Supreme Commander

by Stephen E. Ambrose

  After a few more minutes of polite talk Giraud concluded a gentlemen’s agreement with Eisenhower. As the commander in chief reported to the CCS, “The basis of the agreement is exactly what I offered Kingpin throughout the long conference of yesterday.” Eisenhower would recognize Giraud as the commander in chief of all French forces in North Africa and as governor of the area. Eisenhower based his right to make this appointment on military conquest, although he hoped to keep up the fiction that it represented the real desire of the French people. Giraud agreed to go to Algiers the next day to begin organizing the French forces for employment against the Germans.13

  Tired but happy, Eisenhower had lunch, then took an hour’s nap on the field cot in his cave. Giraud woke him to ask for a radio-equipped plane for himself and modern fighters to train French pilots. Eisenhower said he would see what he could do. Giraud then returned to the subject of a landing in the south of France and Eisenhower had to calm him down again.14

  When Giraud left, Eisenhower sat down at his desk, took a sheet of paper, and began to write. He scribbled “Worries of a Commander” at the top of the page, then listed ten points. He was uneasy because Spain was “ominously quiet.” The French opposition, which had been halfhearted, had “blazed up, and in many places resistance is stubborn.” Three of his points centered around his troubles with Giraud, and another with the fact that no Frenchman, “no matter how friendly toward us,” was able to stop the fighting. The reports he was receiving were “few and unsatisfactory”; in fact “we cannot find out anything.” Indications were, however, that the Algiers force was being held up and the push for Bône and Bizerte delayed.15

  Eisenhower was beginning to realize that none of Murphy’s elaborate schemes got off the ground. In Oran the chief of the conspiracy lost his nerve and the American troops met a hostile reception and had to fight their way ashore. French resistance was fierce and effective. In Casablanca one of Mast’s friends, General Emile Béthouart, did act. He had his collaborators surround the house of General Auguste Noguès, the resident general, and issued orders to Army units not to fire on the invaders. But Béthouart moved too soon, for Patton’s men were still hours away. When news of the invasion of Oran and Algiers came in, with the information that the French in those cities were resisting, Noguès turned the tables on Béthouart, had him arrested, and told the troops to fight. They did.

  In Algiers the situation resembled a bad musical comedy. Shortly after midnight on November 8 Murphy went to the suburban residence of General Juin and solemnly announced that an invasion was in progress. He added that it had Giraud’s sanction. Juin was unimpressed by Giraud’s name but conceded that an American success was vital to the salvation of France. A tough, practical man, Juin was easily the best soldier in the French Army. He was also a patriot who wanted above all to liberate his country from Germans. He would have ordered the French in Algiers to lay down their arms, but he could not because by coincidence his superior, Admiral Darlan, was himself in the city, having come there to see his son, who was in the hospital. Darlan could quickly overrule Juin.

  At Juin’s suggestion Murphy went to see Darlan, roused him from his bed, and persuaded him to come to Juin’s villa with him. Mast had meanwhile used his irregular forces to place Juin under house arrest and take over the city. When Murphy arrived with Darlan in tow, Juin implored Darlan to send out orders to Oran to stop the bloodshed. Juin himself had already ordered the troops in Algiers to withdraw before the invaders. Darlan said he could do nothing without Pétain’s authority, and Murphy gave him permission to send a message to Vichy.

  The regular troops in Algiers, meanwhile, disregarded Juin’s and Mast’s orders, sent Mast’s irregulars flying, and placed Murphy under house arrest. The Americans had landed but they were floundering about in confusion on the outskirts of the city. The two sides soon clashed and blood began to flow. Juin sent out repeated orders to cease fire while the Americans broadcast statements from Giraud that had no effect at all.

  About nine that morning Darlan heard from Pétain—the Vichy head of state told him to act freely. Darlan then arranged for a cease-fire in Algiers but refused to act for all French North Africa until he had a meeting with Eisenhower.16 As Eisenhower wrote his “Worries of a Commander,” resistance in Oran and Casablanca continued.

  After Eisenhower finished writing he called Butcher into his cave, handed him the sheet of paper, and began to talk about where they should eat. Cunningham walked in with a message from Algiers. Eisenhower learned that Darlan was in the city and was willing to negotiate about all of North Africa. “Ike spluttered,” Butcher recorded. Someone asked about Giraud. “What I need around here is a … good assassin!” Eisenhower said. Cunningham reminded Eisenhower of what Churchill had told him: “Kiss Darlan’s stern if you have to, but get the French navy.”17

  The message from Algiers indicated that Darlan would not meet with any Frenchman, but only Eisenhower or his representative. Since Darlan had been told that Giraud was in Gibraltar, that meant he would not deal with Giraud. Eisenhower informed Giraud of Darlan’s presence in Algiers and Giraud said he would not deal with Darlan, whom he distrusted and hated. Eisenhower explained to Smith that Giraud “wants to be a big shot, a bright and shining light, and the acclaimed saviour of France,” and so did Darlan. Eisenhower was caught in the middle. He had promised to push Giraud to the top, and now had “to use every kind of cajolery, bribe, threat and all else to get Darlan’s active cooperation.” Disgusted, he exclaimed, “All of these Frogs have a single thought—‘ME.’ ” He said he was tired, but not because of the operation—“it’s the petty intrigue and the necessity of dealing with little, selfish, conceited worms that call themselves men.”

  Eisenhower was prepared to send Clark to Algiers to talk to Darlan. The situation, as he understood it, was that Mast had done the job in the Algiers area and the city was in Allied hands. At Oran Major General Lloyd R. Fredendall had enough strength ashore to launch a decisive attack. Patton was facing resistance everywhere, and one report indicated that he had re-embarked at one beach. Eisenhower refused to believe it.18

  Eisenhower slept well the night of November 8–9; the best night’s sleep, he wrote Marshall, he had had in fourteen weeks. He was satisfied with the way the American troops were fighting, even though it infuriated him that the French were resisting. Every bullet that was expended against the French was “that much less in the pot with which to operate against the Axis.” Worse, every minute lost meant a week of reorganization and straightening out later, and “I am so impatient to get eastward and seize the ground in the Tunisian area that I find myself getting absolutely furious with these stupid Frogs.”19 It was already clear, moreover, that Murphy had been “completely mistaken” about Giraud. The proclamations in Giraud’s name had done absolutely no good. As far as Eisenhower could tell, not a single French soldier had quit fighting because of them.20 Eisenhower had made a deal with Giraud and would live up to it, but increasingly it looked as though the man to work with was Darlan.

  The reason was that Darlan had a place in the French hierarchy while Giraud did not. There was no single reason why any French officer who had stuck with Vichy this far should suddenly go over to Giraud. None of Eisenhower’s promises to Giraud had any legal backing. Except through force majeure, there was no justification for Eisenhower’s forcing Giraud on North Africa as commander in chief or governor or anything else.

  Darlan had an established position. He had just come from Vichy and could be presumed to possess Pétain’s “secret thoughts,” the thoughts the marshal would have expressed had more than half his country not been occupied by the Germans. Darlan could issue orders and claim they really came from Pétain, and even if they did not he, Darlan, was commander in chief of French armed forces and thus his orders, unless countermanded, were legal. French soldiers could follow their natural inclinations and join with the Americans only if Darlan ordered them to do so, for only then would they be acting legally. To o
bey Giraud was to engage in mutiny.

  Eisenhower and AFHQ were beginning to see all this. Around 11 A.M. on November 9 Clark flew to Algiers. Eisenhower’s instructions were to come to terms with Darlan. While Clark was flying, Hitler was putting pressure on Pétain. The German leader was furious with the French, whom he accused of making a deal with the Allies. To appease him, Pétain authorized German use of Tunisian aerodromes and gave him permission to move large bodies of troops into Tunisia to aid the French in defending against Allied attack. When Eisenhower learned of Pétain’s action, he cabled Clark in Algiers, telling him to put the pressure on Darlan to “urge all Tunisian forces and leaders to destroy Axis planes and resist Axis invasion.”21 Darlan, however, had already sent his own orders to Tunisia, telling the commanders there to co-operate with the Germans. Murphy could not bring him around, nor could Clark, who arrived in the late afternoon. Giraud got into Algiers shortly after Clark, but Darlan simply ignored his countryman.

  On the morning of November 10, in a small room in the Hotel St. Georges, Clark met again with Darlan. Before a tense, perspiring crowd of American and French officers, Clark told Darlan he would force him to come to terms. Towering over the tiny admiral, Clark said his alternatives were action or prison. Darlan, quivering though he was, said he would have to await Marshal Pétain’s orders. Clark flew into a rage. Juin saved the situation by calling Darlan aside and lecturing him on the senselessness of the battle at Oran and Casablanca. Darlan finally decided to go halfway. He told Clark he would order the troops to lay down their arms, but not to fight against the Germans. That meant Oran and Casablanca were now in Allied hands, but the Germans had Tunisia.

  Immediately after the meeting broke up, Pétain declared from Vichy that he had removed Darlan from office. Clark hurried back to Darlan’s side. Darlan said he would have to cancel the armistice. Clark said in that case he would throw Darlan into prison. Darlan decided to let the cease-fire stand.

  The next day, November 11, Hitler announced that he was going to march into southern, unoccupied France. Darlan then announced that this meant Pétain was no longer free to express himself and claimed that he had secret orders from Pétain (which he never produced) that gave him authority to act under such circumstances. At midday he declared that he was going to exercise the powers of the government in the marshal’s name. He again ordered a cease-fire and this time told the French in Tunisia to resist the German landings. Pétain stripped Darlan of his authority, transferring it to Noguès in Morocco, who nevertheless threw in with Darlan.

  French officers in Tunisia did not know what to do, but the Germans soon took away their freedom of action. As early as November 9 the Axis had men and planes in Bizerte and Mateur. The only troops Eisenhower had in the area were the floating reserve of the Eastern Task Force, part of the British 78th Division. On November 11 he sent it ashore at Bougie, about a hundred miles east of Algiers. He might have taken a long shot and thrown everything he had into Bizerte, but the risk—especially after the fighting at Oran and Casablanca—seemed too great. Meanwhile Clark and Darlan did everything they could to encourage the French in Tunisia, but the Army commander there, General Georges Barre, threw up his hands in despair and took the easy way out, withdrawing his forces westward into the mountains, refusing either to fight the Axis or to follow Vichy orders and collaborate with them.

  The French naval commander in Tunis, Admiral Jean Pierre Esteva, was an old friend of Cunningham’s, and Cunningham sent him an appeal in Eisenhower’s name to “use his forces to throw out the German.” Cunningham said that if Esteva would act, Eisenhower would “rush every type of support to his assistance without delay.” But German troops were arriving daily by air and the first sea-borne convoy was on its way. Esteva contrasted the German reality with Eisenhower’s promises and decided to do nothing.22

  By November 11 Eisenhower was afraid that the chance of TORCH being a strategic success had already vanished. The Allies were ashore and were getting ready to push east, but they were going to have to fight for Tunisia and it would probably be a long campaign. There was still a slim possibility of getting Tunis cheaply, but it depended upon the French, especially Esteva. If he “would only see reason at this moment, we could avoid many weeks of later fighting and have exactly what we will then gain at the cost of many lives and resources,” Eisenhower said, but he guessed that the French had “been brow-beaten too long—they are not thinking in terms of a cause but of individual fortunes and opportunities.”

  Esteva had the equivalent of three divisions available. It would take the Germans two weeks to get even one division into Tunisia. If Esteva would act he “could cut the throat of every German and Italian in the area” and Eisenhower could afford to rush every fighter airplane he had into Tunisia. “A situation such as this creates in me so much fury,” he told Smith, “that I sometimes wish I could do a little throat-cutting myself!”23

  The morning of November 12 Eisenhower tried to get to Algiers, where he wanted to put more pressure on Darlan so that Darlan would put more pressure on Esteva and the fleet. The weather prevented him from flying. Clark, meanwhile, had managed to conclude a tentative agreement with the French. As a matter of principle the U.S. had decided that the French colonies were not to be treated as conquered provinces but as friendly territories and Roosevelt had explicitly promised Giraud that the U.S. would not interfere in domestic affairs in North Africa. Murphy said that without the experienced French administrators the area would be chaos and Eisenhower did not have the organization or the personnel to establish a military government. Clark was happy to make a deal with Darlan, the only requirement being that Giraud have an important position—which showed a rather astonishing loyalty to Giraud in view of his lack of effectiveness. On November 13 Darlan took on the title of High Commissioner and assumed the civil powers in North Africa. Giraud became commander in chief of French forces, with Juin as his deputy in charge of ground troops. Darlan explained that he had new secret orders from Pétain ratifying the arrangement and absolving all officers of their personal oath of fidelity to Pétain.24

  On November 12 Eisenhower sent a note to Clark saying that he approved of everything Clark had done and including instructions for the organization of the area. He wanted Clark to hire all the labor he could, paying at least ten per cent more than the prevailing wage. He also warned Clark not to create any dissension among the Arab tribes “or encourage them to break away from existing methods of control.” The Allies would have to use the existing French officials to keep the area under control and Eisenhower did not want “any internal unrest or trouble.”

  Around midday on November 12 Eisenhower received a cable from Smith that shocked him. The commander in chief had been only mildly satisfied with results so far and was deeply upset at the failure to get any force into Tunisia, where the German build-up continued. Although Eisenhower was far from thinking of himself as a hero or TORCH as a great success, Smith told him that the CCS were so enthusiastic with Eisenhower’s quick victories and the agreements that had been reached with the French that they were broaching the idea of broadening operations in the Mediterranean. Smith said the Chiefs wanted Eisenhower to consider the possibility of invading Sardinia. They questioned the necessity of building up TORCH to the strength originally contemplated and felt Eisenhower should return to London for a general strategy conference.25

  The CCS position sounded for all the world like Giraud’s demand that Eisenhower invade southern France. He immediately set out to straighten out their thinking. “I am unalterably opposed to any suggestion at this time for reducing contemplated TORCH strength,” Eisenhower told Smith. The situation had not crystallized. In Tunisia it was “touch and go,” the port of Oran was blockaded with sunken ships, and the country was not completely pacified. “Moreover, every effort to secure organized and effective French cooperation runs into a maze of political and personal intrigue and the definite impression exists that neither Kingpin nor any of the others real
ly wants to fight nor to cooperate wholeheartedly.” Without local co-operation, the Allies would have “a tremendous job on our hands in this sprawling country.” Eisenhower wanted to move ahead in an orderly fashion “but for God’s sake let’s get one job done at a time.” Instead of talking about reduction of forces, the CCS should be contemplating building up TORCH so that Eisenhower could do something effective in Tunisia.

  Eisenhower was more upset at the apparent lack of understanding in London by the CCS than he was at the actual suggestions they had made. He could not understand how they could be so ignorant about the situation. “I am not crying wolf nor am I growing fearful of shadows,” he explained, but he had to insist that “if our beginning looks hopeful, then this is the time to push rather than to slacken our efforts.” This certainly was no time for him to come to London, but he wanted Smith to dispel the “apparently bland assumption that this job is finished.” If one of the Chiefs would spend just five minutes on the ground, he would lose his illusions.26

  After dictating the message to Smith, Eisenhower decided to eliminate the middleman and sent a nearly identical cable to the Chiefs themselves. In a note he dictated to Smith later in the day, Eisenhower said, “Don’t let anybody get any screwy ideas that we’ve got the job done already.”27

  By D-Day plus five Eisenhower had pressures on him from his front and rear. In Algiers, despite their agreement, Darlan and Giraud were still bickering. Clark had gotten about as much out of the French as he was capable of getting, and so far that had not included co-operation at Tunisia or the French fleet. In London, the CCS were displaying a disturbing lack of understanding. But in London Eisenhower had Smith, who could handle things there. He decided to go to Algiers and see what could be done. On the morning of November 13 he climbed into a B-17 and set out for Algiers and a meeting with Darlan.