The Valkyrie Option

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The Valkyrie Option Page 17

by Markus Reichardt


  Brooke felt heartened 'I am sure that we could extract a concession on a suitably phased withdrawal from Italy, the Adriatic and Greece from them. That way we would be able to restore the pre-war balance of power in Central and Eastern, and South Eastern Europe. We could land forces from Italy and Egypt in Greece within two or three weeks... And finally sir and this is something I would not say in front of our transatlantic friends, it has always been British policy to support the weaker power on the continent to prevent the dominant one from dominating Europe in a way that threatens our position. I believe the new German government if they are sincere- and we would still have to test that - would be a useful block on the dominance that Soviet Russia could exert over Europe in a post war world.

  Churchill exhaled calmly eyeing his friend 'Yes, yes indeed it would.'

  pm July 23rd

  Hawaii

  A sizeable crowd had been at the pier when the U.S.S. Baltimore carrying the President pulled in and the welcoming from Admiral Nimitz had gone fabulously except for the grand-standing of General Douglas MacArthur who had arrived suitably late to steal part of the President’s thunder. Despite Nimitz embarrassment, Roosevelt had just shrugged it off.

  That night, the President invited both Nimitz and MacArthur to the villa where he was staying during his time in Hawaii, and after dinner quickly got down to business. Seated before a massive map of the Pacific he asked Nimitz to review the situation and reflect on the current situation. Key to it all was that the US had after weeks of particularly bloody fighting, captured the three key islands of the Mariana Islands – Saipan, Guam and Tinian. With these islands under their control Roosevelt was certain the struggle in the Pacific would move into a new phase – from the Marianas the new B-29, the largest bomber the US had ever built would finally have operational bases from which to reach virtually all of Japan’s population centers.

  The B-29 was General Arnold’s dream child, a bomber larger and more strategic than the B-17 and the President had been a fan from the start. From his time as Secretary of the navy in the inter-war years Roosevelt knew that one day air power would overcome the US’s protective ocean barriers. His answer was that the US had to be the first to get there, and the B-29 was the project to do it. With the Saipan and Guam bases they would now begin hitting back directly at Japan. Roosevelt could feel it, things were turning for the better.

  But his two Generals had very different ideas as to how to exploit this new advantage. Nimitz argued going for the Chinese coast, cutting off Japan from her raw material supplies while coming to the aid of America’s Chinese allies. MacArthur objected because that meant bypassing the Philippines where American and Filipino troops under his command had suffered a humiliating defeat in 1942. There was a moral obligation to go for the Philippines, he argued, otherwise “I daresay that the American people would be so aroused that they would register most complete resentment against you in the polls.”

  It was typical MacArthur bombastic, without respect for the President’s office. It meant that the President’s two most senior military advisors were in fundamental disagreement. Nimitz wanted a naval option, MacArthur a land option. The issue of Germany came up almost the moment the issue of resources was raised. Nimitz correctly argued that with the massive losses incurred by the marines in the Mariana Islands – Saipan alone had resulted 14 000 casualties – US forces were insufficient for MacArthur’s option. Without missing a beat, the General retorted, “then send an additional three divisions back from Europe. From what’s happening in Germany it seems we will soon be able to spare them.”

  Until that moment Roosevelt had sought a compromise but MacArthur forced his hand. “General we agreed a Germany first policy in 1942 and we will adhere to that until she is defeated or has surrendered unconditionally. In the meantime we will rain fire and hell on the Japanese people to soften them up for defeat. “

  “ A few bombs will never break the spirit of these people, Sir.” It was out as usual for MacArthur before the President was done, “they’re not like us and will not be broken by the bombers. “

  “They will if we deprive them of their industrial base and starve them of raw materials. If that means taking the Philippines along the way fine, General. But I feel we’ve spent enough American lives already. You will assist Admiral Nimitz in his push for the Chinese coast with an option to take the Philippines mainland within existing troop strengths. But the word, General, is assist!”

  Pig-headed as he was, MacArthur did occasionally realise when to keep quiet.

  Until the spring of 1944 Britain had more soldiers engaged and far more ships in the European scene, including Italy, than the United States. We even had, on a worldwide calculation, plurality up to that date, after which they overtook us.

  Winston Churchill letter 29 October 1952 (Premiers Papers)

  10:00pm July 23rd

  Blay, Normandy,

  Monty's HQ

  While his superiors were wrapping up their conversation Montgomery sat down to record his thoughts in his private diary. In his usual style he went through the process of the campaign, the state of British morale and the pressure from Ike and the issue of lives. What stuck in his mind was a nasty phrase from De Gaulle, who alone among the junior leaders had caused trouble. At least that he and Ike could agree upon.

  The next paragraph came from the heart: From my earliest days there had never been doubt in my mind that I would want to be a soldier for the British Empire. And determined to come out on top in everything I did, have clawed my way up to the top in the military. But today I learned that straightforward soldiering - the winning of battles and serving your country and its people as one of its premier commanders were not always that straightforward. Today serving the interests of my country meant relinquishing the prize of military victory on the field in favour of political success and spared hardship for the nation.’

  He looked up from the writing at the image on the wall showing a summer green lush countryside - a family activity around a country house. It seemed so peaceful for a moment the pain of his wife's absence hit him and he closed his eyes before resuming his writing. Although there was no-one else to see his emotions they were too tightly controlled to come to the fore even now as he forced the pen in his hand to move across the paper.

  ' .... Remain deeply stung over Rommel's remark on the personal level as it came as a surprise. But he is right. I owe the men and indeed the country the achievement of our objective with a minimum of bloodshed. Peace is always preferable to war. Having failed to break the enemy's front during GOODWOOD, we are unable to force the surrender of his forces right here and now, unless we unleash Cobra. Even that offensive does not offer certainty of success, certainly not with the large number of untested American troops.

  CIGS Brooke called me about his tense meeting with the PM and General Eisenhower who indicated concern over my handling of the meeting. This is deeply distressing, as a desk general Eisenhower cannot understand that the British economy and man-power situation demand victory in 1944. The war is bearing hard on the mass of the people of Britain who have been at war for five years; it must be brought to a close quickly. Requested CIGS to stress to PM and war cabinet that our 'must' is different from the American 'must'; a difference in urgency, as well as a difference in doctrine. This the American generals do not understand; the war has never been brought to their home country. In fact they have not known war on their land for nearly a century.[39]

  I regret to accept that may be a decision that the politicians make. One way or another, however, we will follow Rommel across France, Belgium, and Holland to the borders of the Reich. There we shall see what the politicians have accomplished in the meantime. Already in and of itself the cessation of the flying bombs is a blessing for the nation's morale, a concession that would have required many more weeks of fighting to bring about otherwise. By the time we have reached the border, winter will have set in and any further advances would require detailed preparations and
different logistics in any case. The fewer British lads I loose liberating France and its ungrateful and bombastic leaders, the better.’

  As Montgomery finished writing nearly 500 British bombers roared over the dark British countryside on their way to Germany. The man who sent them - Harris of Bomber Command would not necessarily have disagreed with him about the value of British lives. However, for ‘Bomber Harris’ something bigger was at stake - the possibility of finally proving the decisiveness of the strategic bomber as a war-winning weapon. Ensconced in High Wycombe since 1942, Harris had been running his air war virtually single-handedly - always maintaining that given enough bombers he could win the war, by breaking civilian morale and crippling economic infrastructure. His bombing missions were always decided that morning staff meeting, as it had been that day. During the day Churchill had as usual been notified, via Harris nominal but generally ineffectual boss Air Marshall Portal, but had chosen not to intervene. To one of his aides he grumbled: Keep the Germans guessing at least the Americans cannot accuse us of faint-heartedness. Given that the targets are the Rhineland bridge towns with their railway marshalling yards, immobilizing the Wehrmacht just a little more would not be a bad thing for the short-term. Harris, Portal knew would not take well to a counter order anyway - possibly even going straight over his bosses head to the PM, who right now had better things to worry about.

  11:00pm July 23rd

  Whitehall

  More than three hours after Montgomery had, as usual retired to bed early, the habitual night owl Churchill sat down with his advisors and the war cabinet to formally discus the German proposal. Alan Brooke was called upon again to make his case and there were few disagreements. Everyone in the war cabinet wanted peace, if it could be gotten without compromising on key war aims. Hard-pressed to keep their single Army in strength in the field against the four American ones, the military was unhappy about continuing a conflict that would only illuminate British limitations more as it wore on. If the breakout from Normandy went ahead as a military operation and resulted in a fighting advance across France there was every chance that Britain would be bled white before the Allied forces reached Berlin. Relying on America to supply not only the material but also the manpower to conclude a conflict most deemed to have already been decided, would mean the loss of world power status for Britain. Financially she was already on the brink, sustained mainly by the goodwill and trade structure with her colonies. This view was echoed by those in charge of the economy and the treasury who were all too aware of just how deeply indebted the United Kingdom already was to the United States. The term bankruptcy came up more than once.

  By contrast a controlled withdrawal of German forces all over northern, western, southern and south-eastern Europe offered the opportunity for Britain to restore most of her pre-war status in Europe at virtually no additional cost. And it would do so at a moment where British power still appeared undiminished. Having accomplished the D-day landings was a strategic achievement that would carry weight for years to come. No-one would doubt British greatness or challenge British might after such a demonstration of power; no-one that is unless the prolonged conflict demonstrated American ascendancy in men and material. Brooke was thus instructed to work out what sort of timeframe would best suit British capabilities in each theatre and to submit such a revised proposal to the PM who would confer with the President.

  Brooke was not the only military man concerned that the Americans would prefer a fighting advance. Roosevelt had always viewed the war to be one of principles and few doubted that he would wish to differentiate between the old and the new Germany if undefeated. But the politicians were more relaxed; 1944 was an election year in America. Even a president as popular as Roosevelt was unlikely to survive an election if he kept his troops in a war that no longer required fighting because the other side had thrown in the towel. No, the order of the day was to seize the moment and gain the maximum advantage for the Allied cause and for Britain in particular.

  'Problem is' Churchill growled to himself as he went to sleep around 2am, ' that the American establishment may not see it that way.'

  * * * * *

  While the Allies debated, General Josef Kammhuber, commander of the German Night fighter Forces took a step of far-reaching consequences. Appointed to his post in October 1940 he had built the great defensive system of searchlights, radar stations and anti-aircraft guns and night fighter bases which had come to within an inch of defeating Bomber Commands strategic air offensive in early 1944. Kammhuber's greatest bugbear had been that of Hitler's orders in October 1941 he had been ordered to abandon his experimental 'intruder' operations against British Bomber airfields. Hitler had argued that only enemy aircraft shot down over Germany would be of value in convincing the German people of the magnitude of allied losses. Ever since he had tied Kammhuber's operational hands for under the intruder programme he had been dispatching small groups of specialist night fighters - usually no more than 20 Junkers Ju88s equipped with cannon and small bombs - to attack British bombers at their most vulnerable moments, as they landed at their airfields. In the few brief months that they had operated the few intruders had been responsible for more than 60% of the Luftwaffe's night fighter victories.[40]

  As Bomber Command and the 8 US Air Force had rained death and destruction onto Germany's cities, Kammhuber had strained at the leash arguing for a resumption of the intruder operations. In October 1943 he was briefly granted his wish with substantial results but there was no strategic change. The night fighters had been called back to Germany to participate in the defence of Berlin. By then the marshalling and dispatch of the 500 and thousand bomber raids had grown to an exercise of massive complexity, calling for precision timing at every airfield in eastern England during take-off and landing.

  When in the evening hours of July 23rd, the first reports of the bomber streams came in from the coastal observation stations, Kammhuber, deciding that he was no longer bound by Hitler’s directive, threw off his leash and divided his force into two. All his short-range fighters - mostly Messerschmitt 110 and 210s - were directed against the British Lancaster Bombers as they descended on the Rhineland towns of Cologne and Koblenz, critical railway choke points for the Western Front. As the Bomber stream turned back from the burning towns they found to their surprise that the night fighters did not press their attacks. With only 11 losses the remaining 440 four-engined bombers headed for home.

  By the time they reached British soil none of the bomber crews had seen a night fighter for over an hour and their guard was down. When the first began descending onto their home runways, the Luftwaffe intruders who had tracked their quarry through the moonless night, struck the air fields as they lit up for the returning bombers. Hidden from British radar in the muddle of the returning bomber stream, the Germans achieved complete surprise. Ninety-eight Junkers 88s, Junkers 188s, Dornier 217, Heinkel 115s, 219s and even some ancient He 111s and rather dodgy He 177s - practically every semi-suitable plane and seaplane Kammhuber had been able to scratch together at short notice in northern and central Germany - swooped on sixteen airfields as the Lancasters and Halifaxes landed and taxied on the ground. The result was carnage. Eager to avenge the carnage rained down on Germany's cities the Luftwaffe pilots threw caution to the winds and raked the facilities until they had run out of munitions or targets. 119 British bombers were destroyed during landing or on the ground, most with their crews still inside them. Another 160 were damaged. The heaviest loss of lives occurred at East Kirby airfield where a descending Lancaster with a 1000 pound bomb still stuck in its bomb bay was caught moments before its touchdown and crashed into the airfield's main workshop which, together with the adjacent control tower disappeared in a fireball. At West Raynham a damaged German plane - one of the few hit by anti-aircraft fire - crashed into the airfield's fuel depot igniting a fire that raged out of control. The short-lived firestorm asphyxiated more than 40 ground crew in their nearby foxholes. Before the night was over more tha
n 800 RAF crew and ground staff were dead and another 1200 injured. Nearly 15% of Bomber Commands force ceased to exist, six airfields were out of action due to damage or to air-dropped mines which killed another dozen men during the course of the day. Hastily scrambled Mosquitos caught only seventeen intruders on their way home, two of the He 177s – known in the Luftwaffe as the flying coffins - crashed of their own accord.

  Helmuth Lang also had a busy night. His photos of Rommel and Montgomery shaking hands had come out reasonably well, as had those of Rommel saluting the crowd of Allied officers. Speidel and a senior propaganda officer had taken one look at the photos and ordered that the Rommel/Monty picture be turned into a leaflet. A few brief phone calls to Berlin and he had sent out every military policeman between Paris and Normandy to round up all photographic equipment they could lay their hands on. By the time Winston Churchill finally sank into an exhausted sleep, there were more than 30 master copies of Lang's photo being used to produce glossy copies of the soon to be famous picture. When the first batch of 800 Allied prisoners were escorted across the front into Allied territory just before noon the next day each and every one of them was carrying a glossy photo which according to the Germans was the reason they were going home. Monty and Rommel had made peace; the war according to their former captors was over. The absence of fire from the German frontlines combined with the prisoners reports about what seemed to be preparations for withdrawal seemed to support this. Meanwhile Rommel, assisted by the resourceful Speidel, who invoked his masters name at every opportunity, managed to collect another 1400 allied prisoners including many wounded, for delivery back home. By nightfall these men had been returned to Allied lines at over ten locations; each with their copy of the Rommel-Monty picture, and assisted along all the way by very gregarious German officers full of peace talk. On top of the murmurs about RAF's terrible losses the previous night, an avalanche of rumours about the supposed armistice, impending peace and even a possible alliance with the Germans against the Russians threatened to bring Allied forces to a halt that day.

 

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