as petrol was exhausted and B Echelon was not in sight. The fifty-two Shermans of the Deccan thundered past us here, and behind them came our petrol trucks which nearly thundered past us as well in their eagerness to get somewhere at any cost. We managed to stop them and refuel Bill was determined to gai
n the lead again, and before midday Nos 1 and 4 Troops were there. The Japs were really on the run now; the difficulty was to catch them. Weak opposition was met at one or two places, but the 17th Division with its armour was hardly delayed. The enemy had made an efficient job of blowing all key bridges, but the indomitable sappers worked unceasingly to make diversions for tanks and trucks.

  Early the following morning, Lt Harpartap Singh’s Stuarts, well out in front, were approaching Pyinbongyi when the officer smelled a rat. The village, heavily wooded, stretched for over half a mile on either side of the road, and there was a prominent road block consisting of an overturned vehicle on the south side of a blown bridge. Equally significant, there were no Burmese about, a sure sign that the Japanese were present.

  Upon receipt of Harpartap Singh’s report, the advance guard commander decided to put in a formal attack. After 18 Field Regiment had fired concentrations, the Deccan went in, B left, C right, in support of the two companies of 6/7th Rajputs. Unfortunately C Squadron ran into marshy ground, and had to reverse out and come in from another angle, which delayed completion of the operation.

  No tanks were lost, but the infantry suffered heavily from small arms fire, mines and booby traps. The village had been fortified by an enemy engineer unit which knew its business, and whilst the final clearing, by 1/3rd Gurkha Rifles, was taking place, they set off their pièce de résistance. A Sherman Dozer, which had just reached 255 Brigade, was nosing its way into the road block, when the enemy detonated by remote control a heavy charge buried under the block. Both Dozer and road block were blown several feet into the air, and a number of sappers were killed and wounded. The Japanese also cratered the main road by remote control, but these obstacles were overcome with the aid of the invaluable Valentine scissors bridgelayers. The Deccan had not quite seen the last of these tricky customers, and the following day was very much a repetition on a larger scale.