Supreme Commander

by Stephen E. Ambrose

  In May the CCS were scheduled to meet again (at Washington, code name TRIDENT) to review strategy for the remainder of 1943 and 1944. Before the meeting Eisenhower took up with Marshall the future of AFHQ. He wanted Marshall’s views on future operations in the Mediterranean under various assumptions: HUSKY proving to be a difficult operation; HUSKY going according to plan; or the defenses in Sicily collapsing suddenly and completely.

  Under the last assumption, Eisenhower thought the follow-up troops for HUSKY should be sent into Sardinia and Corsica, with a long-range objective of invading the west coast of Italy. He realized that such a proposal ran counter to Marshall’s views. Taking Italy would force the Allies to take care of the civilian population there. Estimates were that 10,000,000 tons of coal a year alone would be required, along with vast quantities of other supplies. Allied soldiers would also have to be supported. All this would tie up Anglo-American shipping and thus delay the build-up in England for the cross-Channel attack. The only real military advantage the Allies would gain would be possession of airfields capable of handling heavy bombers closer to Germany.

  “I personally have never wavered in my belief that the ROUNDUP conception is the correct one,” Eisenhower assured Marshall, but he pointed out that it would take nearly a year to prepare for it. For political if not military reasons the Allies had to do something in the meantime. The Mediterranean was a major theater, with supply bases and troops already there. They had to be maintained anyway, so with a relatively minor additional expenditure in shipping the Allies could keep the pressure on Germany by continuing operations in the Mediterranean.16

  Marshall replied that if HUSKY went according to plan Eisenhower should be ready to exploit his victory. If there was a sudden collapse, he should have plans ready to seize Sardinia, Corsica, and the heel of the Italian boot. Marshall, as expected, reminded Eisenhower that an all-out invasion of Italy would present serious consequences and prevent major operations elsewhere, but nevertheless the Chief realized that “we must include such an operation in our planning.”

  “You will understand that the operations outlined above are not in keeping with my ideas of what our strategy should be,” Marshall said in conclusion. “The decisive effort must be made against the Continent from the United Kingdom sooner or later.” He warned Eisenhower to be prepared to transfer some of his forces to Great Britain and implied that he was going to do his best to shut down operations in the Mediterranean before they drained more resources.17

  The CCS met for two weeks. The arguments were interminable. On May 19 an agreement of sorts was reached. The CCS declared in favor of a cross-Channel attack in 1944 and made the goal for 1943 the elimination of Italy from the war. On the key question—whether to invade the mainland of Italy or Sardinia and Corsica—the Chiefs could not agree. The plan they finally transmitted to Eisenhower, who had been patiently waiting for guidance, directed him “to plan such operations in exploitation of HUSKY as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces.” How to accomplish this (whether to invade mainland Italy or not) was left up to Eisenhower. He could use the forces he had in the Mediterranean, less seven divisions that would go to the United Kingdom on November 1, 1943.18

  No one was very satisfied with this result, least of all Churchill. Since Eisenhower would make the final decision, the Prime Minister decided to fly to Algiers and try to talk Eisenhower into accepting an invasion of the Italian mainland. He told Roosevelt that he would “feel awkward” if a high-ranking American did not accompany him, for he might then be charged with having exercised “undue influence.” Roosevelt therefore told Marshall to go along with Churchill to represent opposition to the plan for the mainland invasion of Italy.19

  Churchill and Marshall, along with Brooke, Ismay, and entourage, arrived in Algiers on Friday afternoon, May 28. Churchill got right down to business, and what came to be known as the Algiers Conference was under way. He began by saying that he feared the Sicilian campaign might proceed too rapidly, thereby causing an embarrassing interlude of Allied inactivity. Eisenhower said that if that happened he would be willing to go straight into Italy. If the campaign in Sicily dragged on, however, the question of post-HUSKY operations would have to remain unsettled. Much would turn on the strength of Italian resistance and German intentions.20

  The discussions went on for days. Churchill told Eisenhower that “his heart lay in an invasion of Southern Italy.” The choice of Italy over Sardinia represented the difference between “a glorious campaign and a mere convenience.” The glory would come from the capture of Rome, which “would be a very great achievement for our Mediterranean forces,” a fitting climax to the Eighth Army’s odyssey. Rome had no particular strategic or economic importance, but the ancient capital did offer psychological rewards, and the Prime Minister was enough of a nineteenth-century romantic to value such rewards highly. Besides, the prospect of sweet revenge on Mussolini appealed to the Prime Minister.21

  “The PM recited his story three different times in three different ways last night,” Eisenhower complained on May 30. All during the Algiers Conference Churchill talked continuously, trying to wear down the last shred of opposition. On Sunday night, May 30, he called after dinner to ask if he could come over to Eisenhower’s villa at 10:45 P.M. Eisenhower wanted to sleep and he was tired of going over the same ground again and again, but he said it would be all right. Churchill arrived fifteen minutes late, then talked steadily for two hours. Butcher finally had more or less to push him out the door.22 Brooke saw the “very sleepy Eisenhower” the next day and enjoyed the situation immensely. “I smiled at his distress, having suffered from this type of treatment repeatedly.”23

  Despite the late hours, having Churchill and Marshall around was profitable. Eisenhower took advantage of the opportunity to talk at length with Marshall about such problems as promotions, organization, and equipment. Marshall had spent some of his time in Algeria touring the recent battlefields and inspecting troops. On one occasion the Chief and Eisenhower had joined Bradley to watch a practice landing by the 1st Division. Patton was there. As the first wave came up the beach, Patton marched to the water’s edge and confronted a squad of startled riflemen.

  “And just where in hell are your goddamned bayonets?” he shouted. While the soldiers stood helplessly before him, Patton showered them with curses. Eisenhower and Marshall looked on in embarrassed silence. One of Eisenhower’s staff officers, standing next to Bradley, nodded toward Marshall and whispered, “Well, there goes Georgie’s chance for a crack at higher command. That temper of his is going to finish him yet.”24

  Formal meetings and casual conversations about the future continued. Marshall was steadfast in his refusal to make further commitments in the Mediterranean which would draw troops and material from the 1944 cross-Channel invasion. He wanted to delay making any decision until the German reaction to HUSKY was clear. He suggested that Eisenhower set up two separate headquarters, each with its own staff, to plan post-HUSKY operations. One would plan for operations against Sardinia and Corsica, the other for operations against southern Italy.

  Eisenhower agreed. He suggested there might be three possibilities: (1) if the enemy collapsed quickly in Sicily, he would immediately undertake operations against the Italian mainland (a reflection of Churchill’s persuasive powers since Marshall preferred Sardinia); (2) if the enemy offered prolonged resistance in Sicily, the Allies would have no resources available for immediate post-HUSKY operations and the whole campaign in the Mediterranean could then be rethought; (3) if resistance was stubborn but could be overcome by the middle of August, no decision could be made in advance. He thought the third possibility the most likely, and therefore having two separate headquarters to plan separate operations would give him alternatives from which to choose. The Algiers Conference thus ended without a clear-cut decision; in Churchill’s words, “post-HUSKY would be in General Eisenhower’s hands.”25

  On t
he afternoon of June 2 Eisenhower hosted the last meeting of the conference. Montgomery and Tedder joined the British contingent and both outlined the development of HUSKY plans. Montgomery exuded confidence. There were risks involved, he said, but they were justified and he would overcome them. He expected ten days of hard fighting, then a sudden end, after which he would cross the Strait of Messina and get the windpipe of Sicily into his hands. After that he wanted to move up the Italian peninsula.26

  Tedder and Churchill then talked about bombing Rome. The Allies had held off so far for fear of hitting the Vatican, but now they wanted a crack at the Eternal City. The railroad yards would be the target, and they were on the opposite side of the river from the Vatican. With precision daylight bombing, the airmen felt they could hit the railroads without endangering the Vatican. Eisenhower wanted to launch the operation because the railroad bottleneck at Rome was a key in the supply line to Sicily. Churchill promised to get permission from the War Cabinet, while Marshall said he would try to get Roosevelt to authorize Eisenhower to order the bombings.27

  The meeting then turned into a love fest. Churchill grew expansive. In his best oratorical manner he declared that he was satisfied at the great measure of agreement he had found, and full of confidence in Eisenhower and his team. Eisenhower replied that any praise which might be given belonged to the officers around the table. While there might be differences of opinion and discussions in his headquarters, he added, they were never based upon national differences. Marshall then stood and said he wanted to reinforce the Prime Minister’s tribute to Eisenhower and his team. He said that the support the British gave Eisenhower was deeply appreciated and highly significant, because in his opinion the Germans’ greatest discomfort came not so much from their loss of troops as from the fact that Great Britain and the U.S. had worked so well together.28

  “Cunningham commands the naval forces, Tedder commands the air forces, and Alexander commands the ground forces. What in hell does Eisenhower command?” a group of touring American senators demanded to know of Secretary Stimson. The answer was, he commanded Cunningham, Alexander, and Tedder. Eisenhower brought this about, not through any structural change, but by holding weekly meetings with the three British officers, by having frequent casual conversations with them individually, by acting as referee to settle their inter-service disputes, and most of all by the force of his personality. As he explained to his son on June 19, “The one quality that can be developed by studious reflections and practice is the leadership of men. The idea is to get people to working together, not only because you tell them to do so and enforce your orders but because they instinctively want to do it for you.” Eisenhower said a man did not need to be “a glad-hander nor a salesman” to be successful as a leader, but “you must be devoted to duty, sincere, fair and cheerful.”29

  The capture of the tiny island of Pantelleria showed what Eisenhower was talking about. Alexander was thoroughly against the operation. He feared it would fail and that the failure would have a disheartening effect on the troops to be committed against Sicily. Cunningham was not sure, but he was inclined to agree with Alexander. Tedder had his doubts, but he was the first to swing around to Eisenhower’s view because he wanted the airfield on Pantelleria. Eisenhower never wavered in his insistence that the operation go forward, and soon brought Cunningham around to agreement with him.

  Because of the rocky coast line, the only place troops could come ashore in their assault boats was at the tiny harbor. Eisenhower hoped to smash it into submission and concentrate the attacks on the eastern portion of the island. For nearly three weeks the air forces blasted away. Despite the pounding, the Italians showed no sign of quitting. The British general assigned to lead the assault protested to Eisenhower that the plan would never work and that the casualties would be awful. Eisenhower disagreed and decided to carry on.

  Objections from Alexander and other ground commanders continued. They classed Pantelleria as a miniature Gibraltar bristling with guns, and they filled Algiers with their “dismal forebodings.”30 Eisenhower decided to make a personal reconnaissance immediately prior to the assault date to make sure the defense had been sufficiently softened to assure success. He set out on the morning of June 7, along with Admiral Cunningham, on H.M.S. Aurora, as a part of a fleet that was going to Pantelleria to bombard the island. The Aurora sailed right up to the beaches and blasted away, with Cunningham directing some of the fire. (“More to the right,” he would say, or “Try a bit to the left.” He did not use starboard and port, to Eisenhower’s great amusement.) Only two Italian shore batteries replied, and neither of them with any accuracy. Eisenhower was confident that morale on the island was low and thus was confident of success.

  On June 11 the British troops set sail, with H-Hour set for twelve noon. Eisenhower had not slept well the night before; Butcher noted that “he has been going through the same type of jitters and worries which marked the days immediately preceding our landings in North Africa.” Eisenhower fretted all morning, but the finale was anticlimax. Shortly after noon, Cunningham sent word to Algiers that Pantelleria had surrendered before a single British soldier set foot ashore. The Italians had cracked. There was one casualty; a British Tommy was bitten by a mule. The Allies rounded up 11,199 prisoners of war.31

  Eisenhower was elated. “I am afraid this telegram sounds just a bit gloating,” Eisenhower confessed in reporting the success to Marshall. He felt so good that he added, “Today marks the completion of my twenty-eighth year of commissioned service and I believe that I am now legally eligible for promotion to colonel,” that is, colonel in the Regular Army.32

  The airfield on Pantelleria would now be most helpful in providing fighter cover for HUSKY, but that was only part of the reason for Eisenhower’s gay mood. He took deep personal satisfaction in the results. It had been his plan all along, he was the one who insisted upon it, and despite the numerous and highly placed doubters, some of whom were senior to him in rank and experience, it had worked. It was a command decision which showed that the experts were not always right and it gave him confidence in his own abilities and judgment. In later years he would talk of Pantelleria with as much pride as OVERLORD.33

  Now full-scale planning for HUSKY could proceed. “Everybody is tremendously keyed up,” Eisenhower told Marshall on July 1. “Whenever I have a short conference with a staff section, my whole effort is to get the attending individuals to relax a bit.” The planners had been working on HUSKY since January and they were showing the strain.34 It was natural enough, considering the complexity of the operation and the size of the force involved.

  HUSKY was the largest amphibious assault in all history. At dawn on July 10 seven divisions, preceded by airborne operations involving parts of two airborne divisions, would go ashore simultaneously along a front of one hundred miles. Both the frontage and initial assault forces were larger than those at Normandy a year later.35 The amount of detailed planning involved defied belief. Since every step was related, one mistake by one planner or one unit commander would have repercussions that would spread throughout the entire operation. Much depended upon the weather and on the enemy. No one of course could predict the wind force, and this was crucial for the Americans, since they would be making a shore-to-shore invasion, crossing the Mediterranean in their assault boats. How well the Italians would fight was another open question, as was the number of German troops on the island.

  Despite the risks, Eisenhower was confident. In the last week of June he had a two-day conference with all the principal commanders and went over the plans with “great thoroughness. I know that everything that careful preparation and hard work can do, has already or is being done.”36

  On July 7 Eisenhower arrived at Malta, Cunningham’s command post and the best communications center in the Mediterranean. Eisenhower said he felt “as if my stomach were a clenched fist.” He had done all he could do and for the next two days there was nothing to do but fret.37 Everything was now out of his hands—e
xcept for the most important decision of all. He still had to decide whether to go ahead with the operation or call it off.

  All continued to go smoothly, however, and confidence grew. Then, on D-Day minus 1—July 9—the weather turned bad. The wind came up from the west and increased in force. It began piling up whitecaps in the Mediterranean, tossing about the boats in which Patton’s men were crossing and throwing up a heavy surf on the western beaches. The wind would have little or no effect on Montgomery’s landing, since his area was on the lee shore, but if it continued at its present rate of forty knots it would ruin Patton’s landing. Staff officers suggested to Eisenhower that he postpone the invasion before it was too late. Because of the size and complexity of the forces involved, such a postponement would have meant a two- or three-week delay before the invasion could be mounted again.

  Eisenhower conferred with Cunningham’s meteorological experts, who had good news for him. They said the velocity of the wind would likely fall around sundown, and that conditions by midnight should be satisfactory. Marshall sent a wire asking if the invasion was on or off. As Eisenhower later put it, “My reaction was that I wish I knew!” He and Cunningham went outside to look at the wind indicators, which showed that the wind force was dropping as predicted, and to catch a glimpse of some of the troop carrier aircraft towing the gliders filled with men of the British 1st Airborne Division. Eisenhower rubbed his ever present seven lucky coins and silently prayed for the safety and success of all the troops under his command.38