86. vol. 7, ch. 7, paras. 73, 74; k-2, 171; vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 2, 3, 7.
87. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 5, 6; vol. 7, ch. 7, para. 75. Since there is no indication that VERA behaved improperly, it would be unfair to reveal her identity or precise job in the Moscow embassy, both of which are recorded in Symonds’s file.
88. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 7-9.
89. vol. 5, ch. 14, n. 6.
90. It was also considered too risky for Symonds to use his forged British passport to apply for an Australian visa; entry to New Zealand did not require a visa. From New Zealand he would need only Everett’s birth certificate to gain entry to Australia. Symonds, however, was unable to book a direct flight from Tokyo to New Zealand and was forced to use his bogus British passport as a transit passenger in Sydney. When flying from New Zealand to Australia later in the year, he used the same passport with an Australian visa obtained in Wellington, fearing that if he used Everett’s birth certificate an immigration service computer might detect that he had previously possessed a British passport containing the same name and date of birth. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 10-11.
91. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 12-44.
92. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 45-6.
93. vol. 7, ch. 7, para. 76.
94. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 51-2.
95. “The Fugitive Detective and His Secret Trips to Britain,” The Times (April 15, 1981).
96. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 53-4.
97. “Bribes Trial Man Says He was Told to Flee,” The Times (April 7, 1981). “Detective in ‘Morass of Corruption’ is Jailed,” The Times (April 15, 1981). “Confessions of a Bent Copper,” The Times (March 31, 1994).
98. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 526. Lukasevics was unable to claim credit for Prime and Symonds, two of the KGB’s most notable British agents of the 1970s; both had been recruited abroad.
99. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 585-7; Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, pp. 249-52.
100. vol. 7, app. 2, item 69.
101. vol. 7, app. 2, 71. The file noted by Mitrokhin refers to Guk by his codename, YERMAKOV.
102. Zamuruyev was succeeded as head of Line N by Aleksandr Igorevich Timonov. vol. 7, ch. 7, para. 10; app. 2, para. 50.
103. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 599. Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, pp. 269-70.
104. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 582-605. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, ch. 4.
105. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 19.
106. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 586.
107. vol. 7, app. 2, item 73.
108. vol. 7, app. 2, item 72.
109. Earley, Confessions of a Spy, pp. 139-45, 176-9.
110. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 28-35, 609; Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, chs. 1, 14, 15.
111. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 12.
112. Report of the Security Commission (Cm 2930) (July 1995), p. 10.
113. Report of the Security Commission (Cm 2930) (July 1995), pp. 13-14, 32-3. “Phone Call Hoax that Trapped a Spy,” Independent (November 19, 1993); “Vital Clues to a Traitor,” Daily Mail (November 19, 1993).
114. Some indication of the intelligence provided by Kuzichkin and Butkov is provided in their memoirs. On Makarov, see Kahn, “Soviet Comint in the Cold War.” Butkov’s memoirs have so far appeared only in Norwegian.
115. Pasechnik, one of the scientific directors of Biopreparat, the world’s largest and most advanced biological warfare research institute, made contact with SIS during a visit to France in 1989 and was exfiltrated to Britain. Interview with Pasechnik by Christopher Andrew in the 1995 Radio 4 series New Spies for Old? (presented by Christopher Andrew; produced by Dennis Sewell).
Chapter Twenty-six
The Federal Republic of Germany
1. See above, chapter 12.
2. In 1977 the KGB apparat at Karlshorst was training seven East German illegals and investigating another fifty-two potential recruits, most of whom would probably not make the grade; k-5, 774.
3. On its foundation in 1952, the Stasi’s foreign intelligence arm was known as Hauptverwaltung XV (Main Department XV); it was renamed the HVA in 1956.
4. Childs and Popplewell, The Stasi, pp. 122-3.
5. Wolf, Man without a Face, p. xii.
6. k-16, 522. The residencies in Cologne and Hamburg were subordinate to that of Bonn, whose head had the title of Chief Resident.
7. k-19, 247.
8. The leader of the snatch squad was another German agent, WAGNER (later renamed FLORA). For this and other special actions, he was awarded the Order of the Red Star. While WAGNER was stationed in Belgium from 1964 to 1967, SERGEYEV acted as courier to him. k-5, 88; k-16, 212.
9. k-5, 88.
10. k-5, 283.
11. k-5, 284.
12. k-9, 65.
13. Höhne and Zolling, The General was a Spy, ch. 12. Rositzke, The KGB, pp. 189-94. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 412, 452-3; Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 430-9. Mitrokhin’s brief notes on Felfe contain no detailed examples of the intelligence he provided; they confirm, however, that Felfe’s memoirs, Im Dienst des Gegners, contains disinformation fabricated by Service A (k-5, 284).
14. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1, n.
15. Peet, The Long Engagement, pp. 3, 101-3, 184-5, 229-31.
16. Peet, The Long Engagement, ch. 30. Childs and Popplewell, The Stasi, pp. 145-6.
17. The best account of the Otto John case is Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, ch. 10. Mitrokhin saw no file on the case.
18. Nationalrat der Nationalen Front des Demokratischen Deutschland, Braunbuch and Graubuch.
19. Schmeidel, “Shield and Sword of the Party,” pp. 146-7.
20. k-26, 88. The fact that Brandt was given a codename is not, of course, evidence that he was an agent. Even Churchill and Roosevelt were referred to by codenames in wartime Soviet intelligence cables.
21. Brandt, My Road to Berlin, chs. 2-4.
22. k-26, 88. On Rein, see Brandt, My Road to Berlin, pp. 79-80.
23. The British also had ULTRA intelligence on the movements of the Tirpitz. After several unsuccessful British attacks, the battleship was finally sunk in November 1944 with the loss of 1,204 lives.
24. TERENTY was the Czech Communist journalist Walter Taube. Mitrokhin’s note identifies VANYA as Vanek, a former Czech intelligence officer now working for the British. It is unclear whether “Vanek” is a forename or surname (k-26, 88).
25. k-26, 88.
26. k-26, 88.
27. k-26, 86.
28. Colitt, Spy Master, p. 97.
29. Brandt, People and Politics, pp. 47-8.
30. Operations against major foreign statesmen normally required the approval of the political leadership.
31. k-26, 88.
32. Mitrokhin’s notes on Brandt’s file go only to 1962. They do, however, include later references to Brandt from other files.
33. Brandt, People and Politics, pp. 102-3. Abrasimov, later accused of behaving like a Soviet pro-consul, was ambassador in East Berlin.
34. Wolf, Man without a Face, ch. 9; Colitt, Spy Master, ch. 4; Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, p. 300.
35. Probably the best study of Ostpolitik is Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name.
36. Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 156.
37. k-19, 248, 250.
38. Prittie, Velvet Chancellors, pp. 170-1.
39. Marshall, Willy Brandt, pp. 86-7.
40. k-2, 52.
41. Wolf, Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg, p. 261.
42. Marshall, Willy Brandt, pp. 88-90.
43. k-2, 52.
44. “Bank pay-in Slip Published in Bonn Bribes Scandal,” The Times (June 20, 1973). “Steiner Tells of Work as an Agent,” Daily Telegraph (August 8, 1973).
45. Wolf concludes that “it is impossible to establish whether [Steiner] was paid twice over for his services”—by Wienand as well as the HVA directly. Wolf, Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg, p. 261.
46. “Bonn Bribery Allegations ‘Not Proven,’” The Times (March 28, 1974).
47. Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 197-201.
48. Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. 157-65. Wolf identifies a number of boastful inaccuracies in Guillaume’s own account of his career.
49. Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 201-2.
50. Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. xi, 171-2.
51. Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 124.
52. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 238-40, 442-4, 456-7, 611.
53. The identity of Wolf’s first “Romeo spy,” codenamed FELIX, who began operations in the early 1950s, remains unknown. Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 124.
54. k-5, 30, 31.
55. k-5, 31.
56. Barron, KGB, pp. 198-9.
57. k-16, 139. The alias “Franz Becker” is not recorded by Mitrokhin, but was later revealed at Höke’s trial.
58. k-10, 56; k-16, 139.
59. k-10, 56; k-16, 139.
60. k-16, 65.
61. k-16, 139; k-5, 19.
62. k-16, 65.
63. k-16, 139; k-5, 19.
64. k-10, 56; k-16, 139.
65. RENATA was married to RYBACHEK, a Czech illegal based in Switzerland, who was also working for the KGB. k-16, 94, 139; k-12, 5; k-8, 25-6; k-2, 46, 84.
66. “Russia May Have Learned War Secrets,” Observer (September 1, 1985); “Bonn Spy Knew Army Secrets,” Observer (September 8, 1985); “Glamour Spy’s Love Ends in treachery,” Observer (December 14, 1986); “Spionage: Wie ein Helmspiel,” Der Spiegel (December 29, 1986); “KGB Lover Led Shy Secretary into Treason,” Daily Telegraph (September 1, 1987).
67. Mitrokhin’s notes on ROSIE do not give her real name. Press reports after her arrest in December 1976 identify her as Heidrun Hofer.
68. k-8, 7, 177; k-18, 385. According to k-8, 177, ROSIE was recruited in October 1971; according to k-16, 108, she was recruited in 1973. The two dates probably refer, respectively, to the point at which she began to supply information to ROLAND, and to her meeting with VLADIMIR in February 1973, after which the importance of her role as an agent appears to have increased.
69. k-16, 61. From 1970 to 1982 VLADIMIR was an illegal trainer based in Karlshorst, who performed various assignments in the GDR, FRG and Austria. His wife, Irina Yevseyevna (BERTA), was also an illegal.
70. “Bettgeflüster Nach Dienstschluss,” Quick (January 13, 1977).
71. k-5, 20.
72. “Bettgeflüster Nach Dienstschluss,” Quick (January 13, 1977). “Hat Spionin Hofer den BND auf Jahre gelähmt?,” Die Welt (January 14, 1977).
73. k-16, 70; k-18, 5, 145. Details of the lonely hearts column and the alias used by GEORG (though not his real identity) were revealed at Falk’s trial in 1989. Childs and Popplewell, The Stasi, p. 160.
74. Childs and Popplewell, The Stasi, p. 160.
75. k-16, 70; k-2, 374.
76. k-19, 357. Childs and Popplewell, The Stasi, p. 160.
77. k-18, 145.
78. Childs and Popplewell, The Stasi, pp. 160-1.
79. vol. 6, app. 1, part 5; k-14, 747, 748; k-11, 91; k-12, 435.
80. k-14, 747.
81. k-11, 91.
82. t-1, 45, 135; k-5, 193; k-24, 236; vol. 6, app. 2, part 3.
83. k-14, 237; k-8, 72.
84. Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. 142-8; Colitt, Spy Master, pp. 128-34. Gast was arrested on September 29, 1990, four days before the reunification of Germany, betrayed by a former senior official of the now defunct HVA.
85. Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. 188-94; Colitt, Spy Master, pp. 197-205, 235-7. In February 1992 Kuron was sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment and fined 692,000 marks—his total earnings from the HVA.
86. Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. 198-201; Colitt, Spy Master, pp. 203-4. Wolf ludicrously maintains that the prostitutes he employed to provide sexual services for Tiedge and other defectors “were not prostitutes but down-to-earth women, Party members and loyal to their country, who were prepared to do this in return for… a preferential flat or an advance up the waiting list for a car.”
87. “Wienand zu zweieinhalb Jahren Freiheitsstrafe verurteilt,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (June 27, 1996); “Politik: Wegen langjähriger Spionage für die DDR: Karl Wienand zu zweieinhalb Jahren Haft verurteilt,” Süddeutsche Zeitung (June 27, 1996); Imre Karacs, “Cold War Agent Jailed,” Independent (June 27, 1996).
88. Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 188.
89. Wolf, Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg, pp. 186-8. After a conversation with the former Soviet ambassador in Bonn, Valentin Falin, in 1992, Brandt wrote, “Since 1975, Karl W[ienand] committed himself to working for the services over there.” Falin later denied having made a specific reference to Wienand. Roger Boyes, “Brandt Papers Revive Spy Claims,” The Times (February 11, 1995). The files seen by Mitrokhin contain no reference to a KGB attempt to recruit Wienand.
90. Observer reported from Bonn on July 3, 1994 that Wehner was “now widely suspected of having been a Stasi spy.”
91. k-3, 63.
92. Colitt, Spy Master, p. 250.
93. k-3, 63.
94. k-3, 63.
95. Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 169. Wolf’s claims are not confirmed (or denied) by Mitrokhin. Mitrokhin’s detailed notes on Wehner’s file stop in 1941.
96. Wolf, Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg, pp. 185, 210-11. Most of the section of Wolf ’s memoirs on Wehner, like much else dealing with German politics, is omitted from the English translation.
97. Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, pp. 199, 321-2, 533-4.
98. Wolf, Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg, pp. 207, 209.
99. k-2, 53. Wolf then took his revenge on Van Nouhuys by leaking the story to Quick’s rival Stern, which published it on October 25, 1973. A long court battle followed, eventually decided in favor of Stern. Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. 237-8.
100. In 1994 Brandt’s widow caused a political storm by referring publicly to his suspicions of Wehner.
101. Wolf, Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg, p. 218.
102. k-12, 505-6.
103. k-2, 162.
104. k-2, 165.
105. k-2, 179; k-10, 135-6.
106. k-5, 787.
107. Brezhnev’s visit, however, led to enormous expenditure of KGB time and effort. Security procedures were overseen by a committee including the heads of no less than seven KGB directorates (Kryuchkov among them). Twenty-nine KGB and GRU operational groups were assigned to supervise Brezhnev’s security during the visit. k-5, 788-9.
108. k-8, 104. Soviet-FRG negotiations on the natural gas pipeline from Siberia were successfully concluded in November 1981. According to Sir Percy Cradock, later Mrs. Thatcher’s foreign policy adviser, the Reagan administration “found in the Polish crisis [of December 1981] a convenient pretext for sabotaging an agreement they did not like. Their action was at first confined to US companies, but in June 1982 it was extended, with little thought for the consequences, to US subsidiaries and foreign companies as well.” After vigorous protests by Mrs. Thatcher as well as by Schmidt, the United States backed down in November 1982 in return for NATO acceptance of greater restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union. Cradock, In Pursuit of British Interests, p. 56.
109. k-8, 104.
110. Mitrokhin did not have access to the SCD files which reveal the agent’s name.
111. k-13, 44. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record any response by the Schmidt government.
112. k-19, 282. The active measures against Strauss give the lie to Wolf ’s suggestions since the publication of his memoirs that Strauss was an HVA informant.
113. k-5, 718, k-19, 282. Inge Goliath had been withdrawn to the GDR in 1979. Mitrokhin’s notes summarize, but give few details about, a series of other KGB active measures designed to compromise the BND and BfV: operation JUNGLE, conducted jointly with the HVA from 1978 onwards to discredit the BND and disrupt its relations with other Western intelligence services (k-13, 61, 82, 102-3); operations ZHAK-RUZH, ROZA, BURGUNDER,
OSMAN and PANTER (1978), designed, again in co-operation with the HVA, “to expose and impede the activity of the FRG special services in Europe and in the Near East” (k-13, 61); operation ONTARIO (1978), “to cause disagreements between the CIA, the SDECE and the BND” (k-13, 79); operation JAMES (1980), “to exacerbate disagreements between the BND and the CIA” (k-13, 102); operation KLOP (1981), to discredit the BfV (k-13, 85); operation ORKESTR (1981), to discredit West German journalists who were alleged to be BND officers or co-optees (k-13, 86); and operation DROTIK (1981), to compromise Western businesses allegedly used by the CIA and the BND as cover and for other operational purposes (k-13, 87).
114. k-5, 718, k-19, 282.
115. k-6, 102; k-19, 32.
116. Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, p. 320.
117. Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 222.
118. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), More Instructions from the Centre, pp. 38-9.
119. Hanson, Soviet Industrial Espionage; US Government, Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology; Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. 260.
120. RICHARD was first deployed in the FRG in 1964; k-16, 110, 129.
121. k-18, 441.
122. k-10, 39.
123. t-2, 34.
124. vol. 6, ch. 6.
125. Even when restrictions on the export of Western computers were relaxed during the Gorbachev era, fears that they were bugged or deliberately infected with viruses continued. Nikolai Brusnitsin, deputy chairman of the State Technical Commission, complained in 1990 that the software in a West German computer sold to a Soviet shoe-making factory had been deliberately pre-programmed to self-destruct. There had, he claimed, been a whole series of such incidents. Brusnitsin, Openness and Espionage, pp. 28-9.
126. Line X agents identified in the files seen by Mitrokhin include (in alphabetical order) BORIS, the manager of an electronics factory (k-18, 230); DAL, a laser technology and plasma specialist (k-10, 38); DYMOV, a computer programmer at a research center in West Berlin (k-12, 442); EBER, an employee of a major company (k-14, 570); EGON, an East German illegal working as an engineer (k-16, 112, 296); EMIL, an employee of Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (k-10, 37); ERICH, a chemical engineer (k-5, 232); FOTOGRAF, a scientist employed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (t-2, 54); FRIMAN, a rocket technology specialist (K-10, 32, 47); GUTSUL, the owner of a dye company (k-18, 318); HANS, an agent with access to two large engineering firms (k-14, 698); KARL, an expert in electro-magnetism who for part of his career worked as an agent of the Paris residency against French targets; KERNER, a polymer chemist (k-10, 48; k-12, 414; k-16, 120-1); KEST, head of a research group at a medical institute (k-5, 341); KLEIN, a nuclear physicist (k-14, 429); LEONID, a computer scientist in a multinational chemical company (k-18, 277; k-27, 323); LETON, a trade official specializing in radio electronics (k-12, 129); LOTTS, who held a senior position in an aerospace research institute (k-10, 41, 44); MORZH, a Yugoslav who supplied embargoed chemical products (k-5, 9); MOST, founder of an electronics company (k-12, 87); PAUL, owner of an electronics company (t-2, 18); RASPORYATIDEL (“Organizer”), a company director who supplied equipment for assembling integrated circuits (k-14, 570); ROBERT, a rocket engineer (k-10, 35); SHMEL, head of a computer company (k-18, 283); TAL, a designer of chemical factories and polymer plants (t-2, 1); TART, who worked for the giant chemical company Bayer (k-14, 670); TSANDER, a polymer chemist (k-10, 48; k-12, 414; k-16, 120-1); VILON, a company director who supplied embargoed goods (k-5, 10); VIN, director of an electronics company (k-5, 216); YUNG, an aircraft computer systems engineer (k-2, 70, 120); WAGNER, an employee of a major petrochemical company (k-10, 33, 46).
The Sword and the Shield Page 114
