Abraham Lincoln: A Life, Volume 2

by Michael Burlingame

  Though posterity has come to regard Lincoln’s remarks as a succinct, sublime masterpiece and Everett’s oration as a florid, diffuse history lecture, the contemporary press devoted more coverage to the latter than to the former. Several myths grew up around the Gettysburg Address, among them that the president composed it on the train, that he regarded it as a failure, that the crowd and other contemporaries failed to appreciate it, and that it surreptitiously bootlegged the concept of equality into the Constitution.

  Following the ceremony, Lincoln returned to David Wills’s home, where he ate dinner and shook visitors’ hands for an hour. Afterward, he walked to the Presbyterian church to hear an oration by the lieutenant governor of Ohio. En route he was accompanied by John Burns, an elderly cobbler who had won acclaim for fighting alongside the Union troops in July. Lincoln had heard of his exploits and asked to be introduced to him. Around 6 P.M., the president and his suite boarded a train for Washington.

  Lincoln honored at least three requests for autograph copies of the Gettysburg Address. The version known as the “Bliss copy,” composed for sale at the 1864 Baltimore Sanitary Fair, became the most famous; it is carved into a wall of the Lincoln Memorial. Since it was the final copy made, it represents, as Robert Todd Lincoln observed, his father’s “last and best thought as to the address.”251

  The speech was, in effect, another of Lincoln’s highly successful public letters. He realized, as some commentators prophesied, that people “who would not read the long elaborate oration of Mr. Everett will read the President’s few words,” which would “receive the attention and command the admiration of all the tens of thousands who will read it.”252 His audience was the Northern public at large, not merely the crowd at Gettysburg. He aimed to lift the morale of his constituents with a terse, eloquent exposition of the war’s significance. His words admirably served that function in his own day and inspired the respect and admiration of subsequent generations. In 1865, Ralph Waldo Emerson accurately predicted that Lincoln’s “brief speech at Gettysburg will not easily be surpassed by words on any recorded occasion.”253

  Something to Give to Everyone: Presidential Smallpox

  Back in Washington, Lincoln came down with a mild version of smallpox, known as varioloid. It persisted for several days, and part of that time he was quarantined. When told that his illness was contagious, he quipped “that since he has been President he had always had a crowd of people asking him to give them something, but that now he has something he can give them all.”254 Alluding both to the scars that smallpox often caused and to his appearance, he told a physician: “There is one consolation about the matter, doctor. It cannot in the least disfigure me!”255 In fact, he was not disfigured. A visitor on December 6 wrote that although he “looks feeble,” yet “not a mark can be seen.” Earlier, “he only had half a dozen.”256

  The varioloid did more than disfigure one of the members of the presidential party at Gettysburg, William H. Johnson. That young black man had accompanied Lincoln from Illinois and served in the White House until his fellow black staffers there objected to his presence because his skin was too dark. Lincoln then obtained a job for him in the Treasury Department. Johnson contracted smallpox, perhaps from Lincoln, which killed him in January 1864. One day that month, as the unfortunate fellow lay in the hospital, a journalist discovered the president counting out some greenbacks. Lincoln explained that such activity “is something out of my usual line; but a President of the United States has a multiplicity of duties not specified in the Constitution or acts of Congress. This is one of them. This money belongs to a poor negro [Johnson] who is a porter in one of the departments (the Treasury) and who is at present very bad with the smallpox. He did not catch it from me, however; at least I think not. He is now in hospital, and could not draw his pay because he could not sign his name. I have been at considerable trouble to overcome the difficulty and get it for him, and have at length succeeded in cutting red tape .… I am now dividing the money and putting by a portion labeled, in an envelope, with my own hands, according to his wish.”257

  Johnson had borrowed $150 from the First National Bank of Washington, using Lincoln as an endorser. After Johnson died, the bank’s cashier, William J. Huntington, happened to mention the outstanding notes to Lincoln: “the barber who used to shave you, I hear, is dead.”

  “ ‘Oh, yes,’ interrupted the President, with feeling; ‘William is gone. I bought a coffin for the poor fellow, and have had to help his family.’ ”

  When Huntington said the bank would forgive the loan, Lincoln replied emphatically: “No you don’t. I endorsed the notes, and am bound to pay them; and it is your duty to make me pay them.”

  “Yes,” said the banker, “but it has long been our custom to devote a portion of our profits to charitable objects; and this seems to be a most deserving one.”

  When the president rejected that argument, Huntington said: “Well, Mr. Lincoln, I will tell you how we can arrange this. The loan to William was a joint one between you and the bank. You stand half of the loss, and I will cancel the other.”

  After thinking it over, Lincoln said: “Mr. Huntington, that sounds fair, but it is insidious; you are going to get ahead of me; you are going to give me the smallest note to pay. There must be a fair divide over poor William. Reckon up the interest on both notes, and chop the whole right straight through the middle, so that my half shall be as big as yours. That’s the way we will fix it.”

  Huntington agreed, saying: “After this, Mr. President, you can never deny that you indorse the negro.”

  “That’s a fact!” Lincoln exclaimed with a laugh; “but I don’t intend to deny it.”258

  Victory in Tennessee

  On November 21, Lincoln predicted that “the next two weeks would be the most momentous period of the rebellion.”259 Indeed, the war in the West was approaching a climax as Grant prepared to dislodge Bragg’s forces from the heights above Chattanooga. Two days later, encouraging word arrived from there, but Lincoln warned friends against overconfidence, and would not rejoice until receiving conclusive news of Grant’s victory. On November 24 and 25, Union troops captured strong Confederate positions on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, forcing Bragg to retreat into Georgia.

  Lincoln could not participate in celebrations of this victory because he lay sick abed. Meanwhile, he grew quite anxious about Burnside’s fate. That hapless general, ensconced in Knoxville, was being menaced by James Longstreet’s corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, which Lee had sent to Tennessee weeks earlier. On November 24, the president expressed great relief to learn that firing had recently been heard in the vicinity of Knoxville. When asked why he reacted so positively to news indicating that Union forces might be in serious danger, he replied: “I had a neighbor out West, a Sally Taggart, who had a great many unruly children whom she did not take very good care of. Whenever she heard one squall in some out-of-the-way place, she would say, ‘Well, thank Goodness, there’s one of my young ones not dead yet!’ As long as we hear guns, Burnside is not captured.”260

  On November 29, Burnside repulsed Longstreet’s attack. Soon thereafter, General Sherman linked up with Old Burn, forcing the Confederates to pull back toward Virginia. When the president learned of that junction, he joyfully declared that it “is one of the most important gains of the war—the difference between Burnside saved and Burnside lost is one of the greatest advantages of the war—it secures us East Tennessee.” At the same time, he expressed dismay over inactivity in the East, predicting that Meade would probably not intercept Longstreet: “if this Army of the Potomac was good for anything—if the officers had anything in them—if the army had any legs, they could move thirty thousand men down to Lynchburg and catch Longstreet. Can anybody doubt, if Grant were here in command that he would catch him? There is not a man in the whole Union who would for a moment doubt it.”

  The Union triumphs in Tennessee, combined with those at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Port Hudson in July,
sealed the fate of the Confederacy. Military victory for Jefferson Davis’s government was no longer possible. Fighting would continue for another year and a half, but the outcome no longer seemed doubtful. Grant had secured his reputation as the leading Union general. Though it seemed logical to replace Meade with Grant, Lincoln said on December 7, “I do not think it would do to bring Grant away from the West. I talked with Gen. Halleck this morning about the matter, and his opinion was the same.”

  “But you know Mr President,” remarked Old Brains, “how hard we have tried to get this army to move towards the enemy and we cannot succeed.”261

  Indeed, it had proved almost impossible to budge Meade. In September, when the general argued that it would be quite difficult to attack Richmond, the exasperated Lincoln told Halleck: “to attempt to fight the enemy slowly back into his intrenchments at Richmond, and there to capture him, is an idea I have been trying to repudiate for quite a year. My judgment is so clear against it, that I would scarcely allow the attempt to be made, if the general in command should desire to make it. My last attempt upon Richmond was to get McClellan, when he was nearer there than the enemy was, to run in ahead of him. Since then I have constantly desired the Army of the Potomac, to make Lee’s army, and not Richmond, it’s objective point. If our army can not fall upon the enemy and hurt him where he is, it is plain to me it can gain nothing by attempting to follow him over a succession of intrenched lines into a fortified city.”262

  A month later Lincoln tried to goad Meade into taking the offensive against Lee. “If Gen. Meade can now attack him on a field no worse than equal for us,” he instructed the general through Halleck, “and will do so with all the skill and courage, which he, his officers and men possess, the honor will be his if he succeeds, and the blame may be mine if he fails.”263 Meade replied with a typical excuse for inaction.

  Months later, Grant would be placed in charge of all Union forces, and the Army of the Potomac would move decisively against the enemy without such presidential inducements.

  32

  “I Hope to Stand Firm Enough to Not Go

  Backward, and Yet Not Go Forward Fast

  Enough to Wreck the Country’s Cause”

  Reconstruction and Renomination

  (November 1863–June 1864)

  In the 1840s and 1850s, Lincoln’s love for mathematics had led him not only to master the first six books of Euclid’s geometry but also to try solving the ancient riddle of squaring the circle. In late 1863, as prospects for victory improved, he wrestled with the political equivalent of that puzzle: devising a Reconstruction policy that would protect the rights of the newly-freed slaves while simultaneously restoring sectional harmony. To make emancipation more than a paper promise without alienating white Southerners was a daunting challenge, for every measure designed to guarantee the rights of blacks was regarded as an insult by the region’s whites.

  Lincoln faced several questions. Should the rebellious states be regarded as conquered provinces, to be molded to the whim of the victor? Should Rebels stand trial for treason? Should amnesty be extended? To whom? What should be done to protect the freedmen? Should Confederate states be required to accept emancipation before they were restored? Should they be required to enfranchise blacks? Should Reconstruction be postponed till the war was over, or begun while the fighting still raged? Could the Confederates be induced to surrender by offering generous peace terms? Should Congress or the president determine how these questions would be answered?

  In dealing with these issues, Lincoln was hard-pressed to keep the Republican coalition intact. Some Radicals, led by Charles Sumner, argued that each rebellious state had committed suicide, reverting to territorial status, and therefore could be regulated by Congress. They also wished to emancipate all slaves, confiscate Rebel property, and deny political rights to most Confederates. Understandably fearing that such measures might alienate Unionists in the Border States and the Confederacy as well as Northern Democrats and conservative Republicans, Lincoln took charge of wartime Reconstruction as federal forces occupied more and more Southern territory.

  Lincoln’s initial ad hoc response was to appoint military governors and rely on Southern Unionists to rehabilitate their states, with some general guidance from the administration. In March 1862, shortly after the capture of Nashville, he made Tennessee Senator Andrew Johnson a brigadier general and named him governor of the Volunteer State. Later that year he selected governors for North Carolina, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas. Congress acquiesced at first, but eventually balked. Lincoln and the Radicals were to clash sharply over Reconstruction policy.

  Early Experiments with Military Governors

  Andrew Johnson, a fierce opponent of secession and the only U.S. senator to remain loyal to the Union when his state seceded, was given a free hand to restore civilian government to Tennessee as soon as practicable. Lincoln may have made a mistake in appointing the truculent, embittered Johnson for such a delicate task. A wiser choice may have been William B. Campbell, a Mexican War hero and Conservative from Middle Tennessee. Johnson undertook harsh measures, including the arrest of several clergymen, and used inflammatory rhetoric, telling a mass meeting: “Treason must be crushed out and traitors must be punished.”1

  In July 1862, Lincoln urged Johnson to call an election. “If we could, somehow, get a vote of the people of Tennessee and have it result properly it would be worth more to us than a battle gained,” he wrote.2 The president hoped that a civilian government might be persuaded to abolish slavery and accord freed blacks some basic rights. If that could be done, the inevitable white backlash might be minimized, for the momentous changes would be the work of native whites, not Yankees. Johnson disappointed the president by warning that it would be impossible to hold elections before East Tennessee was pacified.

  Conflict between Johnson and military commanders Buell, Halleck, and Rosecrans also chagrined Lincoln, who tactfully tried to reconcile their differences. When Johnson sought to transfer soldiers to Kentucky in order to protect a rail line, the president gently reproved him: “Do you not, my good friend, perceive that what you ask is simply to put you in command in the West. I do not suppose you desire this. You only wish to control in your own localities; but this, you must know, may derange all other parts. Can you, not, and will you not, have a full conference with Gen. Halleck?”3 Simultaneously, he wired the general: “The Gov. is a true, and a valuable man—indispensable to us in Tennessee. Will you please get in communication with him, and have a full conference with him?”4

  To placate Tennessee Unionists who were outraged by the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln agreed to exempt their state, even though much of it remained under Confederate control. That drastic step illustrated the lengths to which the president was willing to go to accommodate beleaguered loyalists in East Tennessee. To a pair of them he wrote in August 1863: “I do as much for East Tennessee as I would, or could, if my own home, and family were in Knoxville.” After pointing out the practical difficulties of inserting and maintaining troops in their region, he added: “I know you are too much distressed to be argued with; and therefore I do not attempt it at length. You know I am not indifferent to your troubles; else I should not, more than a year and a half ago, have made the effort I did to have a Railroad built on purpose to relieve you. The Secretary of War, Gen. Halleck, Gen. Burnside, and Gen. Rosecrans are all engaged now in an effort to relieve your section.”5

  The following month, with Burnside occupying Knoxville and Rosecrans in Chattanooga, the president grew more optimistic. He told Governor Johnson that “it is the nick of time for re-inaugerating a loyal State government. Not a moment should be lost. You, and the co-operating friends there, can better judge of the ways and means, than can be judged by any here.” Lincoln warned that opponents of emancipation and the Union war effort should not be allowed to triumph: “The re-inaugeration must not be such as to give control of the State, and it’s representation in Congress, to the enemies of the Unio
n, driving it’s friends there into political exile. The whole struggle for Tennessee will have been profitless to both State and Nation, if it so ends that Gov. Johnson is put down, and Gov. [Isham] Harris is put up.” The president emphasized that action had to be taken soon, for there was no telling what his successor might do. “Get emancipation into your new State government—Constitution—and there will be no such word as fail for your case.”6

  Rosecrans’s defeat at Chickamauga delayed implementation of the president’s plan. In early October, Lincoln told the general: “If we can hold Chattanooga, and East Tennessee, I think the rebellion must dwindle and die. I think you and Burnside can do this.”7 He also summoned Johnson to Washington for consultations. Unwisely, the governor declined, pleading preoccupation with business. Lincoln’s hopes to have Tennessee become the first Confederate state to reestablish loyal civilian government thus came to nothing.

  A similar attempt in North Carolina also fizzled. In early 1862, Union troops under Burnside had occupied coastal areas of the Tarheel State. To serve as military governor, Lincoln in May appointed an able, temperamental, and combative North Carolina native, Edward Stanly, then residing in California. A faithful Unionist and a longtime friend of Seward’s, Stanly knew the occupied area well, for he had once represented it as a Whig in Congress. There John Quincy Adams called him “a lofty spirit, with a quick perception, an irritable temper, and a sarcastic turn of mind, sparing neither friend nor foe.”8 In North Carolina he enjoyed the reputation of “a man of tact, address and resources” who “knows how to manage men, and possesses the energy and courage requisite to the execution of his designs.”9 Like Johnson, he received carte blanche from the administration, and when he pleaded for more explicit instructions, he was simply told to act as a dictator.