EXTREME PREJUDICE: The Terrifying Story of the Patriot Act and the Cover Ups of 9/11 and Iraq

by Susan Lindauer

  Mega U.S. Oil Corporations shuddered in dismay when the LUKoil contract was announced. Even promises that U.S. corporations could compete for second and third tier sub-contracts for development of the West Qurna field could not alter the blow that Russia’s priority status would cause for U.S. shareholders. It locked into place a structure for oil rights in Iraq that would seriously crimp the long term earning potential of politically connected corporations like Halliburton and Chevron Texaco, which had been eyeing Iraq’s oil potential for a decade. LUKoil agitated Washington.

  Contrary to rhetoric in the European media, however, France, Russia and China weren’t the only recipients of bountiful reconstruction contracts. A substantial offering was made covertly to the United States, as well.

  And the CIA was determined to drive a hard bargain.

  As early as October 2000, Iraq signaled a desire to negotiate a “comprehensive resolution to its conflict with the United States that would be mutually beneficial to both parties,”116 according to U.N. Ambassador Saeed Hasan.

  Central to those discussions, before back channel talks kicked off, Iraq agreed in principle to accept the return of U.N. weapons inspectors, a ground-breaking shift in Baghdad’s policy, and a major break in the deadlock over Iraq’s disarmament. The CIA accepted the talks with that understanding upfront. Notably, Baghdad’s acquiescence occurred fully 18 months before the world community learned of Iraq’s commitment to resume inspections.

  To be fair, as of November and December 2000, Baghdad hoped to structure the new agreement in such a way as to prevent the belligerent and insulting behavior practiced by Richard Butler’s inspection teams before the 1998 pullout.117 At the start of talks, Iraq wanted a statement of intent that U.N. inspectors would behave with a modicum of respect for their host, without racial slurs against Arab culture or mockery of the suffering of Iraq’s people, which was endemic to the previous inspections.

  There was legitimate basis for Baghdad’s concern. I myself overheard derogatory remarks about the Iraqi people in the United Nations cafeteria in New York, of all places. One such conversation between U.S. and British diplomats scorned the deaths of Iraqi children, and ended with laughter. So I know racial insults were fairly common. Baghdad demanded that UN bureaucrats should behave like professionals.

  Above all, Iraq wanted to establish a mechanism for lifting the sanctions as compliance moved forward, so that any new round of weapons inspections could not continue indefinitely, as before, without acknowledging substantial proof of Baghdad’s cooperation and verification of disarmament.

  Over and over, Iraqi diplomats fretted how the U.S. would respond when they found no weapons of mass destruction. How could Iraq compel the United Nations to accept the evidence that there was no weapon stocks left to destroy? What would happen next? How could Iraq make sure the U.N. would follow through to end the sanctions?

  There was so much despair over those questions, and so much distrust, that I knew in my heart no illegal weapons would be found in Iraq. To lighten up the conversation, I would tease diplomats that Baghdad should buy weapons from Iran (formerly Iraq’s mortal enemy), and import them through Syria (another mortal enemy). When the weapons got to the Iraqi border, the Foreign Ministry should call a press conference and officially unveil them, with the announcement that Baghdad was turning them over to the United Nations, because weapons inspectors refused to go away empty handed. The Iraqis could say to the United Nations— “Now you have your weapons! We have bought them especially for you. Go away! And leave us in peace!”

  But it was actually a very serious problem in the structuring of sanctions policy. Sanctions presumed that at all times Iraq would have illegal weapons that should be turned over to the United Nations. Once Iraq stopped possessing weapons— and thus stopped turning them over to U.N. inspections teams— Baghdad fell into a state of Non-Compliance.

  In a perverse twist, Iraq’s inability to hand over WMDs amounted to a violation of the Security Council Resolutions. Nothing in sanctions policy established procedures for what to do next. Because of the rigidity of the policy design, the U.N. bureaucracy could not adjust to that shift in reality. Suspiciously too, the oversight of Iraqi affairs had become a full scale bureaucracy at the United Nations, with high profile jobs and six figure salaries in New York and Geneva. The bureaucracy had a competing purpose— to protect its own job security. U.N. bureaucrats had every incentive to perpetuate sanctions indefinitely.

  It’s unforgivably obscene, if you consider the humanitarian purpose and ideology of the United Nations. But that’s how it was done.

  There was a second problem. Like all sanctions regimens, the nature of its rigidity eliminated any possibility of quid pro quo in talks. It forced an all or nothing solution, blocking intermediary steps that ordinarily would have been implemented to move out of deadlock. Thus, unhappily, the goal of resuming weapons inspections struck many diplomats as impossible to achieve. Iraq would have to forsake its national pride to comply. Meanwhile, the U.S. demanded exceedingly tough standards for access and transparency, which Iraq complained was burdensome beyond the scope dictated by the Security Council. At the end of the day, very few world-class diplomats wanted to stake their reputations to resolve this headache for the international community.

  Just like negotiations for the Lockerbie Trial, that meant the field was wide open for a third party back channel to kick start the process— if someone could be found who was not intimidated by impossible constraints and overwhelming odds against success.

  As it happened, this was just my cup of tea. I had already run this obstacle course in back-channel negotiations for the Lockerbie Trial. Persuading Libya to hand over its two men for Trial was considered impossible, too, for all the same reasons. So I understood the expectations—and my limitations and boundaries. We would get this process unstuck, and solidify Baghdad’s commitment to resume the weapons inspections. Then the preliminary agreement would get handed back to the United Nations, so that legal staff could ratify the agreement in technical language.

  The U.N. would claim victory. Congress would pontificate. And we would watch our success from the sidelines, while others strutted on CNN and the FOX News Channel. All of my glory would go to others— most of them ignorant of how our process of conflict resolution actually worked.

  Straight off Lockerbie, I was genuinely enthusiastic and eager to help, nevertheless. I saw this as a unique and precious opportunity to contribute to my values. I grieved for the suffering of the Iraqi people. And I was willing to assume the political risk. I was fully committed to seeing it through to the end, with the greatest hope that Baghdad’s humanitarian crisis would come to an end once and for all

  And so I grabbed the opportunity with a full heart. I rolled up my sleeves and got to work. I swore to my CIA handler, Dr. Fuisz that anything Washington wanted from Baghdad, I would make sure it got.

  In fact, I was very well-positioned to carry this project forward. As a long-time Asset, I had fairly unique access to Iraq’s senior diplomats in New York. And I had all the right contacts on the Security Council to help me, as well.

  Of all the diplomats at the United Nations whom I was privileged to meet, Dr. Saeed Hasan, Iraq’s Ambassador to the U.N., stood out as the most courageous and highly moral individual that I encountered. Dr. Hasan was fully dedicated at all times to decision making that would protect the future of Iraq’s children.

  Most importantly, by this time, Dr. Hasan had been stationed in New York for seven years as Iraq’s Ambassador and former Deputy Ambassador. As such, Dr. Hasan recognized the scope of commitments necessary for Baghdad to get out from under sanctions. Critically, he accepted the personal risk of delivering that message to Saddam Hussein, at a time when the proposal to resume inspections was still highly controversial in Baghdad.118 Ambassador Hasan understood the greater issue of disarmament for the West. Yet he was fiercely protective of Iraq’s sovereignty. This solution to this quagmire was only possible becau
se of Dr. Hasan. He broke the deadlock.

  In October, 2000, when Iraq indicated it was ready to discuss a “comprehensive settlement on all outstanding issues,” Dr. Hasan communicated that offering through my back channel to Dr. Fuisz and Hoven. From them, it reached the upper echelons of CIA and other concerned parties in the Intelligence Community.

  All agreed that after the November, 2000 Presidential Election, I could take up the weapons inspections with Ambassador Hasan. My role would be to persuade Iraq to accept the rigorous demands for compliance and transparency dictated by the United States. According to CIA conditions, I would have no part in determining what those technical standards should be. I would push Iraq to accept U.S. demands in all areas. I would not criticize U.S. demands publicly or in private conversations. My remarks would be limited to demanding that Iraq satisfy Washington before sanctions could be lifted.

  Most critically, it would be a fixed price. There would be no haggling. The U.S. would define the terms. Iraq would have to agree “with no conditions,” on all matters.

  The CIA was hot for a public victory. Most critically, U.S. Intelligence wanted to show its European allies that Washington had stolen back control of the endgame. That marked a huge success for the Americans. By usurping control of the agenda for ending sanctions, the CIA could play both sides. The CIA could force Iraq to submit to disarmament verification, while preventing Baghdad from punishing Washington for the deaths of one million Iraqi children under the age of 5.

  Weapons inspections remained paramount; but Iraq’s sweetheart deals in Europe and Asia created a new imperative that U.S. Intelligence was determined to rebalance.

  The CIA would move heaven and earth to protect market access for U.S. corporations in any post-sanctions period.

  And so, in November, 2000, while votes in Florida were still getting counted, I sat down with Dr. Hasan at the Ambassador’s House in New York to hold preliminary talks on resuming the weapons inspections.

  The meetings in November and December, 2000 culminated in a letter to Vice President Elect Richard Cheney, dated December 20, 2000.

  At this stage, the Presidential Election continued to be a cliff-hanger. No one had a clue whether the Democrats or Republicans would win the White House. The return of weapons inspectors to Iraq would be gift-wrapped for either of the two Presidential contenders, Vice President Al Gore or Texas Governor George W. Bush, with no party favoritism in the outcome.

  By the Inauguration, the CIA expected to hand the new President the first foreign policy victory of his Administration, comparable to the release of the American hostages from the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, as President Ronald Reagan was sworn into office. The new White House could tout a major foreign policy achievement from a problem left over by the outgoing Administration. It would launch an image of muscular leadership on the world stage, for the new President.119

  All of my U.S. intelligence contacts expected gratitude from the new White House. With those expectations, we mapped out a framework for action required by Iraq.

  First and foremost, Iraq would have to accept the return of weapons inspectors and maximum transparency to verify disarmament.

  Secondly, Baghdad would be required to cooperate with U.S. counter-terrorism goals on a number of ongoing projects.

  Thirdly, Iraq would have to guarantee reconstruction contracts for U.S Corporations, post-sanctions. All U.S. Corporations engaged in non-military production before the first Gulf War would have to be authorized to re-enter Baghdad, and perform at the same level of market share as they enjoyed prior to 1990. Iraq’s commitment to U.S. Corporations would have to be publicly declared and ratified to authenticate the understanding.

  Does all that seem impossible?

  In fact, my efforts proved far more successful than currently understood. The CIA had floated these conditions to Baghdad before agreeing to the talks. Iraq had already issued a general affirmative response before the meetings started.120

  Notably, Iraq’s Ambassador, Dr. Hasan swore that “the conversation would be short, because Baghdad was fully committed to complying with all current U.S. demands.” It would take “only a couple of weeks to hammer out the details, and no longer,” he assured the U.S. in the December 20 letter to Vice President-elect Richard Cheney.121 Ambassador Hasan declared that he was authorized to say Baghdad would welcome “covert or non-covert talks with any U.S. official in New York or anywhere in the world.”

  Infamously, newly appointed Secretary of State Colin Powell jumped on the Iraqi promise of a quick agreement on “all current U.S. demands,” telling Congress that any talks on weapons inspections “would be a short conversation.” In doing so, Secretary Powell was paraphrasing the Iraqi Ambassador.

  There was one great surprise for all of us. Newly elected President Bush appointed Andrew Card, my second cousin on my father’s side, to serve as White House Chief of Staff. That was unexpected. Critically, it must be understood that the decision to engage in covert, back channel talks was reached two months before Card’s appointment. Planning for the talks, and my first two meetings with Dr. Hasan occurred several weeks before Card’s appointment was announced. I cannot underscore enough that back channel talks never depended on my cousin’s promotion.

  It was sheer fate that all of my correspondence detailing the progress of our talks to resume weapons inspections got addressed to Andy Card. In a practical sense, he filled the role of a “picture frame” for correspondence intended for the White House, CIA and national security apparatus. That satisfied one of Iraq’s chief concerns that communications should be addressed to policymakers—not the Intelligence Community. By January, 2003, that portfolio totaled 11 letters to Andrew Card, jointly received by the CIA.

  The stage was set for victory.

  To the surprise of all, President Bush had other plans. Shortly after his Inauguration, on February 16, 2001 he ordered the bombing of Baghdad.

  Instead of a “short conversation” and “fast resolution,” preliminary talks on resuming weapons inspections dragged on another year. When the U.S. could pose no more hypothetical obstacles, FBI records show that in February, 2002, I delivered the agreement to the U.N. Security Council.

  In fairness, at the start of the Bush Presidency, the Administration’s war agenda remained hidden from the American public and significant parts of the Intelligence Community. Assets like me had no comprehension of the depths of President Bush’s determination to lead the world into War with Iraq.

  And so, despite the February 2001 bombing, our back channel talks continued with senior Iraqi diplomats, albeit more slowly. Dr. Hasan ended his tenure as Ambassador to the United Nations and returned home to take up the post of Deputy Foreign Minister. No matter. Iraq’s new Foreign Minister, Naji Sabri, approved of the dialogue, and received communications about all meetings in Baghdad. My talks continued with other senior diplomats— Salih Mahmoud, Saad Abdul Rahmon and Abdul Rahmon Mudhian, whom Baghdad assigned to handle these dynamic communications. Our dialogue stayed highly productive.

  At no time did Andy Card demand that I shut down my project, or cease functioning as an Asset or back channel to Baghdad. There was definite subterfuge by the Pro War cabal at the White House, regarding its intentions towards Iraq. They kept me in the dark, while I continued to perform faithfully.

  One sees now the dilemma faced by the Intelligence Community, as it tried to serve this President. In retrospect, the world fully grasps how diplomacy posed a significant threat to the vanity of unilateralism in the Bush Administration. One sees too late that George W. Bush was a suspicious and impotent leader, who dissembled to disguise his personal weakness. He did not understand the strategic value of solving problems to maintain U.S. control of a situation. Solving problems was never his strength. So he kept everyone else off balance, in order to maintain control.

  But in the opening months of his Administration, the Intelligence Community could be forgiven for the difficulties it faced trying to figure out thi
s new master.

  Campaign rhetoric throughout the 2000 Election emphasized Bush’s non-interventionist philosophy of foreign affairs. The Bush family had close relationships with the Arab-American community, and received a king’s ransom of campaign funds from them. Indeed, the Bush family had longstanding ties to Saudi oil. Throughout the campaign, Bush Jr. emphasized fiscal moderation. Nobody expected George Bush to be a “buck burning” President.

  For its part, the Intelligence Community saw with great clarity that the international community was ready to throw off U.N. sanctions on Iraq, and seize all those tantalizing reconstruction contracts for itself, worth tens of billions of dollars in revenues and jobs.

  Over time, the Intelligence community would come to recognize President Bush’s leadership ineptitude, and experience real frustration over the burdens posed by his weakness. In the meantime, problems had to be solved.

  If the United States stood down from a leadership role in problem-solving, then other nations and coalitions would assert their own leadership and policy direction. That would have shut out Washington, which the CIA considered folly under any circumstance. Allowing American influence to collapse in a vacuum of White House leadership would have been a radical failure for U.S. policy in the Middle East.

  In the first term of the Bush Administration, the CIA still functioned well enough to recognize that paradigm, and act on it. And so U.S. Intelligence made sure that my interaction with Iraq was heavily supervised. The CIA exercised fierce control over the agenda in all parts, and demanded that I must not challenge whatever extra demands Washington chose to impose on Baghdad. In exchange for my unquestioning obedience to the U.S. agenda, I could work towards suspending the U.N. sanctions.