Alexander Litvinenko

by Blowing Up Russia (lit)

  Chapter 7

  The FSB against the people So far the terrorists had not been identified, or rather they had been identified as not being Chechens. The failed bombing attempt in Ryazan prompted the public to think that the FSB might be behind the bombings. For the party of war this was just one more indication that a full-scale war in Chechnya ha to be started as soon as possible. The date of September 24 was no coincidence, for if the bombing in Ryazan had succeeded, Putin and the heads of all the military and law enforcement ministries were scheduled to make hard-line speeches in response.

  On September 24, like a chorus in some well-planned stage performance, Russian politicians began demanding war. Patrushev announced that the terrorists who blew up the apartment houses in Moscow were in Chechnya. We know this is a lie. Patrushev did not identify his sources, since he had none. Patrushev did not offer any proof. His press secretary Zdanovich had spoken only of the possible or probable withdrawal of the terrorists to Chechnya (or to the countries of the CIS). But Patrushev needed to start a war, and so he claimed that Chechnya had been transformed into a hotbed of terrorism.

  Rushailo claimed that organized crime inside and outside Russia had used the Chechen bridgehead to unleash a wide-reaching campaign of subversion against Russia& The agencies of law enforcement and the armed forces have adequate potential to defend the interests of Russia in the northern Caucasus& The federal forces are prepared to mount armed operations. In other words, the MVD was preparing to wage war against Chechnya as part of the effort to combat organized crime, including criminal groups. As though the fight against crime was going perfectly well on all the rest of Russia s territory!

  The situation in the northern Caucasus and the possible consequences for Russia were outlined by the chairman of the SF s security and defense committee, Alexander Ryabov, in an interview he gave to the newspaper Segodnia. In his opinion the world was undergoing a new geopolitical division under the cover of Muslim slogans. For Russia s enemies, the most important thing was to create a weak zone in Russia s soft underbelly. This theory is reminiscent of the conspiracy of the Elders of Zion, except that this time the elders are Muslim, not Jewish. A new geopolitical division of the world is serious business. It will take a serious war to sort it out.

  The newspaper Vek published an interview with the vice-president of a collegium of military experts, Alexander Vladimirov, who expressed the belief that the best solution right now would be a small victorious war in Chechnya. In his opinion the safety cordon around Chechnya proposed by Putin was a good idea, but it should be only the first step, since a cordon for its own sake is a pointless exercise. (Vladmirov s opinion must certainly have been noted, since they actually started with the second step, full-scale war.)

  108 Chapter 7

  109

  The final, decisive word in support of war was spoken by Prime Minister Putin in Astan: The Russian state does not intend to keep things on hold& The recent unprovoked attacks which have taken place against territories contiguous with Chechnya, the barbarous acts which have resulted in casualties among the peaceful population have set the terrorists not only outside the law but outside the framework of human society and modern civilization. Air strikes were taking place exclusively against the guerrillas bases, and this will continue wherever the terrorists may be located& We shall pursue the terrorists everywhere. And if, pardon my language, we catch up with them in the toilet, then we ll squelch them in the johns.

  The mood of the public in those days can best be characterized by the fact that after his inspired phrase about squelching them in the johns Putin s ratings actually improved.

  The propaganda campaign mounted by the supporters of war had produced the desired result. According to an opinion poll conducted by the All-Russian Central Public Opinion Institute (VTsIOM) almost fifty percent of Russians were convinced that the explosions in Russian cities had been carried out by Basaev s guerrillas and another thirty-three percent blamed the Vahhabites and their leader Khattab. Eighty-eight percent of the people questioned were afraid of falling victim to a terrorist attack. Sixty-four percent were in agreement that all Chechens should be deported, and the same proportion were in favor of the mass bombing of Chechnya.

  The bombings of the houses had broken down the resistance of public opinion. A small victorious war now seemed like the only natural response in the fight against terrorism.

  The stupefied country was not yet aware that the terrorists were not Chechens, and the war would be neither small nor victorious.

  Note the absolutely glaring lack of logic here. The Chechen leadership denies it was involved in the terrorist attacks. Zdanovich confirms that there are no Chechens among the culprits, but states that the terrorists have probably gone into hiding in Chechnya.

  This probably is enough to fit the terrorists up with a Chechen trail, which in turn provides a pretext for starting to bomb Chechnya. Aslan Maskhadov declares that he is willing to hold negotiations. But he is not heard. It is important for the FSB to drag Russia into a war as quickly as possible, so that the presidential election can be held against the background of a major armed conflict, and so that after the new president comes to power, he can inherit the war together with all the political consequences which it implies, i.e. the president s dependence on the structures of coercion. Only through war can the FSB finally seize power in the country. It is a simple little matter of a conspiracy with the goal of allowing the former KGB to seize power under the banner of the fight against Chechen terrorism. On October 4, the coup ended in victory for the conspirators.

  That was the day when Russian forces crossed the border of Chechnya. Most of the population of Russia supported the decision taken by former director of the FSB and now Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin; director of the FSB, Patrushev; and FSB general and head of the SB, Sergei Ivanov.

  109

  110

  During this difficult period for the Russian political elite, those who spoke out decisively against war defined their position. Novaya Gazeta should be named as one of the most principled opponents of war against the Chechen Republic: The KGB lieutenant colonel mouthing criminal jargon who finds himself by some miracle at the head of a great country, is losing no time in exploiting the effect produced. Any general or politician planning a military campaign always attempts to minimize the number of his enemies and maximize the number of his allies. Putin is deliberately bombing Grozny in order to make negotiations with Maskhadov impossible, in order to bury all of the regime s previous crimes under the bloody slaughter. The outgoing regime is attempting to use the crime currently in preparation-the genocide of the Chechen people-to bind the entire Russian people in blood, to make it the regime s accomplice and hostage. It is still not too late to call a halt on the road to Russia s destruction.

  Konstantin Titov, the governor of the Samara Region, believed that land operations in Chechnya were a catastrophe for Russia. I am no believer in purely coercive methods of resolving global problems. And in Samara I shall never allow the kind of ethnic purges they have in Moscow. (Konstantin Titov, of course, was not aware that during those days full preparations had been set in place for the bombing of an apartment house on Novovokzalnaya Street in Samara, but the FSB had halted the terrorist attacks after the fiasco in Ryazan).

  The mood of the apprehensive section of the democratic public at this time was described by the well-known Russian lawyer, Anatoly Kucheren:

  When the guns roar, the public prosecutors fall silent The clearest possible illustration is provided by the exercises conducted by the FSB in Ryazan. This act bears witness to the most profound degradation, primarily moral, of the Russian secret services. The secret services continue to think of themselves as a state within a state. Their leaders seem to think that they are not subject to any laws and act exclusively on the basis of political expediency, as they did in those glorious times when the agencies organized abductions and political assassinations in foreign states, created the legends for non-existe
nt anti-Soviet organizations, and wrote the scripts for show trials.

  The numerous spy cases of recent years (Platon Obukhov, Grigory Pasko, captain Nikitin), operation Face in the Snow, various unlawful acts committed on the eve of the presidential elections of 1996, such as the attempt to seal up the State Duma, the escapade in which members of the Russian army were recruited for the storming of Grozny by the forces of the so-called anti-Dudaev opposition in 1994-all of this bears witness to the fact that unlawful tendencies have remained a part of the activity of the secret services to this very day.

  One gets the impression that both the present party of power and the so-called opposition believe that Russia s democratic project is dead and buried. The authorities are not capable of imposing order founded in the law, it is beyond their ability to build a

  110

  111

  society governed by law. The alternative to a society governed by law is a bandit-andpolice state, a situation, that is, in which the actions of terrorists and bandits on the one hand and the agencies of law enforcement on the other are indistinguishable either in terms of their objectives or the methods they employ. Among the public the mass conviction is gaining ground that democracy has failed to deliver as a form of government.

  And since nothing has come of the democratic project, many political players are tempted to have done with it once and for all. So each of them pursues his own goals, but in objective terms the vectors of their efforts coincide. Some are frightened by the impending redistribution of property, some wish to avoid responsibility for committing unlawful acts, some see themselves as the new Bonaparte or Pinochet and are impatient to grasp the rudder with an iron hand.

  Government through democratic institutions has failed yet again in Russia. A time of rule by means of fear is beginning. A time of terror by both bandits and the state. Could this perhaps be the present regime s political project for Russia?

  While Kucheren formulated the apprehensions of the democratic section of the population, the goals and plans of the conspirators who successfully canvassed for the invasion of Chechnya were revealed on March 8, 2000, in the article The country needs a new KGB by State Duma deputy and former head of the SBP, Korzhakov: There is one feature of the preparations for the presidential elections which is of fundamental importance. In characterizing the number one candidate for the highest state position, Vladimir Putin, virtually no one expresses dissatisfaction at the fact that his background is in the secret services, more specifically, from deep within the KGB. Only a few years ago, it was impossible to imagine such a thing, but now public opinion is openly sympathetic to a politician who began his career in one of the secret services.

  Vladimir Putin s high rating is testimony first of all to the fact that people see him, a product of the KGB, as a politician capable of straightening the country out and organizing the work of all the power structures so that at long last we can really start to pull out of social and political crisis. The nomination of a former KGB officer for the highest state position gives me a reason once again to draw attention to certain aspects of the activities of the secret services and the roles they play in general at the present stage of our economic and political development&

  The well-known bombing incidents in houses in Moscow and other towns in the country which have resulted in the death of dozens of peaceful and entirely innocent people, the continuing export of the nation s wealth, the flourishing corruption in state structures, cases of slave-dealing and trading in children-all of this provokes the legitimate anger of our citizens. People ask in bewilderment: where are our secret services, which exist in order to fight this kind of phenomenon? We have enough manpower and secret services: the FSB, the MVD, GRU, SVR, FAPSI-all of these are capable of solving the most complex problems. The real problem is that the secret services act separately, like an open hand, not a clenched fist.

  111

  112

  There was a time when our democratic society was terribly frightened by the existence of the KGB. Then they decided to destroy the monster so that it would not be capable of any surprises. It seemed to some that it would be easier to control the activity of the secret services that way. However, the control did not turn out quite as they had intended and the co-ordination of action by the secret services didn t get very far. This is confirmed by the textbook mistakes and failures suffered in the fight against Chechen and international terrorists. Now even the most vehement opponents of the KGB are beginning to realize that the destruction of that structure has not produced anything useful. Alexander Solzhenitsyn was right when he remarked to a small circle of acquaintances that what we need now is the KGB.

  There is also another real factor. Nobody will ever voluntarily return our national wealth which has been stolen and exported to other countries. Not a single foreign special service will pass up a chance to acquire important secrets in science or other important areas if we do not block off their access to these secrets. Corruption will continue to exist just as long as the relevant services, whose job it is to expose bribe-takers, continue to act separately, each for itself. Stealing from the treasury will continue just as long as our laws remain humane towards those who love to stick their fingers into the state purse.

  In supporting Vladimir Putin s candidacy for the post of president our people are sending the authorities a signal, the meaning of which is perfectly clear: it is high time to gather the secret services together into a single fist and strike out with it at those who prevent us from building a normal life. Russia needs its own KGB! The time has come to speak of this without inhibition! Sharing this opinion, I believe that the first step on the path to the creation of a new Committee of State Security must be the formation of a Secret services Coordinating Committee attached to the Security Council and subordinated directly to the head of state. This will make it possible to formulate the structure of the future KGB and define its functions and objectives. If the Coordinating Committee were to be set up in the immediate future it would make possible a more effective solution to the problem of bringing illegally exported capital back into the country. I say this with confidence, since at one time the President s Security Service did start working along these lines and produced concrete results. The Service demonstrated in practice that bringing capital back into the country is not only necessary, but possible if the job is taken seriously.

  A second high-priority task is the fight against terrorism using specific methods and means, excluding the use of large-scale armed forces and deaths among the peaceful population. Nobody doubts that the Chechen and international terrorists will be destroyed. However, the terrorist threat will not disappear then. It should not be forgotten that in Chechnya a generation of young people has already grown up in conditions of war and hatred of Russians. The aspiration of today s young Chechen boys to avenge themselves on the offenders any way they can will find outlets not just inside Chechnya. It is no longer possible to use the army to combat local manifestations of terrorism, such possibilities have been exhausted. The secret services will be dealing with it.

  112

  113

  A third task is to expose cases of the illegal privatization of facilities of strategic importance and the contrived bankruptcy of factories, plants, and mines, so that they could be grabbed as private property. Experience has shown that we cannot manage without the participation of the secret services in this work either.

  Kucheren believed that Russia s woes were caused by a bandit-and-police state.

  Korzhakov claims that all of the misfortunes were due to the lack of a strong hand of power, since the secret services acted like an open hand, not a fist. Korzhakov suggested clenching the hand into a fist, setting up a Secret services Coordinating Committee and subordinating it to the secretary of the SB (FSB general Sergei Ivanov).

  We can assume that at the head of this new agency Korzhakov saw himself, since he emphasized that the SBP which he used to head had been working along exactly these lines and had
achieved concrete results. In other words, Korzhakov acknowledged that he abused his power and exceeded his official authority, which is regarded as a crime under Russian law and is punishable by imprisonment (Korzhakov s formal functions consisted of guarding the president and members of this family).

  This statement by Korzhakov alone makes it clear what the SBP was doing for all those years under Korzhakov s leadership and what Korzhakov himself was doing afterwards as a private individual with contacts in the structures of coercion. Let us call things by their real names. Having found themselves outside the structures of power and discharged from the secret services, Soskovets and the retired generals Korzhakov and Barsukov, with help from organized criminal structures which they had formerly used themselves, such as Stealth, attempted to become involved in the redistribution of property in Russia and establish control over businesses for purposes of personal gain. Their activities were funded by the Izmailovo organized criminal group. Underground and operational work was carried out by various different ChOPs. Information and propaganda backup were provided by a number of media outlets, either controlled or bought. Combat support was provided by organized criminal groups and individual fighters from the ranks of former employees of the special sections of the MO, FSB, and MVD.