127. Die Welt (July 17, 1986). 128. “Ex-KGB Agent to Return to West,” Guardian (November 26, 1987).
129. k-10, 37.
130. “East Seen Escalating Drive for West’s Industrial Secrets,” Washington Post (October 24, 1986).
131. k-10, 37.
132. “Ex-KGB Agent to Return to West,” Guardian (November 26, 1987). “Red Spy Returns for His Pension,” Today (November 26, 1987).
133. Wolf, Man without a Face, ch. 1.
Chapter Twenty-seven
France and Italy During the Cold War
1. k-4, 91-9, 101. The 1953 list of “valuable agents” in Paris also includes the codename MES, but gives no indication of his or her occupation. The only codenames which can be identified on the basis of information in Mitrokhin’s notes are PIZHO (Georges Pâques) and LONG (Paddy Costello). It is quite possible, however, that the other “valuable agents” include some of those recruited under other codenames during the few years after the Liberation. Pâques’s most important period as a Soviet agent almost certainly came while he was working at the French general staff from 1958 to 1962.
2. vol. 9, ch. 1.
3. See above, chapter 9.
4. “Security Aspects of Possible Staff Talks with France.” (February 24, 1948), JIC(48)5, CAB158/3, PRO. We are indebted for this reference to Alex Craig of Christ’s College, Cambridge.
5. During the 1960s the FRG, as a result of penetration by both the HVA and KGB, became an even more important source of intelligence than France. See chapter 26.
6. “Miscellaneous Soviet Personalities Who Have Served Abroad,” (September 29, 1954), CRS A6283/XR1/144, Australian Archives, Canberra.
7. vol. 9, ch. 1. For other examples of classified French documents on Berlin and the German question obtained by the Paris residency, see Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 68-9, 75-7, 82-4, 95, 145. Though the authors were given access to some reports from the Paris residency, they were not allowed to see the files on agent penetration in France noted by Mitrokhin.
8. On JOUR, chapters 9 and 27.
9. Though given to no access to KGB files on JOUR, Fursenko and Naftali confirm KGB access during the Cuban Missile Crisis to diplomatic traffic between the Quai d’Orsay and French embassies in Moscow and Washington; “Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” pp. 70-1.
10. Wolton, Le KGB en France, pp. 204-6; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 466.
11. vol. 9, ch. 6.
12. Wolton, La France sous influence, p. 70.
13. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 47.
14. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 43. Some doubt remains as to whether the FCD officer who calculated this total took fully into account the transition from “old” to “new” francs.
15. Wolton, La France sous influence, p. 70.
16. vol. 9, ch. 1.
17. k-4, 2-4. Mitrokhin’s notes give no details of the intelligence supplied by GERMAIN, but the award of the Order of the Red Star is a reliable indication of its importance.
18. k-7, 178. After her false flag recruitment, ROZA was controlled by a female agent, JEANNETTE, who doubtless posed as a member of the fictitious “progressive” group.
19. LARIONOV joined the foreign ministry from the army in 1960; k-4, 112.
20. k-4,18.
21. FRENE became a commissaire de police in Paris in 1960; k-4, 114.
22. DACHNIK was recruited during a visit to the USSR in August 1962 by the Fourteenth Department of the FCD “for material reward”; k-14, 1.
23. ADAM was a chemist at the CNRS (Centre National de Recherches Scientifiques) recruited in 1959; k-4, 25.
24. SASHA was recruited in or before 1960. In that year he went to study electronics in Washington; k-4, 113.
25. k-4, 18.
26. Barron, KGB, pp. 169-82. Interview by Christopher Andrew with Yuri Nosenko (November 15, 1987); Wolton, La France sous influence, pp. 374-9. Because these were SCD operations, they do not appear in the FCD files seen by Mitrokhin.
27. k-4, 131. The LOUISA case, unlike those of Dejean and Guibaud, figured in the FCD files seen by Mitrokhin because of the unsuccessful attempt by the Paris residency to renew contact with her.
28. NN’s name is not recorded in Mitrokhin’s notes but can be identified from the biographical detail contained in them as Saar-Demichel; vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 5. Saar-Demichel later admitted his links with the KGB; Wolton, La France sous influence, p. 247. According to Wolton, his original KGB codename was ALEKSEI.
29. Wolton, La France sous influence, pp. 247-50.
30. Wolton, La France sous influence, pp. 374, 379, 411-12, 416-17, 426n., 437.
31. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 5.
32. vol. 9, ch. 4, para. 8.
33. vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 43-5.
34. Mitrokhin’s notes contain no reference to the radical (later socialist) politician Charles Hernu, who was to become defense minister from 1981 to 1985. It has been alleged that Hernu was recruited by the Bulgarian DS in 1953, later had contact with the Romanian Securitate and became a KGB agent in 1963. Dupuis and Pontaut, “Charles Hernu était un agent de l’Est.”
35. k-6, 80, 128; t-1, 61. For legal reasons GILBERT’s identity, though recorded in Mitrokhin’s notes on KGB files, cannot be published. There is some indication that at one point GILBERT avoided contact with his case officer.
36. For legal reasons DROM’s identity, though recorded in Mitrokhin’s notes on KGB files, cannot be published. His file fills seven volumes. DROM’s controllers were, successively, Spartak Ivanovich Leshchev (codenamed LARIN) from 1960 to 1964; Vladimir Filippovich Yashchechkin (YASNOV) from 1964 to 1967; Yuri Konstantinovich Semyonychev (TANEYEV) from 1967 to 1972; and Anatoli Nikolayevich Tsipalkin (VESNOV) in 1972-3. vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 30-1; t-1, 58, 68; k-4, 27, 58.
37. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 33.
38. vol. 9, chs. 2, 4
39. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 5.
40. Myagkov, Inside the KGB, p. 24.
41. In the course of 1965 Saar-Demichel seems to have lost his influence at the Élysée. De Gaulle is reported to have said to a member of his entourage, “Saar-Demichel is a Soviet spy. He doesn’t, of course, steal secrets to hand over to them, but he tells them everything he knows.” Wolton, La France sous influence, pp. 382, 424-6.
42. Wolton, La France sous influence, p. 426.
43. vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 33, 40.
44. vol. 9, ch. 2, para. 11.
45. During the period 1963-6 three unidentified French intelligence officers were members of the GRANIT group, and one of the BULAT group. BON, a former head of department at the Sûreté Générale, worked as an agent recruiter; k-27, 242. The latest reference in Mitrokhin’s notes to penetration of SDECE is to the presence there of a KGB agent (not identified) in May 1969; k-4, 81.
46. k-4, 33, 34, 38.
47. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 30.
48. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 10. Mitrokhin’s notes give few details of the regular (non-bonus) payments to these agents.
49. Mitrokhin’s notes on his file do not specify what proportion of the large sums paid to him were in the form of a regular salary or retainer, but they do make clear that he received very substantial bonuses for particularly important items of S (k-5, 460).
50. t-1, 47; k-4, 34.
51. k-4, 35, 65; k-14, 93; vol. 6, app. 1, part 33; t-1, 264-5.
52. k-5, 281; k-11, 87; t-1, 266.
53. t-1, 42.
54. Wolton, Le KGB en France, pp. 242-3; Favier and Martin-Roland, La décennie Mitterrand, vol. 1, pp. 271-2.
55. Kahn, “Soviet Comint in the Cold War,” p. 20.
56. k-4, 176.
57. The six cipher personnel under cultivation were codenamed ALMAZOV, GROMOV, GUDKOV, KRASNOV, LAPIN and VESELOV. Mitrokhin gives details of only two. The cultivation of LAPIN began in 1980 and plans were made for it to continue after he was posted abroad in 1982. With the assistance of JOUR, an investigation was undertaken of KRASNOV’s finances, home and leisure pursuits, and
he was secretly photographed. At the end of 1981 an (unidentified) illegal began to cultivate him under false flag. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record which, if any, of the cultivations ended in recruitment; k-4, 177.
58. t-1, 46; k-7, 145.
59. k-3, 81; t-1, 32.
60. t-1, 34; vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 7.
61. vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 41-53; k-6, 3-5; t-1, 57.
62. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 16; k-25, 120.
63. t-1, 27; vol. 3, pakapp. 1, 21.
64. t-1, 43; k-4, 180.
65. t-1, 44; k-14, 100.
66. t-1, 36; k-27, 292.
67. t-1, 46.
68. k-7, 145.
69. vol. 9, ch. 2, para. 17.
70. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 7.
71. k-7, 145.
72. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 7. Giscard d’Estaing’s codename is given in k-3, 81.
73. For the two years 1976-7, BROK was paid a total of 217,000 francs: 72,000 francs basic salary, 83,000 bonuses, 62,000 expenses. From January to November 1978, the last period for which details of payments to BROK are available, he received a total of 182,000 francs: 55,000 francs salary, 83,000 bonuses, 62,000 expenses. k-3, 81.
74. Mitrokhin does not identify BROK’s case officer(s) for the period 1946-51. Thereafter, his controllers were Ye. R. Radtsig (1951-7); V. K. Radchenko (1957-9); E. N. Yakovlev (1959-63); I. F. Gremyakin (1970-2); L. I. Vasenko (1972); R. F. Zhuravlev (1972-6); R. N. Lebedinsky (1974-5); Ye. L. Mokeyev (1976-8); and Ye. N. Malkov (1978-9). k-3, 81.
75. M. S. Tsimbal, A. I. Lazarev, A. V. Krasavin, V. P. Vlasov and N. N. Chetverikov; k-3, 81.
76. k-3, 81.
77. See above, chapter 12.
78. vol. 9, ch. 3, paras. 5, 6; t-7, 219.
79. vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 15,24.
80. Raymond Aron, “Il n’y a pas de quoi rire,” Le Figaro (June 23, 1975). Aron, Mémoires, pp. 599-60. Other prominent critics of Le Monde included Pierre Nora and Jean-François Revel.
81. Le Monde (July 3, 1975).
82. Le Monde (September 12, 1975). This claim was subsequently withdrawn, but Le Monde’s critics complained that it continued, in its reporting on Solzhenitsyn, to “prodiguer impunément quelques insultes sous le couvert de l’objectivité.” Legris, Le Monde tel qu’il est, p. 32.
83. A major operational plan for 1975, jointly signed by the heads of the First Chief, Second Chief and Fifth Directorates, aimed “to discredit PAUK [Solzhenitsyn]… through mass information media abroad.” k-3b, 27.
84. Legris, Le Monde tel qu’il est.
85. Jacques Thibau’s analysis of Le Monde in the 1970s concludes: “…il repose à la fois sur ce que ses adversaires ‘de gauche’ appellent l’ordre, et ses critiques ‘de droite’ la subversion. L’équilibre est difficile à tenir. Il requiert de la prudence et de la pratique de la casuistique, mais globalement il correspond à la fonction du journal.” Thibau, Le Monde, 1944-1996, p. 433.
86. However, at least one regular Paris-based contributor to Le Monde in the 1970s, KRON, is identified as a KGB agent (k-24, 153). Mitrokhin’s notes also identify MONGO, one of Le Monde’s African correspondents, as a KGB agent, but do not give his identity or the dates when he was posted in Africa (k-6, 116).
87. t-1, 46, 58; vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 15, 24. Most of Mitrokhin’s notes on influence operations directed against Le Monde are both brief and general. He identifies only two active measures articles by both author and exact date of publication. One is described as “entirely written on KGB themes” by a leading Le Monde journalist; the other was an article “using KGB arguments” by a leading socialist politician. Both were published in 1980. vol. 1, ch. 8; vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 15, 24; k-8, 522; k-24, 153.
88. vol. 9, ch. 2, para. 23.
89. The same disproportion in the treatment of KGB and CIA active measures is evident, on a somewhat smaller scale, in the generally valuable history of Le Monde by Jacques Thibau. Thibau concludes, for example, that one notorious forgery published by Le Monde, the so-called “Fechteler report,” which purported to reveal outrageously belligerent US designs in the Mediterranean, was almost certainly fabricated by the CIA and French intelligence. He does not consider the far more probable hypothesis that it was a KGB forgery (Thibau, Le Monde, 1944-1996, pp. 214-18). For an assessment of the revelations in the mid-1970s of malpractice by the US intelligence community, see Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, ch. 10.
90. SIDOR was recruited in 1956 but later suspected of working for the DST (k-14, 3). JACQUES, an AFP correspondent in a number of Asian countries, was a KGB agent from 1964 to 1973; during that period he had seven different controllers (k-6, 53). MISHA was recruited during a visit to the Soviet Union in 1965; Mitrokhin’s notes do not reveal how long his work as an agent continued (vol. 2, app. 1, para. 46; vol. 2, appendix 2, para. 68). LAN was an agent from 1969 to 1979, mostly—if not exclusively—in France (k-4, 85; k-27, 291). MARAT was an agent in Paris and abroad from c. 1973 to 1982 (k-6, 42). GRININ was recruited in 1980 (k-14, 379).
91. PIERRE, a confidential contact in the 1960s (k-14, 111, 134), and JOSEPH, a confidential contact from 1974 to 1977 (k-6, 84).
92. k-27, 291.
93. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 33.
94. Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p. 134.
95. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 40.
96. Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, pp. 135-49.
97. k-5, 560.
98. vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 37, 39-40. Sakharovsky was referred to at Pathé’s trial by his alias, “Kuznetsov.” The Paris residency believed that the DST had not succeeded in identifying him as the son of the former head of the FCD; k-5, 560.
99. Like DURANT, NANT, VERONIQUE, JACQUELINE and NANCY are identified in Mitrokhin’s notes, but cannot be named for legal reasons; vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 43-9; k-6, 3.
100. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 11.
101. vol. 9, ch. 4, para. 33.
102. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 28; vol. 9, ch. 2, paras. 25-30; vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 13-15.
103. L’élection présidentielle, 26 avril-10 mai 1981, p. 34. Kahn, “Soviet Comint in the Cold War,” p. 18.
104. vol. 9, ch. 3, para. 20. The “affair of the diamonds” had begun with the publication by one satirical weekly Le Canard Enchaîné on October 10, 1979 of an order placed by Bokassa six years earlier for the purchase of a diamond plaquette for Giscard d’Estaing. The Élysée tried to fend off this and similar stories over the next year and a half until it finally announced on March 23, 1981, just over a month before the first round of the presidential election, that diamonds given to Giscard in 1973, 1974 and 1975 had been valued at 115,000 francs and that this sum had been donated to the Red Cross and other good causes in the Central African Republic.
105. vol. 9, ch. 2, para. 31.
106. Le Monde reported during the campaign, “C’est incontestablement le parti socialiste qui a la meilleure image de marque dans l’électorat juif.” L’élection présidentielle, 26 avril-10 mai 1981, p. 73.
107. vol. 9, ch. 2, para. 31.
108. Mitrokhin’s notes give no details of the inside information provided by GILES; k-6, 128.
109. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 3.
110. k-3, 81. BROK was not the only French journalist on whom the KGB radically revised its views. In 1979 the Centre concluded that LAN was providing “material not qualitatively different from material published in the press,” and broke off contact with him. k-27, 291.
111. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 3.
112. The statistics for Line X operations in European residencies in 1975 were as follows (figures for Line X officers certainly refer to 1975; those for agents are for approximately—probably exactly—1975):
Residency Line X Officers [k-5, 420] Line X Agents [k-5, 423]
Belgrade 3 ? Berne 3 ? Bonn 15 9 Brussels 7 4 Copenhagen 6 7 Geneva 3 2 The Hague 3 1 Helsinki 6 2 Lisbon 2 ? London 9 9 Oslo 3 0 Paris 22 22 Rome 9 10 Stockholm 7 1 Vienna 19 29
These statistics were compiled by the Second Department of FCD Director
ate T, which was responsible for Line X operations in the residencies listed above. The figures for the Bonn residency account for only a part of Line X operations in the FRG; Line X operations were also run from Cologne. Line X in Karlshorst, which came under a different department of Directorate T, had fifty-nine agents in 1975 (k-5, 416). A probable majority of Line X operations in Vienna (which Mitrokhin’s notes do not make it possible to quantify) were directed at non-Austrian targets.
113. k-5, 383, 386, 406. Though Mitrokhin’s notes give no later statistics, it is possible that the 1977 record was subsequently surpassed.
114. Mitrokhin’s notes give the following incomplete statistics of Line X officers stationed in European residencies for all or part of the period 1974-9:
Belgrade 4 Berne 6 Bonn 9 Brussels 10 Cologne 13 Copenhagen 13 Geneva 7 The Hague 6 Helsinki 10 Lisbon ? London ? Oslo ? Paris 36 Rome 17 Stockholm 19 Vienna 38 (k-5, 459)
The Sword and the Shield Page 115
