27. Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party, ch. 9; Cossutta, Lo strappo; “Cossutta Sempre Più Isolato,” La Repubblica (January 2, 1982).
28. Hellman, “The Difficult Birth of the Democratic Party of the Left,” p. 81.
29. Though details of the payments to Cossutta and other “healthy forces in the PCI” were passed by Moscow to the Rome Prosecutor’s Office in 1992, they were not made public until 1998. “Pci, ecco le ricevute dei miliardi di Mosca,” Il Giorno (April 30, 1998); “Ecco la Tangentopoli rossa,” Il Tempo (April 30, 1998).
30. t-7, 12.
31. Pike, In the Service of Stalin, p. 49; Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, p. 535.
32. Mujal-León, Communism and Political Change in Spain, pp. 107-9. After their expulsion, Gómez, García and Líster went on to found unsuccessful pro-Soviet splinter groups. Cf. k-3,12.
33. k-3, 16.
34. Mujal-León, Communism and Political Change in Spain, ch. 6.
35. k-2, 65; k-3, 13, 15, 22; k-26, 410.
36. k-3, 18.
37. Mujal-León, Communism and Political Change in Spain, pp. 126-7.
38. k-3, 17.
39. Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, p. 9.
40. Mujal-León, Communism and Political Change in Spain, pp. 127-31.
41. k-3, 20.
42. k-5, 879.
43. k-26, 406.
44. In January, October and December 1980, Gallego was given payments of 10,000 dollars by the Madrid residency. k-26, 405.
45. k-26, 407.
46. The anti-Eurocommunist Catalan Communist Party, the PSUC (Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya), split away from the PCE.
47. Krasikov, From Dictatorship to Democracy, p. 188. His book, originally published in Russian as Ispanskii Reportazh, was translated into a number of languages.
48. k-3, 98.
49. Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party, pp. 337-8.
50. Bell and Criddle, The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic, pp. 19-20; Roy, Somme tout, pp. 156-7.
51. k-3, 65, 115; k-8, 182.
52. Bell and Criddle, The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic, p. 240.
53. k-3, 140.
54. See below, chapter 27.
55. k-3, 140.
56. k-3, 140.
57. Adereth, The French Communist Party, pp. 208-13.
58. The text of the letters was later published in Cahiers du Communisme (October 1991).
59. k-8, 148.
60. Bell and Criddle, The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic, pp. 153-4, 164-5.
61. k-3, 123.
62. k-3, 140.
63. L’Express (July 27, 1970).
64. k-3, 140.
65. Robrieux, Histoire intérieure du Parti communiste, vol. 2, pp. 657-65; vol. 3, pp. 344-5, 406-14.
66. Bell and Criddle, The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic, pp. 154-6, 217-30. Though the Socialists won an overall majority at the 1981 legislative elections and did not depend on PCF support, four Communist ministers served in a Socialist-dominated coalition until 1984.
67. Urban (ed.), Moscow and the Global Left in the Gorbachev Era, pp. 5, 52-3.
68. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 75.
69. Urban (ed.), Moscow and the Global Left in the Gorbachev Era, ch. 2. While Gorbachev was publicly aligning himself with the PCI’s reformist leadership, however, the International Department continued to subsidize the PCI old guard until 1987. In 1989 the PCI, led since 1988 by Achille Ochetto, changed its name to the PDS (Partito Democratico della Sinistra), the Democratic Party of the Left. A breakaway movement established itself in 1991 as the Partito della Rifondazione Comunista.
70. In 1987 the PCE, Gallego’s PCPE, the Progressive Federation (founded by another former PCE member, Ramón Tamames), Pasoc (a breakaway Socialist group) and a number of independents combined to form the Izquierdo Unida; the PCE accounted for about two-thirds of the total membership.
71. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 116; Grachev, Kremlevskaya Khronika, p. 247.
72. Marchais’s message was delivered by Gaston Plissonnier, who for the past twenty years had been the French conduit for the secret subsidies to the PCF. Dobrynin to Gorbachev (June 20, 1987); text in Stepankov and Lisov, Kremlevsky Zagovor, appendix.
73. Politburo decision of July 3, 1987, in Stepankov and Lisov, Kremlevsky Zagovor, appendix. Between 1981 and 1991 subsidies to the PCF totaled about 24 million dollars. Burke, “Recently Released Material on Soviet Intelligence Operations,” p. 246; Albats, The State within a State, p. 222.
74. Haynes and Klehr, “‘Moscow Gold,’ Confirmed at Last?”, p. 283.
75. Hellman, “The Difficult Birth of the Democratic Party of the Left,” p. 81.
Chapter Nineteen
Ideological Subversion
Part 1
1. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, p. 551.
2. vol. 10, ch. 3.
3. Labedz and Hayward (eds.), On Trial, p. 91.
4. vol. 10, ch. 3.
5. vol. 10, ch. 3. Cf. Zamoyska, “Sinyavsky, the Man and the Writer,” p. 61.
6. vol. 10, ch. 3.
7. Aucouturier, “Andrey Sinyavsky on the Eve of His Arrest,” p. 344.
8. Geli Fyoderovich Vasiliev, codenamed MIKHAILOV, had worked abroad as an illegal under the name Rudolf Steiner in Austria and Latin America. On returning to Moscow, apparently unable to stand the strain of life as an illegal, he began work in the Novosti Press Agency (k-16,446). Though the probability is that Vasilyev was the stoolpigeon placed in Sinyavsky’s cell, it is just possible that the KGB used another agent with the same codename—though there is no identifiable record of such an agent in Mitrokhin’s notes.
9. vol. 10, ch. 3.
10. vol. 10, ch. 3.
11. Mitrokhin’s notes record simply that Remizov gave his interrogators “evidence against Sinyavsky.” At the trial this evidence included an admission that he had delivered one of Sinyavsky’s manuscripts to Hélène Zamoyska. Labedz and Hayward (eds.), On Trial, p. 153.
12. vol. 10, ch. 3.
13. Labedz and Hayward (eds.), On Trial, p. 306.
14. Labedz and Hayward (eds.), On Trial, pp. 196, 198, 209.
15. Asked if he had sent his manuscripts abroad “illegally,” Sinyavsky replied, “No, unofficially.” Sending manuscripts abroad was not illegal. But in his final address, the state prosecutor again claimed—inaccurately—that the defendants had sent their manuscripts to the West “illegally.” Labedz and Hayward (eds.), On Trial, pp. 185, 308.
16. Labedz and Hayward (eds.), On Trial, pp. 253-4.
17. vol. 10, ch. 3; vol. 7, nzch. TANOV later took part in PROGRESS operations in Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, using Austrian and forged Canadian passports, and carried out other intelligence assignments in Pakistan, India, France, the Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait and Spain. In 1982 he was recalled to Moscow on the grounds that he was producing little intelligence and had greatly overspent his budget (vol. 3, pakapp. 3).
18. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, pp. 614-16.
19. vol. 10, ch. 3.
20. k-27,370
21. Scammell (ed.), The Solzhenitsyn Files, pp. xxv, 7, 41. This important collection of documents on “the Solzhenitsyn case,” declassified by order of President Yeltsin in 1992, includes a number of KGB reports to the Central Committee and Politburo but not the KGB operational files to which Mitrokhin had access.
22. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 487-8.
23. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 492.
24. Scammell (ed.), The Solzhenitsyn Files, pp. 138-41.
25. Scammell (ed.), The Solzhenitsyn Files, pp. xxix, 161-3.
26. Andropov instituted judicial proceedings against Shchelokov in December 1982, only a month after Brezhnev’s death. Two years later, before his case had come to trial, Shchelokov committed suicide. Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, pp. 330, 348.
27. Scammell (ed.), The Solzhenitsyn Files, pp. 194-210.
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28. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, p. 615.
29. k-21,30.
30. k-21,17; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 4. The spelling of Boucaut in the Roman alphabet is uncertain; it appears in Cyrillic transliteration as “Buko.” Mitrokhin’s notes do not identify Nikashin’s first name and patronymic.
31. k-21,114.
32. Sakharov, Memoirs, pp. 359, 369-70; Grigorenko, Memoirs, pp. 387-8.
33. Article by G. Kizlych and P. Aleksandrov on the Yakir and Krasin cases in the classified in-house quarterly, KGB Sbornik, no. 73; k-25,124.
34. vol. 10, ch. 5.
35. Protocols of Krasin’s interrogation; vol. 10, ch. 5.
36. On Savinkov, see above, chapter 2.
37. Article by G. Kizlych and P. Aleksandrov on the Yakir and Krasin cases in the classified in-house quarterly, KGB Sbornik, no. 73; k-25,124.
38. vol. 10, ch. 5.
39. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, p. 807; Solzhenitsyn, The Oak and the Calf, p. 522.
40. Grigorenko, Memoirs, p. 388.
41. Article by G. Kizlych and P. Aleksandrov on the Yakir and Krasin cases in the classified in-house quarterly, KGB Sbornik, no. 73; k-25,124.
42. Sakharov, Sakharov Speaks, pp. 212-15.
43. Scammell (ed.), The Solzhenitsyn Files, pp. 256-74, 340-6, 350-3.
44. Solzhenitsyn describes his forced departure from Russia in The Oak and the Calf, pp. 383-453.
45. k-21,123.
46. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, p. 886. Though the woman who came to Solzhenitsyn’s door on his first day in Zurich has never been identified, her Russian origins and the fact that within a few weeks, if not days, Valentina Holubová had established herself as his secretary and assistant make it probable that she was the caller. It is unlikely that a genuine native of Ryazan had tracked him down so rapidly. In reality, Holubová came not from Ryazan but from Vladivostok (k-21,123).
47. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, p. 886. The fact that Dr. Frantiˇsek Holub was, like his wife, working for the StB, is implied rather than specifically stated in Mitrokhin’s notes. For example, he records that the Holubs jointly recommended to Solzhenitsyn another StB officer posing as a Czech dissident, Tomáš Řezáč (k-21,123). It is inconceivable that the StB or the KGB would have allowed a husband and wife team to operate in this way unless both were working for them.
48. k-21,123,124. On Solzhenitsyn’s first meeting with Krause, see Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, p. 886.
49. See above, chapters 2, 5.
50. k-21,124.
51. Scammell (ed.), The Solzhenitsyn Files, pp. 387-90.
52. k-21,25.
53. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, pp. 887-8, 890-3, 987-90; Scammell (ed.), The Solzhenitsyn Files, pp. 431-2, 451-3. Rezác’s scurrilous volume, The Spiral of Solzhenitsyn’s Betrayal, described by the author as “an autopsy of the corpse of a traitor,” appeared in Italian in 1977 and Russian in the following year, but failed to find a British or American publisher. While in Russia, Rezác also interviewed Sahkarov, who was unaware of his background (Sakharov, Memoirs, p. 591).
54. k-21,25.
55. Sakharov, Memoirs, p. 428.
56. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, p. 890.
57. k-3(b),27. Mitrokhin copied or noted sections 1-5, 8, 9, 11, 16-19 of the 19-point “plan of agent operational measures.”
58. k-3(b),27.
59. k-25,212.
60. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, p. 955.
61. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 6.
62. k-25,29.
63. There is a vivid description of Solzhenitsyn’s address and its reception in Thomas, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, pp. 460-3.
64. k-25,29. The New York Times and the Washington Post comments on the Harvard Address are quoted in Thomas, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, p. 462.
Chapter Twenty
Ideological Subversion
Part 2
1. Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 346, 390.
2. k-21, 16.
3. Sakharov, Memoirs, p. 429. The Nobel Peace Prize, presented in Oslo, is awarded by the Nobel Committee appointed by the Norwegian parliament. The other Nobel prizes, presented in Stockholm, are awarded by Swedish committees.
4. k-21, 69. Before being passed for signature to Kryuchkov, head of the FCD, and Andropov, this document (reference no. 155/2422) was initialed by B. S. Ivanov, Kryuchkov’s deputy, Oleg Kalugin, head of Counter-intelligence, and V.P. Ivanov of Section A. The alleged “criminals” who supported Sakharov were mostly, if not entirely, dissidents sentenced on trumped-up charges.
5. On the fabricated KGB claim that Sakharov supported the Pinochet regime, see Sakharov, Memoirs, pp. 389, 426.
6. k-21, 64.
7. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, p. 893.
8. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 6.
9. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 260-1.
10. k-21, 104.
11. k-21, 104.
12. Sakharov, Memoirs, pp. 585-92. On the KGB’s use of Yakovlev to attack Solzhenitsyn, see Scammell (ed.), The Solzhenitsyn Files, pp. 394, 398, 409, 426-30.
13. k-21, 1. Cf. Bonner, Alone Together, p. 46. YAK was used for a variety of active measures. One of the files noted by Mitrokhin records that in 1976 he was paid 500 dollars (probably per month). The same file records that Russkiy Golos had a circulation of only 1,500. k-21,106.
14. k-21, 1. Bonner, Alone Together, pp. 37-8.
15. “CHI E” ELENA BONNER? Artifice di piu assassinii la moglie dell “accademico Sakharov,” Sette Giorni (April 12, 1980). Cf. Bonner, Alone Together, pp. 31-2.
16. k-21, 104. Cf. Bonner, Alone Together, pp. 37-8.
17. k-6, 114; k-21, 1, 105.
18. “CHI E” ELENA BONNER? Artifice di piu assassinii la moglie dell “accademico Sakharov,” Sette Giorni (April 12, 1980). k-21, 1, 82.
19. k-21, 1, 105; k-6, 114. Sette Giorni also published an attack on Solzhenitsyn, based on an interview with his first wife (k-21, 82).
20. k-21, 82.
21. k-21, 104.
22. k-21, 104.
23. Bonner, Alone Together, p. 30.
24. Bethell, Spies and Other Secrets, p. 73.
25. Memorandum by Andropov and State Prosecutor Rudenko, no. 123-A (January 21, 1977); Albats, The State within a State, pp. 178-9.
26. k-21, 153.
27. Bethell, Spies and Other Secrets, pp. 98-9.
28. The sentence was thirteen years. Shcharansky, Fear No Evil, pp. 205-6, 224-5.
29. k-21, 157, 159.
30. k-21, 164.
31. k-21, 156. Makarov was informed that the file recording the residency’s success in preventing the award of the prize to Orlov had been passed to Andropov.
32. k-1, 98.
33. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1.
34. Sakharov, Memoirs, pp. 510-16.
35. k-21, 80.
36. Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 296.
37. Bethell, Spies and Other Secrets, pp. 315-16.
38. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 37. In public, in order not to alienate a majority on the Politburo, Gorbachev stuck to the official line. He declared in an interview with L’Humanité in February 1986: “Now about political prisoners, we don’t have any… It is common knowledge that [Sakharov] committed actions punishable by law… Measures were taken with regard to him according to our legislation. The actual state of affairs is as follows. Sakharov resides in Gorky in normal conditions, is doing scientific work, and remains a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He is in normal health as far as I know. His wife has recently left the country for medical treatment abroad. As for Sakharov himself, he is still a bearer of secrets of special importance to the state and for this reason cannot go abroad.” Sakharov, Memoirs, p. 607.
39. Grachev, Kremlevskaya Karonika, pp. 94-104; Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 165.
40. Sakharov, Memoirs, p. 615.
41. Cited in Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, pp. 252-3.
42. Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 295.
43. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, pp. 253-64; Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb, ch. 19.
44. Remnick,
Lenin’s Tomb, p. 282.
45. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, pp. 7-10.
46. k-21, 76.
47. k-21, 153.
Chapter Twenty-one
SIGINT in the Cold War
1. Andrew, “Intelligence and International Relations in the Early Cold War.”
2. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, seeks to assess the varying interest taken by US presidents in SIGINT.
3. Mitrokhin had no direct access to the files of either the Eighth Directorate or the Sixteenth (SIGINT) Directorate, founded in the late 1960s. He did, however, see some documents from both directorates in FCD files.
4. KGB to Khrushchev, “Report for 1960” (February 14, 1961), in the “special dossiers” of the CPSU Central Committee; cited by Zubok, “Spy vs. Spy,” p. 23.
5. Garthoff, “The KGB Reports to Gorbachev,” p. 228.
6. Kahn, “Soviet Comint in the Cold War.”
7. Samouce, “I Do Understand the Russians,” pp. 52-3, Samouce papers, US Army Military Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 237-40.
8. Kennan, Memoirs 1950-1963, pp. 154-7. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 454-6. Kennan was declared persona non grata in October 1952, though chiefly for reasons unconnected with the bugging incident.
9. Bohlen, Witness to History 1919-1969, pp. 345-6. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 456-7.
10. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 357.
11. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 456. Remarkably, Nosenko’s information was not sufficient to convince his CIA debriefers that he was a genuine defector.
12. vol. 6, ch. 9. For illustrations of some of the espionage equipment supplied by the FCD OT Directorate, see Melton, The Ultimate Spy Book.
13. k-18,342.
14. k-1,160. On KGB penetration of the Orthodox church, see below, chapter 28.
15. vol. 7, ch. 5, para. 44.
16. k-24,299; vol. 7, ch. 5.
17. Philby’s career as an SIS officer had ended after his recall from Washington in 1951. Philby’s later account to Borovik of his years in Beirut contains a number of inaccuracies, due partly to his attempt to discredit Lunn (transcribed by Borovik as “Lan”—an error derived, as in the KGB files noted by Mitrokhin, from the conversion of “Lunn” into Cyrillic). Philby attributes his successful escape in 1963 largely to Lunn’s incompetence and adds that “amazingly, three or four years later [Lunn] received a high honour—the Cross of St. Michael and St. George” (Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 354). In reality, as Philby had correctly informed the KGB after his defection, Lunn was awarded the CMG a decade earlier, in 1957 (vol. 7, ch. 5).
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