The Dancing Wu Li Masters

by Gary Zukav

  Since Bell’s theorem shows that, assuming the validity of quantum theory, the principle of local causes is incorrect, and, if we do not want to accept the existence of superluminal connections (“the failure of locality”) as the reason for the failure of the principle of local causes, then we are forced to confront the possibility that our assumptions about contrafactual definiteness are incorrect (“contrafactual definiteness fails”). Since contrafactual definiteness has two parts, there are two ways in which contrafactual definiteness could fail.

  The first possibility is that free will is an illusion (“contrafactualness fails”). Perhaps there is no such thing as “what would have happened if….” Perhaps there can be only what is. In this case, we are led to a superdeterminism. This is a determinism far beyond ordinary determinism. Ordinary determinism states that once the initial situation of a system is established, the future of the system also is established since it must develop according to inexplorable laws of cause and effect. This type of determinism was the basis of the Great Machine view of the universe. According to this view, however, if the initial situation of a system, like the universe, is changed, then the future of the system also is changed.

  According to superdeterminism, not even the initial situation of the universe could be changed. Not only is it impossible for things to be other than they are, it is even impossible that the initial situation of the universe could have been other than what it was. No matter what we are doing at any given moment, it is the only thing that ever was possible for us to be doing at that moment.

  Contrafactual definiteness also fails if the “definiteness” assumption in it fails. In this case, we do have a choice in the way that we perform our experiments, but “what would have happened if…” does not produce any definite results. This alternative is just as strange as it sounds. It is also just what comes out of the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. According to the Many Worlds theory, whenever a choice is made in the universe between one possible event and another, the universe splits into different branches.

  In our hypothetical experiment we decided to throw the switch into the “up” position. When the experiment was performed with the switch in the “up” position, it gave us a definite result (a certain number of clicks in each area). However, according to the Many Worlds theory, at the moment that we threw the switch up, the universe split into two branches. In one branch, the experiment was performed with the switch in the “up” position. In the other branch, the experiment was performed with the switch in the “down” position.

  Who performed the experiment in the second branch? There is a different edition of us in each of the different branches of the universe! Each edition of us is convinced that our branch of the universe is the entirety of reality.

  The experiment in the second branch, the experiment which was performed with the switch in the “down” position, also produced a definite result (a certain number of clicks in each area). However, that result is in another branch of the universe, not in ours. Therefore, as far as we in this branch of the universe are concerned, “what would have happened if…” actually did happen, and actually did produce definite results, but in a branch of the universe which is forever beyond our experiential reality.*

  On the next page is a diagram of the logical implications of Bell’s theorem. It is drawn from informal discussions of the Fundamental Physics Group at the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, under the direction and sponsorship of Dr. Elizabeth Rauscher. These discussions, in turn, were based primarily upon the work of Henry Stapp.

  To summarize, Bell’s theorem showed, in 1964, that either the statistical predictions of quantum theory are false or the principle of local causes is false. In 1972, Clauser and Freedman performed an experiment at Berkeley which validated the relevant statistical predictions of quantum theory. Therefore, according to Bell’s theorem, the principle of local causes must be false.

  The principle of local causes says that what happens in one area does not depend upon variables subject to the control of an experimenter in a distant space-like separated area. The simplest way to explain the failure of the principle of local causes is to conclude that what happens is one area does depend upon variables subject to the control of an experimenter in a distant space-like separated area. If this explanation is correct, then we live in a nonlocal universe (“locality fails”) characterized by superluminal (faster than light) connections between apparently “separate parts.”

  However, there are other ways in which the principle of local causes can fail. The principle of local causes is based upon two tacit assumptions. The first tacit assumption is that we have the ability to determine our own actions, i.e., that we have a free will.* The second tacit assumption is that when we choose to do one thing in place of another, “what would have happened if…” would have produced definite results. These two assumptions together are what Stapp calls contrafactual definiteness.

  If the first assumption (contrafactualness) fails, then we are led to a superdeterminism which precludes the idea of alternative possibilities. According to this type of determinism, it is not possible that the world ever could have been other than it is.

  If the second assumption (definiteness) fails, then we are led to the Many Worlds theory in which the world continuously is splitting into separate and mutually inaccessible branches, each of which contains different editions of the same actors performing different acts at the same time on different stages which somehow are located in the same place.

  There may be still ways to understand the failure of the principle of local causes, but the very fact that it must fail means that the world is in some way profoundly different from our ordinary ideas about it. (Perhaps we really are living in a dark cave.)

  The “no models” option on the diagram is, in effect, the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. In 1927, the most famous assemblage of physicists in history decided that it might not ever be possible to construct a model of reality, i.e., to explain the way things “really are behind the scenes.” Despite the tidal wave of “knowledge” which has swept over us for forty years, the Fundamental Physics Group found it necessary, like the physicists at Copenhagen a half century before them, to acknowledge that it might not be possible to construct a model of reality. This acknowledgment is more than a recognition of the limitations of this theory or that theory. It is a recognition emerging throughout the West that knowledge itself is limited. Said another way, it is a recognition of the difference between knowledge and wisdom.*

  Classical science starts with the assumption of separate parts which together constitute physical reality. Since its inception, it has concerned itself with how these separate parts are related.

  Newton’s great work showed that the earth, the moon, and the planets are governed by the same laws as falling apples. The French mathematician Descartes invented a way of drawing pictures of relationships between different measurements of time and distance. This process (analytic geometry) is a wonderful tool for organizing a wealth of scattered data into one meaningful pattern. Herein lies the strength of western science. It brings huge tracts of apparently unrelated experience into a rational framework of simple concepts like the laws of motion. The starting point of this process is a mental attitude which initially perceives the physical world as fragmented and different experiences as logically unrelated. Newtonian science is the effort to find the relationships between pre-existing “separate parts.”

  Quantum mechanics is based upon the opposite epistemological assumption. Thus, there are profound differences between Newtonian mechanics and quantum theory.

  The most fundamental difference between Newtonian physics and quantum mechanics is the fact that quantum mechanics is based upon observations (“measurements”). Without a measurement of some kind, quantum mechanics is mute. Quantum mechanics says nothing about what happens between measurements. In Heisenberg’s words: “The term ‘happens’ is restricted to the observation.”15 This
is very important, for it constitutes a philosophy of science unlike any before it.

  We commonly say, for example, that we detect an electron at point A and then at point B, but strictly speaking, this is incorrect. According to quantum mechanics, there was no electron which traveled from point A to point B. There are only the measurements that we made at point A and at point B.

  Quantum theory not only is closely bound to philosophy, but also—and this is becoming increasingly apparent—to theories of perception. As early as 1932, von Neumann explored this relation in his “Theory of Measurement.” (Exactly when does the wave function associated with a particle collapse? When the particle strikes a photographic plate? When the photographic plate is developed? When the light rays from the developed photographic plate strike our retina? When the nerve impulses from the retina reach our brain?).

  Bohr’s principle of complementarity also addresses the underlying relation of physics to consciousness. The experimenter’s choice of experiment determines which mutually exclusive aspect of the same phenomenon (wave or particle) will manifest itself. Likewise, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle demonstrates that we cannot observe a phenomenon without changing it. The physical properties which we observe in the “eternal” world are enmeshed in our own perceptions not only psychologically, but ontologically as well.

  The second most fundamental difference between Newtonian physics and quantum theory is that Newtonian physics predicts events and quantum mechanics predicts the probability of events. According to quantum mechanics, the only determinable relation between events is statistical—that is, a matter of probability.

  David Bohm, Professor of Physics at Birkbeck College, University of London, proposes that quantum physics is, in fact, based upon a perception of a new order. According to Bohm, “We must turn physics around. Instead of starting with parts and showing how they work together (the Cartesian order) we start with the whole.”16

  Bohm’s theory is compatible with Bell’s theorem. Bell’s theorem implies that the apparently “separate parts” of the universe could be intimately connected at a deep and fundamental level. Bohm asserts that the most fundamental level is an unbroken wholeness which is, in his words, “that-which-is.” All things, including space, time, and matter, are forms of that-which-is. There is an order which is enfolded into the very process of the universe, but that enfolded order may not be readily apparent.

  For example, imagine a large hollow cylinder into which is placed a smaller cylinder. The space between the smaller cylinder and the larger cylinder is filled with a clear viscous liquid like glycerine (such a device actually exists).

  Now suppose that we deposit a small droplet of ink on the surface of the glycerine. Because of the nature of the glycerine, the ink drop remains intact, a well-defined black spot floating on a clear liquid.

  If we begin to rotate one of the cylinders, say in a clockwise direction, the drop of ink spreads out in the opposite direction, making a line which grows thinner and thinner until it disappears altogether. The ink droplet now is enfolded completely into the glycerine, but it is still there. When we rotate the cylinder in the opposite direction, the ink droplet reappears. A fine line appears which grows thicker and thicker and then collects into a single point.

  If we continue the counterclockwise motion of the cylinder, the same thing happens, but in reverse. We can repeat this process as often as we like. Each time the ink spot becomes a fine line and disappears into the glycerine only to reappear again when the motion of the glycerine is reversed.

  If it requires one complete revolution of the cylinder clockwise to make the droplet disappear completely, one complete revolution of the cylinder counterclockwise will make it reappear in its original shape and location. The number of revolutions required to make the droplet disappear or reappear is the enfolded order. Bohm calls this enfolded order the “implicate order,” which means the same thing.

  Suppose that we deposit a drop of ink on the surface of the glycerine, revolve the cylinder clockwise until the drop disappears (one revolution), add a second drop of ink to the glycerine, continue to revolve the cylinder in the same direction until it disappears (one more revolution), and then add a third drop of ink to the glycerine and revolve the cylinder one more revolution until the third drop also disappears. Now we have three ink drops enfolded into the glycerine. None of them are visible, but we know where each of them is in the implicate order.

  When we revolve the cylinder in the opposite direction, one drop of ink (the third) appears after one revolution, another drop of ink (the second) appears after the next revolution, and another drop of ink (the first) appears after the third revolution. This is the unfolded, or “explicate,” order. The three ink droplets appear to be unrelated in the explicate (unfolded) order, but we know that they are related in the implicate (enfolded) order.

  If we consider the condensation of ink droplets in this experiment as “particles,” we have Bohm’s hypothesis of apparently random subatomic phenomena. “Particles” may appear in different places yet be connected in the implicate order. In Bohm’s words, “Particles may be discontiguous in space (the explicate order) but contiguous in the implicate order.”17

  “Matter is a form of the implicate order as a vortex is a form of the water—it is not reducible to smaller particles.”18 Like “matter” and everything else, particles are forms of the implicate order. If this is difficult to grasp, it is because our minds demand to know, “What is the ‘implicate order’ the implicate order of?”

  The “implicate order” is the implicate order of that-which-is. However, that-which-is is the implicate order. This world view is so different from the one that we are using that, as Bohm points out, “Description is totally incompatible with what we want to say.”19 Description is incompatible with what we want to say because our thinking is based upon an ancient Greek mode of thought. According to this mode of thought, only Being is. Therefore, Nonbeing is not. This way of thinking gives us a practical tool for dealing with the world, but it doesn’t describe what happens. Actually, Nonbeing also is. Both Being and Nonbeing are that-which-is. Everything, even “emptiness,” is that-which-is. There is nothing which is not that-which-is.

  This way of looking at reality raises the question of the consciousness of the observer. Our minds demand to know, “What is the ‘implicate order’ the implicate order of?” because our culture has taught us to perceive only the explicate order (the Cartesian view). “Things” to us are intrinsically separate.

  Bohm’s physics require, in his words, a new “instrument of thought.” A new instrument of thought such as is needed to understand Bohm’s physics, however, would radically alter the consciousness of the observer, reorientating it toward a perception of the “unbroken wholeness” of which everything is a form.

  However, such a perception would not cause an inability to see the explicate order. Bohm’s physics contains an element of relativity parallel to that of Einstein’s theories. The implicate or explicate nature of order (or order of nature) depends upon the perspective of the viewer. The problem is that our present viewpoint is limited to the perspective of the explicate order. From the perspective of the implicate order the apparently “separate elements” of the explicate order are intimately related. Even the phrases “elements” and “intimately related” imply a Cartesian separateness which does not exist. At the fundamental level of that-which-is, the “separate elements” which are “intimately related in the implicate order” are the implicate order.

  The requirement for a new instrument of thought upon which to base Bohm’s physics may not be as much of an obstacle as it first appears. There already exists an instrument of thought based upon an “unbroken wholeness.” Furthermore, there exist a number of sophisticated psychologies, distilled from two thousand years of practice and introspection, whose sole purpose is to develop this thought instrument.

  These psychologies are what we commonly call “Eastern religions.” “Eas
tern religions” differ considerably among themselves. It would be a mistake to equate Hinduism, for example, with Buddhism, even though they are more like each other than either one of them is like a religion of the West. Nonetheless, all eastern religions (psychologies) are compatible in a very fundamental way with Bohm’s physics and philosophy. All of them are based upon the experience of a pure, undifferentiated reality which is that-which-is.

  While it would be naive to overstate the similarities between Bohm’s physics and eastern philosophies, it would be foolish to ignore them. Consider, for example, the following sentences:

  The word “reality” is derived from the roots “thing” (res) and “think” (revi). “Reality” means “everything you can think about.” This is not “that-which-is.” No idea can capture “truth” in the sense of that-which-is.

  The ultimate perception does not originate in the brain or any material structure, although a material structure is necessary to manifest it. The subtle mechanism of knowing the truth does not originate in the brain.

  There is a similarity between thought and matter. All matter, including ourselves, is determined by “information.” “Information” is what determines space and time.

  Taken out of context, there is no absolute way of knowing whether these statements were made by Professor Bohm or a Tibetan Buddhist. In fact, these sentences were excerpted from different parts of two physics lectures that Professor Bohm gave at Berkeley in April, 1977. The first lecture was given on the campus to physics students. The second lecture was given in the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory to a group of professional physicists. Two of these three statements were taken from the second lecture, the one given to the advanced physicists.