Wolseley’s determination and confidence increased further once King Cetshwayo was imprisoned at Cape Town. The new Boundary Commission was given instructions to lay down the borders of the chiefdoms following, where possible, natural physical features. As soon as the plans were finalized, Wolseley invited the Commission to inform the chiefs of Zululand that
Having been conquered by us, according to Zulu law, [Zululand] really belongs to Her Majesty the Queen, but as Her Majesty has no wish to increase her dominions in South Africa, as an act of grace to the Zulu people, she has now parcelled out the country into independent chieftainships. It is, therefore, for her officers, on her behalf, to decide the extent of territory that is by her favour to be allotted to each Chief. This was a right freely exercised by Cetywayo, as well as by his predecessors, and it is a right which devolves upon the Great Queen by right of conquest, and that must not be disputed.9
Wolseley deliberately ignored the findings of the earlier 1878 Boundary Commission and additionally reduced the Zulus’ western boundary, to the benefit of the Transvaal.
When the Boundary Commissioners informed Wolseley that some of the appointed chiefs were unsuitable, he typically suppressed their report. In due course a number of settlement errors became obvious, but Wolseley merely commented that the fault lay with the Zulus’ unwillingness to comply with the settlement’s terms. In reality, the new borders of the country and the boundaries of the chiefdoms ensured that established clan groups were now placed under different clan chiefs and long-standing rival groups came under the same appointed chief. Many Zulus found themselves under appointed chiefs whom they considered to be inferior or uninterested in their responsibilities; many of these disaffected Zulus then responded by ignoring or resisting the new chiefs.
When the matter of growing unrest was brought to Wolseley’s attention, he instructed the Boundary Commission to inform the growing number of disaffected Zulus that they were free to move to another chief’s territory; but the Zulu people were not unlike any other people – they were bonded to the districts where they had been born, which their ancestors had won by farming or warring. The Zulu people were only to be moved from their districts as a last resort; they were not prepared to move merely to satisfy white attempts at political or economic manipulation.
Wolseley had very effectively subjugated the Zulu nation and his hurried and hard-headed settlement satisfied the immediate needs of the home government in a moment of crisis but, in less than two years, the overall situation in Zululand was doomed to deteriorate to such an extent that the Colonial Office would have to abandon the arrangement. The growing unrest would become so serious that uncontrollable violence on a wide scale would threaten British interests as well as the very structure of Natal. With the conjunction of these elements, the inevitable spectre of rebellion began to fester throughout the nation; it would soon erupt into a decade of violence and civil war that would more effectively destroy the basis of Zulu royal power than the British invasion had done. British officials claimed that the ordinary people had retained possession of most of their land but by losing their king and their ability to raise an army, they lost the means to defend Zululand. Natal settlers now greedily looked at Zululand for its fertile farmland and abundant labour force, and the old Zulu order had finally collapsed.
After King Cetshwayo’s death, his young son and heir, King Dinuzulu, desperately attempted to salvage the royalist cause. Sporadic violence continued for four more years during which King Dinuzulu secured Boer help to defeat Zibhebhu, but which cost the lives of a number of prominent supporters of the old order. In 1884 the Boers murdered Prince Dabulamanzi who had commanded at Rorke’s Drift. King Dinuzulu was continually harassed by the colonial authorities and was eventually goaded into supporting armed resistance against the British in 1888. He was defeated, and sent into exile on St Helena.
Yet, unbeknown to the main participants, the debacle of the Zulu War had a hidden and lethal sting in the tail; the war had convinced the watching Boer politicians and generals that the British Army was not invincible. Encouraged by widespread discontent against British interests throughout the Transvaal, the Boer community made secret preparations to resist further British influence. Only six months later they commenced military action against the British at Majuba; it was a conflict that brought early disasters to the British and which developed into an even bloodier campaign, the two Boer Wars.
Meanwhile, disease and a six-year famine severely damaged the Zulus’ ability to feed or re-establish themselves. This ongoing crisis was followed in 1897 by the rinderpest epidemic, which virtually destroyed their remaining cattle, and then, just as they began the long process of restocking their herds, the deadly east coast fever obliterated the young animals. Under British domination, the Zulu social structure had virtually collapsed; the young men became migrant labourers and headed from Zululand towards the growing towns and cities. Then, in 1904, the authorities created black reserves and moved the Zulu population into the most unproductive areas. Those who resisted were classified as squatters and were duly evicted to the reserves – leaving the best land to the white settlers.
In 1906 the authorities levied and enforced a prohibitive ‘hut tax’ on the population. Many Zulus living in Natal took up arms to protest at the harsh levels of taxation imposed upon them. One of the few Zulu chiefs to openly support the protestors was Mehlokazulu kaSihayo. Mehlokazulu had served throughout the Zulu War as an officer in the iNgobamakhosi regiment, and in 1906 he joined forces with the rebel leader, Bambatha. But the balance of power had swung even more in favour of the Europeans and the rebel army was crushed at the battle of Mome Gorge where both Bambatha and Mehlokazulu were killed. Zululand’s turmoil resulted in a ferocious civil war, from which it never properly recovered.
TODAY, THE BATTLEFIELDS of Zululand remain largely as they have been since 1879. The Swedish Mission Society reoccupied its property at Rorke’s Drift once the war was over, and demolished the ruins of the old buildings. However, two of the present-day buildings which stand on the site are built on their original foundations and replicate Witt’s house and storeroom. The coastal site of Gingindlovu has long been covered in sugar cane, introduced by European settlers in the early part of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the remains of Pearson’s entrenchments are still visible at Eshowe and the hills around Nyezane are unchanged, while in the northern sector the battlefields of Hlobane, Khambula and Ntombe remain as they were. The clay hut floors of King Cetshwayo’s royal Ulundi settlements have survived, baked to brick when the British razed the complex; the king’s private quarters have been carefully reconstructed. It is a phoenix raised from the ashes and today the site is a fitting memorial to the pride of the old Zulu kingdom.
Recent research into the Zulu War of 1879 has radically altered perceptions of the conflict and broader threads of South African history have begun to develop. To the British at the time, the war seemed to be a triumph of European civilization over African savagery; today the war can be seen within the context of the systematic reduction of independent African groups in South Africa in the face of expanding power of the developing settler economy.
Modern writers’ interpretations of the war have reflected these changes. The shock felt by the British at the Zulu victory at Isandlwana created a particular image of the Zulu people in British folklore. It is only in the last twenty years that scholars have come to understand something of the Zulu perspective of the events of 1879. Today’s histories of the Zulu War present a more even-handed view of the conflict. Many issues remain unresolved and historians remain divided, especially regarding the war on the ground. Isandlwana attracts particular controversy, retaining an aura of mystery mainly because of the magnitude of the battle and because surviving accounts, reports and maps are often conflicting.
The first feature film about the Zulu War, Symbol of Sacrifice, was made in 1918 and recreated many of the events of 1879 in a way designed to arouse a patriotic response from
its audiences. The film was unusual for its time in that its plots included both British and Zulu characters. In 1964 the popular feature film Zulu, based on the events at Rorke’s Drift, was released. In 1979 Zulu Dawn expanded on this view, presenting the battle of Isandlwana as a classic example of British Imperial folly, but the film lacked the power and conviction of its predecessor. It was not until the 1980s that dramas such as Shaka Zulu again portrayed Zulu characters at the centre of their own history.
The Zulu War, although not the starting point, can be seen as the turning point for late Victorian imperialism. In the years that followed, the legacy of the Zulu War permeated the culture of an expanding British empire to such an extent that it has vigorously accompanied both Zulu and British culture into the twenty-first century.10
AFTER THE ZULU WAR, a steady stream of visitors made their way to the battlefields; that stream continues to this day. Most of the early visitors were disturbed to discover that the battlefield of Isandlwana was still littered with debris from the battle – smashed boxes, derelict wagons, rotting clothing and, most distressing, scattered bleached human bones. Following a number of protests from visitors, the Governor General of Natal instructed one Alfred Boast to organize the cleaning of the site. The task took one month and was completed on 9 March 1883. Boast listed no fewer than 298 cairns marking graves, each containing upwards of four bodies. He even removed the skeletons of the artillery horses killed in the ravine during the flight along the Fugitives’ Trail although some cairns have since been found to contain the bodies of both men and horses.11 The bodies of Captain Anstey and Durnford were reburied by their families, Anstey at Woking and Durnford at Pietermaritzburg. Over the years a number of regimental and family memorials were erected at Isandlwana; in March 1914 a memorial to the 24th Regiment was erected by the regiment. It was not until 2001 that a memorial to the Zulus was built at Isandlwana.
It has to be a total triumph of mankind that today, of all the visitors to Zululand it is the British who are the most numerous and popular with the local people. After everything the Zulu people have endured in the name of Christianity, modernization, socialization and progress, the majority of Zulus continue to live in their timeless way, yet hold the British in high regard – one warrior nation respecting another.
Appendices
APPENDIX A
Chelmsford’s Memo
The following notes on engaging the enemy are from a memo published under the direction of Lord Chelmsford. Such a set was found on the body of Colonel Durnford RE following the battle of Isandlwana. The memo is reproduced exactly.
Although the Zulus will often meet their enemy in a fair fight in the open, like all savages they are fond of ambuscades and other ruses.
In going through bush, remember that the natives will often lie down to let you pass, and then rise and fire on you.
In moving through bush advance and rear guards and flanking parties are necessary.
They should look well under the bushes, and notice all footmarks and sounds, such as the cracking of bushes, &c, and note whether the twigs have been lately bent or broken, or the grass trodden down, all indications of men having recently passed. When the bush is too thick for flanking parties, the leading file should turn to the right and enter the bush as far as he can, kneel, and look well under the bushes; the next file, after about five paces, turn to his left, and the next to his right, and so on. The whole body may do this or only the advanced guard, according to circumstances. As the rear of the force in question approaches, the files rise in succession and close by sections, moving along between the halted sentries, and when the foremost of these is reached the process is repeated.
When waylaying or surprising an enemy make no noise until the enemy finds you, rise, and move, not along the path, but just inside the bush.
When moving near an enemy, or reconnoitring, do not return to the camp by the route you left it.
A common ruse with the natives is to hide a large force in the bush and show a few solitary individuals to invite an attack. When the troops enter the bush in pursuit of the latter the hidden men rise and attack them.
In advancing through bush a herd of cattle is seen feeding with only a small guard, which runs as soon as our troops appear. The mounted men push on to capture the former, and when they are well separated from the rest, the natives, who were hidden all the time in the bush, rise and cut them off before the infantry can come to their rescue.
Native advance guards and flanking parties cannot be trusted, the former will cluster together, and the latter will often lie down.
Natives always know when an enemy is in the bush, but they often forget to report it, thinking the white men know as well as themselves.
The Boers found that the Zulus could not stand repeated cavalry charges on the flanks, and that a very effective method of attack was to gallop upon their flanks, dismount, and fire into them; retreating to reload, or when attacked.
When the wagons of a force are parked at night, if the Zulus attack they always try to make the cattle, which are kept within the park, stampede, in order to break a hole in the line of defence.
The same applies to cavalry, who should take every precaution against their horses being stampeded by a sudden attack.
APPENDIX B
Composition of the Opposing Forces
Isandlwana
Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Pulleine commanded the Imperial No. 3 Centre Column at Isandlwana which consisted of 68 officers and 1,800 men made up from his 1/24th (Warwickshire) Regiment, N Battery 5th Brigade Royal Artillery, 5th Field Company Royal Engineers, 5 companies of the 1st Battalion 2/24th (Warwickshire) Regiment, 1 company of the 2nd Battalion 2/24th (Warwickshire) Regiment plus detachments from the 90th Foot, the Army Service Corps, Army Hospital and Army Pay Corps. Colonial troops under his command included detachments of the Mounted Infantry, Natal Volunteer Corps, Natal Carbineers, Newcastle Mounted Rifles and the Buffalo Border Guard, the 3rd Regiment NNC and elements of the Natal Native Pioneer Corps.
The total Zulu fighting force was about 25,000 with another 10,000 supporters. They were commanded by chieftains Ntshingwayo kaMahole Khoza and Mavumengwana kaNdlela Ntuli and included 13 full amabutho (regiments).
Rorke’s Drift: British forces engaged in the defence of the mission station
Rorke’s Drift: Zulu forces engaged in the attack on the mission station
These consisted of elements of the uThulwana, iNdluyengwe, iNdlondlo and uDloko regiments. The overall commander was Prince Dabulamanzi kaMpande, the king’s half-brother.
Nyezane
Major Tucker was in command of 5 companies of the 80th Regiment stationed at nearby Luneburg. At the scene of the defeat, there were 103 non-commissioned men under the command of Captain Moriarty.
British casualties were high and consisted of 1 officer, 1 doctor, 64 soldiers and 15 black levies killed; the 20 missing soldiers were presumed drowned in the river.
The size of the Zulu force can only be estimated; reports state that between 800 and 3,000 warriors took part. Prince Mbilini kaMswati was in command. Zulu casualties were comparatively light and amounted to 25 Zulu bodies found at the river crossing.
Hlobane
British troops were under the command of Colonel Buller and amounted to 675 officers and men representing the Royal Artillery Rocket Battery plus the following Colonial troops: the 2nd Battalion. Wood’s Irregulars, Frontier Light Horse, Border Horse, Transvaal Rangers together with Dutch burgers under Piet Uys and his two sons. British casualties were enormous compared with Zulu losses: a total of 15 officers and 79 men plus some 140 black troops of Wood’s Irregulars were lost. The second force that attacked the lower terrace was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Russell’s force. This force amounted to 640 officers and men including Royal Artillery and Mounted Infantry supported by the following colonial troops: the Natal Native Horse, Kaffrarian Rifles, 1st Battalion Wood’s Irregulars and a 200-strong detachment of Prince Hamu’s disaffe
cted Zulus.
The Zulus consisted of 2,000-plus warriors from the abaQulusi tribe supported by Mbilini’s clan and the uMcijo and iNgobamakhosi regiments. Zulu casualties are unknown but not significant.
Khambula
British troops at Khambula were commanded by Colonel Wood VC and totalled 2,086 officers and men, representing the following units: the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, 1/13th (Somerset) Light Infantry, the 90th Light Infantry and Mounted Infantry. Colonial troops were made up from Baker’s Horse, Border Horse, Frontier Light Horse, Kaffrarian Rifles, Mounted Basutos, Raaf’s Transvaal Rangers and Wood’s Irregulars.
British and Colonial casualties were low and amounted to 3 officers and 26 men killed with 5 officers and 50 men wounded – all but two from Martini-Henry rifles captured from the British at Isandlwana.
The Zulu force consisted of some 20,000 warriors and was commanded by two senior indunas, Ntshingwayo and Mnyamana Buthelezi. The right horn consisted of the iNgobamakhosi; the left horn, the uMcijo; the centre force, the uDloko, uDududu, iMbube, uThulwana and iNdlondlo. Most of these units had fought at Isandlwana. Units of the local abaQulusi from Hlobane joined the main Zulu force.
Zulu casualties amounted to at least 1,200 killed around the battlefield. Many more died from their injuries.
Ulundi
Lieutenant General Lord Chelmsford was in overall command. The 2nd Division column was commanded by Major General Newdigate, the Flying Column (formally the Northern Column) was commanded by Brigadier General Sir Evelyn Wood. The 2nd Division included units of the King’s Dragoon Guards, the 17th (Duke of Cambridge’s Own) Lancers, Royal Artillery, the 2/21st Royal Scots Fusiliers and the 58th (Rutland) Regiment. The Flying Column included units from the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, 1/13th Light Infantry, the 80th (Staffordshire) Regiment, the 90th Light Infantry, the Army Medical Department, Hospital Corps and Mounted Infantry. The Colonial forces consisted of the 2nd Battalion NNC, Shepstone’s Horse, Bettington’s Horse, Wood’s Irregulars, Natal Native Pioneers, Transvaal Rangers, Frontier Light Horse and the Natal Native Horse. The total force amounted to 5,317 white troops and 1,152 native troops. In the battle their casualties amounted to 3 officers and 10 men killed, with 69 men wounded.
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