CIA Spymaster_George Kisevalter

by Clarence Ashley III

  Why were they concerned? Cherepanov had been with partisan detachments during the war. He could survive in the woods, alone, for long periods of time. They knew that he would disappear if he were not quickly found. On the second day after not seeing him nor hearing from him, they involved the militia. All regular police militia received a photo of his face. These militia and the KGB all over the Soviet Union, particularly the border guards, started a massive search. They went to bus stations, train stations, and dining rooms around all travel stations with photographs of Cherepanov, asking people if they had seen that man. Whenever they would receive some clue from a particular location, they would send out an officer who had known Cherepanov personally, for further investigation. During this process they received many false alarms from all over the Soviet Union.

  George went on, "Now, when Yuri Nosenko defected to us in 1964 he told me what had transpired with respect to Cherepanov. Nosenko was important to the hunt because he knew the target, Cherepanov, who had actually worked for him at one time. To people like Nosenko, who were chasing Cherepanov, they gave extra money, temporary promotions, and all kinds of other emoluments. They provided easy means of transportation, thus promoting clandestine movement, internally, in the search for this target. They were searching for him because they knew that the material was very important to them. It involved Popov as well as the take that the CIA received from Popov. Of course, it was important. For one thing, they revealed information about their operations against the U.S. Embassy and how vulnerable it was. For another thing, they did indicate how Popov was caught."

  In mid-December of 1963 the KGB finally caught Cherepanov in the Caucasus Mountains at a small railway station in a very remote area about one mile from the border with Turkey. He almost made it. George said, "This came about only because, like a damned fool, our charge, for purposes of establishing goodwill with the KGB, had returned those papers to Gromyko. It was a blunder to return them because Cherepanov would have begun working for the CIA as had Popov as well as Penkovsky. Moreover, he would have been good. His experience in intelligence gathering and in counterintelligence would have been quite beneficial to us.

  "So, when I heard this one about Cherepanov from Nosenko, I knew that I was getting the true time of day from Nosenko, and no going to tell me otherwise. When Nosenko traveled with special passports, which he showed me from his inside pocket, allowing him almost unlimited internal traffic, and which gave him the right to grab this and that, I knew that he was on to something red hot. Moreover, I knew that he was for real, because how else in the world could he know so much about what the hell was going on? Well, that is how you find out what is true and what is not.

  "He finally defected to us in 1964. He then just confirmed some things that we already knew about this. When the confirmation was consistent with known facts from the Cherepanov papers and other sources, then I knew that Nosenko was for real. I did, at once. You would too if you were a case officer. Some dumb-asses wouldn't know, but you would. The judgment of a jackass is not what moves the scales. When I say jackass, I say it for the reason that you don't return things blind like that without thoroughly investigating them. You know what I mean?"

  "Did the papers indicate a relationship between Little Guy and Popov?"

  "That was not a problem. They never saw a connection between Little Guy and Popov."

  "Did the release of the information that Marshal Zhukov's speech had been leaked to the West, combined with the knowledge that Popov was in the group that first heard the speech, tend to finger him?"

  "No."

  "Did the incident about the lady who went over to New York and was encountered by the FBI finger him?"

  "It definitely could have but I don't think that it did."

  "Why not? After that, the KGB had an investigation about her being surveilled and put a tail on Popov."

  "Yes, but they had nothing on him. Moreover, the KGB probably didn't believe all that the couple told them of their trip. The KGB, of course, later could look back and conclude that he could have been implicit in the Margarita Tairova incident, but at the time of its occurrence they couldn't have known much for sure. In fact, one note in the Cherepanov papers made reference to this event. It just confused matters to the FBI and our counterintelligence people. These papers confirmed to me, however, that the thing that finally nailed Popov was the act of somebody sending an internal letter to him, a letter from our own embassy." 2

  CHAPTER 19

  The Ukrainian

  As George finished his story about Cherepanov, his telephone rang, blasting the room with a noise that immediately destroyed the pensive atmosphere and all hope of concentration. He reached for the instrument. Usually, he would not allow interruptions to our sessions, telling the caller that he would return the call promptly when we were finished, so I stayed in place. This time he continued his telephone conversation in Russian. Since George knew that I had no proficiency whatsoever in the language, I did not feel the need to excuse myself.

  "It's Nosenko," he said to me, and continued on the telephone.

  George had mentioned this enigmatic individual to me before, but he had never told me the man's complete story. I suspect that it was too painful for him. Even now, I do not know the whole truth about their relationship or the episode. This I do know: the Nosenko saga, with the single exception of the Popov death, grated on George's mind more sharply than any other operational event in his experience. It truly bothered him.

  Nosenko's story begins some six months before his appearance in Geneva, with the defection of yet another enigmatic Soviet. In December of 1961, Maj. Anatoliy Golitsyn, a staff officer for the KGB, specializing in counterintelligence matters and stationed in Helsinki, defected to the West. Golitsyn came preaching a most fundamental gospel: the West must be keenly aware of the Soviet penchant for disinformation in order for its civilization to have a chance of survival.1 He also warned of "Sasha," a Communist spy securely ensconced somewhere within the upper echelons of the CIA hierarchy who already had brought great detriment to the Free World and who threatened much worse.

  Golitsyn was very intelligent and seemed to be well informed of Soviet resources. Moreover, he purported an intimate knowledge of a number of KGB penetrations that had long troubled the CIA, and offered to expose them. He did, however, insist that his worth to the Agency as well as to the rest of the U.S. government warranted special treatment, even an audience with President Kennedy. His Agency managers refused him direct contact but did not stop him from writing a letter to the president. He expected it to be forthwith delivered, but the Agency was understandably reluctant for Golitsyn to have direct-mail correspondence with the president. They asked George to attempt to screen and divert Golitsyn's missive if it seemed provocative. In his book, Molehunt, David Wise gives George's version of the letter incident:

  "Golitsin was a loose cannon; nobody knew what he would say or do. It was embarrassing to have him write to the President. They sent me to accept the letter; I was authorized to promise to deliver it to the President ... and if it was not innocuous, to stop it.... I was acting friendly," Kisevalter related. "'Let's speak Russian,' I said. `Let me see your letter.' .. .

  "The letter said, 'In view of the fact that the President who has promised me things through his brother, Robert, may not be President in the future, how can I be sure the United States government will keep its promises to me for money and a pension?' .. .

  "I said, `You S.O.B. You're a first-class blackmailer. This is shantazh! [the Russian word for blackmail]."'

  Wise continues:

  Shaken by Kisevalter's reaction, Golitsin changed his mind and demanded the letter hack.

  Oh, no, Kisevalter said. You want it delivered to the President, I'll deliver it. Kisevalter grinned as he recalled the moment. "Golitsin jumped up on top of the desk and then jumped down on my side and we began wrestling for the letter. I let him win."2

  Soon after his arrival, Golitsyn was taken under the w
ing of the Agency's chief of counterintelligence, James Jesus Angleton, who reported directly to the director of the CIA. Golitsyn and Angleton became close associates, being of the same mind on many things and each providing the other distinct advantages. Golitsyn gave to the CI chief the benefit of his extensive knowledge of recent Soviet intelligence matters. Angleton made Golitsyn aware of numerous U.S. programs, targets, and intelligence resources. He also sent him to England and took him to France, Norway, Holland, Canada, and Australia, where, with Angleton's introductions and endorsements, Golitsyn received the red-carpet treatment from their intelligence services.3 Soon the Soviet defector knew more about the West's intelligence capability than almost anyone employed by any of its intelligence services.

  No matter, concluded Angleton. Golitsyn was now here to help the West. The Western intelligence services had to be observant of all new defections, however, because, as Golitsyn warned, there would be false defectors who would come to discredit him. Thus the stage was set for Nosenko, who, due to the miscalculations of a number of individuals who were misled by Golitsyn and encouraged by Angleton, proved to be the most perplexing, although ultimately one of the most valuable, defectors in the history of the CIA.

  In June of 1962, Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, a handsome, thirty-fouryear-old, powerfully built man, appeared in Geneva, Switzerland. He was a member of the Soviet delegation at the seventeen-nation disarmament conference. The conference ultimately would lead to the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty, which would produce several comprehensive international agreements, including the ABM (Antiballistic Missile) Treaty. Nosenko was the delegation's security officer, a watchdog employed to keep tabs on the other members of his group, always alert for a potential defection.

  Yuri Nosenko was born on 30 October 1927 in Nikolaiev, Ukrainian SSR. His father, Ivan Nosenko, was an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and had served as the Soviet minister of shipbuilding in the 1940s and 1950s. When he died in 1956, the most important leaders of the USSR, including Nikita Khrushchev, Georgi Malenkov, Nikolai Bulganin, and Klimentiy Voroshilov, formed the guard of honor at his funeral bier. He was buried in the Kremlin wall.4

  Yuri served in the GRU, working in naval intelligence from 1950 until 1953, at which time he joined the KGB and was assigned to the Second Chief Directorate. The First Chief Directorate had the principal responsibility for KGB espionage and counterintelligence outside the USSR; the Second Chief Directorate was mostly concerned with counterintelligence within the USSR. During his first two years in that job he worked in the American Department and monitored the activities of American correspondents and military attaches in Moscow. In 1955 he transferred to the Department for Tourists, which specialized in compromising and recruiting some of these Moscow visitors. In June of 1958 he was appointed deputy chief of the American and British Section of that department, a job he held until January of 1960. He volunteered that in 1956 and again in 1959 he had been given a special commendation for his work in bringing about compromising situations of various American and British visitors in Moscow, thus allowing the KGB to take advantage of these individuals. In January of 1960, he was transferred back to the American Department, and then in January of 1962 he returned to the Tourist Department, where he was named deputy chief of the department, in charge of operations against foreign tourists. Since February of 1962, he had been temporarily attached to the Soviet Disarmament Delegation in Geneva as the chief security officer.5

  A few days after his arrival in Geneva, Nosenko approached an American diplomat and asked for a private talk with CIA personnel. The diplomat notified the CIA office in Bern. From there, a CIA intelligence officer was immediately dispatched to conduct a preliminary investigation into the bona fides and potential worth of the prospective agent. This person eventually would become the principal case officer in one of the most vexing episodes in the chronicles of the CIA. Initially, however, there was difficulty in communication, because the CIA officer's poor Russian and Nosenko's poor English prevented an effective connection. At this point, George was rushed over from headquarters to Geneva in order to serve as an interpreter and additional officer.

  George's informal manner, unkempt appearance, lack of pomposity, as well as beautiful command of the Russian language put him in direct contrast with the straight-laced, company-man, former marine who had initially tried to debrief the sometimes hesitant Nosenko. George made a big impression on the Soviet even before he began to question him. From George's face, speech, and everything else about him, Nosenko knew that he was in the presence of someone of Russian heritage. Nosenko also quickly recognized that George was both an able professional and a compassionate human being. From the start, they liked each other.

  Nosenko volunteered that he was a major in the KGB, currently a staff officer assigned to the Second Chief Directorate. He was, herewith, available for the CIA's use, offering to sell valuable information for 900 Swiss francs. He declared that he needed the money to replace KGB funds he had squandered on a drinking spree.6 He added that his daughter, Oksana, had a serious asthmatic condition. He had learned that a special new drug could help her but the USSR could not provide the medication. He wanted assistance in obtaining the potential remedy. The drug was not legally available in the United States, but George found it in Holland. He then had the medication flown in to Geneva.

  Nosenko met with his American contacts a number of times in a Geneva safehouse. For these liaisons he chose to employ a rather quaint means of countersurveillance. In order to ensure that he was not being tailed to the meetings, he routinely visited a number of bars on the way, having a drink in each. This usually meant the consumption of a scotch and soda in each of four or five stops. At the safehouse, he continued to imbibe, as he was offered drinks throughout the interviews that George conducted. This excessive drinking would later become an issue in the debate regarding Nosenko's veracity and reliability.

  Nosenko promptly disclosed to George the valuable information that William John Vassall-formerly employed as a clerk in the British Admiralty-was an agent of the KGB. He reported that Vassal] had provided the Soviets with extensive amounts of embassy documents and pages of microfilmed naval intelligence information from March 1954 until July 1956, when Vassall had served in Moscow in the office of the naval attache. While in Moscow, Vassall had been caught and photographed by the KGB in a homosexual act. This compromise had led to his becoming a cooperative for the KGB. Moreover, maintained Nosenko, Vassall still was a KGB agent. Golitsyn previously had given information that led in the direction of Vassall, but Nosenko now was pinpointing him. This, in effect, was a bona fide for Nosenko.7

  Nosenko then said to George, "Oh by the way, I am here also to manage the running of Boris Belitsky against you, the guy that your people believe to be running as your agent. He actually is a double agent tinder KGB control." Boris was a prominent correspondent for Radio Moscow. He had attended the World's Fair in Brussels in the summer of 1958, where he was recruited by George Goldberg, who began to run him as an agent for the CIA. Goldberg met with him a number of times covertly in various European cities over the next three years. Considering that this could become a very important contact, Goldberg requested assistance in the form of a backup to himself. Harry Young then was assigned the task of serving as an additional case officer for the operation.

  Following the fair at Brussels, Agency personnel did not overtly meet with Belitsky until he appeared to them in London during April of 1961. In London, he was serving as the interpreter for the cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin. Goldberg and Paul Belkin, a CIA polygraph operator, met with him in order to administer a polygraph examination, hoping to obtain an objective assessment of Belitsky's authenticity. From the results of the test, both Belkin and Goldberg were convinced that Belitsky was clean. Coincidentally, George also had been in London at this time for his initial meeting with Penkovsky. He was aware of Goldberg and Belkin's activity there with Belitsky, but he was not in any way involved
with the Belitsky operation.

  Now, in Geneva, Belitsky was again coming out, and, concurrently, Nosenko was telling the CIA the truth about Belitsky for the first time. Nosenko even used the names of the CIA case officers, Goldberg and Young. This revelation stunned George because Belitsky had passed the CIA lie-detector test in the London safehouse with flying colors. The polygraph operator, Belkin, had said that Belitsky was okay, that he was solidly pro-American-so much so that "he could sing the Star Spangled Banner through his a-hole." s Young, Goldberg, and George - as well as others at the CIA - thought that they had a good agent, but as it turns out the KGB was duping the CIA. Goldberg and Young were there in Geneva pressing Belitsky for information while he was reporting back to his manager, Nosenko, just what they were about. Nosenko was in turn reporting to George what Belitsky had said. There is a Russian expression for such a circumstance-a kto kovo, meaning, roughly, who's waltzing with whom ? 9

  Upon reporting this revelation to headquarters, George was advised, "Don't tell Goldberg; don't tell Young. We don't want Belitsky to know that we are on to him, and they'll never be able to keep a straight face when talking to him if they know that he is `dirty."' For the rest of the Geneva trip, George avoided seeing Goldberg and Young. The unwitting Agency secretary advised Goldberg that George was in town and told George that his friends Goldberg and Young were in town. George just disappeared, however, and they never understood why until told later.lo

  The revelation about Belitsky provided more bona fides for Nosenko. When queried about "Sasha," however, Nosenko drew a blank. He did not profess any knowledge of a mole planted in the CIA.

  Of critical personal importance to George, Nosenko said that the Popov case had been blown by routine surveillance of embassy personnel in Moscow. As he put it, "An American diplomat had been `tracked' in the process of mailing the fateful letter to Popov. The diplomat had ventured down a small and remote street for posting the letter. At a long distance away, but within view of him, a member of the surveillance team, a woman, saw him raise his hand to deposit the letter in a mailbox. The mailbox was emptied, and the letter, bearing an invisible powder that was sensitive to certain electronic devices, was identified and presented. Retrieval of the note and decoding of its message then led ultimately to the arrest of Popov."