The Sword and the Shield

by Christopher Andrew

  64. k-19,264.

  65. k-19,270.

  66. t-7,264.

  67. Childs and Popplewell, The Stasi, p. 82. A KGB file, apparently for the period 1976-7, gives the total size of Stasi personnel as “over 60,000” (k-19,271). This is consistent with documents in the Gauck [Stasi] Archive, which record a rise from 59,500 in 1975 to 75,000 in 1980.

  68. k-19,273.

  69. t-7,184.

  70. k-19,430.

  71. k-19,458.

  72. k-27,78.

  73. k-19,627.

  74. k-27,243.

  75. t-7,94.

  76. k-19,209.

  77. k-26,162. The KGB file on the drug test incident identifies the Soviet player concerned, but, since he was never tested, it is unfair to mention his name.

  78. k-26,162.

  79. k-19,235.

  80. Kusin, From Dubˇcek to Charter 77, pp. 304-25; Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia since 1945, pp. 128-47; Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, p. 384.

  81. Cited in Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia since 1945, p. 102.

  Chapter Seventeen

  The KGB and Western Communist Parties

  1. vol. 9, ch. 1, para. 17.

  2. k-3,65,115. k-8,182. Though the earliest reference in Mitrokhin’s notes to Plissonnier’s collaboration with the KGB dates from 1952, it may well have begun earlier.

  3. Robrieux, Histoire intérieure du Parti communiste, vol. 4, pp. 450-2. Bell and Criddle, The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic, pp. 19, 21.

  4. k-3,65,115. k-8,182.

  5. k-3,65,115. k-8,182. Boumedienne was president of Algeria from December 1976 until his death in December 1978.

  6. Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, pp. 84-7.

  7. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 171-2.

  8. Mitrokhin’s notes do not include any examples of the intelligence obtained by DARIO and his female recruits from the foreign ministry.

  9. At various stages in his career as a Soviet agent, DARIO was codenamed BASK, SPARTAK, GAU, CHESTNY and GAUDEMUS. He appears to have switched from GRU to MGB control immediately after the Second World War. k-10,109.

  10. k-10,101-3,107,109. Mitrokhin’s notes imply that in 1956 DARIO was also instrumental in the recruitment of MAGDA, a typist in the foreign ministry press department (k-10,100,103). Mitrokhin’s notes also record the recruitment in 1970 of an agent in the Foreign Ministry, codenamed STRELOK, by Georgi Pavlovich Antonov. STRELOK subsequently became “reluctant to cooperate” (k-4,80,158; k-2,221,231,268).

  11. k-10,109. See below chapter 18.

  12. k-7,4,193; k-16,338,419; k-18,153; k-20,94.

  13. Cronin, Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria, chs. 1-4; Barker, Austria 1918-1972, part 3.

  14. Barker, Austria 1918-1972, p. 178.

  15. k-18,52.

  16. k-18,52.

  17. k-16,214,216; vol. 5, sect. 6, paras. 5,6 and n.

  18. k-14,722; k-2,175; t-7,1.

  19. k-2,81,145,150.

  20. k-13,55,61.

  21. t-7,1.

  22. The SKP fought elections as part of the Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto (SKDL), mainly composed of Communists and fellow travelers.

  23. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 118-19, 131-2.

  24. Mitrokhin’s notes unfortunately contain nothing on the Communist role in the post-war coalition governments and little on Finland before the Brezhnev era. Given the willing assistance given to the KGB by the SVK chairman (later honorary chairman), Ville Pessi, in the 1970s (k-26,191,211,228), it is scarcely conceivable that such assistance was not forthcoming earlier. Pessi was already a powerful figure as SVK secretary after the Second World War. The earliest post-war example of SVK assistance to Soviet intelligence operations noted by Mitrokhin was the help given in 1949-51 to the illegal VIK in adopting the identity of the Finn Eugene Maki. The first KGB agent in the Finnish police force referred to in Mitrokhin’s notes is ZVEN, a CID officer recruited in 1959 (k-5,309).

  25. Upton, The Communist Parties of Scandinavia and Finland, part 2, chs. 6, 7. Upton quotes from one of the few surviving copies of Leino’s 1958 memoirs, Kommunisti sisäministerinä, withdrawn on the eve of publication.

  26. Upton, The Communist Parties of Scandinavia and Finland, p. 405.

  27. See above, chapter 7.

  28. Klehr and Haynes, The American Communist Movement, ch. 4. This admirable volume omits the role of the undeclared Party members after 1958.

  29. See above, chapter 10.

  30. See below, chapter 24.

  31. Mitrokhin’s notes give the names of two Canadians who assisted in obtaining the passport in the name of “Robert Callan,” no. 4-716255. The Centre also doctored a genuine Canadian passport, no. 4-428012, in the name of Vasili Dzogola (?Dzogol), inserting a photograph of “Abel” and changing the eye color and other particulars to match his. Because of “Abel’s” arrest, this passport too was never used. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

  32. k-27,451.

  33. k-3,122.

  34. Since non-Soviet citizens could not normally qualify for officer status in the KGB, it was intended that the new recruits should become illegal agents rather than illegal officers.

  35. k-26,331.

  36. k-26,332.

  37. k-26,333.

  38. k-3,65,115; k-8,182.

  39. k-26,327.

  40. vol. 8, ch. 13. Mitrokhin’s note on the meeting with Kashtan does not say explicitly that he was asked to talent-spot illegal agents. Given the previous role of the CPC in helping to fabricate illegals’ legends, however, it is barely conceivable that Kashtan, unlike the other Western Communist leaders mentioned in the files noted by Mitrokhin, was asked to recommend only conventional agents.

  41. k-26,217.

  42. KGB Chairman’s Decree no. 0099/OV of August 7, 1972, entitled “Measures for the Further Activation of Illegals Intelligence Activity and Increasing Its Role in the Foreign-Political Intelligence System of the KGB Under the USSR Council of Ministers,” envisaged the recruitment of illegal agents recommended by the Communist Parties of the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina for operations in North America; by the Communist Parties of Belgium, Britain, France, the FRG and Spain for operations in Europe; by the Communist Party of Japan for operations in Asia; and by the Communist Party of Israel for operations in the Middle East. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 4.

  43. k-26,227.

  44. k-26,94-5,308.

  45. Soares, Portugal’s Struggle for Liberation, p. 24.

  46. k-26,108. In Angola, once the richest of Portugal’s colonies, the end of Portuguese rule was followed in 1975 by full-scale civil war between the Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the rival, non-Marxist FNLA and UNITA. Cunhal also promised “to do everything possible to give assistance to the MPLA, including using illegal channels to send people drawn from among experienced military cadres,” though the PCP’s assistance was dwarfed by that from the Soviet Union and Cuba. k-26,205,209.

  47. Maxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy, pp. 69-70. According to Maxwell, the PIDE/DGS archives also revealed that “the PCP had some embarrassing skeletons of its own, not least the secret police informers within its own ranks.”

  48. k-26,4.

  49. k-26,4. For examples of PIDE/DGS documents which appeared in the press, probably as a result of KGB active measures, see Maxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy, p. 70. Mitrokhin’s notes give no details of these active measures. In 1994 the PIDE/DGS archive was opened to researchers, subject to a series of restrictions, at the Lisbon National Archive.

  50. Maxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy, chs. 7-9.

  51. Recruitment leads from the PCP leadership during the mid- and late 1970s included: the government lawyers BORETS and ZNATOK (k-16,180,182); the trade union lawyer ZHAK (k-16,179); MARAT, a registrar of births, deaths and marriages who was able to provide documentation for illegals (k-18,
345); KAREKA, a newspaper editor used for active measures from 1977 to 1982 (k-14,272); and EMIL, a journalist with the ANOP agency (k-14,404). Some of the other Portuguese cultivations, agents and confidential contacts of which details are given in Mitrokhin’s notes probably also stemmed from PCP leads.

  52. k-18,345. Cf. k-26,210.

  53. Pessi had further discussions on agent recruitment in both Moscow and Helsinki during 1978 and 1979; k-26,211,228,191.

  54. k-8,79. Mitrokhin identifies the Dublin resident only by his codename KAVERIN; his real name (Shadrin) is given in Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, appendix D3.

  55. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 53-6. Kryuchkov’s circular to residencies of April 6, 1978 referred to previous circulars of March 28, 1975 and June 17, 1976, apparently written in similar vein.

  56. k-19,7. The main Asian Communist Parties mentioned in Mitrokhin’s notes as taking part in the recruiting drive were those of the Indian subcontinent, Afghanistan and Japan. KGB relations with Third World Communist Parties will be covered in more detail in Volume 2.

  57. It is possible, however, that a latter-day Sorge remains concealed in a file not seen by Mitrokhin. It is also possible that one or more of the recruits of the 1970s and early 1980s developed into an illegal of major importance after Mitrokhin ceased to have access to the files.

  58. k-27,99. Mitrokhin’s notes give Maria’s full name, but it seems unfair to identify her.

  59. k-14,519; k-18,409. Mitrokhin’s notes reveal the identity of LIMB, DANA and MARCEL.

  60. See below, chapter 18.

  61. The FCD communication to Ponomarev of October 20, 1980 was numbered 2192-A/OV. The basic subsidy paid to Kashtan in the late 1970s was 150,000 US dollars, paid in two annual installments, with some supplements. By the 1980s the CPC had a membership of only about 4,000, and was thus receiving a subsidy of about $40 dollars per member. Subsidies were also paid to the Canada-USSR and Quebec-USSR Societies, and to the Severny Sosed (“Northern Neighbour”) journal. In addition, subsidies were sometimes channeled through the CPC to the Haitian Communists, and perhaps other Parties. vol. 8, ch. 13.

  62. Haynes and Klehr, “‘Moscow Gold,’ Confirmed at Last?” pp. 281-4; L. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, p. 414. Mitrokhin’s notes provide numerous examples of “Moscow gold,” especially during the 1970s, but no figures for the total subsidies received by any Communist Party.

  63. Barron, Operation Solo, ch. 4; the aliases of Morris Childs (born Chilovsky) are given in vol. 6, ch. 12. (On Child’s earlier career in the CPUSA, see Klehr, Haynes and Anderson, The Soviet World of American Communism, pp. 257-71.) Barron’s account is based on interviews and other material from Childs, his wife Eva and FBI agents concerned with his case. Operation Solo somewhat exaggerates the importance of the intelligence he supplied to the FBI after his trips to Moscow (see Draper, “Our Man in Moscow,” New York Review of Books (May 9, 1996)). Mitrokhin’s notes from KGB files, however, largely corroborate, as well as making important additions to, Barron’s account of Childs’s role in channeling Soviet funds to the CPUSA. Mitrokhin, unlike Barron, rarely gives annual totals for the Soviet subsidies. But those he provides are compatible with, though not identical to, Barron’s figures. According to the KGB files noted by Mitrokhin, the “allocations” to the CPUSA were 1.7 million dollars in both 1975 and 1976 (vol. 6, ch. 12). Barron gives figures of 1,792,676 dollars for 1975 and 1,997,651 dollars for 1976 (Operation Solo, appendix B); one possible explanation for the discrepancies is that, as sometimes happened, additional allocations were made in the course of the year.

  64. vol. 6, ch. 12.

  65. vol. 6, ch. 12.

  66. The instructor’s congratulations were reported by Friedman to the FBI. Barron, Operation Solo, pp. 144-5.

  67. vol. 6, ch. 12.

  68. Barron, Operation Solo, pp. 144-5. Mitrokhin’s notes and Barron’s book neatly complement each other. Mitrokhin summarizes the account of Friedman’s career in KGB files (vol. 6, ch. 12); Barron describes his career as known to the FBI, though he omits his real name and identifies him only by his FBI codename, CLIP.

  69. vol. 6, ch. 12.

  70. Barron, Operation Solo, pp. 156-7.

  71. vol. 6, ch. 12.

  72. Barron, Operation Solo, ch. 3.

  73. vol. 6, ch. 12.

  74. Barron, Operation Solo, ch. 3; Draper, “Our Man in Moscow,” New York Review of Books (May 9, 1996)

  75. Barron, Operation Solo, p. 263.

  76. vol. 6, ch. 12. Instead of Jackson, Dobrynin asked Hall to bring with him to meetings at the embassy Arnold Johnson, director of the CPUSA Information and Lecture Bureau, once improbably eulogized by Lee Harvey Oswald as “the Lenin of our country” (Posner, Case Closed, p. 149).

  77. DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI, pp. 213-14; Barron, Operation Solo, pp. 262-3. FBI reports to the White House said that Levison had been identified as a secret CPUSA member by “an informant who has furnished reliable information in the past as a secret member of the Communist Party,” presumably Jack Childs. Friedly and Gallen, Martin Luther King, pp. 124, 136-7.

  78. Garrow, FBI and Martin Luther King Jr., ch. 1; Friedly and Gallen, Martin Luther King, pp. 23-8.

  79. Barron, Operation Solo, p. 263; DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI, p. 214; Friedly and Gallen, Martin Luther King, pp. 25-6, 133-5. Though he denied current membership of the CPUSA, O’Dell resigned from King’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference in 1962. Mitrokhin’s notes contain no specific reference to O’Dell but reveal that the magazine Freedomways, with which he became actively involved after leaving the SCLC, had been founded with active Soviet support, continued to receive secret Soviet subsidies and was “close” to the CPUSA. vol. 6, ch. 12.

  80. Barron, Operation Solo, pp. 265-6.

  81. DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI, p. 214-15; Friedly and Gallen, Martin Luther King, pp. 36-43.

  82. vol. 6, ch. 12.

  83. vol. 6, app. 1, part 34.

  84. vol. 6, app. 1, part 4; t-3,76. Mitrokhin had access only to reports in FCD files based on intelligence provided by the agent, not to the agent’s file itself—probably because he had been recruited by the Second (rather than the First) Chief Directorate during a visit to the Soviet Union. Within the United States he seems to have been run from the San Francisco residency.

  85. The transliteration of these names into the Cyrillic alphabet in the KGB report of the meeting makes identification difficult. vol. 6, ch. 12.

  86. vol. 6, ch. 12.

  87. vol. 6, ch. 12.

  88. Barron, Operation Solo, pp. xiii, 312-14, 329-31.

  89. Klehr and Haynes, The American Communist Movement, pp. 173-4.

  90. Haynes and Klehr, “‘Moscow Gold,’ Confirmed at Last?”; Klehr, Haynes and Anderson, The Soviet World of American Communism, pp. 149-64.

  91. Barron, Operation Solo, p. 300.

  92. Healey and Isserman, Dorothy Healey Remembers, p. 273. Dorothy Ray Healey left the Party in 1973.

  Chapter Eighteen

  Eurocommunism

  1. Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party, pp. 254-6.

  2. k-26,187, 252, 288, 295, 296.

  3. k-26, 258.

  4. k-26, 229.

  5. k-26, 59.

  6. k-26, 60.

  7. The Centre concluded that the forgeries had probably been included in the money handed to the PCI in either April or July 1972. k-26, 299.

  8. k-26, 306. From 1969 to 1976 the PCI emissary most frequently used to collect Soviet subsidies from the embassy was Barontini (codenamed CLAUDIO); other emissaries referred to in KGB files were Marmuggi (codenamed CARO) and Guido Cappelloni (codenamed ALBERTO). k-26, 256, 267, 270, 291, 300, 302, 303, 305, 306.

  Smaller subsidies also went to the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) and the San Marino Communist Party. In 1974 the San Marino general secretary sent Brezhnev a Capo di Monte marble clock, via the Rome residency, in gratitude for Soviet financial assistance. k-26, 260, 283, 306
.

  9. k-26, 246.

  10. k-26, 252, 311. The supply of the SELENYA radio system to the PCI by the KGB had been approved in principle by Politburo decision no. P 91/3 of May 17, 1973, but it was agreed that, “The two-way radios must be handed over to our Italian friends [the PCI] only when there is a real need to organize radio communications, bearing in mind that if kept in store for a long period the radio stations require periodic checks, maintenance and repairs.”

  11. Berlinguer’s articles, first published in the autumn of 1973, are reprinted in Valenza (ed.), Il compromesso storico, pp. 14-31.

  12. k-26, 229. Agostino Novella, a veteran member of the PCI Direzione, strengthened the case against Amendola, Pajetta and Ingrao by telling Ambassador Rhyzov that all three had tried to prevent Longo seeking medical treatment in the Soviet Union. k-26, 230.

  13. Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party, ch. 8. Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, 1943-1988, ch. 10.

  14. k-26, 237.

  15. Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party, ch. 8.

  16. Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party, pp. 283-4, 290.

  17. k-26, 257. The KGB files noted by Mitrokhin do not record what use was made of its intelligence on Berlinguer’s allegedly dubious building contracts.

  18. k-26, 264.

  19. k-26, 256. Mitrokhin gives no details of payments after 1976.

  20. k-26, 259, 261. In 1998 a receipt by Cappelloni, dated June 27, 1976, for one million dollars from the CPSU for the 1976 election campaign was published in the Italian press. “Pci, ecco le ricevute dei miliardi di Mosca,” Il Giorno (April 30, 1998).

  21. The training was authorized by Politburo decision no. SG 143/8 GS of January 17, 1979. k-26,2.

  22. Childs and Popplewell, The Stasi, p. 138.

  23. k-26, 158.

  24. Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, 1943-1988, pp. 384-5.

  25. k-26, 158.

  26. The PCI decision to dismantle the radio stations was reported by Kryuchkov to Ponomarev, head of the Central Committee International Department, in a communication of June 22, 1981, published in the Italian press in 1998. “Servizio segreto,” L’Avanti (May 16, 1998).