The Circle
Page 44
A. He hesitated, then increased his rudder.
Q. To the left?
A. Yes, sir. I had gone out on the wing again by then. I realized that the carrier was almost on us, and went back inside. The captain then increased his rudder to hard left and ordered all engines ahead emergency flank.
Q. Which would give what speed?
A. We had boiler power for thirty knots.
Q. And then you collided.
A. Yes, sir. Another 200 feet and we would have made it. Or if the captain had given a right rudder instead of a left, we might have shaved down KENNEDY’s side, but not hit her.
Q. Did you see the commanding officer after the collision?
A. We spoke on the wing, as I described yesterday.
Q. At what point did you leave the ship?
A. As I said, after leaving the bridge, I went about the ship, down to the second deck to release a man from the brig. I helped others find their way topside. Then I went over the side.
Q. Would you describe the situation after the collision?
A. It was chaotic. Because of the fire and the fact we were cut in half, there was no opportunity to muster at life-boat stations. Each man went over on his own. Fortunately, there were plenty of life jackets. But they didn’t protect us against the cold. That was why the absence of the ship’s boat is disturbing.
Q. Have you any criticism to make of the search-and-rescue effort?
A. Of the search-and-rescue, no. I have two questions, though, one concerning the return of the carrier; the other concerning where RYAN’s boat went after the ship went down. If this is the place to raise them.
Q. It is.
A. My first question concerns KENNEDY’s return. Lieutenant Evlin and others were still fighting the fire when the carrier hit us again. There were still men aboard and many in the water nearby. Then, after that, the ship’s boat disappeared. The combination of these two events is why there were so few survivors. Most of the men who died did so after the initial collision. I hope we will find out why.
The witness requested a short break. A fifteen-minute recess was granted.
* * *
EXAMINATION recommenced.
Q. You have referred to a message directing RYAN and other screening units to expedite getting on station?
A. Yes, sir.
The counsel for the Court requested the reporter to mark a message Exhibit B. It was so marked and submitted to the parties and to the Court.
Q. I hand you a message marked Exhibit B. Would you read it, please?
A. “From: CTG 21.1. Action: TU 21.1.2. Subject: Maneuvering. This exercise will test and hone our performance of screening and close-in maneuvering. At 2000Z all units will set and adhere to wartime conditions including radar silence and dimmed lighting. All commanding officers bear in mind that when units are not actually on station they are not contributing to fighting effectiveness of task group. They will accordingly eschew sluggish maneuvering and change stations in the most expeditious manner. In war as in love timing is everything. Prompt and resolute action even at the expense of an occasional mistake is a hallmark of smart destroyer outfits. Admiral Hoelscher sends.”
Q. That is the message to which you were referring?
A. Yes. I think this was the reason Commander Packer decided on a risky maneuver rather than the safer one Lieutenant Evlin recommended.
Q. Can you explain why, feeling as you do, you did not object?
A. Well, Mr. Evlin already had, and the captain overruled him pretty strenuously. Maybe I should have spoken up, too, but I was not confident enough in my understanding of the matter to do so.
Q. After Commander Packer gave his order to come left, then increased his rudder to left full, did it not occur to you to warn him that it would bring him into the path of KENNEDY?
A. I should have. I did not. I thought he knew better than I did what was going on.
COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: This concludes my reexamination of this witness. Do the other counsels desire to cross-examine?
COUNSEL FOR CDR PACKER: I so desire, yes.
* * *
CROSS-EXAMINED by counsel for Commander Packer.
Q. Mr. Lenson, when RYAN came left to course zero-nine-zero, you left the pilothouse to check the captain’s solution, is that correct?
A. No, sir. I crossed the bridge to use the alidade on the port wing. It was Lieutenant Evlin who checked the course at the chart table.
Q. And your conclusion was that he would pass close to the KENNEDY?
A. Again, that was what Lieutenant Evlin said. His solution showed us passing her within 400 yards, which at night, at sea, without radar, is too close.
Q. In which direction?
A. On KENNEDY’S port side.
Q. Is that why you intimated in your previous testimony that you were surprised that the captain turned left?
A. Yes, sir. If he had just held his course, there would have been a close passage, but we would have all been safe.
Q. Now, when you were out on the wing: Could you see the running lights of the KENNEDY?
A. I could see lights.
Q. “Lights”?
A. Yes, sir. As I testified, there were many small dim lights on the carrier’s bearing. I could not distinguish the running lights among the others.
Q. During the time RYAN was on zero-nine-zero, did you get any reports from the lookouts?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you have any reports from your lookouts at all between the turn to one-three-zero and the collision?
A. Not that I recall.
Counsel for Commander Packer had no further questions of this witness.
* * *
CROSS-EXAMINED by counsel for Lieutenant Evlin.
Q. Mr. Lenson, I am coming in in the middle of this case and we will perhaps go over some material already covered. I would appreciate your correction if I err. Now, during the period you were on watch, you said the captain was off and on the bridge. How often was he off?
A. He was on the bridge from about—from when I came on at 0100; he went to his sea cabin for a while, till Lieutenant Evlin called him about the turn; then he came back up at 0200 or 0205. He was on the bridge from then on, except for the short time when he went aft to get his pipe, about 0210.
Q. So that while you were in the screen, steaming in close proximity to other ships, the captain was off the bridge more than he was on it, during the period of your watch?
A. That is misleading on two points, sir. First, we were not “in close proximity” when we were in our screen station. Second, although he wasn’t there every minute, he was in phone contact and came back immediately when we began our course change.
Q. Was the executive officer on the bridge at any time during your watch?
A. No, sir. Occasionally he came to CIC, but I have never seen him on the bridge.
Q. What kind of information were you getting from CIC?
A. None. CIC was secured because the radars were not operating.
Q. Mr. Lenson, are you a qualified conning officer?
A. No, sir.
Q. You have had extensive training, then?
A. At the Academy, but this was my first time in actual fleet steaming.
Q. How long had you been on RYAN?
A. About two and a half weeks.
Q. RYAN was your first afloat duty?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So that about two and a half weeks is the sum total of your Navy experience?
A. Well, yes.
Q. Isn’t it a little odd that you would be assigned to such an important watch with no training?
A. I did—that is, I had some training.
Q. Was RYAN shorthanded?
A. Not in terms of number of officers. But the captain wanted Lieutenant Talliaferro, the chief engineer, off the watch bill. The plant was old and needed attention. So he did not stand bridge watches.
Q. How long had Mr. Evlin been aboard?
A. He said to me once h
e had been aboard for almost two years.
Q. Did you have confidence in him?
A. Yes, sir, he was a very good officer.
Q. Can you tell us how much experience the bridge team in general had in formation maneuvering?
A. Well, that calls for a comparison I’m not—I can’t answer that. I had not been in formations before. I suppose Mr. Evlin had. I’m sure the captain had.
Q. But he was only on the bridge sporadically. Would it be fair to say, Mr. Lenson, that in terms of any assistance or backup whatsoever, Lieutenant Evlin was essentially alone on the bridge of USS RYAN that night?
COURT: You have just established that your witness is incapable of answering that question intelligently, Mr. Barrett.
COUNSEL FOR LT EVLIN: I withdraw the question. Would you describe the lights burning on RYAN on the night of the collision?
A. Dimmed navigation lights.
Q. Please describe them.
A. It would be masthead and range, and port and starboard and stern lights.
Q. But that is the normal lighting for a ship under way.
A. Well, dimmed I guess would be cutting down the illumination from them. There’s a switch on the light panel that you throw to turn on the navigation lights, and it has a Dimmed position.
Q. Did you check them when you came on watch?
A. The boatswain’s mate did that. He reported to me that the lights were burning.
Q. Did you verify that?
A. No, sir.
Q. So in fact, one or more of the lights might have been out?
A. It is possible, if Pettus did not bother to check them. But I’m sure he did.
Q. Correct me if I am wrong, but is it not one of the duties of the junior officer of the deck to check the running lights personally when he comes on watch?
A. [witness paused.] I believe it is.
Q. And you did not?
A. No, sir. I was late relieving and I did not check the lights.
Q. Let’s go on. What was RYAN’s turning radius?
A. I think—I think about 1,200 yards.
Q. At what speed?
A. At standard—at fifteen knots.
Q. And how fast was the ship traveling when Mr. Evlin and the captain were doing their calculations?
A. Twenty-seven knots.
Q. What is the turning radius at that speed?
A. I’m not sure. Probably less than 1,200 yards.
Q. But you’re not sure?
COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: Mr. Barrett, the ensign has said clearly that he was not.
COUNSEL FOR LT EVLIN: Thank you, sir. I withdraw that question, as well.
Let us go on now to the maneuver that Evlin recommended versus the one Packer ordered. Can you reproduce from memory the maneuvering-board solution that he and Commander Packer discussed, as you said in your testimony?
A. Yes, sir, I think I can. [Witness illustrates.] Commander Packer asked him what he would do if the carrier came to a recovery course around two-six-zero. He told him he had worked it out and that he—
Q. Who?
A. Lieutenant Evlin. He intended to slow to fifteen knots and turn right, away from KENNEDY, all the way around to two-six-zero; wait for her to pass us; then fall in astern. The captain said that was too slow. He wanted him to come only slightly right instead and head down the carrier’s port side at flank speed, making a hard left turn into station when he was past her. They had a disagreement about it, and the captain told him to do the maneuver his way.
Q. Did you hear Lieutenant Evlin object to the solution?
A. Yes, sir. That’s what I meant by a disagreement.
Q. Did you feel that the maneuver the captain ordered was dangerous?
A. Well, not exactly. But it sounded riskier than the solution Mr. Evlin wanted.
Q. But you didn’t make your misgivings known to anyone.
A. As I said, it was the first time I’d been in this situation.
Q. In other words, you had not been adequately trained?
A. I don’t know.
Q. But you said nothing?
A. I said nothing.
Q. Let’s go on. If you had been watching KENNEDY, could you have seen her at all times?
A. That’s an unfair question, sir. Mr. Evlin wanted a bearing on her every ten minutes. I did that. I also had other things to do on the bridge.
Q. I stand corrected. Now, do you recall what Mr. Evlin, your OOD, did after the captain relieved him of the conn?
A. He went to check the new course on the maneuvering board.
Q. He no longer was in charge of the ship?
A. No, sir, the captain had taken the conn.
Q. What precisely does that mean?
A. That Commander Packer was responsible for subsequent maneuvers.
Q. And you heard him, the captain, take the conn?
A. Yes, sir, distinctly.
Q. And he legally took control of the ship from that moment on.
A. That is the way I understand it.
Q. What was your status as a result of this?
A. Mine?
Q. That is correct. How did your status change as a result of the captain’s taking the conn?
A. I’m not sure. I suppose I was still the JOD.
Q. And your duty then would be to assist whom?
A. The captain?
Q. Please answer.
A. I suppose it would be to assist the captain, since he had become the conning officer.
Q. And did you then assist him?
A. I was confused. I went out on the wing to try to clarify the situation in my mind.
Q. Mr. Lenson, in your opinion, was there anything that could have saved RYAN after the collision took place?
A. I don’t think so, sir. I heard DC1 Traven’s testimony and it seems to me—
Q. Personal knowledge, please.
A. I don’t think she could have been saved.
Q. Even the forward section of a ship has considerable buoyancy. Did you consider staying aboard to try to save her, as Lieutenant Evlin apparently did?
A. I trusted the judgment of the captain and followed his order to abandon ship. When I thought all of the crew had that word I went into the water, too.
Q. Mr. Lenson, since the collision have you had any duties in regard to the survivors of RYAN?
A. Well, I spent the first few days after we got back to the States in the hospital. After that, in conjunction with the other officers, I’ve had to try to reconstruct the men’s pay records. I helped the XO in getting them clothes and gear and so forth, and I helped write the letters to the next of kin. He signed those, but we wrote them.
COUNSEL FOR LT EVLIN: Thank you, Ensign.
If I may make a brief summary of this cross-examination: The points I have established are, first, that Mr. Evlin was not properly assisted by Mr. Lenson or anyone else normally required to provide such assistance; second, that he had warned the captain in advance against this maneuver; third, that in the midst of a maneuver that he had executed safely only hours before, he was relieved of his post; and finally, that the last orders before the collision proper, which in fact rendered it inevitable, were given by the captain after he had relieved said officer.
I have no further questions of the witness at this time.
* * *
LIEUTENANT Commander Benjamin Bryce, USN, was recalled as a witness. He was warned that his oath was still binding.
Examined by the counsel for the Court.
Q. Commander, you have listened to the testimony given this morning. I know that you were not present on the bridge, but do you have any comments on it?
A. It seems to me that we have here a case of people doing their best to evade responsibility.
Q. Please elaborate.
A. I’m a little old-fashioned in these matters. I was taught that when you had a watch, you were responsible for what went on during that watch. Now, on duty that night we had Lieutenant Evlin and Ensign Lenson. So, the argume
nt that Mr. Evlin’s lawyer here seems to be using is that once Captain Packer got up there on the bridge, all Evlin’s accountability just vanished away.
Now you have to have known this officer, Evlin I mean, to know that even at the best of times he was not the kind of man to actively seek responsibility. In fact, he was just the opposite.
COUNSEL FOR LT EVLIN: I must ask the witness to refrain from personal opinion and stick to facts.
COUNSEL FOR CDR PACKER: Certainly the judgment of his immediate superior as to Lieutenant Evlin’s capacity to stand a watch is of interest.
COUNSEL FOR LT EVLIN: But Commander Bryce has stated earlier that he himself did not stand watches, and that therefore—
THE COURT: The examination will continue.
COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: What do you mean, Commander, when you say Evlin did not actively seek responsibility?
A. He had a lax approach to duty and a tendency to let the men get away with things. We’ve heard Lenson testify to the same attitude in his action when he found a man supposedly sleeping on watch. I had hopes for Lenson when he joined us, but found that he had, through association with Mr. Evlin, who he stood watch with, he soon took on this same coloration.
Q. Do you feel Lieutenant Evlin was lax on the bridge?
A. I can easily believe it. That would account for the casual attitudes of the lookouts, the slow response by the lee helmsman, the way everyone seemed to freeze or panic when collision was imminent. I don’t know about this other maneuver he is supposed to have recommended, but I think what likely happened was Captain Packer arrived on the bridge, found a dangerous situation, and had to take charge cold.
I say this with reluctance, but the Court has to take into account the possibility that things are not exactly as Lenson described them. That is, in his eagerness to clear his friend, and of course himself, he has altered the sequence of events.
Q. Go on.
A. Let’s say, for example, that the course change to zero-nine-zero was ordered before Commander Packer reached the bridge. Then the captain, arriving, realized that the ship was standing into danger. He summarily relieved Lieutenant Evlin, and ordered increasing amounts of left rudder in an attempt to save RYAN. Ultimately, he was unable to rectify the situation and the collision occurred. If events happened this way, you could hardly lay the blame on James Packer.
Q. What evidence have you for such a scenario?