18. Lunn was the author of High-Speed Skiing (1935), A Skiing Primer (1948) and The Guinness Book of Skiing (1983). His father, Sir Arnold Lunn (1888-1974), was one of Europe’s leading ski pioneers, as well as a leading Catholic apologist and a vocal opponent of both Nazism and Communism. His 63 books included 23 on skiing and 16 on Christian apologetics (Dictionary of National Biography, 1971-1980, pp. 522-3).
19. Lunn’s recent Who’s Who entries give the date of his entry into SIS. Earlier entries make no reference to his intelligence career.
20. Unless otherwise indicated, the account of operation RUBIN is based on k-24,299 and vol. 7, ch. 5.
21. k-26,223.
22. k-26,223.
23. The file noted by Mitrokhin does not reveal what the measures were.
24. On Philby’s depression in the late 1960s and partial recovery during the 1970s, see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 24-6, 544-5, and Knightley, Philby, pp. 234-7.
25. One of the CIA officers on whom intelligence was gathered during operation RUBIN was selected by Andropov as the target of an attempted abduction.
26. k-18,342.
27. vol. 6, app. 1 (misc.), parts 1, 4; k-27,242. Mitrokhin’s notes give no indication of what intelligence was obtained by bugging the CIA officer’s flat. VERA’s file records that the KGB lost contact with her in 1975 as a result of the Lebanese Civil War.
28. k-27,239.
29. KGB operations in Africa will be covered in volume 2.
30. Details of operation REBUS in k-17,49,59,185; vol. 6, ch. 10. On November 16, 1981 operation PHOENIX succeeded in bugging the residence of the US ambassador in Conakry. The agent responsible was a Guinean (probably a domestic servant) codenamed MURAT (k-17,145; k-8,519). The KGB also succeeded in intercepting the communications of US embassies in a number of other African capitals, among them Bamako and Brazzaville (vol. 6, ch. 10; k-17,168).
31. The last, reforming chairman of the KGB, Vadim Bakatin, appointed after the failed coup of August 1991, outraged his staff by giving the American ambassador blueprints of the highly sophisticated bugging system (Albats, The State within a State, pp. 311-13). There were several security alerts within the existing US embassy in Moscow during the 1980s. In 1984, however, bugs were discovered in electric typewriters in the US embassy in Moscow which had been in use for some years (Lardner, “Unbeatable Bugs”). In 1986 two marine guards admitted giving KGB agents access to the US embassy. Because of improved security procedures, however, the KGB do not seem to have gained access to the cipher room or other sensitive areas (Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 611).
32. k-22,135,232. The GRU already had posts in a number of its residencies designed to intercept US and NATO military communications.
33. vol. 6, ch. 9.
34. vol. 6, ch. 9.
35. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 92. The POCHIN files noted by Mitrokhin confirm Kalugin’s list of intercepted communications (vol. 6, ch. 9).
36. vol. 6, ch. 9.
37. See above, chapter 11.
38. See above, chapter 11.
39. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 2; vol. 6, ch. 9. There was a further operation to bug UN Secretariat offices in 1963 (k-8,138).
40. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 2.
41. After leaving GCHQ in 1977, Prime broke off contact with the KGB for the next three years. He had further meetings with his case officer in Vienna and Potsdam in 1980 and 1981. His work as a Soviet agent came to light after he was arrested for sexually molesting little girls in 1982. He was sentenced to thirtyfive years’ imprisonment for espionage and three for sexual assault (Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 526-8, 530-1). A senior GCHQ officer was later quoted as saying, “On the political side, there was a time up to the mid-1970s when we used to get useful [Soviet] political and high-level military communications. But that dried up, partly as a result of Prime.” (Urban, UK Eyes Alpha, p. 6.) Because Prime was a Third Directorate, not an FCD, agent, Mitrokhin did not have access to his file. The latest study of Prime, by the detective chief superintendent in charge of his case, is Cole, Geoffrey Prime.
42. Mitrokhin’s notes do not give the date of foundation of the Sixteenth Directorate, but indicate that it was in existence not later than 1968; k-22,232.
43. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 529. vol. 6, ch. 9.
44. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.
45. vol. 6, ch. 9. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record ANTON’s real name.
46. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1179.
47. vol. 6, ch. 9.
48. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1192.
49. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 92.
50. For illustrations of some of the complex antennae on the roofs of Soviet missions in the United States and elsewhere, see Ball, Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), pp. 49-68.
51. vol. 6, ch. 9.
52. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, p. 359.
53. Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 357-8.
54. vol. 6, ch. 9.
55. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 2.
56. vol. 6, ch. 9.
57. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1.
58. vol. 6, ch. 9. On the crisis over the Soviet “combat brigade” in Cuba, see Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 444-7. Mitrokhin’s notes on POCHIN files also record that “during the crisis in Lebanon the [Washington] residency was able to make a correct evaluation of the unfolding situation and inform the Centre on a timely basis that the United States had no plans for military intervention” (vol. 6, ch. 9). It is unclear which Lebanese crisis is referred to. Since the other material in this section of Mitrokhin’s notes deals with the mid-1970s, however, the reference is probably to 1974, when Israel made a series of air attacks against villages in southern Lebanon, which it suspected of harboring terrorists.
59. vol. 6, ch. 9.
60. The FBI shortwave radio communications channels monitored continuously by the RAKETA post during the 1970s were:
• the radio link between surveillance vehicles and the six FBI posts responsible for observing the movements of Soviet personnel (167.4625 megahertz);
• the channel used by surveillance vehicles and observation posts monitoring the movements of members of Middle Eastern and some Western missions to the UN (167.2125 megahertz);
• the channel used for communications between the FBI department investigating bank robberies and surveillance vehicles (167.6887 megahertz);
• the channel used by those investigating other federal crimes (167.3756 megahertz);
• the channel used for communications between the FBI despatch centers in New York and New Jersey (frequency in the 167 megahertz band not recorded);
• the channel used for other communications between the New York dispatch center and FBI vehicles (167.7760 megahertz)
vol. 6, ch. 9).
61. vol. 6, ch. 9.
62. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 4, n. 1.
63. The running costs for the main intercept posts in KGB residencies around the world in 1979 were as follows (figures in thousands of hard currency roubles):
Washington (POCHIN): 26.0
New York (PROBA): 29.4
San Francisco (VESNA): 6.7
Ottawa (codename not recorded): figures unavailable (5.8 in 1977)
Montreal (VENERA): 3.3 (plus 3.5 for purchase of motorcar)
Cuba (TERMIT-S): 18.8
Brazil (KLEN): 4.8 (increased to 8.2 in 1980; 13.3 in 1981)
Mexico (RADAR): 3.5 (increased to 4.6 in 1980)
Reykjavik (OSTROV): 2.3
London (MERCURY): 7.1
Oslo (SEVER): 7.2
Paris (JUPITER): 10.1
Bonn (TSENTAVR-1): 11.3
Cologne (TSENTAVR-2): figures unavailable
Salzburg (TYROL-1): 1.3
Vienna (TYROL-2): 3.3
Berne (ELBRUS): 2.8
Geneva (KAVKAZ): 2.3
Rome (START): 15.0
Athens (RADUGA): 4.2
Ankara (RADUGA-T): 9.5 (plus supplementary 2.2)
Istanbul (SIRIUS): 5.3
>
Teheran (MARS): 5.0
Beijing (KRAB): 4.5
Tokyo (ZARYA): 10.4 vol. 6, ch. 9; 1977 figures for Ottawa from vol. 8, ch. 5)
Because of the KGB’s curious accounting methods, these figures doubtless do not represent the full running costs of the intercept posts. They do, however, give an approximate indication of the relative level of activity at each post. Other significant intercept posts, probably less important than those listed above, included Lisbon (ALTAY), Nairobi (KRYM), Cairo (ORION),The Hague (TULIP), Brussels (VEGA), Belgrade (PARUS), Hanoi (AMUR), Jakarta (DELFIN) and Damascus (SIGMA). Mitrokhin’s notes do not give the budgets for these posts.
64. Ball, Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), pp. 27-9; Rosenau, “A Deafening Silence,” pp. 723-5.
65. vol. 6, ch. 9.
66. Ball, Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), pp. 27-9.
67. vol. 2, app. 3.
68. k-22,136. Shorter reports were submitted by each intercept post at least once a month.
69. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 2.
70. vol. 6, ch. 6.
71. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 3; vol. 6, ch. 6; vol. 6, app. 2, parts 4, 5.
72. On the origins of the UKUSA agreement, see Andrew, “The Making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance”; on its subsequent development, see Ball and Richelson, The Ties That Bind and Hager, Secret Power.
73. t-7,131.
74. t-7,130.
75. k-19,435.
76. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 5.
77. See above, chapter 6.
78. vol. 2, app. 3. The names of the head and deputy heads of the Sixteenth Department are given in k-22,134.
79. Interview by Christopher Andrew with Viktor Makarov, 1993. When Oleg Gordievsky became resident-designate at the London residency early in 1985, the Sixteenth Department officer told him that there was currently no British source providing high-grade cipher material (Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 610).
80. Interview by Christopher Andrew with Viktor Makarov, 1993; Kahn, “Soviet Comint in the Cold War,” pp. 20-3.
81. Interview with Gurgenev (identified only by his first name and patronymic), Izvestia (September 24, 1991).
82. On March 25, 1985, for example, the London residency received an urgent telegram asking for British reactions to Gorbachev’s meeting with the executive committee of the Socialist International. Sooner than report that the event had failed to excite great interest in Britain, the residency simply concocted a favorable reply without contacting any of its limited range of sources. (Recollection of Oleg Gordievsky, then resident-designate.)
83. See above, chapter 21.
84. Interview by Christopher Andrew with Viktor Makarov, 1993; Viktor Makarov, “The West Had No Aggressive Plans against the USSR,” Express Chronicle (February 19, 1992), p. 5.
85. Urban, UK Eyes Alpha, ch. 19.
86. Ball, Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). Ball and Windren, “Soviet Signals Intelligence (Sigint).”
87. Rosenau, “A Deafening Silence,” p. 726.
88. Andrew, “The Nature of Military Intelligence,” p. 5.
89. Rosenau, “A Deafening Silence,” pp. 727, 732 n. 6.
Chapter Twenty-two
Special Tasks
Part 1
1. Djilas, Tito, p. 29; Djilas, Rise and Fall, pp. 106-7; Radzinsky, Stalin, p. 399.
2. k-20,272; Ranković’s codename is in k-20,287.
3. Djilas, Rise and Fall, pp. 82-3, 105-6.
4. k-20,281.
5. k-20,276.
6. k-20,290,292. Tishkov’s cover name (Timofeyev) is given in Djilas, Rise and Fall, pp. 82-3, 105-6.
7. k-20,279.
8. k-20,289,290.
9. Djilas, Rise and Fall, pp. 84-5, 92, 95, 98-9, 105-6; Dedijer, Tito Speaks, p. 268.
10. k-20,292.
11. k-5,707.
12. Djilas, Rise and Fall, chs. 14, 15; Djilas, Tito, pp. 84-7; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 371-2. VAL is identified by Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, p. 338.
13. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 415-17.
14. See above, chapters 5, 6, and 10.
15. MGB report to Stalin, first published by Dmitri Volkogonov in Izvestia (June 11, 1993); reprinted in Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, pp. 336-7, and “Stalin’s Plan to Assassinate Tito,” p. 137.
16. MGB report to Stalin, first published by Dmitri Volkogonov in Izvestia (June 11, 1993).
17. “Stalin’s Plan to Assassinate Tito,” p. 137.
18. Wolff, “Leadership Transition in a Fractured Bloc,” p. 1.
19. Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, pp. 335-8.
20. k-13,267. Some examples of Grigulevich’s works, published under his own name, the pseudonym I. R. Lavretsky and the hybrid Grigulevich-Lavretsky, are included in the bibliography.
21. Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, pp. 249, 252-3.
22. Khokhlov, In the Name of Conscience, part 3; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 430-1.
23. vol. 3, pakapp. 3.
24. t-7,267.
25. t-7,267.
26. Each target file (obektovoye delo) had to give the following information:
1. The role of the target in peacetime and wartime, and its place in the enemy’s military-industrial capabilities. Documents, photographs, films, maps and diagrams giving details on its location, work schedule, security system, personnel, neighbors, populated areas nearby and methods of approaching the target.
2. Detailed descriptions of the target’s vulnerable points, methods of attacking each of them, estimates of the likely damage, and the type of personnel to be used in sabotage operations (agents, illegals, etc.).
3. Opportunities to reconnoitre and sabotage the target. This section of the file contains individual reports (spravki) on every information source available on the target, and on each combat agent (agent-boyevik) selected for operations against it.
4. Details of the special equipment needed for operations against the target, the precise use to be made of it, dead drops, storage arrangements and the role of each of those entrusted with its use.
5. Arrangements for giving instructions to those responsible for attacking the target, together with the codewords for the “special action” to begin. (This part of the file was placed in a sealed package.)
If information on any of the subjects listed above was missing, a note was added to the file on the action being taken to obtain it. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5, n. 2.
27. k-16,255.
28. t-7,311.
29. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
30. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
31. Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. 211-12.
32. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1.
33. Barron, KGB, pp. 421-6. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 467.
34. The fullest account of Stashinsky’s career is in Anders, Murder to Order.
35. Anders, Murder to Order, p. 107.
36. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 468. See below, chapter 15.
37. Richard Beeston, “KGB Refused to Kill Khrushchev” [interview with Semichastny], The Times (December 23, 1997).
38. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 481-2.
39. The text of Khrushchev’s secret speech of August 3, 1961 did not come to light until 1993. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, p. 252.
40. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
41. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. Fonseca was co-founder of the FSLN. Initially it was called the National Liberation Front. “Sandinista” was added, chiefly at Fonseca’s insistence, in 1962 in honor of the “anti-imperialist” hero, General Augusto César Sandino. Volume 2 will give more detail on KGB links with the FSLN and on other operations in Latin America.
42. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
43. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
44. vol. 8, ch. 10.
45. t-7,173.
46. It was planned to put the Wilhemshaven-Wesseling oil pipeline out of action where it crosses the Lippe river and the Seitenkanal; t-7,277.
47. t-7,65; k-16,380.
48. k-2,186.
49. t-7,163,165,170-2. For examples of radio caches, see this chapter, appendices 2, 3.
50. k-5,483.
51. On the MOLNIYA device, see this chapter, appendix 1. Mitrokhin’s notes do not always identify clearly which caches are booby-trapped.
52. See this chapter, appendix 2.
53. Reuter report (January 18, 1999).
54. k-5,382. The Belgian caches turned out not to be booby-trapped.
55. In 1968-9, the Thirteenth Department had one illegal, PAUL, assisted by his wife VIRGINIA, and two pairs of German illegal agents, on whom Mitrokhin’s notes give no further details; vol. 3, pakapp. 3. There may have been others in files not noted by Mitrokhin.
56. The fullest account of PAUL’s career is in vol. 7, ch. 7; there are a few further details in vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. On RAG see also k-11,17. PAUL’s file, on which Mitrokhin made detailed notes, gives little indication of the nature of the assistance provided by VIRGINIA.
57. vol. 7, ch. 7; vol. 8, ch. 9; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. Among other illegals seconded for shorter periods to Thirteenth Department operations was Vasili Gordievsky (GROMOV), who on a mission to Spain in the winter of 1964-5 selected seven landing sites and eight arms caches for DRG operations. Rodin, the head of the Thirteenth Department, requested the Illegals Directorate to give him an award to mark the success of his mission; t-7,279.
58. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1.
59. See above, chapter 11.
60. Deryabin and Rastvorov defected in 1954 to the CIA in, respectively, Vienna and Tokyo. In the same year the Petrovs defected in Canberra.
61. vol. 5, sec. 7n.; vol. 2, app. 3.
62. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 6.
63. vol. 2, app. 3; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
64. See above, chapter 11.
65. Wise, Molehunt, ch. 11; Mangold, Cold Warrior, ch. 12.
66. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
67. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. The KGB also sought, unsuccessfully, to use its agent in the Canadian RCMP, Jim Morrison (FRIEND), to track down Runge.
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