The Sword and the Shield

by Christopher Andrew

  2. vol. 6, ch. 5, parts 2, 3. Unusually, Mitrokhin’s notes from KONOV’s file do not record the real name of either himself or his wife.

  3. vol. 6, ch. 5, parts 2, 3. No details are available of KONOV’s ST.

  4. vol. 8, app. 3a.

  5. ALBERT’s and GERA’s KGB files record that they were issued with Belgian passports nos. 26862/37/41 and 26861/36/41 valid until April 8, 1961. vol. 8, app. 3a.

  6. vol. 8, app. 3a.

  7. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 3.

  8. vol. 8, app. 3, item 7.

  9. vol. 6, ch. 13, part 1.

  10. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 294-320. vol. 6, ch. 13, part 1. During his interview with Barron, Valoushek used the cover name “Zemenek.”

  11. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 320-7; Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, pp. 154-5.

  12. vol. 6, ch. 13, part 1.

  13. vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 3.

  14. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 388-90; Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, pp. 170-1.

  15. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 5; vol. 8, ch. 8, paras. 3, 4. In 1975 alone Hambleton had meetings with Pyatin in Washington, with V. G. Matsenov in New York, with S. S. Sadauskas in Vienna and with A. Rusakov in Prague. His other foreign missions took in Haiti, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel.

  16. vol. 6, ch. 13, part 1. Mitrokhin’s notes do not give IVANOVA’s name.

  17. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 330-1.

  18. vol. 6, ch. 13, part 1; vol. 8, app. 8, item 87.

  19. k-8,78; k-19,158; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. Mitrokhin’s notes do not identify LENA.

  20. k-8,78.

  21. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

  22. vol. 6, app. 2, parts 3, 5.

  23. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. It is not clear from Mitrokhin’s notes whether Feder was a “live” or a “dead double.”

  24. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

  25. vol. 6, ch. 5, parts 2, 3. Like other Steinway customers, Governor Rockefeller can, of course, scarcely be blamed for failing to realize that his piano tuner was a KGB illegal. There is no evidence in Mitrokhin’s notes that Rudenko had contact with him.

  26. Dobrynin, Anatoly, In Confidence, p. 377.

  27. Isaacson, Kissinger, pp. 90-3.

  28. Kramer and Roberts, “I Never Wanted to be Vice-President of Anything!,” pp. 8-9.

  29. Schonberg, Horowitz, chs. 15-17. Mitrokhin’s notes, probably like the KGB file on which they are based, do not make clear exactly how great a part RYBAKOV played in tuning Horowitz’s pianos. The CD 186 was originally tuned by the Steinway chief technician, Franz Mohr.

  30. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

  31. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2; t-7,304.

  32. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. RYBAKOV’s file gives his Moscow address as 108 Mir Prospect, apartment 120.

  33. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, p. 375.

  34. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 4. The main regional priorities for the establishment of illegal residencies in the period 1969-75, apart from North America, were the major states of western Europe, China and the Middle East. With the exception of the United States, where it was intended to establish ten residencies, no state was to have more than two.

  35. vol. 6, ch. 5, parts 2, 3.

  36. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 335-6.

  37. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 3.

  38. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 337-41, 349-51. vol. 6, ch. 13, part 1.

  39. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 355-71.

  40. Though not identified by Mitrokhin, LUTZEN was probably the defector Rupert Sigl, who had worked for the KGB in Karlshorst from 1957 to 1969.

  41. vol. 6, ch. 13, part 1.

  42. vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 3.

  43. Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, pp. 176, 179-83.

  44. vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 4.

  45. Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, pp. 151-4, 184-5. In June 1986 Hambleton was moved to a Canadian jail and released under mandatory supervision in March 1989.

  46. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2; vol. 6, app. 2, part 1; k-16,89.

  47. The fullest published account of the Koecher case is in Kessler, Spy vs Spy (based in part on interviews with the Koechers after their return to Czechoslovakia in 1986). There are some further details in Earley, Confessions of a Spy, ch. 6, and Kessler, “Moscow’s Mole in the CIA,” Washington Post (April 17, 1988). Karl Koecher’s early career is summarized in k-8,110.

  48. k-19,96.

  49. Kessler, Spy vs Spy, pp. 52-63. Kessler, Undercover Washington, pp. 33-4.

  50. k-19, 96. Hana Koecher was given the rather obvious KGB codename HANKA.

  51. Kessler, Spy vs Spy, pp. 60, 245.

  52. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 2; k-8,110.

  53. t-7,306; vol. 6, app. 1 (misc.), part 2. Ogorodnik appears to have been recruited by the CIA while serving in Bogotá in 1974, and to have supplied microfilm copies of hundreds of secret Soviet documents, summaries of which were circulated by the CIA to the White House, the National Security Council and the State Department. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 428-9.

  54. Kessler, Spy vs Spy, pp. 139-44, 152-8, 233-6; Kessler, “Moscow’s Mole in the CIA,” Washington Post, (April 17, 1988).

  55. Hana Koecher sued the journalist, Egon Lansky, who had published the story about her and her husband. The case was dismissed and costs awarded against her. Tom Gross, “Spy’s Wife Gets a Job with Our Man in Prague,” Sunday Telegraph (March 5, 1995).

  56. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 3.

  57. vol. 6, app. 2, part 4.

  Chapter Thirteen

  The Main Adversary

  Part 4

  1. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1n.

  2. See below, chapter 15.

  3. Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 209-10, 513. According to Dobrynin, “Andropov was cautious enough not to interfere in Gromyko’s everyday management of foreign policy, and Gromyko for his part respected Andropov’s growing influence in the Politburo.”

  4. Fursenko and Naftali, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” p. 85, n. 7. FCD intelligence analysis, however, seems to have remained comparatively undeveloped by the standards of the British JIC, the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence and other major Western assessment agencies.

  5. See below, chapters 15 and 19.

  6. Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, p. 322. The letter contained simply routine proposals for strengthening the role of the CPSU.

  7. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 257. During the final months of Brezhnev’s life, however, Andropov began to circulate stories about the corruption of Brezhnev’s family and entourage as part of his strategy to eliminate rivals to the succession. Service, A History of Twentieth-Century Russia, p. 426.

  8. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 130.

  9. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, pp. 6-8; Chazov, Zdorov’ye i Vlast, pp. 115-44.

  10. vol. 6, app. 2, part 6.

  11. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 3; vol. 6, app. 1, parts 12, 41.

  12. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 83. Kalugin does not give Lipka’s name or codename and refers to him only as “a ‘walk-in’ who came to us in the mid-1960s, explaining that he was involved in shredding and destroying NSA documents.” A later analysis by the Centre singled out 200 documents from NSA, the CIA, State Department and other federal agencies as of particular value. Mitrokhin’s notes, alas, give no details of their contents.

  13. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 3; vol. 6, app. 1, parts 12, 26, 28, 41; k-8,78. Lipka’s file includes his and his father’s addresses during the 1970s, as well as details of his wife’s work at St. Joseph’s Hospital in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, together with her telephone number at the hospital.

  14. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 84-9.

  15. Studies of the Walker case include Barron, Breaking the Ring; Blum, I Pledge Allegiance.

  16. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 83.

  17. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 89. The fact that Walker’s file was held by the Sixteenth Department, separately from most other FCD files, explains why Mitrokhin never saw it. There are probably other Sixteenth Department agents of whom he was also unaware.

  18. Earley, Confession
s of a Spy, pp. 7-8.

  19. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 89.

  20. The KGB officers who took part in running MAREK were P. V. Yatskov, B. P. Kolymakov, Ye. N. Gorlitsyn, V. F. Perchik, Ye. V. Piskarev, G. N. Pustnyatsev, V. M. Bogachev, Ye. A. Belov, V. N. Gordeyev, A. V. Bolshakov, S. V. Sychev, V. N. Melnikov, A. A. Alekseyev, S. Ye. Muzhchinin, V. S. Miroshnikov, V. A. Revin, N. V. Medved, I. K. Baranov, V. I. Kucherov, V. S. Loginov, V. I. Shpakevich, I. S. Pakhmonov, V. V. Makarov, A. M. Gvosdev and L. K. Kostanyan. Even after Agee revealed that MAREK was a plant, some in the Centre did not regard the evidence as conclusive.

  21. Earley, Confessions of a Spy, pp. 91-2.

  22. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 111-12. Though Mitrokhin does not identify Sedov by name, he confirms the access to Kissinger by an “operations officer.”

  23. Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 117.

  24. t-7,321.

  25. Dobrynin, In Confidence.

  26. Barron, KGB, pp. 25-7. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 240-3. vol. 6, ch. 10; vol. 6, app. 1, parts 19, 40.

  27. vol. 6, ch. 10; vol. 6, app. 1, part 40. There is no evidence in Mitrokhin’s notes that the cultivation of Waldheim was successful.

  28. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, pp. 331-2.

  29. vol. 6, app. 1, parts 4, 19; t-3,69, k-24,228.

  30. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 4, n. 1.

  31. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2, n. 2.

  32. vol. 6, app. 1, parts 3, 41; t-2,258.

  33. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 2; vol. 6, app. 1, part 41.

  34. vol. 6, app. 1, part 16. The Turkish Cypriot newspaper Malkin Sesi reported on May 18, 1985 that, according to intelligence supplied by Washington to the Turkish government, Ozgur had worked as a Soviet spy from 1974 to 1977.

  35. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.

  36. vol. 6, ch. 4; k-8,103,447.

  37. vol. 6, app. 1, part 38.

  38. vol. 6, app. 1, part 4; t-3,56.

  39. vol. 6, app. 1, parts 11, 39; k-22,71.

  40. vol. 6, app. 1, part 33.

  41. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 2. Mitrokhin does not give REM’s identity. As was frequently the case, the same codename was given to several other agents. None of the others seems to fit the Washington REM.

  42. k-22,207.

  43. t-1,75.

  44. vol. 6, ch. 4; vol. 6, app. 1, parts 16, 19.

  45. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2, n. 2.

  46. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.

  47. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2, n. 2.

  48. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.

  49. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 72-5.

  50. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 103.

  51. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 355.

  52. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.

  53. Kramer and Roberts, “I Never Wanted to be Vice-President of Anything!,” p. 23.

  54. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.

  55. Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 377-8.

  56. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.

  57. In 1977 Lomov returned to New York with his deputy director, Yuri Mikhailovich Zabrodin, for a three-month visit. His main KGB mission on this occasion was to investigate research on interrogation techniques which, the Centre hoped, would cause those it interrogated to have no subsequent memory of their replies to questions. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1; vol. 6, app. 2, parts 4, 5.

  58. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1; vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.

  59. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1.

  60. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1.

  61. See below, chapter 17.

  62. vol. 6, ch. 7. Mitrokhin identifies VLADIMIROV as deputy director of the institute, but does not give his name. Cf. Barron, KGB Today, p. 265.

  63. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1; vol. 6, app. 2, parts 4, 6.

  64. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 112.

  65. vol. 6, app. 1, part 6.

  66. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 485.

  67. vol. 5, section 10.

  68. vol. 6, ch. 3, parts 2, 3.

  69. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 306-7.

  70. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1, n. 3.

  71. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, ch. 4.

  72. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 302-3. Kalugin considered the tone of Andropov’s cable “paranoid.”

  73. Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, p. 351.

  74. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 523.

  75. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 582-603. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, ch. 4.

  76. Shvets, Washington Station, pp. 29, 74-5. Shvets had access to Androsov’s reports as a member of the FCD First (North American) Department from 1982 to 1985, and was then posted to Washington as a Line PR officer in Androsov’s residency.

  77. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 591-605.

  78. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 471-7.

  79. Izvestia (September 24, 1991).

  80. Garthoff, “The KGB Reports to Gorbachev,” pp. 226-7.

  81. vol. 6, ch. 6.

  82. See, for example, Kryuchkov’s 1984 analysis of “the deepening economic and social crisis in the capitalist world.” Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 33-4.

  83. vol. 6, app. 1, part 41. Mitrokhin did not record the statistics for the San Francisco residency.

  84. vol. 6, ch. 6.

  85. Mitrokhin’s notes give the recruitment dates of fifteen ST agents who began work for the KGB in the 1970s: ANTON (1975), ARAM (1975), CHEKHOV/YAYKAL (1976), MAG (1974), MIKE (1973), OTPRYSK (1974), SARKIS (1974), SATURN (1978), SOFT (1971), TROP (1979), TURIST (1977), UGNYUS (1974), ZENIT (1978) and two others whose codenames cannot be published (recruited in 1975-6). VIL appears to have been recruited earlier. Other ST agents active in the USA during the 1970s, whose recruitment dates do not appear in Mitrokhin’s notes, were LONG, PATRIOT and RIDEL. Mitrokhin also identifies five trusted contacts recruited during the 1970s: KLARA (1972), KURT (1973), TSORN (1977), VELLO (1973) and VEYT (1973). In the case of a further eight members of the ST network in 1970s (FOGEL, FREY, IZOLDA, OZON, ROZHEK, SPRINTER, TEP-LOTEKNIK and VAYS), it is unclear from Mitrokhin’s notes which were fully recruited agents and which were trusted contacts. The notes give no dates for the activities of another eight ST agents and trusted contacts probably active in the 1970s: ALGORITMAS, AUTOMOBILIST, CHARLES, KLIM, LIR, ODISSEY, PAVEL and RUTH. Mitrokhin’s notes on all those listed above are relatively brief, varying in length from a few lines to a paragraph. A majority of both agents and trusted contacts are identified by name. vol. 6, app. 1, parts 1, 2, 3, 5, 11, 14, 20, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 38, 39; k-14,171; k-18,380-2; t-1,138, 290,294-5,297-301; t-2,109,161-2; t-7,77.

  86. FREY was an agent and PAVEL a trusted contact in IBM (vol. 6, app. 1, parts 5, 27). Agent SATURN occupied a senior scientific post in McDonnell Douglas (vol. 6, app. 1, parts 27, 32). Agent ZENIT was a scientist in TRW (vol. 6, app. 1, part 27).

  87. vol. 6, app. 1, parts 2, 32.

  88. vol. 6, app. 1, part 38. The case of another scientist at one of the best-known US universities cannot be referred to for legal reasons; vol. 6, app. 1, part 32.

  89. vol. 6, app. 1, part 33.

  90. vol. 6, app. 1, part 31. DARCOM has since become the Army Materiel Command (AMC).

  91. The latest date for which Mitrokhin provides statistics on the total numbers of ST agents run by the New York and Washington residencies is 1970; he provides no statistics on the agents run by the San Francisco residency.

  92. Lindsey, The Falcon and the Snowman. Boyce escaped from prison in 1980, but was recaptured a year later and sentenced to an additional three years for escaping and twenty-five years for robbing seventeen banks while on the run (Lindsey, The Flight of the Falcon).

  93. vol. 6, app. 1, part 27. Mitrokhin’s brief note on ZENIT’s recruitment gives no details of the intelligence he supplied. Other important intelligence on satellite surveillance included the operating manual for KH-11, the most advanced US SIGINT satellite. Early in 1978 William Kampiles, who had been briefly employed by the CIA Wa
tch Center, presented a copy of it to the KGB residency in Athens. He was unaware, however, that the KGB officer who received it, Sergei Ivanovich Bokhan, had been recruited several years earlier by the CIA. Earley, Confessions of a Spy, p. 120.

  94. This calculation appears to have been based on the estimated saving in imports paid for in hard currency. Brezhnev was informed that the economic benefit of ST for the Soviet defense industry had not been calculated. vol. 6, ch. 6.

  95. Similar reports on ST successes were sent to Kosygin, the prime minister, and Ustinov, the Defence Minister.

  96. vol. 6, ch. 6.

  97. t-7,105.

  98. vol. 6, ch. 6.

  99. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 622.

  100. In 1965 the United States had accounted for over 90 percent of the VPK’s requirements.

  101. Documents supplied by the French agent in Directorate T, Vladimir Vetrov (codenamed FAREWELL); cited by Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. 260. On Vetrov, see Andrew and Gordievsky, Le KGB dans le monde, 1917-1990, pp. 619-23. For the text of some of Vetrov’s documents, see Hanson, Soviet Industrial Espionage. Vetrov’s documents and Mitrokhin’s notes complement each other.

  102. Hanson, Soviet Industrial Espionage, p. 31.

  103. vol. 6, ch. 6. Mitrokhin’s notes identify 106 of the KGB’s agents within the Soviet scientific community; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1, n. 6.

  104. vol. 6, ch. 6.

  105. vol. 6, app. 1, parts 2, 32.

  106. vol. 6, app. 1, parts 27, 32.

  107. vol. 6, ch. 6.

  108. Kessler, Spy vs Spy, pp. 167-8.

  109. Also targeted by western European residencies were the US Atomic Energy Commission, the Battelle Memorial Institute, Dow Chemicals, Dupont de Nemours, GTE, Arthur D. Little Inc., Litton Industries Inc., the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and RCA. Mitrokhin’s notes do not indicate which—if any—residencies had particular responsibilities for these targets; k-5,424. The National Institute of Health was targeted because of its research on the effects of chemical and biological warfare; vol. 6, ch. 6.

  110. vol. 6, app. 1, part 1; t-7,8,77.

  111. vol. 2, app. 3.

  112. Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, p. 338.

  113. US government, Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology