The Great Divide

by Thomas Fleming

  In the newspapers, Secretary Hamilton, as Pacificus, continued his strenuous defense of the Proclamation of Neutrality. Congressman Madison struggled to answer him from Virginia, but he had no enthusiasm for the task and his essays were feeble. Hamilton’s attacks grew sharper when he learned that on July 4, Genet and his followers had founded a “Democratic Society” in Philadelphia. It was modeled on the Jacobin Clubs of Paris. The plan was to create similar groups throughout the nation to help change the public mind about the Proclamation of Neutrality.

  In Virginia, James Madison conferred with Senator James Monroe on plans to overturn the Proclamation in the next session of Congress. They were being advised in strictest secrecy by the Secretary of State. In Philadelphia, newsman Benjamin Franklin Bache turned his editorial guns on the Proclamation, calling it “a perfect nullity.” At another point he described it as a pact with the King of England.17

  With no warning, President Washington received an evening visit from Citizen Genet. He burst into the executive mansion to find the President chatting with his wife Martha and their good friend, Senator Robert Morris. Genet exchanged pleasantries for a few minutes and abruptly asked Washington if he could speak to him in private. Washington escorted him into a nearby room, and Genet poured out a torrent of words about his desire to win the President’s friendship.

  The envoy disowned all the harsh things being said against Washington in the newspapers. He believed Washington loved his country and also loved France and was convinced they could come to an understanding. Washington said barely a word. Finally, he escorted Genet to the door, where he calmly told the envoy that he seldom if ever read the newspapers and did not care what they said about him.

  Genet went back to his quarters convinced that he had charmed Washington into submission. The next morning, he rushed to Jefferson’s house to tell him the good news. As he started describing his triumph, the door swung open and in walked the President. Genet glanced at the Secretary of State, and then at Washington, hoping to hear an invitation to remain. Later, he said he would have given “a part of his life” to hear this friendly summons. But the President said nothing and the Secretary of State, with a slight movement of his hand, told the crestfallen envoy to leave.18

  An infuriated Genet told his superiors in Paris what he now thought of President Washington. He incidentally revealed his politically induced loathing for the fallen hero of two worlds, the Marquis de Lafayette. “Until now Washington has been depicted as friendly to France, simple, popular, the enemy of show. You have known Lafayette, well you have known Vasington… He is easy to approach but in reality he is haughty. His settled expression is always half smiling, he caresses you, but he is thinking of deceiving you…”19

  Supreme Court Chief Justice John Jay and two other justices responded to Washington’s request to define neutrality by politely explaining that such a task was beyond the court’s jurisdiction. It was a landmark decision in its own right, sharply defining the federal judiciary’s role. But it left to the president and his cabinet the task of spelling out the rules and regulations of neutrality. It also left to them a final decision on how to deal with Genet.

  Every attempt to discuss the envoy left Hamilton and Jefferson at angry odds. Backed by Secretary Knox, Hamilton still insisted the government should not pass up the opportunity to strike a blow, not only at Genet, but at his American supporters. Jefferson stonily maintained that this tactic would be a mistake; it would only further inflame everyone in America—and in France.

  On July 23, the President took charge of the meeting. Instead of putting the question on the table for further debate, he announced his decision. They would send the record of Genet’s inappropriate letters and actions to Paris, without publishing them in America. Along with this evidence, the Secretary of State would write a “temperate but strong” letter, emphasizing that the government blamed this unfortunate collision entirely on Genet, and suggest his immediate recall. Hamilton still disagreed. He saw much more at stake than Genet’s removal. He was convinced that Washington’s administration was in serious danger of being overthrown.20

  The Secretary of State just as strenuously backed the President’s proposal. The debate continued through two more cabinet meetings. Hamilton cited the activities of Philadelphia’s Democratic Society as further proof that there was an anti-Washington plot in the making. Jefferson maintained that the group was only interested in electing their candidate as governor of Pennsylvania, and after the election they would go out of business.

  Taking the offensive, Jefferson argued that publishing the government’s correspondence with Genet would reveal that there were disagreements in the cabinet. It was a virtual certainty that the garrulous diplomat would write a reply. Did they want him telling the American public that the President did not represent the people—that Washington was the head of a pro-English political party? As for Genet’s superiors in Paris, they would almost certainly feel that the publication was unkind. “Friendly nations usually negotiate little differences in private,” Jefferson said.

  The Secretary’s choice of the phrase “little differences” is rather startling, if Hamilton were correct about Genet encouraging Americans to overthrow their government. Jefferson tried to counter this claim by asserting that the Edict of Fraternity was being used to subvert only royal governments. It was an act of self- defense. There was simply no evidence that Genet was trying to do the same thing in America, which already had a republican government.

  At this point, Secretary of War Knox produced a copy of Freneau’s National Gazette. The front page featured a satiric article and cartoon, The Funeral Dirge of George Washington, in which the paper described the President being condemned for his aristocratic pretensions and thrust beneath the blade of a guillotine.

  Although Jefferson’s account of the incident in his Anas sneered at Knox’s “foolish incoherent sort of a speech,” the move was devastatingly effective. The President exploded into one of his awesome rages. He roared that he wished he had retired at the end of his first term and swore that he would rather be a simple farmer at Mount Vernon than be “emperor of the world.” That rascal Freneau still sent him three copies of his paper every day, as if he expected him to be his distributor. It was further proof that the chief purpose of this worthless sheet was “to insult him.”

  The cabinet sat in mortified silence for several minutes. Then, as he usually did after one of these detonations, the President resumed speaking in a calm, quiet voice. They would go ahead with a compilation of their correspondence with Genet and decide later whether to publish it in America or send it to Paris. Washington asked the Secretary of State to begin drafting the letter that would explain their unhappiness with the envoy to his superiors.

  The Secretary of State never admitted to himself or anyone else the whole truth about Genet: he was the personification of the French Revolution’s arrogant face in America. The current rulers in Paris presumed that the sovereignty of the United States was a mere blip in a worldwide tornado of enthusiasm for their empire of liberté. But Jefferson decided to give up on defending Citizen Genet. In private letters, he carefully spelled out to Madison and Monroe why they had to jettison the reckless envoy. On August 18, the Secretary of State sent Madison a copy of his message requesting Genet’s recall, and urged him to show it to Monroe.21

  A lot had been happening in American ports—all of it bad, from Jefferson’s point of view. In Boston, a judge had ordered the arrest of the French consul for using force to prevent a captured British ship from being returned to its owners. The consul denounced the judge, and the French frigate Concorde, which had captured the ship, flew from her masthead the names of eleven Bostonians who were proscribed as “aristocrats” and enemies of France. Genet wrote an open letter, calling on the republicans of Boston to acquit the consul, which they did, three times.22

  In New York, the French consul declared that any captured ship was as out of the reach of American jurisdiction as if
she were in a French harbor. At another point the New York consul described Jefferson as “this minister of a day and of a republic which owes us the light of day.” The consul wondered how the Secretary “dares to speak to men representing the most powerful nation on earth in the language of the old tyrants.”23

  These glimpses of the incredible arrogance of this phase of the French Revolution convinced Alexander Hamilton it was time to demolish Genet. The Secretary of the Treasury persuaded Chief Justice John Jay and Senator Rufus King to publish in a New York newspaper a report that Genet was threatening to appeal to the American people over the head of President George Washington.

  The story sent indignation simmering up and down the continent. Pledges of devotion to the President poured into Philadelphia from mass meetings in cities, towns, and villages everywhere. A frantic Genet demanded the right to sue the Chief Justice and the Senator for libel. Secretary of State Jefferson informed him that a foreigner had no right to sue anyone in an American court. Genet responded by publishing his letter and Jefferson’s answer.

  On August 25, the Secretary of State, acting as the anxious leader of the Democratic-Republican Party, wrote to James Monroe, who was more violently pro-French than Madison. “You will perceive by the enclosed [news] papers that Genet has thrown down the gauntlet to the President by the publication of his letter & my answer, and is…risking that disgust which I had so much wished could have been avoided. The indications from different parts of the continent are already sufficient to shew that the mass of the Republican interest has no hesitation to disapprove of this intermeddling by a foreigner…”24

  These are significant words. Genet was no longer a spokesman for the glorious French Revolution, the Secretary of State’s “polar star.” He was a menace to the success of the Democratic-Republican Party, and therefore must be discarded. This was the point that Jefferson wanted his chief lieutenants to make clear to everyone who shared their hope of future political power. To Monroe he lamented that he feared “the more furious Republicans” may “schismatize” with Genet. This was, among other things, evidence of the way Jefferson spoke of their new political party as if it were a religion.

  One of these furious schismatizing Republicans turned out to be Alexander James Dallas. Jay and King had cited him as the source of their story. Dallas denied he had ever heard Genet say anything about an appeal to the people against President Washington. But Jefferson, relying on what he had heard Dallas say in their month-ago meeting about the Little Sarah, told James Madison on September 1: “You will see much said and again said about G’s [Genet’s] threat to appeal to the people. I can assure you it is a fact.”25

  CHAPTER 15

  The Secretary of State Calls It Quits

  ON GEORGE WASHINGTON’S DESK, while the President and the cabinet were wrestling with the Genet crisis, was a letter from the Secretary of State, announcing that he wished to resign at the end of September. He reminded the President that he had intended to retire at the end of Washington’s first term, but “circumstances” had prompted “some of my friends” to persuade him to stay longer. Now he saw no obstacle to leaving by the proposed date.

  This letter was almost as curious as the third person message the Secretary of State had sent the President in early July. Jefferson made no mention of Washington’s earlier attempts to persuade him not to resign; nor is there even a hint of apology to the man who was bearing by far the greater burden in the government. The coolness that was permeating their relationship was all too evident.

  The Secretary added that the circumstances that had persuaded him to stay had now “abated” and he wanted—or needed—to seek “scenes of greater tranquility.” Jefferson was referring to the attacks on him by Hamilton and his allies; they had now shifted their verbal artillery to Genet as a better target. The Secretary was speaking as the leader of the Democratic-Republican Party, and the tranquility he sought might be better described as cover. For the time being, the Federalists were in the ascendant and Jefferson saw no point in staying around as a probable target.

  On August 6, the President rode out to Jefferson’s country house hoping to change his mind. Washington began by revealing that Alexander Hamilton had also told him he wanted to resign. His growing family made life on a federal salary more and more difficult. The President reminded Jefferson that he had accepted another term with reluctance. He was not happy to find that he was about to lose two of his chief advisors.

  The Secretary of the Treasury had promised to stay until the end of the next Congressional session, which would begin in December 1793 and end in March or April 1794. Would Jefferson do likewise? His advice might be helpful in dealing with this new Congress. The President did not mention what they both knew—that the Democratic-Republicans would probably have a majority in the House of Representatives, as well as almost equal strength in the Senate.

  Jefferson responded with a veritable jeremiad on his “repugnance for public life.” He found service in Philadelphia caused him “particular uneasiness” because much of his time he was forced to associate with the wealthy leaders of the city’s society and their wives—a circle that “I know to bear me peculiar hatred.” He despised these “aristocrats and merchants closely associated with England with their “paper fortunes” and their penchant for spreading stories about him “to my injury.”

  Jefferson said nothing about his repeated disagreements with Alexander Hamilton. That may surprise some who subscribe to the widely held belief that Washington had constantly favored Hamilton in these disputes. An examination of the record shows the President sided with Jefferson at least as often as he favored Hamilton. This was especially true in the Genet affair.

  The Secretary of State assured the President that the new Congress would be basically loyal to him. Jefferson said he had had no communication with “what is called the Republican Party” since the last Congress met, but he was sure there was no desire to oppose the President’s leadership. All they might want to do was make Congress “independent.” He added that many Republicans were embarrassed by Genet, but most of them would abandon the envoy when they gave further thought to “the nature of his conduct.” Quite simply, there was “no crisis” in that quarter—no one in America wanted to overthrow the government.

  The President told Jefferson he was ready to believe the views of his followers were “perfectly pure.” But he worried that it was not easy, once men “put a machine in motion” to stop it where they wanted it. Washington reiterated his satisfaction with their present Constitution and again dismissed the idea that there was a plot to change the government into a monarchy. If such a movement ever appeared, there is no man who would “set his face against it more decidedly” than him.

  The Secretary of State intervened to say no “rational man” suspected Washington of “any other disposition.” But a week did not pass in which “we cannot prove” there was a “monarchical party” calling the government a “milk and water thing” which must be knocked down to create one with more energy. The President could barely control his exasperation at finding that the Secretary of State still nursed this conviction. If such people existed, Washington said, it was “proof of their insanity.”1

  They turned to discussing a possible successor. Washington said his first choice was James Madison, but he was sure there was no hope of persuading him. He had already approached Chief Justice John Jay, hoping to profit from his experience as Secretary for Foreign Affairs under the old Congress. But he preferred to stay in his judicial robes. They discussed a number of other men without finding anyone who satisfied the President’s requirements.

  With a sigh, Washington suggested a compromise. Would Jefferson agree to stay until the end of December? That would get them through the first weeks of the new Congress, and by that time France would almost certainly have recalled Genet. In Europe, the French might well win a decisive victory against their royalist attackers—or vice versa. Either way, it would make for a more peaceful world
.

  The Secretary of State advanced another clause in the emerging contract. Could he go home to Monticello in September for three or four weeks? The President quickly agreed—and gave Jefferson a few days to say yes to the final arrangement.

  Five days later, Jefferson attached a detailed report of this interview to a long letter to James Madison. It was the second letter Jefferson wrote to him that day (August 11, 1793). He called the letters and the interview “timely information” which might help in formulating plans for “the state of things which is actually to take place” when Congress met in December. He insisted the report must be “sacredly kept to yourself unless you have an opportunity of communicating…to Monroe.” This abrupt about-face after assuring Washington he had had “no communication” with the Democratic-Republican Party makes it all too obvious that Thomas Jefferson had become a passionate player of power politics.

  Crisply, almost bluntly, he gave Madison his recommendations for the coming session of Congress. He hoped the lawmakers would agree to divide the Treasury Department into two “equal chiefs,” one to supervise the customs, the other to oversee internal taxes. That would eliminate Alexander Hamilton’s accumulating power. A declaration of the true sense of the Constitution in regard to the Bank of the United States, even if it were made only by the House of Representatives, would suffice to divorce that entity from the government. Jefferson also urged a vote to censure Hamilton on some of the Treasury’s practices that had emerged in the failed investigation by Congressman William Branch Giles.

  As for the Proclamation of Neutrality—Jefferson told Madison to junk his plans for attacking it. Genet’s antics had all but guaranteed that the “great body of the people” desired neutrality in the war between Britain and France. It would also be political suicide to “find fault with the President”—especially in regard to the Proclamation. In New York, when Genet went there to greet the French fleet, the vote at a “full [public] meeting of all classes” was nine out of ten against the diplomat. In Congress, therefore, it will be “true wisdom” for the Democratic-Republican Party “to approve unequivocally of a state of neutrality…. In this way we shall keep the people on our side by keeping ourselves in the right.”