World War Three 1946 Series Boxed Set: Stalin Strikes First

by Harry Kellogg

  “We are training our crews how to react to a surprise attack from the rear. It will always come from the rear and above or below, so we are concentrating on how to best defeat that tactic. They will always come in from above, as they see height being an advantage.”

  ***

  The following is rather dull and official but it illustrates what was going on back in America. This illustrates how the congress and public were reacting to the war and the military’s response or more importantly seemingly non-response. It’s very similar to what happened after Pearl Harbor when everyone was looking for a scapegoat.

  ***

  Senate Smart Inquiry

  The Hearing

  PROCEEDINGS OF THE SMART INQUIRY

  SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 11TH, 1946

  NINETEENTH DAY

  WASHINGTON, D.C.

  The examination met at 9 a.m.

  Present:

  General Thomas C. Smart, U. S. Army, Retired, examining officer and his counsel and assistant counsel.

  Major Charles O. Manner. U. S. Army Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

  The examining officer has decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings for the eighteenth day of the examination, until such time as it shall be reported ready and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

  No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

  A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination, as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Col. W. W. Smith,

  Record Page 32.

  The witness was duly sworn in.

  Examined by the examining officer:

  1. Q. Please state for the record your name, rank, and present station.

  A. Charles O. Manner, Major, U. S. Army Reserve, currently unassigned, sir.

  2. Q. What duties were you performing during early 1946?

  A. Performing the duties of Aviation Aide to the Commanding General, Fourteenth U.S. Army, American Zone of Occupation, Germany.

  3. Q. That was General Poch's command, correct, major?

  A. Yes sir.

  4. Q. Did the Commander-in-Chief, Occupation Forces, Germany, at that time feel that the units of his command were ready to carry out their assigned tasks and functions?

  A. He undoubtedly recognized many of the weaknesses and strenuous efforts were being made to improve both the efficiency of personnel and the quality and care of the materiel received. Perhaps no combat commander is ever completely satisfied of his command's readiness to fight but he certainly felt that a fairly high standard of efficiency was being developed. There were large numbers of green officers and enlisted men and the complements of most, if not all, units were lower than was to be desired. The antiaircraft batteries were in general far weaker than we desired and they were being improved as rapidly as material could be made available. There was much concern over marked lack of radar sets and the personnel with the requisite skills necessary for their use. There were also weaknesses in certain aircraft and some difficulties were experienced with patrol planes' engines I believe. The lack of skilled crews in the patrol planes, and the lack of suitably-trained replacement aircrew was quite acutely felt. Transports and artillery were lacking, and there were disturbing deficiencies in armor and in other essential strategic materials. Notwithstanding matters of this sort it was felt that the handicaps were not too great to cope with in such situations as were envisaged as arising if war occurred.

  13. Q. Did you at that time sir, concur in the views of the Commander-in-Chief as you have expressed them?

  A. Yes sir; and it may be that in answering the preceding questions that I have erred somewhat toward giving my own views, rather than those of General Poch, although they were probably substantially in accord. He was inclined to be somewhat more pessimistic in that regard than myself.

  14. Q. Did you at the time feel that everything was being done either locally or by making recommendations to higher authority to correct the deficiencies and weaknesses that you referred to?

  A. We certainly felt that there was much to be done and all hands were working very hard to overcome deficiencies. I believe that in general suitable representations had been made to higher authority, and that the Commander-in-Chief and his subordinates were taking all corrective measures that they felt was within their own purview to accomplish. It is doubtful if any were entirely satisfied with the rapidity of progress.

  15. Q. Major, going back to the basic 'Pincher' war plan, what was your opinion at the time as to how that plan contemplated that war with the Soviet Union would start?

  A. The plan itself may not, and probably did not, directly give such an indication, but it certainly must have contemplated that such a war would probably not have been preceded by a formal declaration but rather that it would arise from such hostile attack on the part of the Soviets.

  16. Q. In estimating the situation with respect to the Western Occupation Zones of Germany was a surprise air attack on what are now the NATO forces considered as a course of action available to the Soviets to initiate such a war?

  A. Probably not. At least I, as War Plans Officer did not hold such a view with respect to Western Germany although I did consider such an act possible in Iran or even directed against Korea. It may have been that such a possibility was discussed with the Commander-in-Chief or with other members of the staff. It is probable that some such discussions may have taken place although I have no specific recollection of one.

  17. Q. Do you recall during this planning period any consideration that was given to the efficiency of the Soviet ground and air forces?

  A. Yes sir. While specific data was lacking I and I believe others within the staff felt that there was a rather high degree of proficiency in Soviet air organization on a tactical level.

  18. Q. Do you recall any discussion as to the ability of the Soviet air forces to conduct such an attack as they did on the 2nd of May?

  A. I think perhaps some such discussions, informal discussions, did take place. I do remember giving consideration to the potential danger of ground-attacks to the major airfields particularly after the Soviets' attack in Manchuria in 1945; even though some thought and consideration was given to the possibility of an attack I, personally, never considered it as more than a remote possibility.

  19. Q. Major, are you able to state the views that the Commander-in-Chief American Occupation Zone of Germany, held at that time in this respect?

  A. I feel that if he had entertained the idea that there was serious danger of that nature I would have heard of it in very emphatic terms. I am certain that he was not anticipating any such attack.

  20. Q. General in your thinking and planning at that time, that is the six months leading up to the attack, do you recall what consideration was given to the characteristics of the Soviet Army's leadership particularly Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky?

  A. The leadership in the Soviet Army was discussed from time to time between General Smart, myself, his Chief of Staff, his Operations Officer, his Intelligence Officer, and perhaps others. As I recall now the general impression that was obtained was that in case of war we would have to contend with rather capable and aggressive leadership on the part of the enemy.

  21. Q. Were you at that time familiar with the character of Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky?

  A. Not especially so, but I did consider him capable and bold.

  22. Q. Do you recall discussing him with Captain Roche, while you were serving together on the Staff of the Commander, Scouting Force?

  A. While I have no specific recollection of such discussions, I feel that it is almost certain that a number of such discussions did take place; not only when Roche and I were serving together in the Scouting Force, but also after I came to General Smart’s staff and Roche was serving with the Intelligence component in the Fourteenth U.S. Army.

  23. Q. General during
this planning period leading up to the attack do you recall occasions on which the Commander-in-Chief communicated with army aviators with respect to the ability of Soviet air forces and the possibility of such attacks as occurred on May 2nd?

  A. No, although it is quite possible that I was present at some such discussion with Generals Hall and Bellinger, or perhaps other aviation personnel including Captain Davis, the staff Aviation Liaison Officer. But no, I have no recollection of any discussion with any of them with the particular idea in view that we should have to contend with such an attack.

  24. Q. Did you have knowledge of any aviator whatever who really foresaw the attack of May 2nd, and so expressed himself before that time?

  A. No sir.

  25. Q. General, in the preparation of the Commander-in-Chief's Contributory 'Pincher' War Plan was it ever contemplated at the time that it might be placed in effect either in its entirety, or in part, by order of the Commander-in-Chief prior to the start of actual war?

  A. I believe it was not contemplated that the plan would be placed into effect either in whole or in part by the Commander-in-Chief without reference to higher authority, because of the rapidity of communications. Conversely, I do not believe that that plan circumscribed the Commander-in-Chief's authority in any way to take any suitable action to meet whatever circumstances that might arise.

  26. Q. At that time then, what methods did you contemplate using for alerting army units should the international situation so require and before actual start of war?

  A. By preparatory, or warning message.

  27. Q. General as I understand from your previous testimony, it was your estimate as well as the estimate of practically all of General Smart's staff, that a surprise attack on western Germany was a remote possibility. Will you state the basis for that conclusion?

  A. For us to conduct an attack on the Soviet Union would have involved massive troop movements that could be easily detected. We felt that the Soviets would find the same considerations would deter them from making such an effort against us. It also seemed highly probable that more attractive targets could be found, where their units could be more profitably employed. We felt that even should such an attack be launched our defenses in depth would be sufficient to make the damage inflicted on us small as opposed to the attacking forces, which would have suffered disproportionately heavy casualties by comparison.

  28 Q. Do you recall that your thinking along those lines gave due value to the power of initiative if employed by the enemy in a surprise attack?

  A. I don't think so now; I did think so then. We did anticipate that heavy armored concentrations would be encountered in this area and had considered it quite possible, if not probable, that a mass air attack about the time that considerable forces were on training exercises might be the commencement of the war.

  29. Q. General, under the Joint Action, what service was primarily responsible for the defense of western Germany?

  A. The Army.

  30. Q. Were you in the months preceding the attack on Western Germany familiar with the Army's ability to fulfill its commitments as prescribed by that document?

  A. In a general way, yes. I had made a tour of the front lines with the Commanding General, and some members of his staff in order to see the defenses and as a part of that tour attended a short presentation in Frankfurt with particular emphasis on antiaircraft defenses. With my limited knowledge of the Army's requirements and methodologies of defense I personally felt they were good and adequate. With this in mind I knew as did the Army authorities felt that certain improvements should be made, particularly in respect to antiaircraft artillery.

  31. Q. Were you familiar with General Smart’s opinions with respect to the ability of the Army to defend western Germany?

  A. I believe that he felt that there were some deficiencies particularly in the area of troop quality and training. Not to mention the lack of heavy artillery and antitank guns.

  33. Q. General were you familiar with this letter, 2CL-41 (Revised), which is Exhibit 4, before this examination?

  A. Yes, I remember this letter. Although it was prepared by the Operations Section of the General Staff I had opportunity to review it and recall having initiated some minor changes in the earlier drafts; although at this time I have no particular recollection of what those changes were.

  34. Q. Were there so far as you can recall, any other directives of a general nature affecting the security or providing for the security, of units in western Germany in effect in the months preceding the attack?

  A. I do not now recall whether or not there were. In general such directives if there were any, were prepared by the Operations Section and I would have seen them and had opportunity to comment before their issuance.

  35. Q. Do you recall whether, at the time that is in the months preceding the attack, you considered this letter, Exhibit 4, to adequately provide for the security of Army had the instructions therein been fully complied with?

  A. I recall that we were not entirely satisfied with the arrangements for coordinating air warnings and air operations from the different services along with antiaircraft and other associated tasks and that some discussions and conferences to better perfect arrangements were in progress under the general guidance of Captain DeLany, the Operations Officer. On the whole, I must have thought that the security arrangements set forth in this letter were satisfactory; or else I would have initiated action to effect a change.

  “What's this hearing about, Joe?”

  “They're trying to find a scapegoat for losing Germany.”

  “Damn! Who are they zeroing-in on?”

  “General Smart.”

  “I wouldn't want to be in his shoes.”

  “Amen, brother.”

  ***

  Hopefully after reading that, you will appreciate my more unorthodox way of communicating this history. As I promised; a more scholarly, dull and fact based version will follow in the years to come.

  ***

  ***

  Next we have the RAF in a tizzy about how to fight, what appears to be, the Second Battle of Britain.

  ***

  Bloody Hell

  “What's wrong sir?”

  “We’ve got another war on our hands, a war of tactics.”

  “How so sir?”

  “Please indulge me Major. I'm just thinking out loud. Not only are two powerful factions fighting to decide how the fighters are to be deployed, but we also have more ideas over how the airfields should be defended. One side believes that the antiaircraft gun and the VT fuse, will solve all of our problems and that the combat air patrols over all the airfields will no longer be necessary. Basically this faction posits that the airfields can defend themselves. I've seen the studies, and the VT fuse is wonderful. The statistics do not lie. The Americans have used it quite effectively in the battles against the Japanese kamikaze even though the kamikazes did still get through at times.”

  “Once you get that question out of the way, we still have to decide whether to use the fighters in a 'Big Wing,' as Bader and Leigh-Mallory have proposed, or in smaller, squadron-sized units such as Dowding and Park have proposed. Being outnumbered four-to-one is going to make it a very hard decision I'm afraid I'm leaning towards the 'Big Wing' strategy. We just cannot afford to be wrong in this.”

  “Forgive me for being presumptuous sir, but may I play the devil’s advocate? Couldn't we experiment? In the original Battle of Britain, No.11 Group used the Fighter Tactics and No.12 Group used the 'Big Wing,' as they had more time to prepare. Both seem to have worked in their various areas given the situations that the commanders were presented. Another consideration is that of course, our radar is much better now, so we will have much more time to prepare.”

  “Yes I suppose that given the increased amount of time our new radar installations will give us we will have ample time to detect any formations. Keeping that in mind, the 'Big Wing' will most likely be the best solution for our current problem. The e
xtra time provided by the more powerful radar will allow us to form the 'Big Wing' much quicker and therefore, intercept the Soviet aircraft that much sooner. We will also be able to concentrate our forces to attack the enemy where he is the weakest.”

  “Yet another problem to consider is how can we best base our fighters? Do we disperse them, or concentrate them, guarding them with heavy antiaircraft defenses? If we disperse them, there is less chance that they will get caught taking-off or landing, but it will be more difficult to concentrate them into large formations. If we concentrate them in the few large airfields then we are going to have to rely on our antiaircraft defenses to protect them. Additionally, there is the fact that, if we concentrate them they will be able to form 'Big Wings' faster to reach the enemy earlier and in the force required to mount an effective defense.”