The Circle
Page 40
COUNSEL FOR CDR PACKER: Sir, if it please the Court, I understood I was to be accorded all the rights of a party. You have mentioned only the right to cross-examine.
COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: The Court will extend to you all the rights of a party.
COUNSEL FOR CDR PACKER: Thank you, sir.
COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: I refer now to section 0309 of the naval supplement to the Manual for Courts Martial, referring to the right of any party to challenge the Court. Do any of the parties desire to challenge?
CAPTAIN JAVITS: I do not.
COUNSEL FOR CDR PACKER: I desire to examine Rear Admiral Morehead on the grounds of lack of impartiality.
The challenged member took the stand, was properly sworn and examined as follows.
Q. Admiral, I present here a copy of your official biography. Would you read over it, sir, and tell us if it is an accurate history of your naval service?
A. [Witness read the document.] It is substantially correct, yes.
Q. Substantially correct. I offer into evidence as Defense Exhibit A this summary of Admiral Morehead’s naval career.
COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: That is court-martial terminology. I think you should offer it as Exhibit A. Not as Defense Exhibit.
There being no objection, the document was received as Exhibit A.
Q. Admiral, if I may summarize, this document states that you served aboard aircraft carriers in the Pacific as a reserve flier during World War Two. You were recalled to duty during the Korean Conflict as a flight officer in attack squadrons. You applied for reinstatement in the Regular Navy and after service at the Bureau of Aeronautics served on seagoing staffs with the Seventh Fleet. You were executive officer and then commanding officer of USS MAUNA LOA, following which you commanded HORNET, an aircraft carrier. You are now serving on the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. Is this substantially correct?
A. You left out the fact that I commanded an attack squadron. After I was with the Seventh Fleet.
Q. Thank you, sir. Admiral, do you think, in the light of your long experience in the naval aviation community, that it is better for an aviator to command a carrier, rather than a surface line officer?
A. Well, that’s Navy policy. There are certain special knowledges aviators have that surface officers don’t get in the line of their experience.
Q. And you agree with that policy?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Admiral, should the facts tend to show that Captain Javits, commanding USS KENNEDY, was at fault in the loss of RYAN, would not such a finding conflict with a vested interest of yours—namely, your opinion that carriers should be commanded by naval aviators?
COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: I object. This line of questioning is irrelevant.
The Court replied that the objection was not sustained. The witness was instructed to reply.
A. It would not prejudice me in any way.
Q. Do you know Captain Javits? Have you ever met?
A. Possibly at parties. I do not know him well.
Q. What is your opinion of his professional reputation?
A. I assume it is good or he would not have command of KENNEDY.
Q. Would that bias you in favor of his decisions?
A. No, I don’t believe it would.
COUNSEL FOR CDR PACKER: I have no further questions for this witness, sir.
COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: Admiral Morehead, have you formed any opinion whatsoever yet as to who is at fault?
A. No, I have not.
Q. Is there any reason you cannot approach this inquiry impartially, with an open mind?
A. None whatsoever.
COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: No further questions.
The Court was cleared, the challenged member withdrawing.
The Court was opened. All parties reentered. The Court announced that the challenge of counsel representing Commander Packer was not sustained.
COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: This Court is now duly constituted. I will now read for the benefit of the witnesses the relevant portion of the naval supplement to the Manual for Courts-Martial.
“Whenever inquiry is made into the loss of a ship, the Court shall call for the official report of the commanding officer of the ship, containing the narrative of the disaster, and this report shall be read in the presence of the commanding officer and of such of the surviving officers and crew as can be assembled, and shall be appended to the record.
“After the survivors have been sworn as witnesses, the following questions shall be put to them by the Court: (1) to the commanding officer: Is the narrative just read to the Court a true statement of the loss of USS REYNOLDS RYAN? (2) Have you any complaint to make against any of the surviving officers and crew of the said ship on that occasion? (3) to the surviving officers and crew: Have you any objections to make in regard to the narrative just read to the Court, or anything to lay to the charge of any officer or man with regard to the loss?”
I will now read the dispatch sent by the senior surviving officer.
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DAN straightened, blinking what felt like balls of dust from his eyes. He took several deep breaths and looked at his watch. The steady tapping of the yeoman’s machine was hypnotic. Another hour and a half before he could have another pill. Maybe the pain would help him stay alert.
He stared forward, taking another deep breath as Johnstone said, “Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Bryce.”
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LIEUTENANT Commander Benjamin W. Bryce, Jr., USN, was called as the first witness. He was reminded of his rights and was advised that any statement made by him might be used as evidence against him in any subsequent court-martial. He then took the oath.
Examined by the counsel for the Court.
Q. State your name, rank, and present duty station.
A. Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Bryce, executive officer of … [the witness paused].
Q. You are still attached to the crew of USS RYAN.
A. Thank you. So, executive officer of RYAN.
Q. Were you attached to that ship on the night of this last December 24?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. On the morning of the 25th, was RYAN lost as the result of a collision?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you the senior surviving officer?
A. I am. The captain did not survive.
Q. Do you have a list of the men believed to have died?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And a list of the survivors?
A. It is the same list. What I did was, I got our sailing muster from squadron staff and drew lines through the names of the men who were not picked up alive.
Q. Have you mustered the survivors?
A. I did that on KENNEDY the evening of the 25th.
Q. Are there any who are unaccounted for in any way? That is, who were aboard RYAN when she sailed, and are not accounted for?
A. There is one man who might fall in that category. We had a boatswain’s mate chief who was killed in an accident the day before.
Q. His name?
A. Harvey Bloch.
Q. He was dead before the collision?
A. Yes, sir, his body was in sick bay. I assume that it went down with the ship.
Q. Would you give to the Court, in the presence of the surviving officers and crew here assembled, your estimation of the events leading to the collision between USS KENNEDY and USS RYAN, and the subsequent loss of RYAN?
A. To the best of my ability, I will. As executive officer, I did not stand watches, although I kept my hand in by maneuvering her from time to time. So a lot of what I have won’t be as, you might say, an eyewitness. I was in my stateroom at the time of the collision, working on ship’s correspondence. I understand that we were in a sector formation—
Q. Let us have only what you personally witnessed. We will take testimony from those actually on the bridge later.
A. All right. My cabin was forward of the collision area but not by much. When I heard the impact, I immediately went out on deck
. I then began organizing the fire party. But cut in two, there wasn’t anything I could do at that point to save her. After some minutes, I was told that the captain had passed the word to abandon ship. So, I then abandoned in the ship’s motor whaleboat, and attempted to save as many as possible of the crew. I also saw—I then saw KENNEDY, or it might have been the oiler, come back.
Q. Come back?
A. It came back and rammed the forward section of RYAN.
Q. Go on.
A. Well, on the whaleboat, we had lowered away and were in the water searching for survivors when the engine conked out. The wind and seas carried us away east of where she went down. Eventually, we got the motor running again. We then resumed the search and took those we found to nearby ships for treatment. The boat itself was picked up by USS TALBOT about 0400.
Q. Go on.
A. We were given medical treatment and a shot of brandy. At dawn a helo took us to the carrier. That is about all I have to say.
Q. Commander Bryce, what was RYAN’s last port of call before the collision?
A. It was our home port, Newport, Rhode Island.
Q. How long had she been at sea?
A. Sixteen days. We operated in the North Atlantic and Arctic, then west of Ireland.
Q. Is the dispatch which you sent to the Secretary of the Navy a true statement of the loss of RYAN?
A. As far as it goes, but of course it’s not complete. There are many facts that this Court will have to uncover, and I hope to assist it in that.
Q. Have you any complaint to make against any of the surviving officers and crew of RYAN?
A. As I said, I was not on the bridge at the time. I do know many relevant facts, some of which relate to individuals who were on watch during the collision. I would like to hear their versions of what happened before I make a formal complaint.
COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: I will have further detailed questions to ask this witness. However, in order to expedite the hearing, I ask that he be excused from the stand at the present time without cross-examination.
Neither the counsel for the Court, the Court, nor the other parties desired further to examine this witness, and he resumed his seat.
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LIEUTENANT (jg) Aaron Reed was then called as a witness. He was sworn and examined as follows.
Q. State your name, rank, branch of service, and duty station.
A. Aaron Reed, lieutenant junior grade, antisubmarine officer on RYAN.
Q. What was your duty station on the morning of 25 December?
A. I was off watch. I had turned over the deck to my relief, Lieutenant Norden, who I understand turned it over again shortly thereafter to Lieutenant Evlin.
Q. You have heard the narrative by the senior survivor read. Have you any objection with regard to it?
A. No.
Q. Lieutenant, what was Commander Packer’s condition the last time you saw him on the bridge?
A. He seemed fatigued. He had been sick, he had a cold, and between us waking him up to ask about course changes and so on, he would nap in his chair.
COUNSEL FOR CDR PACKER: I object. I believe that the bridge was dark at the time. The captain may have merely been silent.
THE COURT: Does the witness have any grounds for saying that RYAN’s commanding officer was sleeping, other than that he was silent?
A. He snored.
THE COURT: The counsel for the Court will continue.
Q. Aside from his “naps,” did the captain seem alert when you woke him?
A. Yes, sir, he would come awake and listen to you and then give a response or an order.
Q. Were the responses consecutive and logical?
A. I would say so.
Q. Yet you said that he was, and I use your words, “fatigued” and “sick.” You must have based that conclusion on some evidence. What was it?
COUNSEL FOR CDR PACKER: Sir, the counsel for the Court is attempting to lead the witness to conclusions rather than eliciting evidence.
COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: It is obvious, I think, that establishing Commander Packer’s physical and mental condition are vitally important in this investigation. I am trying only to get the witness to elaborate on a matter he does not seem too helpful with.
LIEUTENANT (jg) REED: I am trying to be helpful, sir.
THE COURT: Commander Johnstone will continue.
Q. To return to the captain’s condition: What led you to believe he was fatigued and sick?
A. As I said, he had a cold.
Q. And had become fatigued, I assume, by being on call or on deck almost continuously for many days?
A. Yes, sir. During the whole time we were involved with the sonar trials, the storm, then during the—subsequent events, with the—
THE COURT: We will not go into certain events occurring before the night of the collision. They are irrelevant. Do you understand?
A. Yes, sir.
COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: Go on, please.
A. As I was saying, he had been on deck essentially nonstop for a period of four or five days, and hadn’t had much sleep before then, either.
Q. You have heard the senior survivor’s narrative. Have you any objection with regard to it?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you anything to lay to the charge of any officer or man with regard to the loss of USS RYAN?
A. No. I was proud to serve with Commander Packer. He was a fine seaman and a fine commanding officer. Whatever happened that night, I’m sure he wasn’t to blame.
Neither counsel for the Court, the Court, nor the parties desired further to examine the witness. He resumed his seat.
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LIEUTENANT (jg) Marcus R. Silver was then called. He was sworn and examined as follows:
Q. State your name, rank, branch of service, and duty station.
A. Lieutenant Junior Grade Marcus Roland Silver, USNR, CIC officer on RYAN.
Q. Where were you on the morning of the collision?
A. On the bridge. I was in Lieutenant Norden’s section from 1945 till midnight, but since my relief was late, I stayed there until 0115.
Q. Do you know why your relief was late?
A. There was some kind of shakedown going on in the weapons department. For that reason, Lieutenant Evlin was standing part of Mr. Norden’s OOD watch also.
Q. So you stood several hours of watch with Evlin, ending about an hour before the collision?
A. That is right.
Q. What was Lieutenant Evlin’s condition at the time?
A. Condition?
Q. Was he in proper condition to stand watch? Not tired, upset, or sick?
A. I’m sure he was tired—we all were—but not so tired he couldn’t stand watch. He seemed okay to me.
Q. Was Commander Packer on the bridge during your watch?
A. Yes, sir, he was on deck in my first watch—I mean before midnight—when we took station in the screen, and when we went to plane guard, and then when we went from plane guard back to screen.
Q. We will return to that maneuver, but first, I am going to follow the same line of questioning with you as I just have with Lieutenant Reed. Do you agree with his evaluation of the captain’s condition as “fatigued” and “sick”?
A. In general, yes.
Q. In general?
A. I agree with what he said.
Q. What was your opinion of Commander Packer?
A. He was a hard-driving man, pushing himself hardest. He may have driven himself too hard in regard to staying on the bridge essentially on a 24-hour basis. I thought he was maybe too tired to immediately grasp everything we said to him. And as Aaron—Lieutenant Reed, said, he had flu or a cold.
Q. Mr. Silver, you mentioned RYAN’s taking plane guard station aft of KENNEDY in the watch previous to the collision, effectively prefiguring the maneuver that later—during which the disaster occurred. We are now going to go over that in detail with you, to add to our understanding of that situation.
A. I’m ready.
/> Q. Can you describe how the ship maneuvered at that time?
A. Yes, sir. The formation was on a southerly heading, about one-eight-zero. The carrier corpened around—changed her course—to two-six-zero and ordered us to take station astern of her. We calculated a solution in two legs, two-five-zero at fifteen knots for eight minutes, then right to I think it was three-zero-zero at twenty knots; but by then, we could steer by eye on her stern light.
Q. How close did you come to KENNEDY in this maneuver?
A. I can’t answer that, sir. We had no means of determining range.
Q. Can you give us an estimate?
A. On the board, we figured we would pass her outside 1,000 yards. That’s about what it looked like by eye, too.
Q. Commander Packer approved this maneuver?
A. He didn’t say anything either for or against it that I know of.
Q. Did you consider it an unorthodox or dangerous maneuver?
A. I’ve been taught that any operation close to a carrier is dangerous, sir. But this one seemed safe to me. It took us quite a while before we reported to the KENNEDY we were in position, though. The captain asked once how much longer it would be. I think this was in view of the message.
Q. What message was that?
A. The one that said to take station as quickly as possible.
Q. To your recollection, what did the message say?
A. As I recall, it said that screen units were taking too long to get to station—it must have meant the others; we hadn’t done any yet—and that from now on to proceed to station in the fastest way possible.
Q. You saw this message, or heard about it?
A. I read it. It was taped to the bulkhead on the bridge. I’m sure it’s in the group commander’s outgoing message log.
Q. Let me ask this again, because it’s an important point: Did Commander Packer express any reservations or impatience when Lieutenant Evlin executed this maneuver on your watch?
A. No, sir. Not that I heard or can recall of. Just asking that once how much longer it would be.
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