Abraham Lincoln: A Life, Volume 2

by Michael Burlingame

  To defuse the effect of Lincoln’s Niagara Manifesto, some Republican newspapers hinted that the administration would negotiate for peace without making abolition a prerequisite. In addition, both Seward and Interior Secretary John P. Usher gave speeches to the same effect. Those two cabinet members denied that they spoke for the president, but their prominence led some to believe that they were in fact doing so, their protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. George B. Cheever, who thought Lincoln “absolutely incapable of the work given him to do” and devoid of “moral dignity and honesty,” inferred from Seward’s speech that the administration was willing to accept restoration of the Union with slavery intact. “This is Lincoln’s arrangement,” Cheever confided to his wife, “and being such, I am still entirely doubtful whether God will allow him to be reelected.”63 On the other hand, a Wisconsin Republican assured Lincoln that Seward’s speech “has done much good to the Union cause,” for it “has tended to calm the excited minds” of voters who objected to the Niagara Manifesto.64

  Placating Both Radicals and Conservatives

  With the fall of Atlanta, the dump-Lincoln movement abruptly collapsed. Thurlow Weed had described that effort to Seward as “equally formidable and vicious, embracing a larger number of leading Men than I supposed possible.”65 On September 20, the New York Evening Post, which had been sharply critical of Lincoln, approvingly noted that he “has gained wisdom by experience. Every year has seen our cause more successful; every year has seen abler generals, more skillful leaders, called to the head; every year has seen fewer errors, greater ability, greater energy, in the administration of affairs. … While Mr. Lincoln stays in power, this healthy and beneficial state of things will continue.”66 John Sherman, who had denigrated Lincoln and supported Chase’s candidacy, now confided to his famous brother that the president was “better than so timid & unworthy a man as McClellan will be in the hands of such traitors as Vallandigham.”67 The senator told fellow Ohioans that Lincoln’s “solicitude for the public welfare is never-ceasing. I differed from him at first myself, but at last felt and believed that he was right, and shall vote for this brave, true, patriotic, kind-hearted man. All his faults and mistakes you have seen. All his virtues you can never know. His patience in labor is wonderful. He works far harder than any man in Erie County.” To exchange such a leader for the “idle, incompetent” McClellan would “be a devilish poor trade.”68

  Frémont withdrew from the race, largely thanks to the efforts of Michigan Senator Zachariah Chandler, a self-appointed peacemaker who worked behind the scenes to unite the party. In August, he began his extensive shuttle diplomacy with a visit to Ben Wade, who realized that he had made a blunder by signing Henry Winter Davis’s manifesto denouncing Lincoln. The senator was in the mood to reconcile with the president despite his personal aversion to him. When his good friend and ally Chandler asked him to stump for Lincoln, Wade agreed on condition that the president would dismiss Montgomery Blair. David H. Jerome of Detroit, a future governor of Michigan, was present at this interview and described it as “rather titanic.”69 Chandler approached Lincoln with Wade’s request. (Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson advised the president that “every one hates” the postmaster general and predicted that “tens of thousands of men will be lost to you or will give a reluctant vote on account of the Blairs.”)70

  Earlier, the president had petulantly dismissed suggestions that he fire Blair, who had acquired a reputation as a “political Ishmaelite, whose hand seems to be against every man.”71 When Thaddeus Stevens warned that the Republicans of Pennsylvania would not “work with a good will” unless Lincoln pledged to dismiss Blair, the president bristled. Expressing regret that he could not make such a promise, the president said with some heat: “If I were even myself inclined to make it, I have no right to do so. What right have I to promise you to remove Mr. Blair, and not make a similar promise to any other gentleman of influence to remove any other member of my cabinet whom he does not happen to like? The Republican party, wisely or unwisely has made me their nominee for President, without asking any such pledge at my hands. Is it proper that you should demand it, representing only a portion of that great party? Has it come to this that the voters of this country are asked to elect a man to be President—to be the Executive—to administer the government, and yet that this man is to have no will or discretion of his own? Am I to be the mere puppet of power—to have my constitutional advisers selected for me beforehand, to be told I must do this or leave that undone? It would be degrading to my manhood to consent to any such bargain—I was about to say it is equally degrading to your manhood to ask it.”72 When the Republican National Executive Committee asked for Blair’s resignation in compliance with the party’s platform, Lincoln flatly denied their request.

  In August, Francis P. Blair, Sr., recognizing that his controversial offspring might damage Lincoln’s reelection chances, told the president “that he might rely on my sons to do all they could for him,” and suggested that Frank Blair be recalled from the army “to heal party divisions in Missouri & Stump the States.” He added that Montgomery “would go the rounds also—and would be very willing to be a martyr to the Radical phrenzy or jealousy, that would feed on the Blairs, if that would help.” Lincoln replied that “nobody but enemies wanted Montg[omer]y out of the Cabinet” and that “he did not think it good policy to sacrifice a true friend to a false one or an avowed enemy.” Still, he did appreciate Montgomery’s generous offer to “cheerfully resign to conciliate the class of men who had made their war on the Blairs because they were his friends—and sought to injure him among the ignorant partizans of those seeking to supplant him.”73

  Lincoln changed his position on September 3, when he met with Senator Chandler, Elihu Washburne, Iowa Senator James Harlan, and James M. Edmunds, head of the Union League. According to Henry Winter Davis, who heard the story from Chandler, the four men “intimated that the country thought well” of Lincoln but that it was upset by his acceptance of Chase’s resignation. If “he would remove Blair all might still be well.” After the president defended his postmaster general in a lengthy review of events in Missouri, his callers replied that even if a case could be made for Blair, “still all who will vote for you think Blair false and untrustworthy and you can’t convince them; so you must remove him or be defeated.”

  “But I don’t want to desert a friend!” Lincoln exclaimed.

  “Very possibly, but you will go down with him. What you say about Blair may be true—but nobody thinks so and everybody wants to get rid of him. Won’t you let him go?”

  “Well I’ll think of it.”

  Chandler then said: “I am going to New York to see Wade; and probably if I could say you will remove Blair I could secure his support and get Fremont out of the way.”

  Lincoln exclaimed, “Well I think it may be done!”

  The next morning Chandler told Lincoln “if Fremont could be induced to withdraw by giving up Blair he would do [arrange] it.” To his wife, the senator confided that Lincoln “was most reluctant to come to terms but came.”74

  Chandler proceeded to New York on his mission, which Senator Harlan told him was so important that if he succeeded he would do more for the campaign that any ten men could do on the stump. In New York, Chandler was chagrined to discover that Wade had not arrived. Undaunted, Chandler carried on negotiations with Frémont and his advisors, David Dudley Field and George Wilkes. Frankly, Chandler informed Frémont that Lincoln would not withdraw; Chandler also insisted that the Republicans would lose unless the general abandoned his campaign. Moreover, Blair would be dismissed if Frémont quit. The Pathfinder promised to think it over.

  Frémont received conflicting advice from his friends. Some abolitionists, like Wendell Phillips, counseled him to remain in the race, while others, like John Greenleaf Whittier, favored the opposite course. Colonel Nathaniel P. Sawyer, a leading Republican in Pittsburgh, urged him to “withdraw as soon as practicable in favor of Lincoln and J
ohnson” if he had “assurance of Mr. Blair’s immediate removal and also Mr. Stanton’s and the assurance that Mr. Seward will not be reappointed.” Although Sawyer held a rather low opinion of the president, he pledged that if Frémont withdrew, he and former Pennsylvania Governor William F. Johnston would support Lincoln.75

  The persistent Chandler followed Frémont to Massachusetts and kept pressing him. After further reflection, the general said he would quit without conditioning his action on Blair’s dismissal. He now recognized that his cause was hopeless after the Democratic convention had failed to endorse him, and he did not wish to see McClellan in the White House. According to Jessie Benton Frémont, Whittier’s advice—“There is a time to do, and a time to stand aside”—was the “deciding word” that persuaded her husband to withdraw.76 Chandler feared that if Frémont did not make his resignation contingent on Blair’s removal, Lincoln might retain the postmaster general in office. After remonstrating with the Pathfinder in vain, Chandler hastened to inform Lincoln of Frémont’s decision and ask for the quid pro quo that he had specified before undertaking his mission: Blair’s dismissal.

  When the Michigan senator made that demand, Lincoln replied: “Well, but I must do it in my own way to soften it.” It is not known whether Chandler informed Lincoln that Frémont would quit even if Blair remained in the cabinet. Perhaps the president realized that he could keep Blair on, but still he may have decided to sacrifice him in order to placate Wade, Davis, and their allies.

  Frémont’s grudging letter of withdrawal, written on September 17 and published five days later, understandably displeased Lincoln. In a most ungracious fashion, the Pathfinder offered to support the Republican ticket: “In respect to Mr. Lincoln, I consider that his Administration has been politically, militarily, and financially a failure, and that its necessary continuance is a cause of regret for the country.”77 Lincoln was so put off that when Chandler called at the White House on September 22, the president “showed symptoms of flying from the bargain.” But Chandler insisted that “the form of the withdrawal was not a condition; and offensive as it was, still it was a substantial advice to support L[incoln].”78

  The president agreed and the next day asked Blair to honor his pledge to step down: “You have generously said to me more than once, that whenever your resignation could be a relief to me, it was at my disposal. The time has come. You very well know that this proceeds from no dissatisfaction of mine with you personally or officially. Your uniform kindness has been unsurpassed by that of any friend; and, while it is true that the war does not so greatly add to the difficulties of your Department, as to those of some others, it is yet much to say, as I most truly can, that in the three years and a half during which you have administered the General Post-Office, I remember no single complaint against you in connection therewith.”79

  The request surprised Blair, for he believed that opposition to him was waning. On September 23, he startled Bates and Welles with the news: “I suppose you are both aware that my head is decapitated—that I am no longer a member of the Cabinet.” When Welles asked what was behind the president’s decision, he “said he had no doubt he was a peace-offering to Frémont and his friends. They wanted an offering, and he was the victim whose sacrifice would propitiate them.” Welles opined that “the suggestion of pacifying the partisans of Frémont might have been brought into consideration, but it was not the moving cause.” Lincoln, he said, “would never have yielded to that, except under the pressing advisement, or deceptive appeals and representations of some one to whom he had given his confidence.” Blair replied that “there is no doubt Seward was accessory to this, instigated and stimulated by Weed.” Welles believed that Chase was “more influential than Seward in this matter.”80 To his wife, Blair complained that Lincoln “has given himself and me too, an unnecessary mortification in this matter,” but added that “I am sure he acts from the best motives.”81 His brother-in-law, Gustavus Fox, thought Blair’s dismissal “rather a summary process and does not appear to me to be frank and true, but politics is not made up of the finest mettle.”82

  Bitter though he may have been about Seward and Weed’s influence with the White House, Blair responded to the president’s letter handsomely: “I can not take leave of you without renewing the expressions of my gratitude for the uniform kindness which has marked your course towards [me.]”83 He was pleased that Lincoln followed his father’s advice by appointing as his replacement William Dennison, former governor of Ohio and a friend of the family. David Davis congratulated Lincoln on the selection, calling Dennison “honorable, highminded pure, & dignified” and “a wise & safe counsellor.”84 Davis’s cousin, Henry Winter Davis, however, disagreed, but rejoiced that the president, whom he called a “mean and selfish old dog,” had dismissed his chief antagonist: “Blair is gone! Our necks are relieved from that galling humiliation.”85 Blair’s dismissal indicated to the Maryland congressman that “bullying may do something” and that Lincoln “thinks more of himself than of his friends.”86

  Lincoln told Welles that he needed to placate Radicals upset by Chase’s departure while Blair was allowed to remain in the cabinet. Chase and his numerous friends believed that the retention of the postmaster general was “invidious, and the public would consider it a condemnation of himself [Chase] and an approval of the Blairs.” The president trusted that Blair’s dismissal “would reconcile all parties, and rid the Administration of irritating bickerings.” As Welles later recalled, Lincoln at that time “was greatly embarrassed by contentions among his friends, by nominal Republicans, by intense radicals, and the strong front of the Democrats.”87

  Blair’s abrasiveness had in fact alienated most of the cabinet. Bates considered him a “tricky politician” who lacked “the first conception of statesmanship.”88 Chase deeply resented Blair’s private letters that Frémont had released years earlier in which the postmaster general said the treasury secretary “has more horror of seeing treasury notes below par than of seeing soldiers killed.”89 Blair and Chase had quarreled over patronage matters. When Blair dismissed Chase’s friend Lewis Clephane from his position as postmaster of Washington, the treasury secretary appealed to Lincoln. As they discussed the matter, Blair entered the room and insisted that each department head could fire employees in his domain without consulting other cabinet members. Chase snapped back, “Very well, then according to your own rule, I appoint Mr. Clephane collector in this district in the place of your friend Bowen, who is removed!” Lincoln admonished them: “Take your own course, gentlemen, and do not bother me with your changes.”90 In addition, Blair and Stanton were not on speaking terms; upon learning that Chandler celebrated the dismissal of the postmaster general by having “a good drunk,” the secretary of war “said he would like to have known when & where, that he might have had a hand in it.”91 Chandler rejoiced, boasting that he had “been successful in all that I undertook to do.”92 Blair was so quick to impugn the motives of others that Lincoln chided him gently: “It is much better not to be led from the region of reason into that of hot blood, by imputing to public men motives which they do not avow.”93

  As he campaigned for Lincoln that fall, Blair disingenuously contradicted Democratic charges that he had been sacrificed to appease the Radicals: “I retired on the recommendation of my father,” who “would not permit a son of his to stand in the way of the glorious and patriotic President who leads us on to success and to the final triumph that is in store for us.”94 Indeed, Francis P. Blair, Sr., told his son Frank that the sacrifice of Montgomery “tends to give a greater certainty of the defeat of McClellan, which I look upon as the salvation of the Republic.”95 Discontent among Conservatives threatened to break into the open, but when Frank Blair learned that some of his friends intended to attack the president for dismissing his brother, he squelched their plans.

  Bates regretted Lincoln’s decision to let Blair go, for the Radicals now seemed in the ascendant. “I think Mr. Lincoln could have been elected with
out them and in spite of them,” he confided to his diary. “In that event, the Country might have been governed, free from their malign influences, and more nearly in conformity to the constitution.”96 In Lincoln’s view, however, the Conservatives were not totally marginalized. He speculated that if Montgomery Blair “will devote himself to the success of the national cause without exhibiting bad temper towards his opponents, he can set the Blair family up again.”97

  Lincoln’s willingness to let Blair go was rooted in his understandable fear that Frémont might siphon off essential votes. The general was especially popular among Missouri Germans, who scorned Lincoln as the “great violator of the Constitution,” a “still greater butcher of men,” and one who “remains unmoved in the face of the greatest misery, and who can crack jokes like a Nero while Rome is burning.”98 In late August, the president asked a Baltimore Republican about the progress of the Frémont movement, which allegedly troubled him far more than did the upcoming Democratic convention. The president told Gustav Koerner that “he would lose … the German element, which held the balance of power in Missouri, Wisconsin, and Illinois.”99 The president may well have been thinking of the 1844 election, for, as the postmaster of Brooklyn observed, the “Fremont movement is a weak concern,” but so too was the Liberty Party candidacy of James G. Birney that doomed Henry Clay’s bid for the presidency.100

  Lincoln was also eager to have Wade, Davis, and other Radicals rejoin the fold. Some administration critics hoped that Chase would publicly denounce Lincoln as he had done in private, and the president expressed fear that Chase would come out against him. But Hugh McCulloch, comptroller of the currency, met with Lincoln in September to help reconcile Chase and the president. During their conversation, Lincoln “made a frank statement of his kind feelings for Mr. Chase,” thus “removing all cause for estrangement between them.” Shortly thereafter Chase, eager for the seat on the Supreme Court that seemed likely to open soon, returned to the Midwest to campaign for Lincoln and Johnson.101