The Lost Ranger: A Soldier's Story

by Mehlo, Noel

  The PRG was to spearhead the drive and to provide cover for the larger invasion elements of the 116th RCT. Force A, consisting of the 2nd Ranger Infantry Battalion, Companies D, E, F, and half of HQ were set to assault Pointe du Hoc at H-hour under the direct command of Colonel Rudder. This after one of his subordinates was relieved of command of this element on the cross channel voyage. Force B consisted of the 2nd Ranger Infantry Battalion, Company C. They were assigned to make their assault west of Vierville and destroy the German positions and radar station at Pointe et Raz de la Percée regardless of the missions of Force A and Force C. Lt. Colonel Schneider, with his 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion, and Companies A and B of the 2nd Rangers made up Force C. They were to wait until H+30 for word of the success or failure of Force A. If Rudder was successful, Force C was to follow them up the cliffs at Pointe du Hoc and engage the Germans in support of the 116th RCT in taking their objectives to the Grandcamp-Maisy-Isigny area. If Rudder was unsuccessful, Force C was to land on the western portion of Omaha Beach at H+60 alongside the 116th RCT in front of Vierville, and assault westward overland to relieve Force A. According to Taylor, these orders were spelled out in:

  Field Order (FO) #1, Headquarters Ranger Group, Appendix 1, to S-2 Estimate, 18 May 1944, and Annex 12 Army Neptune, and

  Operational Report, No. 38, Hq 9th Air Force the FO of the two Ranger battalions24

  Figure 242: Photo of type of 155 mm guns similar to those identified at Pointe du Hoc Figure 243: Aerial photo of Point du Hoc revealing extent of bombing and bombardment leading up to and including D-Day. (NARA)

  According to a portion of the BIGOT plan for Operation NEPTUNE for D-Day, the Ranger Mission officially consisted of six parts: 1. Reconnoiter enemy positions at POINTE ET RAZ DE LA PERCEE and at the Radar Station, and report strength and location enemy encountered, condition of defenses and enemy movements vicinity of ST PIERRE DU MONT.

  2. Reconnoiter new battery position on PINTE DU HOE. Report condition of battery, strength and location enemy encountered, and prepared enemy defenses.

  3. Reconnoiter new battery position east of POINTE DU HOE at MGRS 598934 and report type and condition of artillery, if present, and strength and location enemy encountered.

  4. Observe ST PIERRE DU MONT and road to GRANDCAMP and report strength and location enemy encountered and prepared enemy defenses.

  5. Reconnoiter ST PIERRE-GRANDCAMP road and report condition of road through flooded area, prepared enemy defenses covering road and prepared enemy defenses and enemy movements in GRANDCAMP.

  6. Reconnoiter GRANDCAMP-MAISY areas and report strength location of enemy encountered, condition of defenses in GRANDCAMP and of the battery positions southwest of MAISY, and enemy movements along the road ISIGNY-MAISY.

  A reader of this should not be lulled into a sense of any conspiracy, or that the Rangers’ mission was a wasted effort because the guns at Point du Hoc were not in their emplacements on the cliff. They were there. They had been moved slightly to the south unknown to the Rangers at the time. These 155 mm guns were capable of firing to devastating effect at Allied forces. Figures 242 and 243 illustrate the Point du Hoc objective and the type of gun there. The battery at Grandcamp-Maisy was equally dangerous, and the Rangers were likewise charged with taking it on. Both German batteries were spaced to inflict carnage in their respective zones of interlocking fire with the weapons on hand.. The Rangers were charged with killing the enemy and destroying vital weapons at both locations.

  The officers of the Rangers were briefed at the last minute that an additional German Divisional Unit (German 352nd Infantry Division) was expected at Omaha Beach. Regarding the last day aboard the LSI, S/SGT Chance wrote: “Rather uneventful, most everyone was rechecking equipment, guns, ammo, gas masks, etc. At this point there was some anticipation of what may lay ahead, for we had trained hard for a definite mission, yet the enemy was still distant and the war not yet a personal affair.” He went on to say: “We were briefed thoroughly on our mission and what intelligence had found. I recall a division (German) was conducting exercises in our area. This would increase the size and reduce the time of counterattack. This worried most of us.”22 Ranger John Carlin Hodgson, Company F wrote: “We practiced getting on our equipment and into the LCAs for three days. We had to be letter-perfect because none of us knew just when THAT time would come. Every man in the outfit knew what our mission was and we were told it over and over.”24 Another Ranger spoke of this time as being full of suspense and anticipation. S/SGT Belmont indicated: “Most of the time aboard ship was spent cleaning our weapons, studying air photos of the beach we were going to land on, rehearsing in our minds how we were going to accomplish our assigned mission. There was conversation such as which Company of the Battalion would get across the beach first, who’s platoon would reach their objective first, how far inland would we be at the end of D-Day, etc. We were highly trained and probably didn’t realize what combat would be like.”10

  General Raaen wrote in his book Intact that after 0200 hours on the morning of June 6, that you could begin to see the “dull red glow” and hear the “rumbling of bombs” on the Normandy coast.26 Captain Runge indicated: “On the deck of a small Channel Liner the “Prince Baudouin" with 200 Rangers watching a sight which looked like the sun on the horizon in the night. It was the Air Forces dropping 1200 tons of bombs on Pointe du Hoc.”27 S/SGT Donald L Chance remembered watching and listening to the bombing of the French coast from ten miles out to sea aboard the deck of his LSI, the HMS Prince Baudouin. 1st Sgt Avery J Thornhill, B Company indicated he missed out on some of the overnight activities and wrote: “I took an overdose of sea sick pills and slept until about 0300 hours 6 June, on awaking the firing had begun and no one was allowed on deck of the ship due to fragments from the anti air craft #### fire falling on deck.”28 PFC Weast wrote: “On board the transport previous to boarding the craft, things were quiet, the last visit by the chaplain, preoccupied soldiers, little talk – lots of thinking. We had fried fresh eggs for breakfast at 0330, few ate.”12 Other Rangers reported being served pancakes. Many of the vessels had barrage balloons tethered to them to ward off would be attackers.

  At about 0400 hours, the loudspeakers aboard the HMS Prince Leopold called out “U.S. Rangers to your station.” The men geared up, headed for the deck to their station where they were to board their assault section LCA, got into their assigned boats and were lowered to the English Channel. S/SGT Ranney wrote of this moment: “That was my most memorable moment because we were ready to go, and I don’t think anyone would have backed out if he’d had a chance to.”21 Ranger Hodgson wrote: “The morning of June 6, was just as bad as the morning of June 5 had been but the order came through to get equipment and into assigned boats. We were given food and ammunition for 24 hours only. We were also issued a Mae West (life jacket) and a puke bag. Men were very seasick but so many things happening you didn’t seem to notice or think much about it. As far as the eye could see, anything that could float was heading for the French coast; planes overhead and destroyers firing on the beach. Nothing much in the way of conversation unless we saw a plane get hit.”25 1st Sgt Thornhill wrote: “The water was very rough and we had a hard time launching our little LCA, as we were placed in the LCA’s prior to the boats being launched and when we would be halfway to the water a wave would pick up the LCA and almost put it back on the mother ship, then the wave would recede leaving us hanging in the air. When the LCA returned to the length of the cables we got quite a jar. My company didn’t lose a man in the launching or in the trip to the beach. Those British coxswains really knew their job.”28

  Just before he was to climb aboard his LCA, Captain Whittington paid S/Sgt Copeland a visit, where he instructed him “make damn sure every soldier gets off the boat or leave them there,” and he grimaced with a solemn stare. Captain Whittington instructed JR to be the last one off of his LCA to accomplish this mission, and the Captain went to shore aboard the other B Company LCA carrying 1st Platoo
n. JR recounted this story to his biographer, and later on to me personally during our visit. He said he knew exactly what Whittington meant. JR and the 2nd Platoon of B Company embarked from the port side of the HMS Prince Leopold onto their assigned LCA. Based on review of the records of the 504th Flotilla assigned to the HMS Prince Leopold, I strongly believe that B Company was assigned to LCAs 550 and 568. The US military landing tables indicated that B Company was assigned Landing Table Index n° 1162 and 1163. I have not been able to find a correlative list between the British Flotilla records provided to General Raaen after the war and the landing table data. The possible identification of the two British LCAs is a collaborative effort that warrants additional study. The HMS Prince Leopold transported Assault Flotilla 504 consisting of LCAs 550, 568, 570, 572, 622, 623, 1045 carrying the 5th Ranger companies B, A, E and half of HQ. The HMS Prince Baudouin transported Assault Flotilla 507, consisting of LCAs 521, 554, 577, 578, 670 863 and 1377, carrying Companies D, F, C, and half of HQ. General Raaen sent me an email in October, 2012 that stated: “Taylor's Notes say, "the first wave, 7 boats had B, A & E in two craft each, with a headquarters craft in the middle of A; the second wave . . .". Ergo, B's boats were either the first two or last two Index Numbers of the wave. My guess since everything else was left to right, that B's boats were the first two Index Numbers.” It is possible that today no surviving LCAs exist in a historical preservation context, which is a shame. It is also possible that no official records exist listing what units were assigned to specific landing craft for the whole of the invasion.

  Carl Weast looked at his watch and recalled it was 0430 when he and his fellow B Company members boarded their LCAs. The Rangers merely stepped from deck to LCA. The Leopold swung it’s davits and lowered the men into the Channel (Figure 244). The water was very rough. As the LCAs were lowered, the smaller craft would make contact with a wave and float. Then the water would fall away and the craft would react wildly as the ropes suspending them tightened against the effect of gravity in what appeared to be a harrowing experience for the riders. After the LCA was sufficiently lowered, the experienced British coxswains cut loose the craft allowing it to fall into the sea below. As the craft left the LSIs, they travelled out and away from the vessels and took up pre-determined circular patterns in marshalling areas awaiting word for the run-in to shore (Figure 245).

  Figure 244: An LCA leaving the LSI HMS Rocksand for the island of Nancowry, on the Nicobar Islands, October 1945. Other LCAs are suspended on davits waiting to be loaded before being lowered. As the LCA flotilla pulled away from the HMS Prince Leopold, 2nd Lt. Francis Dawson, D Company, recalled hearing “Good Hunting, Rangers!” announced over the PA system of the ship.29 S/Sgt Copeland noted that the puking began almost immediately after being set to sea aboard the LCA as the little craft heaved back and forth in the choppy seas. Each LCA had a small pump to extricate water entering the craft. Copeland told his biographer Gary M. Graves “they were useless. The pump hose was no bigger than my thumb… too little to move any quantity of water let alone puke. You couldn’t pump it fast enough to do any good.” Finally, out of necessity the soldiers used their helmets to scoop the liquid out of the boat; it was a never ending task.”30 PFC Weast wrote: “As we were getting into the LCA’s they gave us waterproof Kraft paper bags to vomit into in case we got sea sick. I used mine to help bail the water out of the boat. The small British LCA’s were heavily loaded, the channel rough and plenty of water was coming in over the sides. We took turns working the hand operated bilge pump, bailed with the bags and helmets barely managing to keep afloat. I recall one of the boys suggesting an interesting place where the king might stick the royal navy. However he and the others changed their attitude later when these British sailors got us through the beach obstacles to a dry touch down.”12

  Figure 245: Landing craft marshalling near transport vessel awaiting orders to go ashore. In Mediterranean on November 8, 1942 (NARA) 1st Lieutenant Pepper, normally the 1st Platoon Leader reportedly accompanied 2nd Platoon to shore. It is possible this was done to offset the lack of experience of 2nd Lieutenant Mathew Gregory, the new 2nd Platoon Leader with less than two months experience in his role. It is also possible and more likely to me that since Whittington went ashore with 1st Platoon, Pepper travelled with 2nd Platoon as he was the Company Executive Officer (XO). Splitting Whittington and Pepper apart would be a measure used to ensure survivability of the chain of command for the company. The twilight of the break of dawn occurred at 0440 hours nautical time. General Raaen recorded the initiation of the massive shore bombardment let loose. “Suddenly there was a tremendous crash, roar, blast. Sully and I jumped up, but the Petty Officer calmly said, "Sirs, that is the Battleship Texas opening the bombardment of the coast." The time was 0550, forty minutes before H-Hour…31 Omaha Beachhead reported the US Naval Forces in the bombardment were 2 Battleships, 3 Cruisers, 8 Destroyers, as well as numerous other landing craft with one type or another artillery aboard in all directions opened fire with hellacious noise and concussion.”31 The mighty U.S.S. Texas is shown in Figures 246 and 247.

  All the men of the invasion could see the blasts from the muzzles of the guns of the naval fleet. They could feel the blast waves speed across the water beneath them and through the air around them as shells of every size ripped across the sky to their waiting targets. The men could time the shells from the muzzle flash until the flash of the blasts ashore just over the horizon as they were still some eight miles from shore and just beyond horizon due to the curve of the earth.

  Figure 246: Photo of U.S.S. Texas, BB-35 firing batteries (NARA)

  Figure 247: U.S.S. Texas, BB-35 (NARA) The crimson sunrise discussed at the beginning of the chapter occurred while the Rangers were in transit heading to shore at 0558 hours. Their primary mission at this time was to be the follow-up assault force to land at Pointe du Hoc and to destroy the six known 155 mm guns that threatened both Omaha and Utah Beaches.

  PFC Ching shared with me in an interview that S/Sgt Hull was a really nice NCO, but his countenance changed every time the men entered a combat situation. This was the case on D-Day. Ching told me, “Yeah, until he get serious, all S/Sgt Hull would say is “ALL RIGHT GUYS, GET THE LEAD OUT!” Then he would say “EARN YOUR PAY!” PFC Ching and S/Sgt Copeland echoed the same sentiment that S/Sgt Hull was a dedicated and good soldier who took care of his men.

  Ranger Task Force B, consisting of 2nd Ranger Infantry Battalion, C Company approached and landed on the far right (west) end of Omaha Beach in Charlie Sector to the west of WN 72 located at Beach Exit D-1. They landed at 0645 nine minutes after the 116th Infantry Regimental Combat Team, Company A, where these Rangers suffered 19 KIA, 13 Severely Wounded in Action (SWA) and five Lightly Wounded in Action (LWA) of their original 68 men. Colonel Rudder and Companies D, E and F and the other associated warriors in Task Force A landed at the base of Pointe du Hoc at between 0705 and 0708 when their scheduled landing time had been at 0630. This happened due to a navigational error of their flotilla.33 According to Hatfield, the Army Air Corps had been late in a flight of bombers to strike Pointe du Hoc, actually bombing it at 0645. The delay saved Task Force A from being bombed by friendly fire. Task Force C, consisting of the entire 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion and the 2nd Ranger Infantry Battalion, Companies A and B, waited one-half hour behind Task Force A offshore between Omaha Beach and Pointe du Hoc waiting for one of two radio messages from Task A at 0700. If Task Force B heard “Praise the Lord,” they were to follow in and assault the point. If they heard the message “Tilt,” then they were to assume the assault a failure, or not secure enough to follow behind Task Force A. This would trigger landing at the secondary objective first practiced at Slapton Sands, of landing on Omaha Beach and protecting the flank of the 29th Infantry Division. They then were to turn right (west) to relieve the Rangers at Pointe du Hoc. The designated Landing location was to be Dog Green at Exit D-1. Task Force B waited off the shore until 0710 until Lt Colonel Schneider ordered h
is flotilla to Omaha Beach after receiving no clear radio message.34 Important at this point was that the tide was fast coming in and currents were now running strong to the east.

  Another very important element of success to the overall assault on Omaha Beach was the arrival and leadership on one highly competent and skillful leader. His name was Brigadier General Norman Daniel "Dutch" Cota, Sr, Assistant Division Commander of the 29th Infantry Division (Figure 248).

  Figure 248: Brigadier General Norman Daniel "Dutch" Cota, Sr (US Army photo) He was integral to the planning of the operation, and has been mentioned previously in the book. He landed on the beach at 0730, arriving at Dog White amongst the 116th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), C Company. This was approximately 900 yards east of Exit D-1 and just to the left of where the 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion would land ten to fifteen minutes later. He arrived aboard LCVP 71with the main command group of the 116th RCT including Colonel Charles D.W. Canham, Commander of the 116th RCT. Their LCVP struck an obstacle and dislodged the teller mine attached to it. The mine did not explode. Omaha Beachhead reported “From the standpoint of influencing further operations, they could not have hit a better point in the 116th zone. To their right and left, Company C and some 2d Battalion elements were crowded against the embankment on a front of a few hundred yards, the main Ranger force was about to come into the same area, and enemy fire from the bluffs just ahead was masked by smoke and ineffective. The command group was well located to play a major role in the next phase of action.” General Cota and Colonel Canham set about the task of getting men moving off of the beach and up the bluffs. The first unit they motivated included elements of the 116th RCT, C Company. Cota set out moving up and down the beach waving his Colt 45 urging men on. By all accounts, he was instrumental in leading the assault. He did so by example.