CIA Spymaster_George Kisevalter

by Clarence Ashley III

  Although Penkovsky had no more clandestine meetings with Janet, he did meet her on occasion at official functions and they passed tapes and messages back and forth. These opportunities occurred only occasionally during that spring. As time progressed he became more and more concerned about the ever-tightening circumstances that he was sensing. He had been promised trips abroad that had been precipitously canceled: Switzerland in March, Seattle in April. He was concerned as to his future and he wanted to make plans to permanently exit the Soviet Union.

  The CIA concluded that a dangerous situation existed and thought that Penkovsky should cease his espionage activities for the time being, getting rid of all incriminating material. The British disagreed. In fact, they believed that the Americans were not leveling with them. Did the CIA have other information that led them to be afraid, information that was not being shared with them?The CIA could not convince them otherwise, so a compromise was reached. The Americans and the British would get the appropriate men, under cover, into each of their embassies. If Penkovsky could have regular access to these embassies under the guise of his official cover organization, he would have a perfect reason to meet both people. Both intelligence agencies could then execute all future transfer of materials with ease and security. In June, the CIA finally sent its man, Rodney Carlson, to the U.S. Embassy. Should Penkovsky be invited there for the celebration of some big American day such as Independence Day or Christmas, the Agency was prepared.

  The British were not as concerned as the Americans about the potential threat and insisted that Greville Wynne could serve until a replacement for Janet Chisholm could be provided. Janet was to be relieved in any event because she was pregnant again and wished to return home for delivery of her child. In July, Wynne met Penkovsky in Moscow with a new plan for communication. He showed Penkovsky pictures of Janet's replacement) as well as the new CIA man, Rod Carlson, and his wife. In addition, Wynne gave Penkovsky a special tiepin, identical to the one Carlson would wear for their initial meeting. Penkovsky told Wynne that he wanted to defect and come to the West. He was worried. He was having trouble with his one-way communication device. He sounded desperate. He wanted to come out, even if he had to leave his family. Wynne noted that his own baggage had been searched in his hotel room and that when he and Penkovsky were together they were watched. Moreover, when Wynne met with the Soviet business committee to make plans for an exhibition, he sensed that he was being grilled.

  On Independence Day in 1962, Penkovsky was invited to Spaso House, the American ambassador's residence, and was able to meet Carlson. Both were hopeful that a new phase in the relationship could begin. A few days later Penkovsky officially escorted Wynne out of Moscow. To Wynne, Penkovsky appeared rattled and quite nervous about the surveillance. Nevertheless, Penkovsky had the temerity to make a formal complaint to the GRU. He and Wynne should not be surveilled! After all, he had official reasons to be seeing Wynne!

  During the summer, Penkovsky had successful meetings with Wynne but he continued to feel that the world was closing in on him. Finally, on 27 August, he and Rod Carlson executed a successful pass of information, the first for the Americans in all of this time. At that meeting, Carlson also gave Penkovsky an internal passport. This document, forged by the CIA, would permit the holder to travel about freely within the Soviet Union. Otherwise, internal travel was almost impossible in the police state.

  Still in August, Penkovsky again met Carlson at a party. Carlson received seven cassettes from Penkovsky and gave him instructions from the team. In early September, Stuart Udall, the U.S. secretary of the interior, visited the Soviet Union and Penkovsky attended a social function in connection with the trip. There he met with Carlson and told him that he would have something for him the next night, 6 September, during the film showing at the British Embassy. No Americans were invited, however, so Carlson was not able to be there. Penkovsky was seen there; but after that, no CIA or SIS people saw him again, even though he was invited to diplomatic functions three times later in September.

  In October, the missiles in Cuba were detected. Some had previously warned about this possibility. CIA Director John McCone had advised the president as early as August that he believed in the presence of offensive missiles in Cuba. In August, Sen. Kenneth Keating of New York stated that he had evidence of the entrance of strategic offensive missiles in Cuba. Other senators, Thurmond, Capehart, and Goldwater, berated the president for his "do-nothing" policy visa-vis Cuba.

  Almost no one within the Kennedy administration, however, believed that the presence of offensive missiles in Cuba was likely. First of all, there was no hard evidence (e.g., photos); secondly, the Soviets themselves had assured Kennedy there were no missiles in Cuba. After some delay, McCone was able to schedule U-2 flights over the island. On the flight of 14 October, offensive missiles were photographed. With the information that Penkovsky had previously provided, the missiles immediately were identified. Moreover, the technical characteristics of the missiles also were available through this material.

  Within days, analysis by Agency personnel indicated the missiles' range (more than 1,000 nautical miles) and the extent of the threat. The United States had overwhelming superiority to the Soviets in offensive missiles, as well as superior intelligence, due in no small part to Penkovsky, but there was great concern-even fright throughout the world-regarding the prospect of war over the Soviet presence in Cuba. The concern was warranted. In addition to the incipient missile threat, the Soviets already had a tremendous nuclear capability through their long-range bomber programone that could have been fatal to the very existence of the United States; and fully operational IL-28 Beagle Bombers were being uncrated in Cuba. More than two weeks of indecision on the part of the Kennedy administration followed.

  On 27 October, a U-2 aircraft, piloted by Maj. Rudolph Anderson, Jr., was shot down by an SA-2. Anderson was killed. Tensions rose and the president was pressured to order an attack on Cuba. Fearing, correctly, that such an action might escalate the situation, he made no decision. Meanwhile, other missiles in Cuba, with greater ranges (2,000 nautical miles), were discovered to be nearing operational status. The CIA-SIS team sent a radio message to Penkovsky asking for information on the situation-particularly if an early-warning message were warranted. There was no reply.

  Eventually, the crisis was substantially defused with the Soviet proposal to withdraw the missiles in exchange for a U.S. agreement not to threaten Castro or Cuba anymore, as well as its pledge to remove similar U.S. missiles that were deployed in Turkey. Although the Turkish government was unwitting of the agreement, and had previously expressed displeasure at such an action when the U.S. had broached the question (because the missiles were nearing obsolescence), they acquiesced. At least in the minds of the public, the matter was resolved. However, there was no promise on the part of the Soviets to remove the long-range bombers that were deployed in Cuba, so in reality, a dangerous situation still existed. Ultimately, in mid-November, an agreement was reached that the aircraft also would be removed in late December.

  Penkovsky could have been the ultimate intelligence asset. With his position as a senior colonel in the Soviet Army, his association with the GRU, and his relationships with people such as Varentsov, Penkovsky could have the capacity to render an early-warning signal if a nuclear attack from the Soviets were imminent. The team, therefore, had devised two procedures Penkovsky could use in such a case, if no personal contact were feasible. In one scenario he would mark a designated lamppost with a dark chalk circle about waist high and then follow that with a call to a specified phone number. If he heard the proper response, he then would blow three times into the mouthpiece and hang up. This would mean "beware; an attack is under way." In case the phones were not operative or the proper response was not obtained when he made the call, he was to mark the same lamppost in the manner as before and then load a dead drop with the message. He also was to call a specified telephone number to indicate that the dead drop had been
, or would be, loaded. Other than to signal nuclear attack or that his status drastically had changed (e.g., he had been dropped from the committee or was being posted outside of Moscow), he was not to load the dead drop. Moreover, the dead drop should be used only once.

  At 9:00 A.M. on 2 November, soon after the Cuban missile crisis appeared to be settled, U.S. Embassy personnel in Moscow received a telephone call at the designated location. The caller blew three times into the receiver. The embassy cabled this information to headquarters while Paul Garbler and one other person observed the light pole. The mark was there-a circle, waist high, in dark chalk. This meant that the dead drop also had been loaded. The situation was an extreme emergency; perhaps an attack was imminent. The CIA had to clear the dead drop.

  George described the next steps. "Jacob, a Dartmouth man and a friend of mine, went with an embassy official, in an embassy car, to a spot not far from the dead-drop location and parked. Jacob got out of the car and walked in a circuitous route to shake any possible surveillance, pausing at appropriate places to observe the scene. Seeing nothing suspicious, he made his way to the dead-drop area. The State Department man, totally unwitting as to what was about to transpire, got out of the car and went in another direction, expecting to do some routine shopping. Jacob stepped into the dead-drop location to clear the drop. He cleared it. There was a matchbox. Important information would be therein. Suddenly, walls broke open! It was a stakeout. Four huge men pinned his arms to his raincoat as they seized him. They literally dragged him to a car, kidnapped him, and took off.

  "The State Department guy, seeing what had happened, took off back to the U.S. Embassy. He rushed in and screamed, `They grabbed Jacob. Protest at once through the secretary of state to Gromyko, Molotov, or whomever. We must spring him. Demand his release; he is our diplomat.'

  "In the meantime, Jacob was with the KGB being grilled. Clandestine operations! Illegal activities! Espionage! They tried to pin as much on him as possible and they also tried to see if they could get him to work with them against his own embassy. He had one answer. `I-want-my-embassy!' They became angry with him. He was like an automaton. He kept saying just one thing: `I-wantmy-embassy.'

  "The guy in the back room says, `Which damned embassy?' They didn't know whether he was American, Canadian, or British. How could they know? It was a joint operation. So finally, it was unearthed that it was the U.S. Embassy, and finally, after whatever, one or two hours, of verbal chastising, but nothing more, the man in charge, the KGB arresting officer, said, `Their foreign office is calling ours. We're PNGing2 the man. By international law, we have to release him to his embassy. Tell them to come around.'

  "Shortly thereafter, State Department people picked him up and took him back to the embassy. They PNGed him and nine others. Our doctor, who I also happened to know, was PNGed. He was from Atlanta. I used to know his mother and his father; I played bridge with them in Atlanta. He was the American Embassy doctor, Alex Davison. Poor Alex didn't know a damned fool thing about the operation. Anyway, that is neither here nor there. So, Hugh Montgomery, he was PNGed. He had an official job there; he was a recipient of one of the phone calls. Jacob, of course, and the contact man, Rodney Carlson, were also PNGed. In addition, they threw out an `innocent' State Department employee. He was expelled although he didn't know anything of the affair. Five British as well were sent home. It's funny. I knew all of these guys. Well, anyway, those are the personae; that is how it happened.3 Later on that day, within an hour or so of Jacob's arrest, Wynne also was arrested in Budapest, Hungary. He was there with his wagon, trying to sell his goods. He was arrested by their secret police and turned over to the KGB, who dragged him to Moscow to be put on trial along with Penkovsky."

  Penkovsky had two trials, overt and covert. The overt trial was on 7 May 1963. There, he bravely tried to defend Wynne. He stated that Wynne was a war hero, saying, "He fought the same Hitler that we did." Wynne had been an officer for the British Navy during the Second World War. "His business activity was completely in the blind. He did not participate in espionage or even know what he was actually doing. If he carried anything he didn't know what it was," Penkovsky plaintively, but to no avail, stated. Fittingly, Gen. V. V. Borisoglebsky was the presiding judge. He had been the court-martial judge for Gary Powers as well as for the Soviet who had been flown black to see General Cabell. He was the one who had told Penkovsky of the latter when Penkovsky was at the missile school.

  At his overt trial, the Soviets tried to depict Penkovsky as a drunkard. He certainly was not. He drank only a little wine. They could not hide the fact that he had been a most competent military officerindeed, a war hero. They did, however, succeed in hiding the fact that he was GRU. He got no help from his high-placed friends. By this time, Varentsov was no longer a marshal of the Soviet Union; Penkovsky's father-in-law, General Gapanovich, was dead; and "Serov was somewhere in Siberia, demoted and marching on the Mongolian border," according to George. "There was cashiering coming and going all over Moscow for lack of diligence in watching out for a spy of the caliber of Penkovsky."

  Penkovsky was sentenced to be shot. In May of 1963 the Soviets claimed that the sentence had been complied with. "They didn't execute him at once," George surmised, "since they could kill him like a flea at any time. They probably wanted to query him about many of the CIA operations. `Is so and so one of their penetrations too? What else did you tell them?' How else would they know? Like Ames. We would want to know to what extent he had compromised us." They could have tortured Penkovsky for a long time while trying to find out what information he might have given the team. Evidently, his family did not get penalized. Perhaps he made some deal in order to spare them. Some accounts allege that he was burned alive while a group of new GRU officers witnessed, in order to recognize their own fate should they take the path of Penkovsky. Some say that was the fate of the man who was flown back for a visit with General Cabell. We don't know for sure, but George did not think that was the case with Penkovsky.

  Wynne was sentenced to eight years of hard labor but he was traded for one of their spies in much the same way that Gary Powers was exchanged for Rudolf Abel. On 22 April 1964, Gordon Lonsdale, a.k.a. Konon Trofimovich Molody, and Wynne passed each other at Heerstrasse checkpoint in West Berlin. This is the same man that George, at the request of the British, had tried to influence at their April 1961 meeting in London. Then Wynne came home and wrote The Man from Moscow, The Man from Odessa, and Meeting on Gorky Street. According to George, "He tried to do this and that; he tried to make a big fanfare out of it. He was a little bit odd."

  Undoubtedly, this was the most productive U.S. espionage operation of the Cold War. Penkovsky's documentary material came out in English translation to about 10,000 pages. Almost all of it was topsecret information. By contrast, the Popov operation, which previously had been the CIA's most successful clandestine operation, provided about 1,300 pages of comparable material, although none of the Popov information was classified higher than secret. With the Minox and his access to GRU and missile archives, Penkovsky effectively used 110 cassettes of film, producing 5,000 frames, nearly all of which were perfectly readable.

  During the last team meeting in London, Leonard McCoy had briefed the case officers on the requirements Penkovsky should attempt to fulfill when he went back to the Soviet Union. One was to obtain a secret version of Military Thought, a publication whose existence had been disclosed through Popov. This document was designed to reflect the current opinions of senior Soviet military officers. Popov had given George an unclassified version but in 1959, a Soviet naval captain defector confirmed the existence of a secret version.4 Penkovsky did not obtain this secret version; rather, he provided a top-secret version, a text that the case officers did not know about. It gave, in detail, the views and intentions of Khrushschev's most senior military officers.

  Penkovsky provided the Americans and the British with personal histories of leading Soviet generals and the minutes of Central Committ
ee meetings of the Soviet Communist Party, including some actual documents.

  The high-level technical manuals and missile specifications that Penkovsky provided made it clear that the United States was far ahead of the Soviets in military space. But as he told George, the Soviets were "breaking their backs" to close in on the U.S. lead, and they would soon be a tremendous threat to the West.

  Penkovsky photographed various Kremlin telephone books, including those of the Defense Ministry, the secure Red line, the Academy of Sciences, etc. This information gave a means for piecing together a rudimentary organizational chart of those assigned there.

  He identified 341 GRU people in Moscow and 192 abroad, and he listed 75 KGB, mostly in London and Paris. These were unique contributions on his part. He also confirmed CIA suspicions about hundreds of other intelligence personnel.

  He supplied information about a new tank that the Soviets were creating. So the United States created one to combat it.

  He gave the CIA and SIS full knowledge of the SA-2, the surfaceto-air missiles that shot down both the U-2s of Gary Powers near Sverdlovsk, USSR, and Maj. Rudolph Anderson over Cuba. Thus, countermeasures were developed. Eventually, he provided the technical characteristics of all tactical missiles and rockets in the Soviet Union.

  Most importantly, Penkovsky's information was timely. The team sent reports every day to the White House and 10 Downing Street during the Bay of Pigs debacle in the spring of 1961, the Berlin crises in the summer and fall of 1961, and the Cuban missile crisis in October of 1962. Through personal contacts with Varentsov, Penkovsky was able to tell much about Soviet intentions during that period, something a photograph cannot do. In July of 1961 he stated that the Soviet Union would sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR (East Germany), thereby recognizing them as a separate nation. This forewarning enabled a prepared response from the United States. He also suggested that East Berlin would become a closed zone and added that if the United States objected, the Soviets would relent. Of course, President Kennedy did not act on the information, and the Berlin Wall went up unchallenged.