A Special Duty

by Jennifer Elkin

  “I can assure the House that every effort in our power will be made to aid and sustain Marshal Tito and his gallant band. The Marshal sent me a message during my illness, and I have since been in constant and agreeable correspondence with him. We intend to back him with all the strength we can draw, having regard to our other main obligations.”(Churchill) xvi

  At the end of November 1943, their first month of special-duty operations, the Storey crew had undertaken twelve sorties, of which five had been fully successful on primary targets. Weather conditions and lack of signals accounted for the failures, though leaflets were successfully dropped on most secondary targets, which didn’t require the accuracy of a supply or agent drop. It was often the missions that were not completed (DNCO) that proved the most testing because they often involved circling over a target at low altitude for a long time before deciding to abort. The weather conditions in Europe during that winter of 1943/44 were terrible, and this put enormous strain on the young crews and also their aircraft. Three crew members in these early flights, Walter Davis, Charlie Keen and Jim Hughes had met at 10 Operational Training Unit in Abingdon, where, early in training, they were given the opportunity to ‘crew up’. This was a fairly informal process during which they chose who to fly with and Walter remembered how he met Tom Storey and came to join the crew: “A very tall sergeant approached me to ask if I would be his wireless operator and could I pick out a good navigator. I said I knew just the man.” Charlie Keen recalled many years later that, having agreed to join the crew as flight engineer, they went off to the cinema. When they came out of the show, Tom took hold of Charlie’s arm and said: “I can’t see a thing in the dark!” Charlie was taken aback, thinking – “What kind of mistake have I made here? I’ve crewed up with a pilot who has no night vision.” But then Tom laughed and he realised it was a joke. In fact Charlie always maintained that Tom’s landings were better at night than during the day, and since he flew forty-two operations with him, he was well qualified to judge! Team spirit was everything and the ex-policeman, the sheet-metal worker, the office clerk and the shop assistant not only flew together, but spent their off-duty hours together as well, forming a solid team. Now, at the end of November 1943, a month in which the men of 148 Squadron had given hope and practical support to resistance fighters throughout the Balkans, they began to make plans for the festive season. A committee, led by the ever resourceful Flying Officer Guest, was formed to make arrangements for the Christmas celebrations. They might be a long way from home, but a spirited approach to this traditional family time boosted morale.

  Also at the end of November, Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt were meeting secretly at the Soviet Embassy in Teheran, with Stalin in a strong negotiating position after Russia’s crushing defeat of the German army at Stalingrad, and continued advance, which had created a significant turning point in the war. The leaders agreed to give Tito stronger allied support in Yugoslavia, and Stalin managed to extract tacit permission to manipulate Poland’s border with Russia after the war and install puppet governments in other Baltic states, sealing the fate of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania for the next 50 years.

  Notes

  1 Royal Canadian Air Force.

  2 Hurn records show Wellington HZ895 taking off for Rabat Sale 30 minutes after the Storey crew, but landing at Chivenor with engine trouble. It returned to Hurn for re-despatch.

  3 General Svetozar Vukmanovic.

  4 JUDGE.

  5 AIR ‘the flowers that bloom in the spring’, GROUND ‘have nothing to do with the case’.

  6 A coloured flare fired from a special pistol (Very pistol) for signalling at night.

  7 A rank in the British Army’s Household Cavalry.

  8 They were dropped to the SWIFTER Mission, headed by Lt.Col. Alan Palmer

  9 British Mission operating with partisans in Agrinion area of Greece

  10 HUNDON, later FLOTSAM, British Mission attached to Tito’s Partisans in Slovenia

  11 Missing Research and Enquiry Service (formed to investigate cases of missing airmen).

  12 Operetta The White Horse Inn, words and music by Ralph Benatzky and Robert Stolz

  13 British Mission working with established partisan bases in the mountains west of Korca in Albania

  14 Allegations made against Mikhailovic were disputed by a number of Mission officers attached to him and the withdrawal of support to him and subsequent abandonment remains controversial.

  CHAPTER 2

  CHRISTMAS AT TOCRA

  High priority for the Squadron in early December was operation AUTONOMOUS – the infiltration of agents Alfred de Chastelain and Ivor Porter into Romania. Their mission, a political one, was to link up with opposition leader Iuliu Maniu and convince him of the need to accept an unconditional surrender to the Russians. An attempt had been made to get just de Chastelain in during the moonless part of the night of the 22nd November, using three aircraft, one carrying de Chastelain, and two simulating a mine-laying operation in the Danube to divert attention.i The attempt failed because of a thick cloud layer that obscured the drop zone, and whereas the two diversionary Halifaxes jettisoned their bombs over the sea and returned safely to base, the aircraft carrying de Chastelain became iced up on the return leg, ran out of fuel and crash-landed in the sea. Ivor Porter had been awake all night waiting for news of the mission and was feeling reasonably hopeful because of the favourable weather reports, but when the aircraft didn’t return his optimism turned to anxiety. The next day news began to dribble in that de Chastelain and the crew had parachuted to safety but the aircraft was lost.1

  The Storey crew took part in the next attempt to get the AUTONOMOUS agents in, on the night of the 4/5th December, and this time five Halifax aircraft were involved, with Warrant Officer Cyril Fortune, described in the Squadron Operations Record Book as “Second to none on the Squadron for piloting and daring-do”, carrying both de Chastelain and Ivor Porter. Three of the diversionary aircraft were to drop delayed-action bombs into the Danube, which would create a big splash and go off after a few hours, giving the illusion of prematurely-exploding mines. The Storey crew’s role in the deception, as the fourth diversionary aircraft, was to drop leaflets over Sofia and Plovdiv in Bulgaria and cause as much mayhem as possible, to make it look as though they were diverting attention from the mine-laying and thus keeping everyone’s attention off the personnel drop. As they circled over Sofia, wireless operator Walter Davis turned his ‘identification friend or foe’ (IFF) signal on and off to interfere with enemy radar and, with searchlights scanning the sky, they gave a conspicuous enough display to give the impression that they were deliberately diverting attention from something else! All was going to plan, but when Fortune’s aircraft arrived at the target with de Chastelain and Porter, despite perfect visibility, there were no reception signals and the operation had to be abandoned again. Three of the aircraft had already completed their diversionary work so the fourth aircraft, which had been the last to take off, jettisoned her bombs over the sea on receipt of the prearranged ‘abandon’ signal, and they all headed back to base. Ivor Porter was bitterly disappointed at the failure of the plan, especially as they had been able to pick out lights in the windows of the houses on the ground, and yet they had received no signals:

  “This crew had put in many operational flying hours; the pilot was a quiet, impressive character in whom we had complete confidence; the weather had been better that one would expect for the time of year. A chance like this was unlikely to occur again.”ii

  On the return leg, all five aircraft were diverted to Benina because of strong crosswinds at Tocra, and Ivor Porter grumbled about having to spend the night in the plane: “Cold, hungry and angry”. Agents must have had nerves of steel to endure these long flights with all the fear and anticipation involved only to have to return to base and go through it all again.

  And they did go through it all again on the 21st December; Porter, de Chastelain and Romanian sabotage expert, Silviu Metian
u. An experienced crew was assembled in a Liberator, piloted by Brotherton-Ratcliffe, and the three personnel were successfully dropped into southern Romania, just north of the Danube. They landed in a thick mist and had difficulty finding each other, but this was just the start of their troubles. They had come down fifteen kilometers from their intended target and couldn’t find the car and driver that should have been waiting for them, so they hid overnight and walked to a nearby village the next morning to get some help. The villagers didn’t help them – in fact they turned them over to the gendarmes, claiming a reward in the process, and the three men were taken into custody where they remained for the next nine months. They were eventually freed in August 1944 when King Michael, twenty-two years of age, carried out a remarkable act of political courage in deposing fascist dictator Antonescu, dismissing his government and finally putting Romania on the side of the Allies for the rest of the war.iii

  Ivor Porter, in his memoirs written after the war, expressed irritation at the RAF’s failed drops and navigational errors, which is probably natural for someone involved in such dangerous work. He said of the first attempt to get de Chastelain in: “The Liberator had stooged too long over the target looking for signals, their radio had broken down; they had mis-navigated over Albania, run short of fuel and had all baled out off the Italian coast.”iv The aircraft was in fact a Halifax, and Brotherton-Ratcliffe was one of the most experienced and respected pilots in the Squadron. His version of events was that, on the return trip, the plane had become iced up – so much so that the noise of cracking ice was heard throughout the aircraft – and his instruments had flicked on and off, with the airspeed indicator sporadically reading zero. The flight engineer reported that they had used 300 gallons of fuel in 50 minutes, which was 75% more than normal, and he summed it all up on the official RAF 441A Form with remarkable understatement: “Operation not successful. Ran out of petrol over Italy after attempting to land in unsuitable conditions – crew baled out – aircraft lost.”v

  Weather conditions had once again led to a failed operation and contributed to the loss of an aircraft. It was, above all else, the biggest factor in failure rates during the winter months because, even if the aircraft reached the drop zone, the crew needed to see the ground and that meant coming down low to try and get beneath the clouds or, if amidst mountains, circling at a safe height in the hope of a window opening up. The Squadron would shortly bring into service the Rebecca/Eureka system of air-to-ground radar that improved the efficiency of drops, but for the moment they relied on eyesight. When it came to dropping personnel, even greater care was taken, and in the case of the AUTONOMOUS drop, additional precautions were taken to avoid drawing attention to the lead aircraft. The pilot was instructed to close and open the throttles of all four engines in order to give the reception committee an aural recognition signal. This was to be repeated several times and it was stressed to the crew that no visual signal must be given from the aircraft. They had nothing but respect for the personnel they carried and did their best to drop them at the optimum height and in the right place – “They were great blokes – they said nothing from the time we took off till they went out of the hole. They just got themselves ready and went – marvellous lads.”vi

  By December the Greek civil war was at its height and, although an immediate ban on the supply of arms to either side had initially been imposed, this was later lifted in respect of General Napoleon Zervas, leader of the republican EDES guerrilla movement who had proved loyal to the British and was seen as the non-aggressor, having been attacked first by ELAS.2 Wing Commander Blackburn and Tom Storey delivered supplies for Zervas, at his Kalentzi headquarters, on the night of the 3rd December, and in spite of a confusion of dummy and true fires at the drop zone, both aircraft dropped their loads within ten minutes of each other in eight runs. Part of the understanding with the British was that Zervas should not use weaponry supplied to him by air to advance his cause in the civil war, but for the Allied officers attached to opposing ELAS guerrillas, this policy caused ill feeling and put them in a difficult and dangerous position.vii It was frustrating for Allied officers that while the Germans were burning villages throughout Greece, the partisan groups were keener to fight each other than the enemy. The partisans knew that it was only a matter of time before the Germans departed and, for them, the primary goal was to establish a position of superiority for when that time came. One man who worked hard on peace negotiations between the guerrilla factions was US Major Gerald Wines, who was dropped to the Allied Military Mission in Viniani by the Storey crew on the night of the 7th December. ‘Jerry’ Wines, veteran of World War I, became head of the American component of the Allied Military Mission, earning widespread respect for the solidarity he helped to foster between the British and Americans in Greece.viii It was he and Christopher Woodhouse who eventually persuaded the parties in the Civil War to sign a peace treaty and agree to assist with operation NOAH’S ARK, subsequently delayed, which was the sabotage and harrying of retreating Germans.ix The other members of the OSS team dropped by Tom Storey that December night were Lieutenant Kermit Anderson, Lieutenant Robert Moyers, Lieutenant Nicholas Tryforos and Sergeant Spiros Kaleyias, whose various activities included sabotage, the building of airstrips, distribution of humanitarian aid to the Greek people and the thousands of Italian soldiers stranded in the mountains following the armistice, and, in the case of Robert Moyers, medical care. As a trained dentist and vet Robert Moyers became somewhat of a hero to the Greek people as he amputated limbs and performed lifesaving surgery, but as a dentist, his skills were apparently not in great demand.x

  A high proportion of flights during December were to Albania, following the appointment of Brigadier Edmund ‘Trotsky’ Davies as head of the Allied Mission there. He had been dropped in by the Forester crew in October and the enlarged Mission required stores and personnel. Winter conditions meant that the timing couldn’t have been worse for the supply effort required and, to add to the miserable conditions on the ground, a German drive had already caused staff at two Mission stations to flee. By mid-December Brigadier Davies and his SPILLWAY Mission were on the run themselves in bitter-cold conditions of driving rain and snow. Night after night they waited for promised supplies that didn’t arrive, and the growing sense of abandonment led to understandable ill-feeling:

  “Had an explanation followed we would have understood, but space on the air was considered too precious for explanations. We always felt that it was not appreciated at our base how much work and preparation went into a reception and how much disappointment was felt when no plane arrived. At base they felt that we did not appreciate engine failures, bad weather and changes in policy of allotting aircraft.”xi

  The Storey and Ellison crews had managed to deliver rations, clothing, stores and explosives to the more southerly Mission3 of Major Bill Tilman in November, but the next three drops attempted by the Storey crew failed because of either incorrect signals or engine trouble. Bill Tilman had been in Albania for four months, having arrived just before the Italian surrender, and he didn’t think there would be much to do except perhaps help with the repatriation of Italian prisoners and try to stop the Albanians from massacring them. However, the swift movement of German troops into Albania made for a much tougher assignment, and although Tilman and his partisans did their best to slow the enemy’s progress by burning bridges and attacking garrisons, they were powerless to prevent the large-scale burning of villages that accompanied the German progress. With the onset of winter and lack of supplies, conditions became very bleak. Relief came when the Brotherton-Ratcliffe crew managed to get one supply load to them in mid-December and another at the end of the month. Bill Tilman described in his memoir what it was like being on the receiving end of a supply drop:

  “It was a heartening sight to see a big four-engine Halifax roar down the valley five- or six-hundred feet over the signal fires, drop its load, do a tight turn without troubling to gain height, and come back for its second r
un. As the plane turned, the navigation lights on the wings seemed almost to brush the hillside.”xii

  There were too many times though when the supply drop failed and the frustration and disappointment of the reception group was also felt by the crews, who had flown for hours, only to arrive at the drop zone and find no visibility, no signal fires, or the wrong letter of the day flashed to them from the ground. Sometimes the reception group lit dummy fires to divert enemy attention from the actual drop zone and the crew would need to be briefed not only on the correct signals, but also the dummies, which they would need to identify while controlling a low-level approach amidst shrouded mountain peaks. One of the most common medical problems suffered by pilots was visual fatigue, which is not surprising considering the level of concentration demanded of them, almost always in poor light.xiii The reception groups themselves were not always well organized as they waited furtively on the ground, exposing themselves to danger by lighting fires, only to then hear the heavy drone of the aircraft circling above a dense cloud bank. Sometimes the aircraft would fly on to a secondary target and then return to the original one for another try, only to find that the fires had burned out and the partisans had given up, thinking the aircraft had gone. Enemy spotter planes were always on the lookout for the scorched earth of burned-out signal fires, which added to the danger for the reception group and encouraged the location of dropping grounds to be as remote and inaccessible as possible. A DNCO4 in the logbook meant a failed operation, but that belied the effort and skill that a crew had put into the sortie, and, as they debriefed and headed for bed, the ground crew would get busy unloading the containers and bundles to prepare another aircraft for the next attempt. Each month a ‘league table’ would highlight success- or failure-rates for each crew, along with tables of tonnage dropped to each area and a breakdown of the reasons for failure – weather, mechanical, lack of signals, etc., all of which increased the pressure on the exhausted crews – nobody wanted to fail. These are fairly typical signals from the field: