Crossing the Buffalo

by Adrian Greaves

Pearson placed himself on the knoll, now accompanied by the artillery and the Buffs, and gave orders for both the Queen’s and regimental colours to be unfurled. The Zulus to the right of his position were difficult to see as they advanced through the long grass. To make things worse, other groups of Zulus began to appear and also put down heavy long-range fire into the gathering British defenders. One casualty was Colonel Pearson’s favourite horse, which was badly wounded, necessitating its destruction. Pearson’s casualties were mounting and, in response, several officers directed a series of carefully aimed volleys into the Zulu sharpshooters who were causing the most damage.

  The Zulu centre and right horn then advanced into the attack but Pearson had prejudged their intention and already manoeuvred his force to counter them. Earlier that morning Midshipman Coker and his Gatling gun team had been with the assembled wagons servicing the weapon. On hearing the firing they had hurriedly completed their work and ran with the Gatling to a prominent knoll. From here they put down a devastating rate of fire among the Zulus. The warriors began to panic and retreated once more, suffering further heavy casualties as they withdrew. On seeing the Zulus’ disarray, Pearson audaciously gave the order to advance. There was a race between the Buffs and sailors to close with the Zulus but their combined advance slowed towards the top of the rise as the assembling Zulus made a determined stand. Led by Commander Campbell, the sailors made a wild cutlass charge and the Zulus finally broke and fled in disarray. Groups of Zulus were seen to take refuge in the undergrowth but well-placed artillery shells rapidly forced them into the open and onto the spears of the pursuing NNC.

  The battle lasted less than ninety minutes and another potential disaster for the British became a remarkable victory. Pearson’s men had behaved admirably under fire but he was undoubtedly lucky. If the Zulu attack had been co-ordinated against the strung-out column, especially while it was crossing the river, the outcome for Pearson’s whole column could have been disastrous. By the end of the battle the British had lost twelve men killed and some twenty wounded, two of whom later died of their wounds. The Zulus suffered in excess of 500 killed and many hundreds wounded. Indeed, the condition of the wounded shocked many soldiers. One wrote:

  It was pitiful to see the fellows lying with fearful wounds. They were very quiet, and seemed to bear pain well, no groaning or crying out … one of them had crawled at least a quarter of a mile with a broken leg. One poor fellow was in an ant bear hole about 70 yards from the vedettes in front of them, and they did not see him for a long time until he called out – asking them to find him.7

  The battle was, in the words of Colour Sergeant Burnett of the 99th, ‘terribly earnest work, and not at all child’s play’.8 During the aftermath of the battle the British assisted the Zulu wounded but such humanitarianism ceased when the slaughter and mutilations of Isandlwana became known to the troops. In later actions of the Zulu War few wounded were spared – by either side. During questioning of the wounded Zulus Pearson learned that the Zulu plan to attack the column had been pre-empted due to the early attack by the NNC; he was also left in little doubt that an even greater Zulu force was gathering to oppose him.

  The column’s dead were carefully buried in a single grave. The column’s padre, the Reverend Mr Robertson, formerly of Eshowe, led the burial service and, without further delay, the march was resumed towards Eshowe. Pearson did not want the Zulus to believe that they had slowed his advance and he also needed to be clear of the very rough bush country along the Nyezane river to lessen the possibility of a further Zulu ambush. The Zulu dead were left to the circling vultures and scavenging wild animals. The day had been unbearably hot and after a further arduous march onto high ground Pearson called an early halt for the night.

  At 3 a.m. on the following morning the column resumed the march; only 2 miles remained and the column reached Eshowe without further incident at 10 a.m. on 24 January. The Reverend Mr Robertson’s first point of call was to his wife’s grave in the mission cemetery.

  The defence and relief of Eshowe

  The abandoned mission station occupied conveniently high ground and the first troops to arrive discovered that it was in good condition. The station consisted of a corrugated iron-roofed steepled church, three other mudbuilt structures and a nearby garden filled with orange trees. It covered an area of just 120 yards by 80 yards, sloping west to east, and there was a good supply of water from two nearby streams. In addition there were three more buildings standing a short distance away. The senior Royal Engineer present, Captain Warren Wynne, had reservations that some marginally higher ground within sniping range overlooked the mission. Furthermore, a deep ravine filled with impenetrable undergrowth and home to a colony of puff adders came right up to the perimeter and could conceal a Zulu assault.

  Pearson’s view of Eshowe was summed up in his first report to Chelmsford. He wrote, ‘It is the ugliest bit of ground for a camp or a defensible post I have seen. However the buildings, which have all been left – are good for stores that it would be a pity to abandon it for another site.’9

  As soon as camp was made, work started on making the area defensible. Pearson ordered an earthwork to be built around the mission site and trenches to be dug. The fruit trees were cut down and the offending undergrowth was soon cleared to give unrestricted fields of fire. The already weary men then toiled on through the stifling heat of the afternoon until all stores were unloaded and placed in the outlying buildings. The next day, 25 January, forty-eight of the empty wagons were escorted back to Fort Pearson to collect more stores. They passed another convoy en route to Eshowe and the first rumours began to spread that all was not well with the Centre Column. Some even reported hearing a rumour that Colonel Durnford and his NNC had been annihilated.

  Like Isandlwana, Eshowe was intended to be little more than a staging post on the line of advance and Pearson did not expect to remain there long. Nevertheless, the following day his Zulu-speaking Colonial mounted pickets heard Zulus in the surrounding countryside calling to one another across the hilltops that they had won a great victory. The next day a runner from Fort Pearson brought the first of a series of confusing messages, which confirmed that the Centre Column had been defeated. Pearson and his column were shocked by the incoming news; it seemed inconceivable that the Zulus, primarily armed with spears, could overcome an army equipped with sophisticated modern weapons. Furthermore, Pearson’s force all knew that they were a long way from the safety of the Natal border; they were also surrounded and vulnerable and possessed limited supplies.

  Without volunteering any opinion or advice, Chelmsford formally withdrew his earlier orders to Pearson and replaced them with the option of remaining at Eshowe or retreating back to Fort Tenedos. Pearson took the unusual step of calling his officers together to decide whether to retreat or stay. Having finally fortified Eshowe, he was reluctant to withdraw. If the Zulu army was heading for Eshowe, any slow-moving column returning to Fort Pearson would seriously risk being overwhelmed. The officers were divided; some felt that they should try to reach Natal where they could assist in its defence against the anticipated Zulu counter-invasion, while others sought to stay in order to force the local Zulus to maintain a siege rather than allowing them to intimidate. Captain Wynne of the Royal Engineers put forward a robust case for remaining at Eshowe. He argued that a retreating column would be highly vulnerable to attack and that a strong garrison at Eshowe would require a large force of Zulus to contain it. Additionally, they would be ready to continue the advance to Ulundi once the second invasion began. Pearson and those officers present agreed with Wynne and so the die was cast. Boosted by the arrival of the incoming convoy bringing fresh supplies, all hands worked with a will to strengthen the defences.

  Pearson recognized that the mounted men and the NNC were unnecessary in such a defensive position and feeding them would be difficult if supplies were interrupted. He accordingly ordered Major Barrow to take his force, with the NNC, back to Fort Tenedos; this reduced the st
rength of the Eshowe garrison to 1,460 combatants and about 335 civilians. He forwarded a full report of his proposed activities to Chelmsford and in return requested a full tactical appraisal of events along the border. As the fort was still cramped for space, some 1,000 oxen were also sent back to Natal, along with their drivers; many oxen strayed along the way and were immediately lost to the shadowing Zulus. The remaining cattle were laagered alongside the entrenchment until it dawned upon the defenders that this made a noisome health hazard.

  King Cetshwayo was understandably indignant that Pearson’s column had settled at Eshowe, and responded by ordering the local Zulu regiments to encircle the British position and prevent their withdrawal. Within days the Zulus had completely surrounded the British position and settled down to watch the proceedings and listen to the bands playing. Their siege was to last seventy-two days.

  By the second week of February Wynne had loopholed all the buildings and ordered a deep ditch to be dug around the perimeter with the earth piled inside to form a defensive rampart. During the coming weeks he added traverses to stop the possibility of Zulu rifle fire raking the interior lines, while ‘trous-de-loup’, known by the soldiers as ‘wolf-pits’, were dug in the ground with pointed stakes placed in the bottom; these were built across the three approaches to the fort. Wire entanglements were stretched from stakes hidden in the long grass so that any Zulu attack would be slowed once it entered within range of the garrison’s weapons. Firing platforms for the cannon and Gatling gun were constructed at the angles of the ramparts while drawbridges were built at the two gates. All in all, the fort at Eshowe became an impressive-looking fortress and was the most sophisticated of the ninety-nine British earthwork forts built during the entire war.

  After working in the oppressive heat of the day the men then had to sleep wherever they could, usually in the open, as there was no room to erect their tents within the encampment. The lucky ones slept under the wagons. Due to the presence of the Zulus around the fort, disturbing false alarms were a nightly feature; and large bodies of Zulus were regularly seen, although none actually approached the fort. On one occasion, troops opened fire on figures seen moving near the lines, only to discover at dawn that they had riddled their own laundry hung out to dry. However, the Zulus were not completely inactive during this time; some evenings they ventured close to the camp in order to move the range marker posts under cover of darkness, and they also removed posts marking a new roadway under construction from the fort. Wynne and his sappers resolved this particular irritation by mining the posts with explosives. Pickets and vedettes were regularly detailed to keep the Zulus away from the immediate area around the fort; these were dangerous assignments as the Zulus would regularly fire on such patrols. Private Kent of the 99th, attached to the Mounted Infantry, was killed when Zulus hiding in long grass attacked a patrol and a Corporal Carson was also shot at; he returned wounded to the fort but lived to tell the tale.

  The stifling hot weather eventually broke and heavy tropical rain added to the soldiers’ miseries. Everyone was constantly drenched and with no available shelter, sickness quickly spread among the men. The garrison had sufficient food and plenty of ammunition but it lacked adequate medical supplies and on 1 February the first man died of fever. The heavy rains turned the area within the entrenchment into a quagmire of effluent-polluted mud that added to the garrison’s growing discomfort. It was too late for a withdrawal back to the Lower Drift; instead, nearly 1,800 men were now effectively under siege with no immediate prospect of receiving supplies or reinforcements. In response, Pearson ordered the commissariat to put the garrison on three-quarter rations.

  Aware of the danger of disease spreading through the overcrowded garrison, Pearson took steps to prevent the camp’s fresh water supply from becoming polluted and orders were given to site and rotate the latrine area downhill away from the camp. Despite these precautions, the overwhelming stench of the camp and the nearby cattle laager became increasingly offensive, attracting huge clouds of flies that infested the garrison’s food supplies. The men’s general health continued to deteriorate to the extent that, by the end of February, the majority of soldiers were suffering from serious stomach disorders and seven men had died, including one who committed suicide by drowning. The casualties were all buried on a grassy slope nearby. Surgeon Norbury of HMS Active complained that the health of the garrison was at risk from the men’s habit, against orders, of filling their water bottles from a stream that drained through the cemetery – but despite his complaints the practice continued. As well as coping with disease, few in the garrison escaped the infectious ‘Natal sores’. With few efficacious medicines, treatment was limited to bandages and an unidentified powder. Captain Pelley Clark described the suffering:

  There were few in the fort that did not appear with a piece of rag round one of their fingers, or their noses enveloped in cotton wool, with some white powder on it, giving them a most unearthly appearance.10

  The garrison was completely isolated and totally unaware of events in the outside world; not knowing whether the war was being won or lost, the men were prey to every type of rumour and imagining. In the hope of maintaining morale, Pearson had the regimental bands of the 3rd and 99th perform regularly and this did much to lift the men’s spirits. Although the hills near Eshowe had a direct line of sight across the 25 miles to the Tugela river and Fort Pearson, Chelmsford had not thought that heliographs would be of use in South Africa. As a result, the only reliable means of communication between Eshowe and the outside world was unavailable. A system of sending messages using black volunteer runners was tried but most were caught and killed by the Zulus. As the siege progressed Wynne made various attempts to build a semaphore, most of which were frustrated by the weather. These included a large paper screen, which was blown down by a sudden storm. He then constructed a hotair balloon, also made of paper, which the wind blew in the wrong direction. Various attempts were made to improvise a signalling system from items found around the mission site and after six weeks of siege, Wynne succeeded in making a heliograph, using a carefully positioned piece of lead piping taken from the church roof and an officer’s shaving mirror.

  As the weeks went by, healthy food became scarce. Captain Wynne wrote to his wife about the rations:

  We chew the generally very tough, much stewed ox, with, as a rule, about a tablespoon of preserved carrots, sometimes some large haricot beans. These, and biscuit, is our daily food at breakfast, lunch and dinner: in fact every meal the same, except that we have coffee at breakfast and tea at dinner. I really do not mind it, but most fellows get very tired of it, and complain of insufficiency.11

  To supplement the men’s reduced rations Pearson encouraged foraging patrols to plunder local deserted Zulu homesteads in the hope of finding additional food. Although the garrison’s meagre rations held out until Eshowe was relieved, plundered vegetables and fruit from such homesteads were enthusiastically collected and there was even greater excitement when a wagonload of consumables was discovered, having been left behind by the Volunteers. Pearson decided that these goods should be auctioned; all went for high prices, especially several jars of pickles.

  Meanwhile Chelmsford and his staff were busy with preparations for the second invasion of Zululand. However, before these could be finalized, the relief of Eshowe was essential. The political embarrassment of having such a large military force besieged by the Zulus was a constant burden and Chelmsford’s plan depended on having Pearson’s wagons and men for the new force. By focusing British attention on extricating Pearson’s column, Chelmsford successfully ameliorated the ongoing storm that had broken over him following the disaster at Isandlwana, and the relief column’s ultimate success undoubtedly helped to restore his reputation and personal confidence.

  At the beginning of February the first flashed messages from the border were received at Eshowe but relief was not imminent. It was generally acknowledged by all at Eshowe that until Chelmsford received additional t
roops from Britain, he was powerless to offer any hope to the beleaguered garrison. Pending the arrival of these reinforcements at Durban and the long march to Eshowe, the garrison had to fend for itself. When news eventually came that a relief column was being assembled spirits rose at Eshowe, only to be dashed again by the realization that the late summer rainstorms would seriously hinder any relief column. Pearson also learned that the Zulus were gathering along Chelmsford’s route to Eshowe but he was powerless to intervene. To maintain morale, Pearson detailed several mounted forays against nearby homesteads; one such homestead belonged to Prince Dabulamanzi but this action merely provoked the Zulus into harassing Pearson’s patrols with greater determination.

  During early March Chelmsford built up a strong enough force to attempt Pearson’s relief. He had 400 men from HMS Shah, and 200 from HMS Boadicea with two Gatling guns. Beside the Buffs and 99th left at the Lower Drift by Pearson, the infantry comprised the newly arrived 57th, 91st Highlanders and 60th Rifles. The NNC and Major Barrow’s mounted troops made up the balance of the relieving column. The total strength was 3,390 whites and 2,280 blacks, well exceeding the number flashed to Pearson. It was Chelmsford’s intention that the column would be commanded by Major General Henry Crealock, but as Crealock did not reach Natal in time, Chelmsford took personal command on 23 March.

  The battle of Gingindlovu

  Chelmsford wrote to Wood who was holding the northern part of Zululand and asked him to undertake a major offensive action that would be sufficient to divert Zulu forces away from his attempt to relieve Eshowe in the south. The resulting action was doomed to failure as, unbeknown to the British, the main Zulu force was already approaching Wood’s position.