The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History

by Peter Heather

  69 Though not any more in cash, as the non-subsistence elements of the local economy, such as its pottery industries, seem to have collapsed by c. 420.

  70 The three quotations that follow are from Gildas On the Ruin of Britain 23. 5, 24. 3 and 20. 1.

  71 On the crisis of the 440s and the end of Roman Britain, see e.g. Campbell (1982), Ch. 1; Higham (1992), Chs 5–8; Salway (1981), Ch. 16; Esmonde Cleary (2000).

  72 The rest of North Africa, southern Gaul as far east as Arles, north-western Gaul affected by the Bagaudae, central Gaul and northern Italy affected by Attila’s campaigns.

  8. THE FALL OF THE HUNNIC EMPIRE

  1 Jordanes Getica 48: 246–55: 282.

  2 Momigliano (1955) and Goffart (1988) come to opposite conclusions about the Cassiodorus–Jordanes relationship from more or less the same set of observations. Suggestions as to why Jordanes should have lied mostly turn on the fact that he was writing on the eve of an east Roman campaign which destroyed the Ostrogothic Italian kingdom. It has been argued that the Getica contains an important political message (from Cassiodorus, or pretending to be from Cassiodorus), urging people not to resist the east Roman forces. These hypotheses conveniently ignore the problem of how the Getica’s supposed political message was to be disseminated. The only way of turning a literary history into political propaganda is to suppose that landowners were assembled and exposed to the Getica in the way that people had been exposed to the speeches of a Themistius, a Merobaudes or a Sidonius Apollinaris. This is highly unlikely. For more technical argument, see Heather (1991), Ch. 2.

  3 Cassiodorus concentrates on the royal dynasty from which Theoderic (Cassiodorus’ master) came – the Amal family – and organized Gothic history by geography, dividing it up according to the different abodes inhabited by Goths at different times. Both of these points are evident in Jordanes’ history. See further Heather (1993).

  4 Group 1: first known from Jordanes’ account of the collapse of the Hunnic Empire, then from many sources subsequently (see further Heather (1996), 111–17). Group 2: see p. 193–4. Groups 3/6: best evidence from Malchus of Philadelphia in the 470s, origins perhaps documented in Theophanes AM 5931 (see further Heather (1996), 152ff.); cf. above Ch. 7 n. 42. Group 4: Jordanes Romana 336. Group 5: Priscus fr. 49. Group 7: Procopius Wars 8. 4. 9ff. (‘not numerous’), Buildings 3. 7. 13 (3,000 warriors strong).

  5 Valamer and his nephew Theoderic united at least groups 1 and 6, but possibly also 3 and 4; see Heather (1991), Ch. 1, with full refs.

  6 This reference and the next quotation are from Getica 50: 261–2, 50: 260.

  7 Theoderic the Amal, the Ostrogothic king of Italy, fought against the Gepids, for instance, in 488/9 and again in the early 500s.

  8 Getica 50: 262–4.

  9 Getica 268–9, 272–3.

  10 Priscus fr. 49.

  11 Getica 272–3.

  12 Getica 248–52.

  13 The crucial passage is Getica 248–52 plus the discussion of Heather (1989), with full refs to previous attempts to resolve its obvious difficulties.

  14 Refs as PLRE 2, 385f. Maenchen-Helfen (1973), 388 and n. 104, denies the identity of the two Edecos, but it is generally accepted; cf. (and more generally on the emergence of the kingdoms that would succeed the Huns’) Pohl (1980).

  15 Except possibly the Amal-led Goths. Jordanes says that they came west of the Carpathians after the Huns fled east after following the battle of the Nedao (Getica 50: 263–4). This seems unlikely, and I suspect that they were settled in Pannonia by the Huns and not on their own initiative, but there is no way to be certain.

  16 Getica 53: 272–55: 282.

  17 Getica 54: 279.

  18 Fr. 45.

  19 Getica 52: 268 vs. 53: 273.

  20 Thompson (1996), esp. Ch. 7; cf. Maenchen-Helfen (1973), 95ff.

  21 Priscus fr. 11. 2, p. 259.

  22 Tervingi and Greuthungi: p. 145. Burgundians: p. 198. Of various Goths, group 3 above, perhaps identical with the later Thracian Goths (n. 4 above), were detached from Hunnic overlordship by Roman military intervention, and the Amal-led Pannonian Goths (group 1) were very clear that they had been made part of the Hunnic Empire by force, even if the ‘Balamber stories’ of the Getica are confused (n. 13 above).

  23 Merchant: Priscus fr. 11. 2, p. 269 l.419–p. 272 l.510. Gibbeting: Priscus fr. 14 p. 293 ll. 60–5.

  24 Fr. 49.

  25 Theophanes AM 5931 (group 3): the point obviously holds, whether or not group 3 can be identified with group 6 (see n. 4 above).

  26 The next three quotations are from Priscus fr. 2, p. 225; p. 227; p. 227.

  27 The Romans provided Attila with a succession of secretaries, including the prisoner Rusticius who wrote the odd letter (Priscus fr. 14, p. 289). This governmental machine made lists of renegade princes who had fled to the Romans and possibly kept track of the supplies required from subject groups.

  28 Most dominated: the Goths who appear in Priscus fr. 49, part of which is quoted above. Least dominated: the Gepids who led the revolt against Attila’s sons (Jordanes Getica 50: 260–2). In between, the Pannonian Goths of Valamer (Jordanes Getica 48: 246–53, 52: 268ff.), with commentary by Heather (1996), 113–17, 125–6.

  29 Each of the Hunnic-period ‘horizons’ is named after one of these rich burials.

  30 An excellent introduction to Apahida and the other rich burials of the period is provided by the catalogue volume Menghin et al. (1987).

  31 Gold certainly existed in fourth-century Germania and was being worked into plate. The famous fifth-century treasure from Romania, the Pietroasa horde (Harhoiu (1977), contains one or two items which were clearly antiques at the time of deposition and must have been made in the mid-fourth century. Roman gold coins were also far from unusual.

  32 After Bierbrauer (1980).

  33 E.g. Ammianus 17. 12–13, 19. 11, on Constantius’ settlement in the Middle Danube in the late 350s, with further commentary by Heather (2001).

  34 Odovacar in Gaul: Gregory of Tours Histories 2.18 (sometime between 463 and 469); cf. PLRE 2, 791–3. Herules, Alans and Torcilingi: Procopius Wars 3. 1. 6: Ennodius Life of St Epiphanius 95–100.

  35 Romana 336.

  36 Sidonius Poems 2. 239ff.

  37 The other possibly complicating factor was the arrival of a new nomad power north of the Black Sea. By the early 480s, for instance, Bulgars had established themselves close to the Empire’s Danube frontier (John of Antioch fr. 211. 4).

  38 Fr. 37.

  39 Fr. 45.

  40 Jordanes Getica 49: 255, probably originating in Priscus and translated therefore by Blockley as Priscus fr. 24. 1.

  41 Best general accounts of Aetius’ fall: Stein (1959), 347ff.; Stickler (2002), 150ff.

  42 For Petronius’ career, with full refs, see PLRE 2, 749–51.

  43 The next few quotations are from Priscus fr. 30.

  44 On Avitus’ early career, with full refs, see PLRE 2, 196–8.

  45 For a recent study of Sidonius and his life and times, see Harries (1994); Stevens (1933) remains valuable.

  46 Dill (1899), 324; for a collection of similar judgements, see Harries (1994), 1–2.

  47 Letter 4. 10. 2, quoted in Harries (1994), 3.

  48 Many have contributed to this revolution in appreciation, and an excellent introduction is Roberts (1989) with references to other relevant studies.

  49 The next few quotations are from Sidonius Poem 7.

  50 Priscus fr. 30. 2.

  51 Full reconstruction: Courtois (1955), 185–6.

  52 Priscus fr. 32 = John of Antioch fr. 202.

  53 On this Gallic literary context, see e.g. Harries (1994), Chs 1–2.

  54 Sidonius Letters 1. 2.

  55 The story of the campaign is told in Hydatius Chronicle 173–86. On the previous joint Romano-Gothic campaigns in Spain, see Chs 5 and 6 above.

  56 It is impossible to reconstruct Burgundian history in detail, but for fuller discussion and refs, see Favrod (1997).

&
nbsp; 57 History of the Persecution 1. 13.

  58 This quotation and the next are from Sidonius Poem 7. 233–6, 286–94.

  59 Sidonius Poem 361ff. Next quotation: 510–18.

  60 Refs as PLRE 2, 198.

  9. THE END OF EMPIRE

  1 Depending on the balance between 500- and 1,000-man units: Jones (1964), vol. 3, 364 and 379; see further p. 63. The eastern section of the Notitia dates only to the mid-390s, but eastern armies suffered no massive losses after this. In 395, the east also controlled the entire field army of Illyricum (another 26 regiments), but thereafter west Illyricum and its forces were returned to western control.

  2 The argument of Goffart (1981). Constantine defeated a series of rivals between 306 and 324 to unite the Empire, having started by controlling just Britain and Gaul. Julian had been appointed Caesar in the west by his cousin Constantius in 355, but revolted in 360, uniting the whole Empire under his control on Constantius’ sudden death in 361.

  3 Theodosius accepted that Persia should exercise hegemony over two-thirds of Armenia, taking just one-third for himself.

  4 A fair summary of Roman–Persian relations can be found in Blockley (1992). Rubin (1986) brings out the extremely peaceful nature (in relative terms) of Roman–Persian relations in the fifth century as opposed to the sixth or fourth.

  5 Not. Dig. Or. 5, 6, 8.

  6 CTh 7. 17. 1 of 412.

  7 421: Theophanes AM 5931 (cf. Ch. 8). Ruga: Maenchen-Helfen (1973), 81–94.

  8 Zosimus 6. 8. 2–3.

  9 Thus Hydatius Chronicle 154 reports: ‘The Huns . . . were slaughtered by auxiliaries sent by the Emperor Marcian and led by Aetius, and at the same time they were crushed in their settlements both by heaven-sent disasters and the army of Marcian.’ See further Ch. 7 above.

  10 Cameron (1970), 176ff. disposed of the old argument that Alaric was encouraged to move into Italy by Constantinople. Edward Thompson’s judgement can be found at Thompson (1996), 161ff.; he was particularly exercised by the revenge Attila would have wreaked on the east in 453 had his own death not brought a halt to campaigning. I therefore find nothing in the detailed narrative to support the argument of Goffart (1979) (see n. 2 above).

  11 Scholarly opinion on Ricimer’s policies has ebbed and flowed, with some regarding his barbarian origins as having undermined his loyalty to Rome. But the Visigothic succession was actually in the hands of another line, descended from Vallia’s successor Theoderic I, so that Ricimer would probably not have been very popular had he turned up in Visigothic Aquitaine; and Ricimer’s policies, while certainly self-interested, show no general pro-barbarian bias. O’Flynn (1983), Ch. 8, provides a general survey. On Majorian, see PLRE 2, 702–3, with refs.

  12 Poems, 2, 317–18. Best narrative account: Stein (1959); 380ff.; cf. O’Flynn (1983), 111–17. For the Gallic perspective on these manoeuvres, see Harries (1994), Chs 6–7.

  13 Hydatius Chronicle 217.

  14 As Sidonius put it: ‘Receiving a count’s authority, he traversed the Danube bank and the whole length of the great frontier lines, exhorting, arranging, examining, equipping’ (Poems 2, 199–201). As comes rei militaris (second-grade field army general), he sorted out the mess on the Danube in 453/4, as the civil war between Attila’s sons progressed and the successor kingdoms to the Hunnic Empire emerged.

  15 He continued to deal with the longer-term fall-out from the Hunnic collapse, confronting Valamer when he invaded Illyricum in search of a subsidy in c. 460, and fighting off the Hunnic fragment led by Hormidac which invaded the Empire in the 460s.

  16 In the 390s, as recorded at Not. Dig. Or. 19, the field army of Illyricum comprised 26 units, something over 10,000 men. Illyricum was then divided between the east and west on Stilicho’s accession in 395, and its western army was already down to 22 units by 420 (Not. Dig. Occ. 7. 40–62). Subsequently, the region took a heavy pounding, including the loss of Pannonia to the Huns, so that by the 460s the command was largely confined to Dalmatia and its military establishment probably much smaller, although Marcellinus supplemented his regular troops with barbarian auxiliaries (Priscus frr. 29, 30). On Marcellinus in general, see MacGeorge (2002), pt 1.

  17 Visigoths and Burgundians: Harries (1994), Ch. 6. Roman army of the Rhine: MacGeorge (2002), pt 2. Brittany: Galliou and Jones (1991), Chs 1–2. Franks: James (1988), Chs 2–3; Wood (1994), Ch. 3.

  18 Poems, 13. 35–6.

  19 Letters 1. 11.

  20 Letters 1. 9.

  21 Majorian had forced the Burgundians to give up some of the cities (civitates) of the Rhône valley and their revenues; most significantly Lyon, which they had seized during Avitus’ reign; and he had browbeaten the Visigoths into acknowledging his power, as well as attracting Gallic landowners. On Anthemius and the Gallo-Romans, see Harries (1994), Ch. 7.

  22 The sources variously report that the marriage occurred both before the Vandal sack and upon Placidia’s arrival in Constantinople. They were perhaps betrothed in 454/5, therefore, and actually married in 462 (PLRE 2, 796–8, with Clover (1978) generally on Olybrius). Vandal sack of Rome: p. 378 above.

  23 Justinian’s general Belisarius managed to conquer North Africa in 532/3.

  24 The next three quotations are from Sidonius Poems 5. 53–60, 338–41, 349–50.

  25 I would assert this principle with the greatest insistence, although some don’t seem to realize how much the public life of the late Empire resembled that of a one-party state: see further Heather and Moncur (2001), esp. Ch. 1.

  26 Sidonius Poems 349–69, 441–69.

  27 This raises the same issue faced with Geiseric in Ch. 5, as to whether Majorian’s forces were to be transported in one lift or several. Belisarius required 500 ships to move 16,000 troops (see p. 400), so Majorian’s 300 could have moved about 9,600 in one go, and I doubt that he was planning to go into battle with so few. So I suspect he was planning for at least two movements of troops, and hence would not have wanted to place his advance guard too close to Carthage. On Majorian’s campaign, see further Courtois (1955), 199–200.

  28 Candidus fr. 2 = Suda X 245.

  29 Respectively John Lydus On the Magistrates 3. 43; Procopius Wars 3. 6. 1; cf. Courtois (1955), 201; Stein (1959), 389–91.

  30 Eleven hundred ships: Priscus fr. 53 = Theophanes AM 5961; the MS reads ‘100,000 ships’, 1,100 being an emendation based on the figure of 1,113 supplied by Cedrenus, p. 613. The amended figure would make the 468 armada the same size as that assembled for the putative 441 expedition which never sailed: see p. 290. In 532, when the emperor Justinian mounted a more exploratory expedition towards Vandal Africa, the eastern Empire assembled 500 ordinary ships, together with 92 specialist warships (dromons), which again makes 1,100 seem proportionate for an all-out effort.

  31 On the fleet of 532, see Casson (1982) with refs to ancient shipping in general. To put the east Roman effort into broader perspective, the ‘invincible Armada’ which set sail from Spain in the late spring of 1588 comprised 90 great ships of 300 tons’ displacement or more, and another 40 auxiliary craft. This, however, was merely a covering force for the army of the Duke of Parma, who was meant to provide additional barges to get his men across the Channel.

  32 Manpower: Procopius Wars 3. 6. 1. Marcellinus: sources as PLRE 2, 710. Heraclius: Theophanes AM 5963.

  33 In contradiction of Courtois (1955), 201, who is generally an excellent guide, but wished to downplay the scale of the effort made in 468.

  34 The next three quotations are from Poems 2. 14–17, 537–43 and 315–16.

  35 Belisarius’ later fleet sailed from Italy for Africa on 21 June 532 and eventually put in to the Bay of Utica, close to Carthage, which was large enough to accommodate its 600 ships.

  36 Poems 5. 332–5.

  37 CTh 9. 40. 24; Zosimus 1. 31–3, with commentary by Heather (1996), 38–43, on the third century. Zosimus explicitly notes that ships and sailors were provided by settlements north of the Black Sea.

  38 Viereck (1975), 165–6, ga
thers the references.

  39 Mattingly (2002), 313.

  40 The next three quotations are from Procopius Wars 3. 6. 18–19, 20–1 and 22–4.

  41 Procopius Wars 1. 6. 10–16. It is worth comparing Basiliscus’ failure in 468 with Belisarius’ success in 532. Belisarius sailed with a smaller force, landed safely, and wrapped up the Vandal kingdom in under a year via two decisive land battles. He landed at Caputvada, south of Cape Bon, clearly much further away from Carthage than Basiliscus’ target, whatever it was. Belisarius also achieved complete strategic surprise. The North African expedition was an unexpected gamble on the part of his master the emperor Justinian, prompted by a succession dispute in the Vandal kingdom which divided the Vandal forces. Hence, when Belisarius turned up, 120 ships and 5,000 of the Vandals’ best fighters were away squashing a revolt in Sardinia, and he was able to land his men without a battle at sea. In amphibious landings, among the most difficult of military operations, the attackers should have at least a 6:1 advantage over the defenders according to modern doctrines. Basiliscus may well have been trying to land too close to Carthage, which would have brought him right into the middle of the Vandal fleet. But he may have been on a hiding to nothing anyway. News of his fleet, anticipated with so much excitement by Sidonius in January 468, could hardly be suppressed. Geiseric was bound to know of its arrival, so it is doubtful, huge as it was, that it had enough of an advantage to pull off victory in the face of forewarned and mobilized opponents. In 1588, likewise, the Spanish design was flawed: Medina Sidonia didn’t have a powerful enough fleet to hold off the English, and the Duke of Parma had nowhere near enough transports and smaller escorts to get past a Dutch inshore fleet and make it to England. Parma knew this perfectly well, and didn’t even try to get his men ready, even though he had plenty of advance warning of the Armada’s arrival.

  42 His reticence has prompted a wave of inconclusive speculation on the part of excitable modern historians. The most dramatic hypothesis about Severinus is that of Lotter (1976), who argues that the Life really begins after c. 460 and not c. 453 (the death of Attila), and that Severinus was in fact the consul of 461, with a long administrative career behind him. I don’t subscribe to this (see the response in Thompson (1982)), but I do think that the events begin closer to 460 than 453, since, rather than the Huns themselves, they feature the successor states to the Hunnic Empire (such as the Rugi and the Goths of Valamer), which took some time to form.