When he returned to England Wolseley fared no better; both the people and the government were by now unconvinced by his treatment of the Zulu people. The Broad Arrow publicly noted his quiet return and wondered whether to praise or condemn him. The usual public trimmings of glory were conspicuously absent although he received the CB, a title he had rejected four years earlier. It is most likely that this very public rebuff was due to the influence of those in high places who continued actively to protect Lord Chelmsford.
CHAPTER 17
Aftermath of the Zulu War
Zululand, having been conquered by us, according to Zulu law,
really belongs to Her Majesty the Queen.1
SIR GARNET WOLSELEY
The raison d’être for the British invasion of Zululand was to overthrow barbarism and King Cetshwayo in order to protect the European population of Natal against the threat of an imminent Zulu invasion. In reality, this was not as singular or to the point as it seemed. Beneath the veneer of this apparently laudable crusade lay more practical and commercial causes, including the subjugation of the Zulu people in order to facilitate the British policy of Confederation in South Africa – itself a smokescreen to allow European commercial interests, in both Natal and the diamond fields, who needed access to the Zulu workforce. Almost as important, Frere considered the defeat of the Zulu army vital to protect the growing number of Boers settling in Zululand while at the same time it would confirm Britain’s military invincibility to any potential adversary. It would also ensure the vainglorious Frere and Chelmsford honourable places in history.
It still remains difficult to identify any legitimate reason for Britain going to war with the Zulus. It is therefore not surprising that by March 1881, nearly two years after the war, the defeated Zulu king struggled to find any justification for the war and while held prisoner at the Cape he dictated a letter to the Governor, Sir Hercules Robinson, in an attempt to understand recent events. In his inimitable way King Cetshwayo poignantly wrote, ‘Mpande did you no wrong, I have done you no wrong, therefore you must have some other object in view in invading my land’.2 That ‘other object’ continues to elude the majority of historians who study the Zulu War and who still rely heavily or exclusively on the Zulu refusal to comply with the British ultimatum of December 1878 as the justification for war. Many historians’ sources are based on contemporary accounts that were highly subjective purely because it was inevitable that they were written by surviving senior British officers with important reputations to preserve; and with regard to the unexpected defeats, sufficient scapegoats abounded, some obligingly now dead from loyally following their commanders’ orders. Apart from private letters and reports from those involved, official military accounts of the day tended to rely on the official Narrative of Field Operation, but that narrative refrained from any allusion to controversy. Perhaps the most honest explanation can be credited to Laband and Thompson in their Field Guide to the War in Zululand in which they state that ‘there is still no general agreement on the causes of the Anglo Zulu War’, although the sustained Boer migration into Zululand was clearly the precipitate cause of the war.
In retrospect, Frere’s reasons for the Zulu War were widely accepted by the white population of Natal. Initially the overriding and terrifying assumption that a bloodthirsty Zulu invasion of Natal was imminent can today be seen as little more than an official excuse for war. Understandably, Natal’s European settlers took their pre-war cue from the British who directly influenced the Natal newspapers to regard the war as inevitable, yet there is evidence that few actually considered it desirable. However, once the war began, support for the official Frere line strengthened immeasurably. Frere’s propaganda had been successful; the white population believed they had been spared an appalling fate at the hands of invading Zulu impis; more importantly, much money was to be made from supplying Chelmsford’s army.
Nevertheless, there were many who resolutely believed that the war had been an unnecessary evil. The Bishop of Natal, John William Colenso, known to the Zulus as ‘Sobantu’ – ‘Father of the People’ – preached that the Zulu nation under Cetshwayo had presented no real threat to Natal. Nevertheless, the High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, and the Secretary of State for Native Affairs in Natal, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, had deliberately provoked the conflict to further their wider ambitions for South African Confederation. There can be little doubt that Colenso was right in his damning assessment and that Isandlwana and all the other defiant battles were nothing more sinister than brave acts of self-defence by the Zulu king and his army.
Tragedies abound in any war. Perhaps the most obvious in this war was the absence of any intention by the British to pursue their policy of Confederation once the war was won; instead, they withdrew from Zululand. Not satisfied with victory, their victorious invasion force deliberately wasted the land along their lines of withdrawal. They then exiled the Zulu monarch to remove any form of national leadership and departed from Zululand leaving the impoverished Zulus to their fate.
The reason for this lack of purpose was clear; circumstances had changed since the first invasion six months earlier. Disraeli’s government was on the verge of collapse as a direct consequence of the war and with it went Britain’s political enthusiasm for further colonial development or military adventure in southern Africa. Worse still, the setbacks experienced by Britain in the Zulu War sent a clear message to her brooding adversaries, especially to the Boers in the Transvaal and Orange Free State; if the British lion could be seriously mauled by a force of part-time black warriors, they reasoned, a well-prepared European force would undoubtedly fare even better.
Defeating the Zulus was one thing – holding them down was another. Following the battle of Ulundi, Sir Henry Bulwer suggested to Wolseley that Zululand should be divided into four independent chiefdoms, later increased to thirteen, and the whole country placed under the supervision of a British adviser. A number of influential people with vested interests, including traders, missionaries and local officials, were all eager to advise Wolseley on the method of control. During Wolseley’s stay in Zululand while awaiting the capture of King Cetshwayo, an exercise referred to as ‘Catchewayo’ by the troops, he sought advice from anyone who had detailed knowledge of the Zulus and in typical Wolseley style, he pitted one against the other. He wrote:
I worked them all separately as far as possible in obtaining news for me & [I] then compare their statements: I have a horror of being in the hands of any one man especially if that one be not an English officer.3
Whether or not that was a reference to John Dunn is not clear but there can be little doubt that Dunn, traitor to his former friend King Cetshwayo, was looking after his own interests and was slowly but surely managing to have increasing influence upon Wolseley. Dunn had earlier been forced to flee from Zululand following the outbreak of war and had then joined Chelmsford’s Intelligence Department. Wolseley liked Dunn and he accepted that Dunn knew more about the Zulus and Zululand than anyone from whom Wolseley sought advice. Dunn appeared to be the archetypal Englishman: he wore expensive European clothes, spoke as eloquently as any senior officer, and he had the ability to mix socially at the highest level, notwithstanding his proclivity to having numerous Zulu wives and concubines. Needing his counsel but clearly perplexed by Dunn, Wolseley wrote:
He is a power in Zululand and I intend making as much use of him as possible. My idea is to increase his powers by making him paramount Chief over the District of Zululand lying along the Tegula [Thukela] & Buffalo Rivers frontiers of Natal. I shall thus secure the civilizing influence of a white man over the district of Zululand nearest to us, and he and his people will be a buffer between us and the barbarous districts of Zululand beyond. He is at heart more a Zulu than an Englishman, but he has none of the bloodthirsty and conquering instincts of the Zulu people.4
He went on,
I have never met a man who was more of a puzzle to me than Dunn. He has never been in England & most of h
is life has passed in Zululand without any English or civilised society, and yet in his manners he is every way the Gentleman. He is quiet, self-possessed and respectful without any servility whatever, and his voice is soft and pleasant. He is much more of the English Gentleman than any of the self-opinionated & stuck up people who profess to be ‘our leading citizens’ in Natal. He leads a curiously solitary life, but he says he enjoys it thoroughly, being in every way his own King, without any policeman in his dominions to serve him with a writ or lay rough hands on him for taking the law into his own hands. He has as many wives & concubines as he wishes to keep & he has a clan about him who are all ready to obey his slightest nod. He pays periodical visits to Natal & has his books, letters & newspapers sent to him regularly. I wish I dared make [him] King of Zululand, for he [would] make an admirable ruler:however I am giving him the largest District in the country, an arrangement that I believe will be the small end of the wedge [of] civilisation inserted into it.5
John Shepstone, Acting Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal, also strongly influenced Wolseley notwithstanding that Wolseley privately despised Shepstone. Due to Shepstone’s extensive knowledge of all the senior Zulus, he prepared a list of Zulu chiefs whom he considered fit for appointment as the thirteen new regional chiefs. Theophilus Shepstone, brother of the Acting Secretary, was certainly instrumental in the preparation of his brother’s list: the majority of those selected were prepared to accept the Zulu royal house as nothing more than the total cause of their nation’s downfall. On this subject, Wolseley wrote:
Such breaking up of the cohesion of the country will, I firmly believe, preclude for the future all, or almost all, possibility of any reunion of its inhabitants under one rule.6
Having considered all the advice, Wolseley prepared to enforce a strict settlement on the defeated Zulus. On a very hot 1 September 1879, 200 of the most senior Zulu dignitaries and chiefs were summoned to the newly established British headquarters at Ulundi where Wolseley addressed them concerning the fate of Zululand. Through his interpreter, John Shepstone, the gathered assembly were brusquely informed that their captured king was being sent into exile at the Cape and would never be permitted to return to Zululand. They were then informed that Zululand was to be divided into thirteen independent chiefdoms each ruled by a Zulu chief selected and appointed by the British, each chief to have command under the overall supervision of a British administrator. There was not to be the remotest possibility that any one individual, of royal birth or otherwise, would be able to rise up in the image of King Shaka to reunite the Zulus. As was generally expected, John Dunn was awarded the largest and most influential chieftainship in Zululand, along the border with Natal, in return for his loyal services to the British during the campaign.
It is generally accepted that the British invasion of Zululand quickly and severely disrupted the Zulus’ economic structure and caused massive loss of life. Their military defeat would now ensure the destruction of their political system. Wolseley knew only too well that over several decades, the royal house had inextricably penetrated all aspects of Zulu social life to the extent that King Cetshwayo, through his previously loyal chiefs, exercised total control over the Zulu people. Power in the hands of one king, in the mould of Shaka or Cetshwayo, was now to be impossible.
Without exception, the thirteen new chiefs were men who had either fought for the British or had deserted King Cetshwayo prior to his capture; none could exercise much control over his people. Chiefs were appointed with the deliberate intention of creating political disharmony and rivalry. One of the appointed chiefs was a complete outsider; in recognition of his service to the British by providing mercenaries for the Natal government, a Sotho chief, Faku, was appointed chief of the district near Rorke’s Drift, previously dominated by Chief Sihayo. On appointment, Faku ordered Sihayo to leave his district, together with his son Mehlokazulu. Chief Mnyamana, Cetshwayo’s chief councillor, was likewise offered a remote territory but refused to accept it. Various interpretations are given for this; many Zulus assert it was out of loyalty to the exiled king. His own explanation to the Boundary Commission was that
I honestly considered that I was going to be given a tract of country which, though amply large enough for my extensive following, yet, it did not include one-third of the land where my kraals were situated.7
Mnyamana knew that part of his own northern area, the land of the abaQulusi, was to be allocated to Chief Hamu. This settlement was Hamu’s reward for defecting to Colonel Wood’s Northern Column during the campaign. For these reasons Mnyamana refused to sign the paper as he did not see his way to govern a people who were unlikely to respect him as their chief. The remainder of Mnyamana’s chiefdom was therefore given to Ntshingwayo and in consequence, the second most powerful man in Zululand (after King Cetshwayo) was excluded from the settlement. Ntshingwayo in turn was reluctant to accept the district because it contained so many Buthelezi and Mdlalose people, as well as another chief’s (Sekethwayo’s) personal homestead. Sekethwayo was appointed over a district further to the west.
Only four of these thirteen carefully selected chiefs were present at the meeting where the agreement was signed; among the stipulations was the obligation to respect their new boundaries, to abolish the Zulu military system and ensure the right of the people to seek employment beyond Zululand. This latter requirement was especially destructive to Zulu society as it encouraged a migration of male Zulus to areas of strong British commercial interest, especially farms in Natal and the more distant diamond fields located to the north near present-day Johannesburg. The Zulus were also forbidden to import firearms or become involved in any form of trade that did not have its origin in British-controlled Natal or the Transvaal, a stipulation of immense financial value to Chief Dunn. Capital punishment without trial was forbidden; land could not be sold, traded or purchased without British permission and the chiefs were to keep the peace and apply the law according to the ‘ancient laws and customs’ of their people, so long as these laws did not offend the sensitivities of the British administrator, although, for some weeks, no one could be found to accept this poisoned chalice. In October a Mr Wheelwright was appointed to the civilian position of British Resident in Zululand, a post that attracted an annual salary of £600 plus an expense account of £100. He was tasked with the role of being the ‘eyes and ears’ for the British government and monitoring the thirteen chiefs. He had no voice or power, the position lacked any credibility and this thankless task soon proved impossible – he resigned.
Melmoth Osborn, formerly a senior Natal official and close friend of Theophilus Shepstone and at this time serving in the Transvaal, was persuaded to consider the task; he accepted and was duly appointed as the British Resident Administrator of Zululand. He was soon to discover that the position lacked any real authority other than to offer advice to the new chiefs and to oversee them if it appeared that they were acting beyond the terms of their appointments. Wolseley clarified the situation when he wrote:
I have been careful to make it clear that we intend to exercise no administrative authority over the country, and that we wish to disturb the existing conditions of life and government only where, as in the cases of the military system and the barbarous practices of witchcraft, these conditions were irreconcilable with the safety of British subjects in South Africa, or with the peace and prosperity of the country itself.8
The inevitable result of Wolseley’s deliberately unreasonable settlement was that Zululand was quickly plunged into chaos, the country lacking leadership, control and supplies. Within weeks Zulu fought against Zulu as the new borders of the country and individual chiefdoms indiscriminately cut across both the social and the political groupings that had developed during the previous fifty years.
Wolseley further instructed that King Cetshwayo’s relatives must abandon their homes and move into Chief Dunn’s territory along the border with Natal, an order that was simply ignored as Dunn was considered to be a traitor for support
ing the British against his former friend and ally, the king. Wolseley also instructed the appointed chiefs to collect all royal cattle and firearms and deliver them to the British Resident. Of all Wolseley’s diktats, this most irritated the Zulus; after all, cattle were virtually the currency of the Zulu economy. King Cetshwayo owned most of Zululand’s cattle, which made him the most powerful man in the kingdom; his royal herds were easily recognized by their whiteness, indicating their ownership, and due to their large number they were distributed through many royal households and represented the livelihood and sustenance of many ordinary people who tended the herds. Wolseley’s instructions merely gave those newly appointed chiefs who felt sufficiently confident the legal opportunity to seize the king’s cattle and plunder from those Zulus who had previously been loyal to King Cetshwayo. This disruption quickly developed into a crippling and very destructive civil war and more Zulus died during the immediate period following the Zulu War than in the war itself.
To give his draconian plan the cloak of respectability, Wolseley appointed a second Boundary Commission to demarcate both the new external border of Zululand and the thirteen internal boundaries. The Commission was instructed to ignore his earlier assurances that the Zulus would be left in full possession of their land. The northern limit of the kingdom was to be moved southwards to the Pongola river to exclude the abaQulusi and Emagazini people, together with most of Hamu and Mnyamana’s people. In the north-east the new boundary would follow the Lubombo mountains and the former territory; land that was now excluded from the new Zululand would be given back to the Tongas.
Crossing the Buffalo Page 33
