Defeat Into Victory

by Field-Marshal Viscount William Slim

  The rest of Phase 2 on 33 Corps front had gone better. On the 12th April, a brigade of the 7th Division had, after a fight, captured Kyaukpadaung, the road centre where three years before I had argued with the Chinese commander. Next day, Gwegyo, of unhappy memories, was cleared. Enemy casualties were considerable in both these actions. By the 17th, the brigade turning west had its patrols in the southern outskirts of Chauk. Another brigade of the 7th Division, fighting down the east bank of the Irrawaddy, had already got a foothold at the northern end of Chauk. On the 18th, the two brigades squeezed the enemy out of the town, and Chauk with five guns, forty lorries, and much other booty was ours.

  While these events had been taking place in the Mount Popa–Kyaukpadaung area on the cast bank, activity was boiling up on the west side of the Irrawaddy. Here, after its failure in the attempt to cut 4 Corps’ communications, Yamamoto Force, much weakened, had reverted to the defensive. Its task was to hold our 28 East African Brigade about Letsc and thus cover the withdrawal of the Japanese 54th Division from Arakan. This withdrawal was now well under way and, as it progressed, the enemy strength on the west bank steadily increased. The East African Brigade was to return to India as part of our programme for reducing supply demands, and in the second week of April it was relieved by 114 Brigade of the 7th Division from the east bank. The substitution took some little time, and as a result our advances on the east and west banks were not level. Towns on the eastern bank were usually taken several days before the corresponding places on the other side. This led to large bodies of the enemy, cut off from retreat on the east, escaping to the west bank, and again swelling the numbers who could oppose our advance there. The estimated enemy strength on the west bank north of Prome at this time was nine to ten thousand, and our intelligence reported that the main concentrations were in the Salin area sixteen miles north-west of Yenangyaung, and a larger one about Padan, twenty-eight miles south-west of Magwe, where 54th Division troops from the An Pass were collecting. Numerous smaller parties were scattered along the west bank, but it appeared that the general object of all Japanese forces in the area was to retreat south under cover of rearguards, until they could recross to the east either at Allanmyo or, if this town had been lost, at Prome.

  With the idea of cutting off the gathering at Salin and the enemy opposing 114 Brigade, Evans, commanding the 7th Division, on the 24th April sent his 89 Brigade across the river to the west bank opposite Yenangyaung. It formed a bridgehead and rapidly spread out north and south against minor opposition. Meanwhile, 114 Brigade continued to press south, clashing on the way with scattered parties of rather bewildered Japanese. On the 26th, Salin, evacuated by the enemy, who withdrew south-west to avoid 89 Brigade, was occupied. The two brigades made contact, and pushed south together, 114 Brigade on the right finding resistance stiffening as it approached Padan. On the river bank, 89 Brigade entered Minbu, opposite Magwe, on the 29th against slight resistance but 114 Brigade had a stiff fight, ten miles north of Padan, in which the Japanese rearguard counterattacked three times, and another determined action nearer Padan on the 29th. After this fight, patrols failed to gain contact as the enemy was in full retreat to the south. The Japanese had contrived to cover the withdrawal of the 54th Division from Arakan, but their whole situation on the west of the Irrawaddy had now become perilous, not only from the pressure of our two brigades on that bank, but because the rapidity of our 20th Division’s advance on the other, constantly compelled them to seek farther and farther south for a crossing to the east.

  While the rest of 33 Corps had been moving in the ‘Union Jack’ manœuvre over the Irrawaddy, the 20th Division had been left behind to deal with the last stubborn resistance of the Japanese at Kyaukse. Then, having taken Kyaukse on the 30th March and harried the last of Katamura’s unhappy divisions into the hills, it handed over to the 19th Division and collected south of Meiktila. There, with characteristic energy, Gracey flung himself into preparations for Phase 3. With serviceable vehicles from the 2nd Division, which was about to fly out to India, he was able rapidly to reorganize two of his brigades on a motorized establishment. On the 11th April, the conversion complete, he set out with all speed to take part in the 33 Corps advance south. His task was to strike at die Japanese rear at Magwe and Allanmyo.

  Sakurai, commander of the Japanese Twenty-eighth Army, entrusted with the defence of the Irrawaddy Valley, was facing north and east. His main communications, road and river, ran south, but his link with the Thirty-third Army, eighty miles away on the railway axis, bent east at Magwe and went through Taungdwingyi. The latter town could be either a bastion to defend his right rear or a threat to it. Everything depended on who occupied it. Sakurai was short of troops, no British were nearer to Taungdwingyi than Meiktila, the country between was waterless and the road unfit for motor transport; there would be time enough for warning. Sakurai, therefore, concentrated his Japanese troops at places nearer to our forces and on our direct lines of approach; he left Taungdwingyi mainly to Indian National Army units and to his administrative troops. In this he made a fatal mistake—he miscalculated the speed at which we could move. On the 11th April, no British forces were within sixty miles of Taungdwingyi; on the 14th, one of Gracey’s mechanized brigades had seized it. The blow was so sudden that for some days the Japanese command did not realize what had happened, and continued to send convoys via Taungdwingyi to the great profit and entertainment of the 20th Division. Small parties of Japanese and larger ones of Jiffs were encountered by our patrols in the neighbourhood, but the only serious hostile action was an attempt to collect a force to hold a position about ten miles south on the road to Allanmyo. On the 18th April, a small armoured column from Taungdwingyi reached the Irrawaddy, eleven miles south of Magwe, and sank three boatloads of Japanese trying to escape across the river. The other mechanized brigade, which had halted at Natmauk, thirty miles north of Taungdwingyi, advanced from there and occupied Magwe, against light opposition, on the 19th April. In clearing up the town, thirteen guns and a hundred and twenty Jiffs were captured and a little later a complete battalion of the Indian National Army, over six hundred strong, was collected in batches from the roadside, where it was waiting to surrender. At Magwe, as at Taungdwingyi, enemy convoys, which included a complete field ambulance, continued to arrive and were promptly and efficiently dealt with. The Japanese retaliated by shelling Magwe from the west bank, but took no other action.

  On the day Magwe fell, the 7th Division was pushing from the north down both banks of the Irrawaddy. On the east bank, a brigade encircled Yenaungyaung, and on the 22nd occupied the town and oilfield against intermittent, but at times fierce, opposition. The Japanese were bewildered by the speed, strength, and direction of the 20th Divisions thrust. Their whole plan for the defence of the oilfields had collapsed; even their retreat was cut off. As we held the main roads, they were forced in their efforts to escape south either to take to side tracks, abandoning their vehicles and heavy equipment, or to cross the river westwards, hoping ultimately to recross farther downstream. Sakurai’s only chance of collecting any appreciable portion of his forces again was, by hook or by crook, to hold us north of Allanmyo. This he tried to do, but the most he could produce to block our 20th Division columns, advancing from Taungdwingyi on Allanmyo, were small, hurriedly assembled parties who, while they fought gallantly, could not do more than cause us some delay at the cost of practical annihilation to themselves. Allanmyo was entered on the 28th April, and cleared against the hopeless resistance of a devoted rearguard from the 55th Divisional Cavalry, who lost five guns and most of their number killed. By now, however, this high morale was no longer universal among Japanese troops. As our brigade from Magwe pushed down the east bank to link up with the one at Allanmyo, patrols discovered a large enemy party resting in a village. An air strike was immediately laid on. The Japanese scattered in panic and on the site were afterwards found abandoned four guns, wireless sets, grenade dischargers, many rifles, and six officers’ swords. Moral
e was certainly not what it had been, but Japanese savagery remained, for the bodies of six villagers tied to trees and bayoneted were also found.

  By the 1st May, 33 Corps Headquarters was established at Magwe, and the 7th Division, with two of its brigades on the west bank, was also there. 268 Brigade was collecting in Allanmyo, about to cross for operations on the west side of the river, while the 20th Division was just starting its advance from Allanmyo on Prome and Rangoon.

  By the end of March, 4 Corps with its headquarters at Meiktila, was gathering for the main drive south. Grouped round the town were the 17th Division, the 5th Division, with one brigade still to arrive, and 255 Tank Brigade. In addition, the headquarters and one brigade of the 19th Division were there, ready to take over as soon as the corps left, while the remaining brigades of this division were along the Mandalay road to the north. I found a rather noticeable jam of headquarters in Meiktila, and I decided I should have to wait for some of them to move before I brought mine there. I felt, too, that perhaps the Japanese were a little close as yet for an Army Headquarters in Meiktila to be really comfortable.

  In fact, the Japanese were still a good deal in evidence, and it became daily plainer that Honda would try to regroup his divisions on the good defensive position astride the main road at Pyawbwe. His 49th Division, detailed to hold the centre, was already in place digging hard, his 18th, about Thazi, was to occupy the right, and the 53 rd, coming in from the north-west, to take up the line on the left. Given a little time, the Japanese position could become most formidable and, if we were seriously delayed by it, our chances of getting to Rangoon would be slight. On the other hand, if we really smashed Honda’s army, it was unlikely that Kimura could produce another force capable of holding us farther south. Honda’s stand so far north should be all to our advantage, but we must crush him and quickly.

  On the 30th March, Messervy’s 4 Corps with the 17th Division and 255 Tank Brigade, set about doing so. Cowan, the divisional commander, was in tactical control of the battle and his plan was for a converging attack. His 99 Brigade was to move first east to take Thazi then, turning south, to seize the high ground south-east of Pyawbwe. 48 Brigade was to strike straight down the main road from Meiktila, while 63 Brigade was to swing round Pyawbwe on the west and occupy the rising ground south-west of the town. A fourth tentacle of envelopment would be an armoured and motorized infantry column, which, driving still wider on the west, would cut the Rangoon road south of Pywabwe. Having gained these positions, the whole force would close in on the main defences and assault them from all sides.

  No sooner had the various advances gained contact, than it became clear that the Japanese, while surprised by the speed with which we had mounted our attack, were determined at all costs to halt us. Scattered over the country around Pyawbwe were many villages, some large, some small, and almost all of these had been made into strong-points, mutually supporting and self-supplied from dumps within them. The enemy thus held a wide defensive zone which had to be fought through before his main positions could be reached. It would have been difficult to devise a scheme of defence more suited to the Japanese soldier or more calculated to delay us.

  The first hitch in our proceedings occurred when 99 Brigade found a strong garrison firmly embedded in Thazi to which the enemy clung as cover for the escape route into the Shan Hills. Direct assault would, at the best, be costly; any other form of attack would necessarily be slow. Similarly, on the Meiktila road, 48 Brigade was soon fighting its way forward from village to village—a dogged process. Whether these Japanese had been caught by our advance before they could fall back on to positions nearer Pyawbwe, or whether it was the policy of their Higher Command to hold in such depth, I did not know, but they fought like cornered wild cats. When you knew the way—and our men did—they were not difficult to kill, but it took time. And we had not got much time. With this in mind, on the 2nd April, I flew to Meiktila.

  I found Messervy and Cowan quite as well aware as I was of the need for speed. Cowan intended to recover the momentum of his advance by leaving a small detachment to contain Thazi, while 99 Brigade, ignoring it, pushed on again. We improved on that by calling in the brigade of the 19th Division from Meiktila to deal with Thazi. This they did a few days later, after some hard fighting. Cowan was confident that, as the result of other steps he was taking, the push astride the road would gather speed. Having seen for myself everywhere the obvious urge to get on and close with the enemy, I left feeling much happier than when I had arrived as so often happened after contact with the forward troops.

  For some days 99 Brigade forced its way through the villages south of Thazi, until on the 7th April, it drew level with 48 Brigade which was held up opposite Yindaw, a large village ten miles from Pyawbwe. Both brigades had advanced with determination, killing several hundreds of the enemy and capturing guns, but Yindaw, which they now faced, one on the north, the other on the east, was the toughest nut their teeth had yet met in this battle. It was part of the Japanese permanent defences, with a strong garrison, estimated at about a thousand, who had orders to hold to the last. It had, also, great natural strength, as on one side it was protected by a lake and on others earthen banks and water channels restricted all approaches, limiting those for armour practically to the road itself. It was our tanks that the enemy feared most, and his defences were generously covered by anti-tank guns, obstacles, and mines. For three days, Yindaw was bombarded from the ground and the air while our troops broke into some of its outer defences. Then on the 8th, remembering our decision at Thazi, our brigades were ordered to by-pass it on both sides and leave it to be dealt with by the 5th Division, which was following the 17th. Next day, 99 Brigade reached the high ground just north of Pyawbwe. Fighting strongly, 48 Brigade on die road was closing in from the north-west, and 63 Brigade, having completed its sweep round the town and inflicted many casualties, was on the rise to the south-west. While the brigades were thus pushing forward, the armoured column fought its way to the Rangoon road and, on the 9th, cut it south of Pyawbwe. It even sent a reconnaissance to Yamethin, twelve miles farther south. During the night of the 9th/ioth April, three Japanese medium tanks were rash enough to approach ours. A brisk action ensued in the light of our searchlights, and all three enemy tanks were destroyed in the only night tank-versus-tank encounter of the campaign.

  On the 10th, the heart of the Japanese position, Pyawbwe itself, was attacked. Here the defences were most thoroughly prepared and the 49th Division, which held them, fought grimly. 99 Brigade’s first assault, in spite of its gallantry, failed to take the heavily bunkered waterworks position. Another of its attacks took a full day of close fighting to clean up a maze of nullahs and dug-outs on the outskirts of the town. Mortars and the point-blank fire of pack-guns eventually drove the last of the garrison into the open, where some three hundred were accounted for by our tanks. 48 Brigade, in hand-to-hand fighting, cleared the cantonment quarter, and carried by assault the heavily defended railway station and railway embankment areas. Throughout the day, the armoured column drove northward on a broad front against increasingly disorganized opposition, knocking out guns, overrunning supply dumps, and killing many Japanese as they began to break south. It was this armoured attack in rear which finally cracked the enemy resistance. By dawn on the nth, the whole of Pyawbwe was in our hands. Such defenders as survived had made off south and east in the darkness, many of them only to be hunted down by our mobile patrols which at daylight began to scour the country.

  The skill with which Messervy and Cowan had handled the battle was matched by the dash and resource of their troops. Nearly two thousand enemy dead were picked up in Pyawbwe and the surrounding villages, many more were killed about Thazi. Thirty-one guns, eight tanks, many vehicles, and great quantities of stores and ammunition in scattered dumps fell into our hands. It was a thorough and costly defeat for the enemy. The Japanese 49th Division, which had clung so desperately to its defences, had been destroyed in them. The 18th Division, i
n Thazi and the villages to the south, had been unmercifully hammered until it broke up. The 53rd Division had been caught by our troops west of Pyawbwe, as it tried to move back to take up its positions on the Japanese left, and had been thumped and banged out of the ring before it could reach them. It was no longer a fighting formation, but a collection of fugitives. For its size, Pyawbwe was one of the most decisive battles of the Burma war. It shattered Honda’s army, but it did more—it settled the fate of Rangoon.

  Now the straight, all-out drive on Rangoon could be loosed. Early on the morning of the 11th April, as the 17th Division cleared the battlefield and hunted down enemy stragglers, the 5th Division went through. They were off! I stood beside the road outside Pyawbwe and saw them go. Three hundred miles and, with luck, some thirty days before the monsoon to do it in. It would be a close thing, but, after yesterday’s battle, I was sure 4 Corps would pull it off. They certainly meant to, and they looked like it; there was an air of purpose about every truck that rolled dustily by. Mansergh, commanding the 5th Division, drew his to one side, stopped and got out to greet me. Fresh, alert, and eager, he somehow, for a flash, made me think of the start of a dawn duck shoot in India, but we spoke of more serious business, before he, too, moved on. I watched vehicle after vehicle pass, loaded with Indian soldiers grasping their weapons, and on their faces was the same look as on their commander’s, alert and eager. I had begun the war as a brigadier in this division in 1939, and I was proud of them. We should get there all right! A dull roar above made me look up. That noise, three years ago, would have sent us all diving for cover. Now, I was the only one to raise my head, and see our fighters streaking south across the sky. We took them for granted, yet it was they who made possible this swift move of soft vehicles, almost nose to tail, down one road. I went back to Cowan’s headquarters and found him grimly cheerful, as a commander who had won such a battle might well be. With Messervy we discussed on the map the way the advance would go.