The Valkyrie Option

by Markus Reichardt

  ‘ I don’t like it Winston, the Germans may be withdrawing but at a speed that allows them to take every serviceable tank, gun and most of their ill-gotten loot with them. Who says they are not withdrawing to fight another day. German militarism will survive if we let it.’

  ‘Yes they wish to fight another day but another enemy. The Russians.’

  ‘The Russians are our allies Winston. The Germans are our enemies.’

  ‘Mr President, I… ‘Churchill’s voice faltered. He implicitly hated FDR’s style. The President was not a man to confront issues directly. He preferred to create a conversation whose tone remained amicable and whose direction was determined by subtle comments. Categorical statements were rare. He was also likely to stifle the more verbose and flowery use of the English language that the British Prime Minister preferred. ‘Winston, the Germans are our enemies, that’s why we joined you even before they declared war. Even without Hitler they still are. I know them. I have experienced them first-hand even before Hitler came to power they had militarism in their system. Now if they wish to surrender, disarm and accept our terms then let’s hear what they have to say. But I think we should both reassure this basic tenet of the alliance and communicate our resolve to Uncle Joe.’

  Uncle Joe, how Churchill disliked the phrase. For him it summed up everything that was wrong with FDR’s understanding of Russia. Prompted by his Vice-President, Henry Wallace, literary and intellectual circles in the US and the politically myopic American Ambassador to Moscow, Joseph Davies, Roosevelt held to an illusion that Stalin’s notion of democracy and anti-imperialism was roughly in line with his own. Now that poor health was keeping the trusted aide Harry Hopkins away from FDR more and more often, British viewpoints were receiving less and less hearing. And yet he had to control his tongue, American resources had been vital to containing the German threat, they might soon be critical to protect Britain’s European position against the Russians. This reality lay at the core of what he had always referred to as the ‘special relationship’ with America.

  ‘Mr President, there is no doubt that we went to war against an aggressive Germany led by Hitler and his fascist henchmen. I believe that the removal of Hitler’s regime and the request of the new lot in Berlin for terms changes things. I believe we should consider these terms. Maybe not openly just yet but we should consider them.’

  ‘You and I agreed upon a policy of unconditional surrender.’ Again FDR was being unusually blunt. He could ignore subtleties when it suited him. It was clear that Eisenhower had gotten to him. What Churchill did not, could not know was that FDR’s terseness came in part from the President’s lack of knowledge. Denied a better understanding of the new men in Berlin, the President reverted to his traditional generalizing negative view of Germany and Germans, something he had acquired on his single trip to that country. Having committed to a policy of unconditional surrender and deprived of meaningful inside information on the new men in Berlin, he was caught. Even worse he was caught in the middle of what he knew would be his last election campaign. Anyway he stepped he could get in wrong in what promised to be a tight race. He had always supported Britain’s struggle because of his view that a strong Germany dominating Europe would eventually pose a mortal threat to the interest of America. He had found ways in which to help Britain on America’s terms because Churchill alone had stood against Hitler in 1940 and most of 1941. Together with the Russians they had turned the tide. Stauffenberg’s coup and Rommel’s gamble now forced him and Churchill to confront just how deep their relationship went. Their subordinates had always marvelled at how well they had gotten along, because there were very real differences; in temperament, the future of colonialism, their belief about the geopolitics of Europe, the shape of the post-war world.

  Some had commented that they felt FDR and Churchill had nothing in common but the war against Hitler. Others had argued that it was Churchill’s ability to ignore the fundamental shift in power between the two nations taking place between 1940 and 1944 that made the system work. Both seemed to sense in their gut that this comment might be put to the test. The only way to avoid this was to cling to the basic tenets of their alliance. After all Britain now needed the United States. Or at least that was how FDR, overlooking the hundreds of years of British policy towards continental Europe saw it.

  ‘Mr President, yes we did agree upon the terms of the Casablanca Declaration which you put forward. But I believe, and my cabinet believes that that was against a Germany run by Hitler. Even the Russians afterwards thought that this demand would stiffen the German will to fight. ’

  ‘Winston are we not splitting hairs here. The Germans are an aggressive, militaristic nation. They have been that way for hundreds of years. With or without Hitler their instincts are in that direction and therefore they must be controlled. We must enforce unconditional surrender. What benefit do we derive from letting them off the hook now?’

  ‘Frankly Mr President a weak but not destroyed Germany will be a counterforce to Russia’s dominance of the European continent when this conflict is over. A continent on which we – both our nations – have key interests. It is the birthplace of democracy. It cannot be dominated by the Bolsheviks. To do so would merely replace the menace Hitler presented with another. We believe that it would be advantageous for both our countries if we ensured the safe return of the various governments in exile to their respective homelands both in Scandinavia and western Europe as well as in the Balkans. The Germans have already as an upfront signalled their withdrawal from all parts of Western Europe and Scandinavia. This will almost immediately restore the governments of Holland, Belgium, France, ..’

  And what about Eastern Europe?’ FDR was playing devil’s advocate but without conviction.

  Churchill however was on firm ground here. “Mr President they made the concessions I mentioned upfront, we can now sit down with their negotiators and talk about how we go about restoring the legitimate governments to the countries of Central Europe and the Balkans. We could get these concessions possibly before the Wehrmacht yields these areas to the Red Army. In a way the Germans are offering us a chance to create a new Europe.’

  ‘Winston, are you trying to tell me in all seriousness that Uncle Joe is another Hitler.’

  Churchill bit his lip. Damn the naïve Americans, no sense of history. Already in 1919 that had been his big problem with then US President Wilson who had completely misjudged the nature of the Bolshevik threat and refused to support the allied sponsored military intervention against Lenin’s Government. What American leaders did not seem to realise was that Britain had permanent interests rather than permanent friends or enemies. Britain had to be strong enough to influence the balances of power in Europe and other regions of the globe. As a nation America was just too young to understand this and its culture just to flighty.

  ‘In terms of our national interests he has the potential to become one, if there is no counterforce in the European theatre. In 1941 he became our ally when Hitler invaded his country. For two years prior to that he was Hitler’s ally. During that period both our countries thought very hard about confronting over his aggression towards Finland. Hitler’s invasion, not his policies, Mr President, made him our ally.’

  ‘Nonsense, Winston. He is part of the alliance that will build the United Nations. We sorted that out at Teheran.’

  Churchill had to swallow hard a few times. You did Mr Roosevelt, he said silently to himself. Or at least you think you did in a few simpleton sentences that ignored a millennium of European history. Churchill thought but could not say. He had not forgotten the manner in which FDR has sought to develop a relationship with the Soviet dictator at his expense in the Iranian capital. The Teheran conference had been the first meeting of the three allied leaders and Roosevelt already laying the ground for his world body, the United Nations had turned on the charm in an effort to dispel any suspicion on the part of Stalin. It had been a naïve and clumsy effort based on complete ignorance of the
mind of the paranoid Stalin and the logic of the Soviet system. Roosevelt has assumed that his chatty style which had managed to ensnare most American politicians would work if applied unaltered to the Soviet dictator. Churchill, who like Stalin had a sense of European history and power politics had come away distressed at the naivety of the American leader who had approached the Soviet dictator as he would any hard-nosed Democratic Party boss. Nor had he entirely forgiven. He had been a member of Britain’s parliament before Roosevelt had held any public office. His philosophy of statecraft was the product of a richer and deeper tradition as well as more developed experience. He had been in the thick of great events for four decades and a participant as well as an organizer of war as well. He had spent his adulthood dealing with the tides of German power. FDR had not.[47] It was time to lay down a few unpleasant realities about Britain’s national interests in the various parts of Europe, especially the Balkans and the Aegean.

  Roosevelt did not like what he heard and said so. To diffuse the situation he launched into one of ramblings about his imaginary or real brushes as a nine-year old in 1891 with German militarism. Roosevelt had always believed that his brief experiences in German society at that age and later on honeymoon had given him a special understanding of German politics and psychology. As always their detail depended upon the needs of the situation and had never been tainted by any careful study or thought about the country or its future. A key weakness, and one that drove Churchill to distraction was that Roosevelt could not differentiate between the autocracy of the last Kaiser and the Nazi regime. For him Prussia and its military tradition inevitably led to Hitler. “Winston, the German people as a whole are responsible for what has taken place, not just some Nazi leaders that they conveniently dump when things go bad. Germany must have it driven into her that she will be a defeated nation and this must be done so hard that she will hesitate to start a new war ever again. All the Germans must understand that they have been waging a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization.[48]

  In the end they agreed at least for the moment to disagree: While Roosevelt stated his intent to issue a statement reaffirming the policy of unconditional surrender, Churchill extracted a promise not to seek additional battle but to follow the retreating Germans in a manner to maintain their retreat at maximum speed. As a conciliatory gesture he also promised to send over a dossier of British information on the new men in Berlin to demonstrate their bona fides. Normally FDR would have rejected this out of hand, but in his present situation he agreed to look at the contents. The Prime Minister would record later in his verbose and self-serving memoirs that this was the day the break between the two leaders began. Britain had spent herself in defence of Europe’s freedom, he would later write, and rather than affirming and supporting her post-war position and rewarding the British people for the sacrifice and endurance, Franklin Roosevelt expected Britain to crawl alongside America into bed with the Bolsheviks. Churchill acknowledged that as a politician he might have to publicly kiss Stalin on two cheeks, but even in private he had no intention of kissing him on all four.

  That day another unpleasant meeting took place in London. Eisenhower had called Montgomery before the joint High Command Council where he berated him for passing the strategic initiative to the Germans by agreeing to a ceasefire. Brooke, who sat in on Churchill’s behalf, tried vainly to defuse the confrontation but found that neither side was willing to compromise. Montgomery remained his prickly self, splitting hairs and failed to show even the slightest acceptance that his actions had been less than perfect. He denied making a truce but when pushed by Eisenhower who insisted on being addressed as his superior, boiled over and dug his heels in with comments about Ike being a desk jockey not caring for the lives of the men under his command. The fact that Eisenhower was again chain smoking did nothing to placate the vehemently anti-smoking Imperial Marshal.

  Eisenhower was on a mission supported by his President and went for the jugular, knowing himself supported by at least one of the key English leaders, Air Marshall Tedder, called for his resignation and when this was not forthcoming summarily sacked him. Tedder voted with the Americans and Brooke found himself outvoted when Eisenhower stood up and made it clear that only one man, Montgomery or he, Eisenhower, could remain in his position by the end of this meeting. With a heavy heart Brooke abstained and the Command for 21st Army Group formally passed from Montgomery. Brooke hoped to salvage something by privately requesting from Eisenhower a delay in the announcement so that a new post could be found for Monty. Having gotten his way SHAEF was in a generous mood and gave the CIGS 48 hours. And in that 48 hours, while Monty sulked and Brooke and Churchill manoeuvred, Rommel’s forces were moving and time slipped away from the Allies. With it went the initiative on the western front. Ironically Eisenhower had accused Monty of passing the initiative, but in the end it was these 48 hours that counted. Together with some poor weather it gave the Germans time to disengage and allowed their retreat to gain orderly momentum.

  Following the meeting at which Monty was sacked Commander of the US Eighth Air Force, General Carl Spaatz, inadvertently held a meeting which would eventually lead to Harris downfall. Since August 1942 his US Eighth Air Force had been operating from British airfields against enemy targets on the continent. From the start Harris had sought to enlist the US planes for his saturation bombing campaign, but had been rebuffed. Attacks on defenceless civilians as an overt policy did not go down well in Washington nor with Spaatz personally. And so the situation had developed where the political leaders had framed their objectives for the bomber offensive against Germany in sweeping enough terms that there was something for both. Harris had continued to go after German cities to crush the German will to resist, while Spaatz had concentrated on daytime raids against more narrowly defined military and transportation targets. When the US fighters acquired the capability to reach deep into the German heartland it had been Spaatz’s American planes that had struck the crippling blows to the German synthetic fuel production capacity, had wrecked its transport links and on the side had also hit many of its cities. Still Harris had held the course but in early 1944 his bomber offensive against key German cities floundered in the face of heavier than expected German air defences around Berlin. Doubts had quickly spread as to the effectiveness of his two-year old campaign, doubts which Spaatz had done nothing to dispel. Even Harris’ boss Portal began to have serious misgivings, although he never voiced them publicly. A real turning point had come with a March raid on Nürnberg in which 95 of 782 British bombers were shot down and the majority of the rest failed to find their target due to bad weather. This happened just as General James Doolittle took over from Spaatz in the knowledge that the Americans now had the planes and technology to support the American strategy of selective bombing. To the Americans this made targeting civilians even less palatable.

  Spaatz who had become USAAF commanding general happened to have picked July 25th for a meeting in which future targeting strategy was to have been discussed. As they had no direct control over Harris, Spaatz and Doolittle had anticipated the meeting to end in the usual agreement to pursue parallel and theoretically complimentary strategies which would leave Harris bombing German towns while the USAAF went after targets in France. However when Portal sat down he informed the Americans of the meeting with the Prime Minister in such clear terms that Harris was left nearly speechless. The usually cautious British Air Marshall would later record in his memoirs that he had not planned to be so clear but had suddenly felt compelled to make a statement for reasons of humanity and posterity. He would also record that after Hitler’s removal he agreed with Churchill’s policy to cease intentional bombing of civilian residential targets. In retrospect Portal seemed to has surprised himself with his firm stand.

  After a few minutes of inconclusive acrimony between the British, Spaatz asked Portal directly for the wording of his instructions and got Churchill’s quote that “Bomber Command rebuild its bases but cease
all bombing raids against civilian targets for the moment.“

  Harris tried vainly to now muscle in on the American bombing target list arguing that Churchill’s instruction did not, in fact, change much. But neither Spaatz nor Doolittle was going to allow the headstrong commander onto their turf. Both had received detailed assessments of the damage done to the British force by Kammhuber raid and had no intention of being blamed for a repeat if the Harris launched another night raid supposedly under their campaign and got caught by the Luftwaffe’s night fighters again. They would stick to their daylight raids and instead suggested that Bomber Command assist in various targeted day-light ground support operations against along the front in France and against key transportation targets of value to the enemy. Harris still convinced that he would get Churchill to change his mind demurred, playing for time. Neither of them appreciated that since the Germans were already withdrawing both Bomber Command and the US Eighth Air Force would be struggling to designate such targets for the coming weeks. In the days that followed the meeting, Harris repeatedly vented at Portal who meekly but consistently hid behind the Prime Minister’s instructions.

  July 25th

  The Kremlin, Moscow

  Stalin stared silently at the photograph, Helmuth Lang’s now-famous image of Montgomery and Rommel shaking hands. Around the table Beria, Molotov and Zhukov waited silently for a reaction. Beria was worried, whenever the dictator went quite for long periods there was rage building up. The Vozhd[49] who had recently developed symptoms of arteriosclerosis and high blood pressure could be explosive and violent in a bad mood. The almost unpredictable appearance of those bad moods was one of the few things Beria genuinely feared. Finally Stalin looked up. ‘Comments, Analysis?’