Apart from the ‘Bromhead Report’ and his note warning those at Helpmekaar, only two other letters are known to have been written by Bromhead. The first was written to Captain Goodwin-Austen of the 2/24th on 19 February; Goodwin-Austen had been with Chelmsford on the 22–23 January. It can be clearly seen that the style and syntax in the official Bromhead Report differs considerably from that used in the two letters – which indicates that Bromhead was not the author of the official report.7
It is possible that Bromhead suffered considerable anguish from the trauma of the battle as his ongoing lethargy subsequently irritated certain senior officers. Curling was not alone in disparaging Chard and Bromhead. Major Clery was one of Chelmsford’s staff officers at Isandlwana and had remained at Rorke’s Drift after Chelmsford’s departure; he wrote on the subject:
Reputations are being made and lost here in an almost comical fashion, from the highest down wards. At the risk of being looked on as very ill-natured and scandalous, I will have a little gossip with you on the subject.
Well, Chard and Bromhead to begin with; both are almost typical in their separate corps of what would be termed the very dull class. Bromhead is a great favourite in his regiment and a capital fellow at everything except soldiering. So little was he held to be qualified in this way from unconquerable indolence that he had to be reported confidentially as hopeless. This is confidential as I was told it by his CO [Lt Col. H.J. Degacher 2/24th]. I was about a month with him at Rorke’s Drift, and the height of his enjoyment seemed to be to sit all day on a stone on the ground smoking a most uninviting looking pipe. The only thing that seemed equal to moving him in any way was any allusion to the defence of Rorke’s Drift. This used to have a sort of electrical effect on him, for up he would jump and off he would go, and not a word could be got out of him. When I told him he should send me an official report on the affair it seemed to have a most distressing effect on him. I used to find him hiding away in corners with a friend helping him to complete this account, and the only thing that afterwards helped to lessen the compassion I felt for all this, was my own labour when perusing this composition – to understand what it was all about. So you can fancy that there was not one who knew him who envied him his distinction, for his modesty about himself was, and is, excessive.
Of Chard there is very little to say about except that he too is a very good fellow – but very uninteresting. The fact is that until the accounts came out from England, nobody had thought of the Rorke’s Drift affair except as one in which the private soldiers of the 24th behaved so well. For as a matter of fact they all stayed there to defend the place for there was nowhere else to go, and in it they fought most determinedly.8
Chard’s company commander, Captain Walter Parke Jones, who had fortified Helpmekaar, was so irritated by Chard’s lack of ambition that he wrote:
Chard makes me angry, with such a start as he got, he stuck to the company doing nothing. In his place, I should have gone up and asked Lord Chelmsford for an appointment, he must have got one, and if not he could have gone home soon after Rorke’s Drift, at the height of his popularity at home. I advised him, but he placidly smokes his pipe and does nothing. Few men get such opportunities.
Chard was later attached to Colonel Wood’s column where he avoided both work and any interpersonal contact. Both Wood and Buller were puzzled that such a brilliant and stubborn defence had apparently been orchestrated by such a mediocrity as Chard. Wood described him as ‘A dull, heavy man, scarcely ever able to do his regular work.’ Sir Garnet Wolseley, who succeeded Lord Chelmsford, and who presented both Chard and Bromhead with their Victoria Crosses, was also critical. He found Chard ‘...a hopelessly dull and stupid fellow, and Bromhead not much better’. Glyn had discussed Bromhead’s future with Lieutenant George Banister who was the acting adjutant for the 24th Regiment at Rorke’s Drift; Banister referred to the conversation in a letter to his father – Surgeon General Banister:
The Colonel took me aside and said ‘I promised you the Inspector of Musketry and it is still yours as I never go back on my word, but I should like to do something for Bromhead, and it is about the only thing he is fit for, so would you let him have it and instead take the Adjutancy?’ I told him I did not care for the Adjutancy and had always looked forward to the other thing, but that under the circumstances I would not for worlds stand in Bromhead’s light. At first he would not hear of it, but eventually agreed if I would take up the Adjutant work.9
Despite the widespread scepticism on the part of their fellow officers, Queen Victoria favoured both Chard and Bromhead. With their fame and royal patronage, it is remarkable that both men’s careers failed to prosper further and both died before they were 50. In the final analysis, it is probably Major Clery’s observation above that lets the cat out of the bag; nobody in the invasion force had thought of the Rorke’s Drift affair except as one in which the private soldiers of the 24th behaved so well. It is, after all, most likely that Chelmsford’s staff took the initiative in ensuring that both Bromhead and Chard signed suitably impressive reports to offset the disastrous news and serious repercussions about to be unleashed following the unimaginable losses at Isandlwana. An examination of both reports reveals that they were not written by Bromhead and Chard, although the two officers signed and dated the documents.
One of Chelmsford’s senior staff officers, Major Clery, had remained behind at Rorke’s Drift after Chelmsford and his staff departed on 24 January. It is possible, therefore, that Clery was either the author or the instigator of these two important ‘Chard’ and ‘Bromhead’ reports. Clery was a confidant of Chelmsford and an experienced report writer; he would also have had access to an official scribe who could have written the reports – although there is no direct evidence of such a person having been at Rorke’s Drift. Clery had been with Chelmsford while the Zulus sacked Isandlwana; he had also been culpable in the unfortunate decision-making process that led to the defeat and, of all people, he would have realized that a dramatic report from Rorke’s Drift might deflect the criticism that would undoubtedly be unleashed upon Chelmsford and his staff once the news of Isandlwana reached home. Indeed, the timing of ‘Chard’s’ report being written and publicized coincides exactly with the parallel deception that was being orchestrated by Chelmsford’s staff following the defeat at Isandlwana. In that instance, Chelmsford’s orders to Colonels Pulleine and Durnford, having been ‘lost’, were then suitably rewritten so as to imply that the two officers had disobeyed Chelmsford’s orders relating to Isandlwana. Both Pulleine and Durnford, conveniently killed by the Zulus at Isandlwana, were then publicly and officially blamed for the disaster.10
As the former column commander, Glyn was also, unbeknown to him, cast in the role of scapegoat. Even though he was severely distraught by the loss of his regiment, Chelmsford deliberately isolated him at Rorke’s Drift where he was unable to defend his reputation. It was not until 21 February that Glyn was able to write his highly emotive report;11 by then he had access to writing paper and had carefully considered the sequence of events since the fateful 22 January. As the camp commander at Rorke’s Drift, Glyn would have been able to call upon a scribe’s services – had there been one. Because Glyn personally wrote his own report, it is most unlikely that Chard and Bromhead had the use of a scribe, unless surreptitiously and unbeknown to Glyn; the identity of the author of their reports therefore remains a mystery.
Later that year, and now safely back in England, Chard was required to submit a further report at the request of Queen Victoria. Nothing is known of the preparation or research that went into this second report, other than the fact that apologies for the delay were given to Queen Victoria as Chard claimed to have lost his notes.12
There are a number of other ‘original’ Chard reports in existence but none carries Chard’s actual signature. Perhaps the most famous of these is owned by the Trustees of the Kimberley Public Library in South Africa. This particular ‘Chard Report’ came to light in 1929 when it w
as published by the Natal Mercury as part of the 50th Anniversary of the battle at Rorke’s Drift. There are minor discrepancies in the report and a casual examination of the writing, and especially the signature, clearly reveal that it was not written or signed by Chard.
CHAPTER 10
Pulling the Strings – Awards and Campaign Medals
One of the things that no fellow can understand.1
LIEUTENANT COLONEL PICKARD OF THE ROYAL HOUSEHOLD
The glowing reports concerning the battle and victory at Rorke’s Drift quickly and effectively steered public attention away from the disaster at Isandlwana, while the heroic accounts of outstanding bravery restored the reputation of the army and satisfied the British politicians, press and public alike. Now came the recognition and awards for that bravery. At first the matter was clear-cut; Victoria Crosses2 were to be awarded to the six soldiers named in the Bromhead Report – and also to Lieutenants Bromhead and Chard, but only after Lord Chelmsford secretly added the officers’ names to the list. This was an unprecedented breach of military protocol, which was further disregarded by the War Office as neither of the two officers responsible for these medal recommendations were ever consulted, namely Chard, as the senior officer during the battle, nor Glyn as the overall commander of those involved. A member of the Royal Household, Lieutenant Colonel Pickard, mentioned this in a letter to Sir Evelyn Wood (commander of the Northern Column in Zululand) after Chard had been to Balmoral to meet Queen Victoria. Pickard wrote:
It seemed odd to me that he [Chard] was not consulted on the distribution of the VCs. But it is only one of the things that’no fellow can understand’. He is not a genius, and not quick, but a quiet plodding, dogged sort of fellow who will hold his own in most situations in which, as an English officer, his lot may be cast.
Was the award of so many medals due more to the perceived propaganda value of the victory than a measure of the enormous bravery of those involved? There can be little doubt that, as author Ian Knight wrote, ‘by elevating Rorke’s Drift to the level of a major strategic victory the more damaging significance of Isandlwana was obscured’.3 This view was first aired publicly by Lieutenant General Garnet Wolseley, the new Commander-in-Chief and General Officer Commanding South Africa; he stated that it was ‘monstrous making heroes of those who saved or attempted to save their lives by bolting or of those who, shut up in buildings at Rorke’s Drift, could not bolt, and fought like rats for their lives which they could not otherwise save’.4 Although Wolseley voiced his criticism of the awards, he had been personally obliged to escort the Victoria Cross medals all the way from London. The timing of the awards was also significant; it coincided exactly with the second invasion of Zululand when morale throughout the new invasion force was not high, especially among the many troops fresh from England. These recently arrived and inexperienced soldiers were, after all, in some trepidation at the reputation and prospect of meeting the hitherto victorious Zulu army and the widespread publicity of the award of an unprecedented number of Victoria Crosses would certainly have boosted the troops’ morale.
The awards were also extremely popular with the British press and, quick to recognize the mood of the people, the War Office soon considered making further awards. This was just as well for by March, questions were being asked in Parliament as to why the ordinary soldiers at Rorke’s Drift had not been nominated or considered for their acknowledged acts of bravery. It was also realized by the press that the only known nominations to date were for members of the 24th Regiment. In the House of Commons a number of difficult questions were asked; some boldly challenged the involvement of Queen Victoria and her uncle, HRH The Duke of Cambridge, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the British Army. On 27 March 1879 an MP, Mr Osborn Morgan, asked Colonel Stanley as Secretary of State for War why no awards had been conferred upon NCOs and private soldiers. The reply given was that such awards took a considerable time to process – but that the matter was under consideration. Another MP, Doctor Ward, asked on 8 May why Surgeon Reynolds had been overlooked for an award. The Secretary of State for War gave a defensive reply by stating that it was premature for him to consider what awards or honours should be given, and added that Surgeon Reynolds had already been promoted fourteen months in advance of his seniority and had passed over the heads of sixty-four other medical officers. Nevertheless, the first to benefit from such serious lobbying was Surgeon Reynolds; although his promotion to surgeon major was backdated to the date of the battle, his name was subsequently added to the medal list on 17 June 1879.
Other members of Parliament kept the pressure on Colonel Stanley when, on 16 June, Mr Stacpoole asked whether it was true that, in recognition of the gallantry of the NCOs and privates at Rorke’s Drift, they had been awarded one free flannel shirt and one pair of trousers? Colonel Stanley, clearly stung by the innuendo, replied that such an order had been given to compensate the soldiers for damage to their uniforms and added, ‘whether regard was had for gallantry or not I cannot say’.
Other reports began to circulate in England and South Africa about Dalton’s role at Rorke’s Drift. The belief grew that it was Dalton who was mainly responsible for the successful defence, especially when rumours were confirmed that he had previously gained a military qualification in field fortifications. Questions about Dalton’s role were asked both in Parliament and by the Duke of Cambridge so the matter was referred on to Sir Garnet Wolseley, the new Commander-in-Chief and General Officer Commanding South Africa. Wolseley had already written about his unease:
I presented Major Chard RE with his Victoria Cross: a more uninteresting or more stupid looking fellow I never saw. Wood tells me he is a most useless officer, fit for nothing. I hear in the camp also that the man who worked hardest at Rorke’s Drift Post was the Commissariat Officer who has not been rewarded at all.5
Clarification of the matter was finally sought from Major Chard who was asked to comment on the actions of both Dalton and Dunne but, rather surprisingly, though he acknowledged their actions his reply was less than supportive. Undaunted, Dunne’s and Dalton’s commissary general, Sir Edward Strickland, was convinced that the actions of his officers in the defence of Rorke’s Drift had deliberately not been recognized; he wrote to Chelmsford in his new capacity as Military Secretary at the War Office and within a week the correspondence concerning the matter was placed before the Duke of Cambridge. His decision on 18 October was short, final and, worse, unfair.
We are giving the VC very freely I think, but probably Mr Dalton had as good a claim as the others who have got the Cross for Rorke’s Drift Defence. I don’t think there is a case for Mr. Dunne.
Dalton was awarded the Victoria Cross in January 1880, and it was presented by Major General H.H. Clifford on a parade at Fort Napier. Rather perversely, Dunne received nothing other than the knowledge that he had been recommended for the VC. Nevertheless, Dunne fared pretty well. He was involved in the first Boer War in 1880–81 and was present at the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, when the British defeated the Egyptian Army. He transferred to the newly formed Army Service Corps as a Lieutenant Colonel, was awarded a CB and retired as a full colonel.
Another body of men, the Colonial forces, had originally been omitted from the medal list. When this was realized the reports were re-examined and on 29 November, Corporal Schiess NNC was gazetted as a recipient of the Victoria Cross for his actions during the battle. When he received his medal from Sir Garnet Wolseley on 3 February 1880, Wolseley expressed the wish that Schiess might live long to wear the decoration. Sadly he was to die a pauper only three years later.
The allocation of Victoria Crosses for Rorke’s Drift was so disjointed that the time span of awards extended to more than one year and apart from the intense background politicking and intrigue, each award was given the highest level of publicity by the press, for which the government was equally grateful. Even so, there were dissenters. The Broad Arrow of 23 August 1879 wrote:
It must be confessed that the milit
ary authorities in Pall Mall have shown lavish prodigality in the distribution of the Victoria Cross, which would probably startle their contemporaries in Berlin [a reference to the profusion of Iron Cross awards]. We say there is a chance of the Victoria Cross being cheapened by a too friendly eagerness in Pall Mall to recognise acts of equivocal valour.6
It is a myth that the Reverend George Smith was offered the choice of a Victoria Cross or an army chaplaincy; he received the chaplaincy but there is no evidence or recommendation to substantiate the story that he ever had a choice.
“AN OFFICER” writes to Punch –
“In your Cartoon, of March 22, you, as worthy head of the Army, thank Lieutenants Chard and Bromhead for their heroic defence of Rorke’s Drift. In the background are seen some men of the 24th Regiment, and scattered about are quantities of Commissariat Supplies. Cannot you find some corner for a memorial to the only officer who was killed that night while gallantly doing his duty, Assistant-Commissary Byrne? Should you ignore the only officer ‘severely wounded,’ to whom all were indebted for his advice and skill in turning his supplies of flour and biscuits into parapets – Assistant-Commissary Dalton? Or the young officer who gained the admiration of all by erecting the last defence under a heavy fire, Assistant-Commissary Dunne? Or Surgeon Reynolds, who only laid on one side his rifle to attend to the wounded?”
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