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The Sword and the Shield

Page 113

by Christopher Andrew


  27. Driberg, Ruling Passions, p. 229.

  28. Driberg, Guy Burgess.

  29. According to Mitrokhin’s summary of Driberg’s KGB file, he was used for “the publication of KGB themes in the British press,” and “sent to the United States and other Western countries with a [KGB] brief”; vol. 7, ch. 14, item 3.

  30. Wheen, Tom Driberg, p. 337.

  31. Ziegler, Wilson, p. 313.

  32. Wheen, Tom Driberg, pp. 353-4.

  33. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 3.

  34. Wheen, Tom Driberg, pp. 362-8, 400.

  35. Ziegler, Wilson, p. 313.

  36. Frolik also identified three other Labor MPs whom he claimed had been in the pay of the StB: Will Owen, John Stonehouse and agent GUSTAV (not so far reliably identified); Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 523-4.

  37. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 2.

  38. Fletcher, £60 a Second on Defence, pp. 132-3.

  39. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 2.

  40. Fletcher claimed that MI5 had shown his wife intercepted letters in 1969 showing that he had had an affair during a visit to Hungary. Dorril and Ramsay, Smear, p. 197.

  41. Dick Crossmann was less impressed, telling his diary that Wilson had done “a magnificent job of blowing out his information” in order to pose as a Soviet expert. Ziegler, Wilson, pp. 89-94.

  42. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 18.

  43. Ziegler, Wilson, p. 91.

  44. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 18.

  45. Ziegler, Wilson, p. 94.

  46. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 18.

  47. Wise, Molehunt, pp. 97-9. Mangold, Cold Warrior, pp. 95-7.

  48. Wright, Spycatcher. Wright later disowned most of his own conspiracy theory and said in a Panorama interview that there had been only one serious plotter (BBC1, October 13, 1988).

  49. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 15. In view of the connection of the future Labor leader, Michael Foot, with Tribune and the allegations made against him by the Sunday Times in 1995, for which he received libel damages, it seems appropriate to add that Mitrokhin’s notes contain no reference to him.

  50. Crankshaw, Putting up with the Russians, 1947-1984, p. xi.

  51. Crankshaw, Russia by Daylight, p. 12.

  52. Dictionary of National Biography, 1981-1985, p. 101.

  53. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 42.

  54. Crankshaw, Putting up with the Russians, p. 13.

  55. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 42.

  56. Crankshaw, Putting up with the Russians, p. 81.

  57. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 42.

  58. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 17.

  59. Barron, KGB, pp. 343-5.

  60. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 17. The KGB file on operation PROBA disproves suggestions that Courtney was the victim of a plot by MI5 rather than the KGB. Dorril and Ramsay, Smear, p. 107.

  61. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 13. There is no record in Mitrokhin’s notes of any major hemorrhage of information by any seduced member of the British embassy staff after Vassall.

  62. See above, chapters 10 and 12.

  63. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 103-5. Though the main features of Molody’s career as illegal resident in London, much of which came out at his trial in 1961, are already known, the files noted by Mitrokhin add some important details.

  64. vol. 8, ch. 8. SVYASHCHENNIK had previously been used to “check” Hambleton before his recruitment by the KGB; vol. 8, app. 1.

  65. vol. 8, ch. 8.

  66. Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, p. 119.

  67. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 3.

  68. k-11, 19.

  69. Microdot letter found in BEN’s possession after his arrest in 1961. Bulloch and Miller, Spy Ring, ch. 11; West, The Illegals, pp. 175-7.

  70. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 3.

  71. Agranovsky, “Profession: Foreigner.”

  72. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

  73. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. A KGB file for 1953 describes LONG as a “valuable agent” of the Paris residency; k-4, 99. According to their passports, “Peter Kroger” had been born in Gisborne, New Zealand, on July 10, 1910 and “Helen Kroger” had been born in Boyle, Alberta, on January 17, 1913; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. Their colleagues in the British book trade believed both to be Canadian.

  74. Snelling, Rare Books and Rarer People, p. 208.

  75. Blake, No Other Choice, p. 265.

  76. Agranovsky, “Profession: Foreigner.”

  77. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17.

  78. vol. 7, ch. 12.

  79. Houghton, Operation Portland, Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 446-7.

  80. Wright, Spycatcher, pp. 137-8; Rositzke, The KGB, pp. 76-7.

  81. vol. 7, ch. 12.

  82. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

  83. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

  84. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 68-72.

  85. Blake, No Other Choice, pp. 264-5.

  86. vol. 7, ch. 12.

  87. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 447-8.

  88. vol. 7, ch. 12.

  89. vol. 7, ch. 12.

  90. RAG had been recruited in 1955; his work as a Soviet agent was known to at least one leader of the Belgian Communist Party. k-11, 17.

  91. vol. 7, ch. 13. At the time of Koslov’s recall, the Centre does not appear to have decided whether his final destination was to have been Britain or the United States.

  92. Bagrichev later became head of the first department in Directorate S; a file noted by Mitrokhin records him as holding that post in 1975. vol. 7, ch. 8, para. 6.

  93. Lopatin became acting resident, following Chizhov’s sudden recall to Moscow in 1966 after he had apparently suffered a brain hemorrhage; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 773, n. 121. Chizhov appears to have recovered. In the mid-1970s he was resident in Mogadishu. k-12, 452.

  94. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 517.

  95. Frolik, The Frolik Defection, p. 82.

  96. From 1964 to 1968 Savin was Lyalin’s predecessor as the Thirteenth Department officer at the London residency; he later became head of Line N in Finland. vol. 7, app. 2, paras. 61, 84.

  97. West, A Matter of Trust, p. 171. Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. 198.

  98. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 517-18. In 1971 sixteen Line X officers were operating under official cover in London: one (Sherstnev) as embassy first secretary; three as third secretaries; one as attaché; eight in the trade mission; one in Mashpriborintorg (International Machine Tool Trade Organization); and one as a trainee. Additional Line X officers were being selected for positions in the Moscow Narodnyy Bank and in an (unidentified) Anglo-Soviet organization. The number of Line X officers was seriously reduced as a result of the mass expulsion of September 1971. k-2, 124.

  99. vol. 7, app. 1, item 65; k-2, 124. For legal reasons, it is not possible to include the names or other identifying details of the Line X agents contained in Mitrokhin’s notes.

  100. vol. 7, app. 1, item 51.

  101. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 24; k-2, 120.

  102. vol. 7, app. 1, item 70; k-2, 124.

  103. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 4.

  104. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 16.

  105. vol. 7, app. 1, item 64; k-2, 124

  106. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 36; k-2, 124.

  107. vol. 7, app. 1, item 69; k-2, 124. The engineer DAN is not to be confused with the Tribune journalist with the same codename.

  108. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 15; k-2, 124.

  109. vol. 7, app. 1, item 96.

  110. k-2, 124

  111. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 31.

  112. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 518; West, A Matter of Trust, pp. 115-19.

  113. Reports of the Security Commission in June 1965 (Cmnd. 2722) and November 1968 (Cmnd. 3856); Pincher, Too Secret Too Long, pp. 421-3, 463; West, A Matter of Trust, pp. 127-9, 161-2.

  114. vol. 7, app. 2, item 64.

  115. vol. 7, app. 2, item 31.

  116. vol. 7, app. 2, item 14.

  117. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 24-6. 118. Philby, My Silent War, p. 17.

  119. vol. 6, a
pp. 1, part 37

  120. Philby’s original codename had both Russian and German forms, respectively SYNOK and SÖHNCHEN, both meaning “Sonny.”

  121. vol. 6, app. 1, part 37

  122. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 525-6.

  123. See above, chapter 23.

  124. Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, p. 184.

  125. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 131.

  Chapter Twenty-five

  Cold War Operations against Britain

  Part 2

  1. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 24-6. Knightley, Philby; pp. 234-7.

  2. Izvestia (October 1, 1971).

  3. See above, chapter 7.

  4. SIS officers stationed in Beirut since Philby’s defection in 1963 had been identified by the bugging of the British embassy and SIS station in operation RUBIN; vol. 7, ch. 5, para. 38.

  5. Izvestia (October 1, 1971). Robert G. Kaiser, “Soviets Name 7 Britons as Mideast Spies,” Washington Post (October 2, 1971).

  6. vol. 7, ch. 5, para. 29. Al Zaman editorial (May 8, 1972).

  7. BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/3823/i (October 27, 1971). Al Zaman editorial (May 8, 1972).

  8. vol. 7, ch. 5, para. 36.

  9. vol. 7, ch. 5, para. 29.

  10. L’Orient-Le Jour (Beirut) (May 13, 1972); The Times (April 7, 1973). When later questioned by Knightley about the KGB’s renewed contact with him in the early 1970s, Philby was “a little vague” (Knightley, Philby, p. 237). Philby could scarcely have forgotten the long interview in Izvestia on October 1, 1971, which marked his partial return to favor, but plainly preferred not to talk about it.

  11. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 133-41. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 544-5.

  12. vol. 7, app. 2, item 82.

  13. Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. 199; West, A Matter of Trust, pp. 171-2.

  14. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 525-6.

  15. vol. 7, ch. 6.

  16. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 526.

  17. vol. 7, ch. 6, para. 9. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record the date at which the bugging of the trade delegation was discovered. In 1989, however, the Soviets publicized their discovery of the bugs some years earlier. Christopher Andrew, Simon O’Dwyer Russell and Robert Porter, “Battle of the Bugs on the Wall,” Sunday Telegraph (June 4, 1989).

  18. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 514.

  19. vol. 7, app. 2, item 7. KGB agents in the London embassy on January 15, 1973 were Ivan I. Ippolitov (minister-counselor), Ralf Bernkhardovich Mikenberg (second secretary), V. I. Solovev (third secretary), Andreï Sergeyevich Parastayev (first secretary), Grigori Petrovich Dremlyuga (aide to naval attaché), Andrei Filippovich Pekhterev (senior assistant military attaché), Nikolai Nikolayevich Pleshakov (interpreter), I. A. Bardeyev, (assistant naval attaché), A. A. Abramov (attaché), I. M. Klimanov, Dmitri Alekhin (duty office keeper), Leonid A. Moskvin (third secretary), Vasili A. Tolstoy (duty office keeper), Viktor Mikhailovich Gribanov (trade attaché), Vladimir Petrovich Molotkov, Stanislav Pokrovsky, Lev. A. Konev, Viktor Mikhailovich Ivanov (trade representative) and Tamara Tikhonovna Nikulina.

  20. vol. 7, ch. 3, para. 12; vol. 7, ch. 3, paras. 6-7.

  21. vol. 7, app. 3; k-27, 453.

  22. k-4, 154.

  23. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 16.

  24. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17.

  25. k-2, 124.

  26. See above, chapter 24.

  27. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 4.

  28. vol. 7, ch. 3.

  29. vol. 7, app. 3, n. 8. It does not follow that the KGB succeeded in sending agents or trusted contacts to all these colleges.

  30. vol. 7, app. 2, item 77. Because of his difficulty in combining a career as a distinguished research scientist with work as an operational intelligence officer, Lednev was later allowed to leave the KGB, though he was no doubt expected to retain an association with it. According to KGB files, in 1981 he was deputy director of the Institute of Biological Physics in the city of Pushchino. vol. 6, app. 2, part 5.

  31. vol. 7, app. 2, item 4. In 1979 Lopatin was succeeded as head of Directorate T by Leonid Sergeyevich Zaitsev, who had also begun specializing in ST while at the London residency in the 1960s. vol. 3, pakapp. 3, items 294-5; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 622.

  32. k-2, 124. vol. 7, app. 1, item 66.

  33. COOPER, who worked in the new products department of a pharmaceutical company; a virologist; a research scientist in a pharmaceutical company; and an engineer at a British nuclear reactor. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 31; k-2, 124; vol. 7, app. 1, item 96.

  34. Meetings between STARIK and his controller took place in Paris, those with DAN in Western Europe. In 1975-6 contact with HUNT was maintained by an agent of the Paris residency. Other cases were run by the Copenhagen and Helsinki residencies (k-2, 124; vol. 6, app. 1, part 39; vol. 7, app. 1, items 65, 68).

  35. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 12.

  36. John Steele, “25 years for the Spy Who Stayed in the Cold,” Daily Telegraph (November 18, 1993).

  37. Report of the Security Commission (Cm 2930) (July 1995), chs. 2-4.

  38. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 12.

  39. On the information about Smith passed by MI5 to EMI in 1978, see “Phone Call that Trapped a Spy,” Independent (November 19, 1993).

  40. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 12.

  41. The Security Commission later concluded that Smith had held on to some of the classified documents he had obtained at Thorn-EMI and given them to the KGB some time after he lost his security access in 1978. One or more of the payments recorded in his file may thus refer to a period after his loss of access. Since Mitrokhin’s notes end in 1984, the details of KGB payments to Smith cannot refer to his later years as a Soviet agent.

  42. “‘Boring’ Idealist Who Spied for Russia Gets 25 Years,” The Times (November 19, 1993).

  43. Report of the Security Commission (Cm 2930) (July 1995), pp. 8-9. “Dear Maggie, Please Let Me Spy for the KGB!,” Daily Mirror (September 21, 1993). Laurence Donegan and Richard Norton-Taylor, “Spy Who Slipped Through the Net,” Guardian (November 19, 1993).

  44. See below, chapter 25.

  45. Britain ranked fourth in ST collection.

  46. Klöckner INA Industrial Plants Ltd was a British-based subsidiary of the West German firm Klöckner Co., Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien.

  47. The KGB officers who received commendations for their part in the operation were A. B. Maksimov, V. G. Goncharov, V. A. Andryevskaya, A. I. Baskakov, A. N. Belov, V. P. Varvanin, A. N. Kosarev, A. V. Smirnov, A. A. Shishkov, S. A. Agafonov, V. K. Gavrilov, S. Yu. Demidov, B. I. Danilin, O. I. Bukharev and V. A. Sedov. vol. 7, app. 3, n. 15.

  48. See above, chapter 21.

  49. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 14.

  50. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 18. On Parastayev, see also vol. 7, app. 1, items 7, 42.

  51. Ziegler, Wilson, p. 503.

  52. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 18.

  53. Ziegler, Wilson, pp. 508-9.

  54. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 18.

  55. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, p. 129.

  56. vol. 7, ch. 16, items 54, 62.

  57. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 62.

  58. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 129-30.

  59. See above, chapter 24.

  60. Information from Oleg Gordievsky.

  61. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 50.

  62. Morning Star (October 31, 1975).

  63. De-la-Noy, Mervyn Stockwood, pp. 214-15.

  64. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 50. Tony Benn was also invited to dinner but declined because “Mervyn Stockwood is such an old gossip that he’d tell everybody that he’s had a dinner party for the Secretary of the Communist Party and myself.” Benn, Against the Tide, p. 482.

  65. De-la-Noy, Mervyn Stockwood, p. 212.

  66. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 51.

  67. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 53.

  68. Alasdair Palmer, “How the KGB Ran the Guardian’s Features Editor,” Spectator (December 10, 1994). Interview wit
h Richard Gott, Guardian (December 12, 1994).

  69. Mitrokhin did not note either Gott’s KGB file or references to other Guardian articles by him. His notes thus do not clarify the nature of Gott’s relationship with the KGB. Gott acknowledges having met KGB officers in London, Moscow, Vienna, Athens and Nicosia, but claims that the only money he received from them was to pay travel expenses to and in the last three locations. Interview with Richard Gott, Guardian (December 12, 1994). Cf. Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, pp. 281-2.

  70. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 66. Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, House of Commons Official Report, Session 1977-78, vol. 944, col. 1200.

  71. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 506-8.

  72. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 101-2, 138-9.

  73. Observer duly reported American claims that the document was forged but gave greater weight to evidence for its authenticity (Observer, January 22, 1984).

  74. “A Girl’s Best Friend,” New Statesman (November 5, 1982).

  75. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 630.

  76. vol. 6, app. 1 (misc.), part 1; k-12, 51.

  77. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 130-7.

  78. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, p. 118.

  79. There is, for example, no reference in Mitrokhin’s notes to Geoffrey Prime, the agent in GCHQ, who was—unusually—recruited and run outside the UK by the KGB Third Directorate, to whose files Mitrokhin did not have access.

  80. vol. 7, app. 1, item 77. There is another tantalizing one-sentence reference to a SIGINT official (apparently British) codenamed ZHUR (JOUR), contacted in 1963 for the first time since 1938. Mitrokhin gives no indication whether or not the contact had any result. It is also possible that the reference was garbled, since the longest-serving agent providing intelligence on cipher systems, an employee of the French foreign ministry, was codenamed JOUR. vol. 7, app. 1, item 122.

  81. vol. 5, ch. 14.

  82. The Times (November 29, 1969, March 31, 1994).

  83. vol. 5, ch. 14, para. 1; vol. 7, ch. 7, para. 74.

  84. vol. 5, ch. 14, n. 4; vol. 7, ch. 7, para. 74.

  85. vol. 5, ch. 14, para. 2 and n. 4.

 

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