EXTREME PREJUDICE: The Terrifying Story of the Patriot Act and the Cover Ups of 9/11 and Iraq

by Susan Lindauer

  Equally disappointing, Ambassador Agam was also returning to Malaysia. His distinguished career in diplomacy had been rewarded by a much deserved invitation for Malaysia to head the Non-Aligned Movement (N.A.M.), with Ambassador Agam holding a top Secretarial post. Malaysia was scheduled to host a meeting of the N.A.M. in Kuala Lumpur in February.

  Rani Ali would be leaving New York in just days. At our final lunch, he offered some critical parting advice,245 which I took seriously to heart.

  The most urgent question now, Rani Ali argued, was how to get the United States out of its corner, so that Washington could embrace the world position for peace and still come out declaring victory. The U.S. had to appear triumphant.

  In this phase, Rani Ali urged me to go back to Baghdad, and look for anything more that I could get for the United States to close that deal.

  I agreed wholeheartedly. On my walk up Third Avenue to the Iraqi Embassy on East 79th Street, I thought about different possibilities.

  There was talk that Iraq had cancelled the LUKoil contract with Russia for development of the West Qurna Oil fields, containing 8 billion to 10 billion barrels of oil.246

  With profound apologies to Russia, I recognized that if I could persuade Iraq to offer a major first-tier oil concession to the United States, it might push us over the top to lock in a peace agreement. What can I say? I had to examine every possible opportunity. Frankly I cringed to hear that Iraq had pulled LUKoil’s rights to develop that oil field. It hurt my efforts that Iraq should renege on its contractual commitments to Russia or any other country for post-sanctions reconstruction or oil development. It was important that U.S. corporations must be able to trust Iraqi promises, as part of lifting sanctions. If Baghdad would break its agreements with Russia or France, both outspoken opponents of sanctions policy, what would they do to the U.S., which had tormented them for 13 years?

  See the problem? Still, LUKoil gave me an edge. I wasted no time raising the possibility with Iraqi diplomats that afternoon on December 21, 2002.

  It’s important to clarify that I’m the one who decided to ask for the LUKoil contract. Rani Ali did not suggest that I take it. That was my own idea.

  Iraqi diplomats seized on my suggestion immediately.

  On January 8, 2003, I made a final appeal for peace to my dear second cousin, White House Chief of Staff Andy Card.247

  Reminding him about my special contacts with Iraqi diplomats, I offered to secure the LUKoil contract for the United States. I made sure Andy understood the U.S. could definitely have the West Qurna field. However, if the White House did not want it, I hoped Baghdad could restore Russia’s contractual rights.

  The purpose of my letter was greater than the LUKoil contract, however. I made clear that I would use my back-channel access to get anything more the United States wanted from Baghdad, so the Bush Administration could be satisfied in accepting a non-military solution to this (non) conflict.248

  My letter on January 8, 2003 provided a devastating forecast of the dangers of invading and occupying Iraq.249

  “My dearest cousin, this War with Iraq will hurt us, too. In six weeks or six months, it won’t matter. Because when it hits, it will hit so hard it will not matter that there was ever a delay. The Iraqi people hate Americans, no matter what they think of Saddam. When I was in Baghdad last March, more than one Imam swore to me their people would tear off the arms and legs of American soldiers, and decapitate them, and drag their bodies through the streets. They swore their women would fight, too.”

  “Once the U.S. bombing starts, the Iraqi exiles will have no credibility as leaders. None whatsoever. They will be hated as pawns of the United States, and my God, let me tell you, Arabs can hate. A U.S. victory will never be sweet for long.”

  “Above all, you must realize that if you go ahead with this invasion, Osama bin Laden will triumph, rising from his grave of seclusion. His network will be swollen with fresh recruits, and other charismatic individuals will seek to build on his model, multiplying those networks. And the United States will have delivered the death blow to itself. Using your own act of war, Osama and his cohorts will irrevocably divide the hearts and minds of the Arab Street from moderate governments in Islamic countries that have been holding back that tide. Power to the people, what we call “democracy,” will secure the rise of the fundamentalists. And before the next Presidential election, Andy, it will become a disaster.”

  “You are in my prayers. Let me help you. Please.”

  Warning Secretary Powell before his U.N. Speech

  Andy Card was not the only White House official whom I approached to outline opportunities for peace in January, 2003.

  By happy chance, Secretary of State Colin Powell lived next door to my CIA handler, Dr. Richard Fuisz in McLean, Virginia.250

  For years I’d been told that soldiers appreciate peace more than ordinary people, because they understand what battle actually costs. They understand what it means to ask men to die, and to send men to kill. They understand the sacrifice for soldier families, and the price of destruction unleashed on the community by their weapons. As General Wesley Clark said, you don’t go to War unless there’s “absolutely, absolutely, absolutely no other way.”251

  War should be a last resort when all other options fail.

  With that understanding, many of us in the anti-war community pinned our hopes on Secretary Powell. A retired four-star General and Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the outside it appeared that Secretary Powell had serious doubts about the necessity and consequences of a War with Iraq. We all hoped the wisdom of his extraordinary military experience might persuade civilians running the Pentagon to slow down and give peace a chance.

  Concerned that Secretary Powell might not have access to the full range of peace options before the War, I decided to approach Powell at his home on January 8, 2003—the same day that I delivered my 11th letter to Andy Card. In the package for Secretary Powell, I included several of my earlier progress reports to Andy Card on our talks to resume the weapons inspections, including Iraq’s response to the 9/11 attack, dated September 24, 2001—and the comprehensive peace framework dated December 2, 2001.252

  I advised Secretary Powell that the peace framework continued to be viable and productive.

  On January 27, 2003, I returned a second time— just a few days prior to Secretary Powell’s infamous speech at the United Nations on February 5, 2003. In greater detail than before, I advised him that Iraq’s enthusiasm for the inspections was so strong during the preliminary talks from November 2000 to March 2002 that it was unlikely Iraq might be hiding Weapons of Mass Destruction.253

  This message was not ambiguous.

  On January 27, 2003, I told Secretary Powell:

  “If what you claim is really what you want, this is a viable framework that would allow President Bush to declare a moral victory for his leadership. Working from a formidable position of power, having soldiers ready in the Gulf, the White House could achieve a victory without going to War.”

  “What I have to say next will be more aggravating, but I have an obligation to advise you.”

  “Given that Iraq has tried for two years to hold covert talks with the United States, with the promise of immediately resuming weapons inspections, there’s a very high probability that Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction. Forget what the Iraqi Opposition has told you. They’re famous liars, and most desperate to engage the United States in their protection. You can’t kill 1.7 million people and return home after a vicious bombing campaign to a great parade.”

  “No, Iraq emphasized for more than a year before Kofi Annan got involved, that Baghdad would jump at the chance to prove to the world they had no weapons. At any moment Iraq was ready for those inspections to begin, and that says to me that they felt always they had nothing to hide. They simply insisted that without U.S. support for the plan, it would have no benefits or meaning for resolving tensions. Current events have proved that they were right.”
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br />   “Don’t deceive yourself, Mr. Secretary that War would have no costs. Believing your own rhetoric at this moment would be the most rash and incendiary mistake. Fighting street battles searching for Saddam would entail deadly risks for U.S. soldiers. No matter what Iraqis think of Saddam, the common people hate the U.S. for sanctions and bombings, and they would consider it traitorous to help you. Under these circumstances, the brutality necessary to win this war would be consumption for the entire Arab world. It would produce a disastrous period of occupation. The Iraqis have fought occupations before. They would strike back wherever possible.”

  “Outside Iraq, Islamists would point to the failure of west-leaning leaderships to protect the Iraqi people. Fundamentalists would seize on that failure to force concessions for their strict cause. There would be a shift to the will of the people alright. No wonder Iran has been chuckling to itself. Iran and Osama— not the United States—would be the greatest victors in this war. The Arab Street would rush to their side.” (Yes, I called the rise of Iran, here and in other papers.)

  “Please let me help you. You can still achieve a greater victory, Mr. Secretary, and maintain the force of America’s moral authority in the world’s eye. The objectives of the Bush Administration can be achieved without igniting terrorist revenge and international boycotts. Or destroying political alliances in the War on Terrorism. Or forcing massive deficit spending that will prolong the U.S. recession and scare the hell out of Wall Street and the Middle Class. Or starting a Holy War—which this would become.”

  Well, OK jury. What do you think?

  Were those the words of a “foreign agent provocateur?” Does my analysis qualify as “treason?”

  Actually, I believe I offered a rational argument worthy of Secretary Powell’s consideration. As a long-time U.S. Asset covering the Iraqi Embassy at the United Nations, I had unique, primary access to special information that could benefit his decision-making. It was appropriate that I should take action to make sure he was formally advised of it. A military commander entrusted with the welfare of hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers needs as much input to define his options as possible. In this situation, Washington could have demanded anything from Baghdad, and got it all, without engaging in battle. The U.S. could have demonstrated victory without the hell of War and Occupation— a sort of “unconditional surrender,” without sacrificing U.S. soldiers or destroying the lives of Iraqi civilians.

  And so I think my action was legitimate, so long as my language demonstrated proper respect for Secretary Powell’s seniority and stature, which I certainly tried to do.

  Notably, in 2007, the Senate Intelligence Committee singled out the “outstanding quality” of intelligence reporting in January, 2003, calling it “one of the few bright spots” in Pre-War Intelligence.254 The Senate Committee listed the specific warnings that I detailed in my January letters to Andy Card and Secretary Powell in its citation.

  Senator John Warner (R-Virginia) called it “chilling and prophetic.”

  As for Secretary Powell’s ability to identify me as an Asset, my CIA handler, Dr. Fuisz was Secretary Powell’s next door neighbor—and a well recognized member of the intelligence community. My relationship with Dr. Fuisz was easily discovered. Either a quick background check or a simple google search on the internet would have turned up our link together on Lockerbie. My knowledge of Secretary Powell’s home address had to come from next door. It’s not rocket science.

  All of that makes it difficult to understand why Secretary Powell should have turned his copies of the Andy Card letters over to the FBI.—something he surely forgot when he gave his infamous interview to Barbara Walters in September, 2005.255

  In that extraordinary sit-down exclusive that aired on “20/20”, Secretary Powell excoriated mid-level bureaucrats at the CIA—not the top dogs, but mid-level bureaucrats— for not warning him in late January 2003, before his notorious speech at the U.N.— that claims about Iraq’s weapons capacity were not realistic or substantiated. His Deputy, Richard Armitage likewise complained bitterly that no one had the courage or foresight to warn Secretary Powell off the bad intelligence that laid the foundation for his remarks at the United Nations.

  Nobody except me.

  And I got arrested for it.

  As they say, no good deed goes unpunished in Washington.

  But I was stupefied when I heard Colin Powell’s complaint to Barbara Walters. It was an appalling lie. There’s serious question as to whether General Powell violated his oath of military service to the detriment of the welfare of U.S. soldiers, when he made that false declaration. I think he should face a court-martial to answer for it. By then, I was gagged by the indictment, and locked up tight on Carswell Air Force Base. I could say nothing, while the Good General whitewashed the blood and dirt off his reputation.

  Ah, but I’m getting ahead of myself.

  I was blessedly ignorant of the dark outlook for my future. I carried on my anti-war outreach to Capitol Hill and the United Nations in New York as passionately as ever.

  Syria and Malaysia—The World’s Best Hope for Peace

  The departures of Rani Ali and Ambassador Agam from the Malaysia Embassy did not handicap my efforts in New York, fortunately. Over the years I had cultivated widespread sources at the United Nations. With the storm of War darkening the horizon, I made every effort to use all of them. With the help of Rani Ali, I tracked down phone and fax numbers for every Ambassador’s office256 in the U.N. General Assembly.

  By January, I was bombarding senior diplomats at the U.N. with appeals to support peace. FBI wire taps prove I lit up phone lines all over the Security Council and key embassies.

  I argued that the existing peace framework addressed all parts of the conflict, and thus rendered War with Iraq avoidable and unnecessary.

  What we needed was the technical language to ratify Baghdad’s offerings to the United States—257 just like we’d done with weapons inspections and the Lockerbie Trial.

  In January and February, 2003, I floated an idea that the United Nations should draft Ambassador Agam—who had 30 + years of senior diplomacy under his belt— to lead a “working group” into Baghdad.

  Recently, Syria had taken a non-permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. In a letter to Syria’s Ambassador Wehbe on February 3, 2003, I wrote:258

  “Many more opportunities for diplomacy exist even now. I urge Syria and other peace-seeking nations on the Security Council to support the formation of a Working Group that could go to Baghdad, and build a framework as an alternative to War. After talks in Baghdad, the Working Group could present its findings to the United Nations for debate.”

  “This framework would create a parallel track to War preparations. Its purpose would be to define the Iraqi Government’s own commitments on a full range of social and political rights that have been stymied by Baghdad’s necessary preoccupation with grinding sanctions. With that understanding, the United Nations could better decide whether War is necessary at all.”

  In Washington style, I circulated the Wehbe letter all over the Security Council and General Assembly.

  I also suggested the “Working Group” should be charged with implementing the collection of democratic reforms proposed by senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad a year earlier. Iraq’s proposal included some highly creative suggestions, such as housing Iraqi exiles in expanded embassy compounds, and granting Iraqi exiles the rights to establish political parties, party headquarters and opposition newspapers. Returning exiles would have had the right to announce their candidacy for office, and actively campaign for election around the country.

  Each part of this framework would be ground-breaking. Above all, it could be guaranteed. The hardest part had been accomplished already. Baghdad had accepted the demands. All that was missing was a technical agreement to begin implementing the various components, which the “Working Group” could handle.

  To his great credit, Ambassador Agam declared months before that he w
ould come out of retirement, if necessary, to lead comprehensive peace talks with Iraq. He was fully committed to the project, and totally capable of delivering it.

  At the February, 2003 meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Kuala Lumpur, Ambassador Agam and my old friend Dr. Saeed Hasan, now Iraq’s Deputy Foreign Minister, discussed the possibility. Traveling to Baghdad for talks would have been out of the question, because of loud whispers that War was imminent.259 Nonetheless, talks could still be held in Geneva or Paris.

  The situation was not hopeless. War was not inevitable. There was not a lack of viable options. That’s flat wrong.

  It was only a question of who had the courage to pursue peace. Some of those answers are surprising. Malaysia’s special contribution to anti-war efforts, behind the scenes, deserves recognition, praise and appreciation from the international community.

  As it turns out, Malaysia was not the only farsighted leader on the world stage.

  On the evening of February 4, 2003, wire taps by my good friends at the FBI prove I contacted the Syrian embassy at the United Nations, and spoke directly with Syria’s Ambassador Wehbe.260

  It helps to know that Ambassador Wehbe and I had been briefly introduced by Rani Ali at a Lebanese Taverna popular among U.N. diplomats. On other occasions, he observed me lunching with diplomats from Libya and Iraq. That stood out, since Western contacts with either of those countries was highly unusual in those years. My role in talks for the Lockerbie Trial would have been known to Syria’s diplomats, as well.

  All of that helps explain why Ambassador Wehbe probably recognized who I was, during this phone call.

  Ambassador Wehbe: “The Ambassador is speaking.”

  Lindauer: (Laughs) “I did not expect you to answer your own phone.”

  Ambassador: “Indeed!”

  Lindauer: (Laughs) Ah, my name is Susan Lindauer…